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ABSTRACT 
"THE  NORTH  WEST  SHELF  NATURAL  GAS  PROJECT: 
AN  ANALYSIS  OF  CRITICAL  EVENTS 
The  thesis  which  follows  is  an  attempt  to  examine  a  complex 
organisational  phenomenon  corporate  policy  within  a  multinational 
resource  based  joint  venture.  It employs  a  multidisciplinary conceptual 
framework  which  draws  on  a  range  of  disciplines  including  Business 
Policy/Strategy,  Organisation Theory and Macroeconomics  (see 1.1). 
The  central  concern  of  the  thesis is to  "Explain how prevailing 
political  and  economic  factors  have  influenced  the  policy  decisions 
undertaken  by  the  North  West  Shelf  (NWS)  joint  venturers  throughout 
critical  periods or  'events'  in the history of Australia's largest capital 
project."  This  objective  is  accommodated  within the main body of the 
thesis  along  with  two  other  interrelated  goals  "Production  of an 
original  and  comprehensive  commentary  on  the history of the North West 
Shelf  project  from  1973  to  1986  and  the design of a  broad conceptual 
schema  to  describe  the  decision  making  environment  of  the  NWS  joint 
venturers."  (see  Figure  3).  This  schema is ultimately developed into a 
model  with  general  applications  for  the  study of corporate policy and 
strategy  within  multinational  resource based joint venture projects  (see 
8.3).  Policy,  Strategy  and  Environment  are  the  three keynote  terms 
employed  in  the theoretical base of the  study which attempts  to highlight 
the essential connection between them  (see 1.1.3). 
The  topic  of  corporate  policy and strategy relating to  the North. 
West  Shelf joint venture was  chosen for  a  number  of reasons,  not least the 
sheer  scale and significance of the project for  the Australian and Western 
Australian  economies.  The  NWS  project has been given a  high media profile v 
since  the  Woodside  joint  venture  participants  (JVP)  made  their first 
commercial  gas  finds  off  North  Western  Australia  in  1972  (see 
Introduction) . 
It  has  also  been the  subject of extensive parliamentary debate at 
Federal  and  State  level,  with  continuing  political controversies over 
government  control  and  high  levels  of  foreign interest in Australia's 
premium natural gas fields. 
Federal  and  West  Australian  legislative  frameworks  and  policy 
instruments  relating to  large scale petroleum and mineral developments  are 
examined  in  some  detail  in  the  thesis  (see Chapter 4).  The  essential 
interaction  between  corporate  and  public policies  (host governments  and 
multinational  joint  venturers),  is  also an  important focal point of the 
study. 
To  date no  comprehensive historical commentary has been produced to 
describe  the  planning  and  development  of  Western  Australia's largest 
resource  project:  in  terms  of capital invested  ($A12  billion by 1995) 
(1987  dollars)  and  revenue  from sales of hydrocarbons,  piped natural gas 
and  1iquified  natural  gas  (LNG)  to  domestic  and export markets.  The 
thesis  accommodates  this  goal  through  the use of published sources  and 
interview  material  (see  1.1  and  1.2)  within  a  unique  theoretical 
framework. 
Interview  respondents  provided  both general background on the  NWS 
venture  and  a  variety of perspectives  on a  series of 'critical events'  in 
the  history  of  the  project.  Analysis  of  these  'events',  through 
comparison  of  interview  responses  and  information  from  a  range  of vi 
published sources,  provides  an essential insight into  the policy decisions 
taken by  the  NWS  joint venturers  during critical periods  in planning and 
development  of the project. 
The  central reference point in the  thesis  is the  'Conceptual Map' 
which is comprised of a  series of schematic  di~grams outlining various 
sectors  of the North West  Shelf project organisation's  internal and 
external environment.  The  map  and relevant concepts  are used to 
demonstrate  how  policy outputs  from  the  NWS  joint venture  influence  and 
are  influenced by other organisations or interest groups within the 
project organisation's  internal and external environment. 
The  NWS  project organisation is seen to be  linked to  a  series of 
other influential organisations  and  government bodies  through  an 
interorganisational network.  This  follows  Odell  (1983)  who  developed the 
concept  of an international petroleum network to highlight essential 
connections  between corporate  and  governmental bodies  operating at each 
level within the vertically integrated international petroleum industry 
(see  3.1). 
The  network concept is usefully employed in the  thesis  to 
illustrate the  influence which World  level  (multinational),  National  and 
State level interests can hold in relation to corporate policy and 
strategy within a  multinational joint venture project. 
The  thesis  is structured in a  form which  allows  Chapters  3  to  8  to 
pursue  and develop  a  series of discrete  themes  relating to  the  NWS 
project.  These  are bound  together by the  theoretical  framework  and 
conceptual  schema set out in Chapters  1  and  2.  In broad terms  the  content vii 
of  the  study  breaks  down  as  follows:  Introduction  - (i) Historical 
background  to  the  NWS  project;  (ii)  the  structure  of  the  NWS  joint 
venture,  (iii)  chronology  and  overview  of  key  events  influencing the 
planning  of the project.  Chapters  1  and  2  cover  the theoretical structure 
and  methodological  basis  of  the  study.  The  contribution of various 
writers  to  the  multidisciplinary  conceptual  framework of the thesis is 
discussed  in  detail.  Chapter  3  covers  the worldwide petroleum network, 
the  structure  of the Australian oil and gas  industry,  the position of the 
NWS  project  as  an exporter of liquified natural gas  (LNG)  and the  growing 
international  trade  in  this  product.  Chapter  4  is primarily concerned 
with  the legislative and public policy framework,  which has been developed 
at  Federal  and  State  level  to  govern  the  development of large scale 
petroleum  and  minerals projects in Australia.  Provisions with particular 
relevance  to  the  NWS  project  are considered at length.  Chapter  5  is a 
simple  but  detailed  description  of the  Conceptual Map,  highlighting the 
influence  of  a  series of key external bodies  on the corporate policies of 
the  NWS  joint venturers over specified periods of time.  Chapters  6  and  7 
provide  a  detailed  analysis  of  three  'critical  events'  identified by 
interview  respondents  as  having  an  important  impact  on  the  future 
development  of the  NWS  project. 
Each  event  is set within a  wider context of political and  economic 
change  within Western Australia and Australia.  Major macroeconomic  shifts 
in relevant international markets  are also considered. 
In  the  final  chapter information presented in Chapters  3,  6  and  7 
is  updated  bringing important  themes  pursued in these sections  through to viii 
the  end  of  1988.  A  simple  model  of 'Policy Making  Environment'  for 
multinational  resource  based  joint  ventures  is presented incorporating 
major  features  drawn  from  the  conceptual  map  employed throughout the 
thesis.  Final  conclusions  are presented in order to  draw  together both 
the  theoretical  and  thematic  content of the work and identify key areas 
for  future  research. ix 
REFERENCE  SYSTEM 
The  Harvard  referencing  system  is  employed  in  this study 
indicating: 
1.  The  author/editor's  surname. 
2.  Date of text/journal article publication. 
3.  In  certain  cases  page  numbers  are  included for  the 
reader's convenience. 
Newspaper  articles 
corporate/government  sources 
main body of the  text. 
The  study  also 
certain  information  to 
rather  than  directly 
includes: 
uses 
be 
into 
A.  Material  which 
description  or 
but  provides 
footnoted). 
and  certain  journal  and 
are  quoted directly in brackets  in the 
a  separate  Endnoting  system to allow 
referenced  at  the  end of each chapter 
the  bibliography.  This  information 
is  not  of  primary importance  to  the 
commentary being presented in the text 
a  useful  supplement  (i.e.  normally 
B.  Material  drawn  from  interviews which has been used to 
support  or  develop  certain commentaries  or arguments 
presented by the  author. 
Endnote  Symbols 
The  reference  symbol  used  to denote  type  'A'  information is 
*[1]  and **[1]  for  type  'B'  information  (interview material). x 
NOTE  TO  THE  READER 
Prior  to  delving  into  the  considerable detail on the nature  and 
content  of the study presented in Chapters land 2,  it is recommended that 
the  introduction  should be  read carefully.  Section  'A'  serves  to provide 
the  reader  with  essential  historical background to  the North West Shelf 
project,  whilst  Section  'B'  will  furnish  a  working  knowledge  of the 
corporate  profile  of  the  complex  multinational  organisation  commonly 
labelled  the  Woodside  joint venture.  Section 'c'  'The  Strategic Overview 
of  Project  Development'  serves as  an orientation map  for  the reader.  The 
diagram  and  supporting  text  show how key events  linked to  the corporate 
strategy  of  the  NWS  joint  venture  participants can be placed within a 
broader political and economic context. xi 
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INTRODUCTION 
PART  A.  THE  HISTORICAL  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  NORTH  WEST  SHELF  PROJECT 
This  thesis is a  study of corporate policy relating to  the planning 
and  development  of the North West  Shelf natural gas  project.  It attempts 
to  place  a  number  of key policy decisions  taken by the North West  Shelf 
(Woodside)  joint  venturers,  within  a  broad  political  and  economic 
context.  Woodside  (corporate)  and relevant government  (public)  policies 
are  considered in relation to  a  series of key events  in the history of the 
project.  In view of this it is essential that the reader has  a  good grasp 
of  the  historical  background  to  these events prior to delving into the 
main body of the thesis. 
From  the  earliest  days  in  the planning of the giant $12  billion 
(1986  dollars)  North  West  Shelf  (NWS)  gas  production project,  it was 
evident  that  foreign  based multinationals were  to play a  crucial role in 
its  development  (Woodside,  1986).  As  with  all large scale petroleum 
related  ventures,  there  was  an immediate need to raise large amounts  of 
project  capital  and  to  harness  the  specialist knowledge  that would be 
required at each stage in the undertaking. 
Woodside  Petroleum,  the  operator  for  the  NWS  joint venture,  had 
acknowledged  the need for powerful  financial  and technical backup  from  the 
outset  of  exploration  over  the vast 367,000 km2  area designated to  them 
under  the  terms  of their initial offshore exploration licences.  Thus  in 
1964  in order to  support an intensive exploration programme  and ensure  the 
development  of  any  commercial  discoveries,  they  extended  an  earlier 
partnership  with Mid-Eastern Oil  into an unincorporated joint venture with 
the  Burmah  Group  and  Royal  Dutch Shell who  were  joined shortly after by 
British Petroleum and the California Asiatic Oil  Company. 2 
The  new  venture  was  to meet with little success until 1971,  when 
gas  was  struck  on the Scott Reef,  at a  depth of 2.6 miles  some  270  miles 
off  the  North  Western tip of Australia.  Later,  major discoveries  to the 
south  made  at  North Rankin,  Goodwyn  and Angel were  to prove sufficiently 
attractive  to  encourage  the  joint  venture  participants  to  draft 
preliminary development plans  for  NWS  gas  and hydrocarbon reserves. 
Throughout  the  early  seventies  progress  was  slow in the  face  of 
Federal  opposition  to high levels of multinational interest in Australian 
based  resource  projects.  Development  was  also  hampered  by  ongoing 
disagreements  between  the  Federal  and West Australian governments  over  a 
number  of key political and legislative issues relating to the project. 
The  election  of the Fraser Liberal/NCP  government  in December  1975 
proved  to  be  something of a  landmark in the history of the  NWS.  The  new 
administration,  eager  to  revitalise  foreign  investment  in  Australian 
resource  projects,  introduced a  number  of measures  including a  benevolent 
taxation  package,  which provided a  major financial  incentive  to the joint 
venture participants  (see 4.2.1). 
The  Federal  coalition's  new  deal  for  the Petroleum and Minerals 
sector  was  phased in during 1976  and 1977  and served to pave  the way  for  a 
number  of  structural  agreements  between  the  Federal  government,  Sir 
Charles  Court's  Western  Australian  administration  and  the  NWS  joint 
venturers.  In  November  1977  the  joint  venturers  announced  the 
establishment  of a  Memorandum of Understanding  (MOU)  with the  State Energy 
Commission  of Western Australia for  the purchase of 250 million cubic feet 
a  day  (MMCFD)  of NWS  gas.  With this agreement in place and  the  subsequent 
launch  of  a  $50 million project feasibility study in 1978,  the mould was 
set  for  the  development  of Australia's largest capital undertaking  (see 
4.3.1). 3 
By  the  end of 1979  detailed outlines  of an integrated project plan 
based  on  the  delivery  of  10.9  million  cubic metres  of gas  a  day  (370 
MMCFD)  to  the  SECWA  and  6  million tonnes  of LNG  per  annum  to  the Japanese 
market  were  being  prepared  by  the  joint  ventures.  From  the joint 
venturers'  point  of  view it appeared to be  an appropriate  time  to  launch 
the  project  in  view of promising international market  demand projections 
for  natural gas  and LNG.  Index linked crude oil prices  stood in excess  of 
US$30  bbl,  having  effectively  doubled  in  the  wake  of  the  Iranian 
revolution  of  November  1978  (International  Petroleum  Encyclopedia 
1984:p308). 
In  response  to  these  favourable  economic  conditions  and  in 
expectation  of a  continued rise in oil and gas  prices,  the joint venturers 
launched  the  project  in  early 1980.  Site preparations  and construction 
work  for  onshore  and  offshore  infrastructure continued without serious 
disruption  until  the  end of 1981.  This  period had witnessed the  signing 
in  September  1980  of a  firm sales contract for  the purchase  of 350  (MMCFD) 
of  NWS  gas  by the  SECWA  from  the joint venturers  and  the establishment in 
June  1981  of  a  Memorandum  of Intent  (MOl)  on  the part of eight Japanese 
power  utilities  to  contract a  total of 6  million tonnes per  annum  of NWS 
LNG  by  the mid 1990s  (see  5.1,  6.1 and  6.2). 
By  the  end  of 1981,  the effects of rapid wage  and price inflation 
in  Australia,  promoted  by  the expectation ofa national resources boom, 
had  added  massively  to  the front end loading of capital required by the 
joint  venturers  to  launch  a  single phase  gas production and processing 
project.  In  response  to  the massive  financial burden which  this would 
place  on  Woodside  Petroleum  and  to  a  lesser  extent  the  other four 
companies  participating  in  the  project at the  time,  a  two  phase project 
plan was  devised under  a  new  development proposal. 4 
In  1982,  the  project  was  split  into  two  distinct phases  - the 
Domestic  gas  phase  (Phase  I),  supplying  natural  gas  to  the Western 
Australian  market  and  the  LNG  Export phase  (Phase  II)  supplying liquified 
natural  gas  to Japan. 
The  Domestic  phase  was  scheduled  for  completion  in  1984 with 
construction  work  on  the  LNG  plant  and  additional  infrastructure to 
commence  in  1985.  Under  the  new  arrangements with the Domestic  and  LNG 
phases  to  be  developed sequentially over  a  fifteen year period,  the  JVPs 
could  supply  project  capital  in smaller  increments  spread over  a  longer 
period than had originally been planned  (Allen,  1984). 
Whilst  this measure  eased the  situation for  a  short period a  number 
of  significant shifts which  took place within international energy markets 
in  1982  and  1983,  led the joint venturers  to make  further  changes  in their 
development  plans  for  the  NWS  project.  A  slow drop  in oil prices  and a 
downward  revision  of  Japanese  LNG  demand projections  for  the  1990s were 
two  of  the  factors  which affected the joint venturers'  strategic position 
at  the  time.  Japanese  estimates  for  total national  LNG  demand  in 1990 
were  set  at  44  million  tonnes  per  annum  (mtpa)  in 1977,  with  the  1983 
estimate  indicating  a  drop  to  36.5  mtpa.  This potential threat to  the 
joint  venturers'  sole  export  market for  LNG  coupled with problems  which 
were  developing  with  sales  to  the  West Australian market,  indicated a 
clear  need  for  revising  existing  project  plans  (see  5.1.1 and 6.2.1). 
Faced  with  these  difficulties  and  a  continued  rise  in final project 
construction  costs  from  an  estimated  $8  billion (1981  dollars)  to  $11 
billion  (1983  dollars),  the joint venturers  devised a  strategy to  ensure 
the  long  term future  of the  NWS  development  (Allen,  1984).  This  involved: 5 
(i)  Restructuring  the  equity  ownership profile for  the  NWS  project by 
introducing  a  sixth  participant  for  the  LNG  phase  in 1984.  This 
profile  changed  again in the wake  of a  successful  takeover bid for 
Woodside  Petroleum  launched  by  Shell and Broken Hill Proprietary 
Limited  (BHP)  in April  1985  (see 5.2.1). 
(ii)  All  aspects  of project hardware  were  reviewed i.e. plant,  equipment 
and materials  for  areas where  cost reductions  could be  implemented. 
In  1984  the  one-sixth participation scheme  was  introduced for  Phase 
II  as  an  attempt  to  divest the  equity interests and associated financial 
commitments  of  the  operator  for  the project,  Woodside  Petroleum.  Once 
agreement  was  reached  between the venturers,  Woodside's  50%  stake  in the 
LNG  export  phase was  divested to  give all the participants an equal 1/6th 
share,  through  transfer  of  a  1/12th share  to both Shell  and  BHP  and  the 
introduction  of  the  Mitsui-Mitsubishi  (MIMI)  partnership  as  a  sixth 
participant.  The  latter measure  was  justified by  the joint venturers  as 
an  attempt  to  stabilise Woodside's  financial position in relation to  the 
project  and  increasing the client nation's  investment in the  LNG  programme 
(Allen,  1984). 
A  new  technical  scheme  had  emerged  in late 1983  to  instigate a 
series  of  changes  in  the  design of the  LNG  plant.  The  principal change 
was  a  decision  to  shift  from  the  "W"  concept steam turbine water based 
cooling  system  to  the  "SIPM"  'Y'  concept  gas  turbine air cooled system. 
This  measure  coupled  with  a  decision  not  to produce  LPG  on the  Burrup 
Peninsula  site  in  North  Western  Australia was  estimated by  the Western 
Australian  government  to  have  saved up  to  $1  billion on  the  overall cost 
of the project  (DRD  May  1985:  p92). 6 
This  series  of  policy  changes  appeared  to  enjoy  a  measure  of 
success  in  that  they served to reassure Japanese buyers  of the  long  term 
financial  viability  of  the  NWS  project prior to their signing of the  LNG 
export  contracts  in  August  1985.  These  adjustments  in the  long  term 
planning  of  the  NWS  project  may  have  influenced the Japanese  actions. 
However,  more  decisive  factors  leading to the  signing of the all important 
LNG  contracts were: 
(i)  At  project  level,  the  Shell/BHP  takeover  of Woodside  Petroleum 
which  they  claimed  would assure  investors of the future  financial 
stability of the Woodside  group. 
(ii)  The  joint  Federal/State  government  rescue  plan  for  the  SECWA, 
involving  the  transfer of $315  million in forfeited royalties over 
the  20  year operating period of the project. 
(iii)  Market  conditions  within  the  international petroleum network and 
the Japanese market  for  LNG. 
These  important  areas  are  all  examined  in this work which attempts  to 
place  the  strategy and corporate policy of the  NWS  joint venturers within 
a  broad political and economic  context  (see part C). 
PART  B.  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  THE  JOINT  VENTURE  1964-1986 
The  original  joint  venturers  - Woodside  (Lakes  Entrance)  Oil  NL, 
Mid-Eastern  Oil  NL,  Burmah,  Shell,  BP  and  California-Asiatic  - came 
together  in  the  mid-1960s  in  order  to  explore  the  367,000  km2  permit 
area  which  had  been granted to the Woodside,  Mid-Eastern Oil partnership 
in  1963.  However,  by the mid-1970s  the financial pressures concomitant 
with  participation  in  a  large scale capital venture like the North West 
Shelf  development,  initiated  a  significant  change  in  the  internal 
structure  of  the  venture.  This  came  in 1976  when  the  Burmah Oil  Company 7 
sold  out  its  interests  to  BHP  and established a  participation structure 
for  the  Domestic  phase which endured until March  1985.  After this point, 
equity  arrangements  were  altered  by  the  Shell/BHP  takeover of Woodside 
Petroleum  (see Tablel). 
In  1972,  the year of several major  NWS  commercial  gas  discoveries, 
a  new  company  Woodside-Burmah  Oil  NL  - had been formed,  merging the 
interests  of  Woodside  (Lakes  Entrance)  Oil,  Mid-Eastern Oil and Burmah. 
The  new  company  in which Burmah held the controlling interest held a  50% 
stake  in  the  joint  venture,  leaving  the  remaining  50%  equally divided 
between  BP,  Shell  and  Cal-Asiatic.  By  1976  Burmah  was  facing  a  major 
financial  crisis,  due  in  part to heavy  investment in oil tankers  in the 
post  oil crisis period of 1974/75.  This  financial problem and a  number of 
other  intramural  differences  which  arose  within  the  Woodside-Burmah 
Company,  eventually  led  to  Burmah selling out its company  shares  to  the 
Australian  minerals  giant of BHP.  After this restructuring,  BHP  and Shell 
consolidated  their  interests  in  the  joint  venture  and  the  Woodside 
Petroleum company was  formed. 
In  the  period  between  the  formation  of  the Woodside  Petroleum 
company  in  1976  and  the  Shell/BHP  takeover of April 1985,  a  number  of 
additional  alterations  were  made  to  the  equity structure of the joint 
venture.  The  first minor  change  came with the  formation of the North West 
Shelf  Development  Pty.  which was  assigned to manage part of the Shell and 
BHP  . joint  shareholding  in  the  Woodside  Petroleum company.  Direct and 
indirect  joint  shareholdings  in  Woodside  for  the  two  companies  totalled 
more  than  43%  in early March  1985,  a  month prior to the  takeover.  A year 
after  the  takeover  in  the  joint  shareholding  had  risen to  over  80%. 
Recent  figures  for  the  proportion  of  this  equity  held  through  NWS 8 
Development  Pty.  are not available although  a  report issued by Woodside  in 
1980  placed  indirect  equity  in  Woodside  Petroleum held through  the  NWS 
Development  Pty.  at 32%  (Allen,  1986)  (see  6.2  and Table  1). 
No  further  significant changes  in the  equity structure of the joint 
venture  arose  until November  1984 when  the MIMI  consortium was  officially 
introduced  as  a  sixth  participant  in  Phase  II.  This  resulted  in 
Woodside's  50%  stake  in  the  LNG  phase being divested 8  1/3%  to  each of 
Shell  and  BHP,  16  2/3%  to  MIMI  leaving 16  2/3%  to Woodside.  Woodside 
retained  its  50%  stake  in  the  Domestic  phase.  A  few  months  after the 
entry  of  the MIMI  consortium to  the joint venture,  Shell and  BHP  launched 
a  bid  to  take over Woodside  Petroleum's  remaining equity in the project. 
Shell  and  BHP  now  hold in excess  of  80%  of Woodside  stock in addition to 
their  direct  shareholding  in the project as  a  whole  and have  established 
themselves  as  the  dominant joint venture participants. 
Equity  holding  in  the  North  West  Shelf  joint  venture  in the 
pre-takeover and post takeover periods broke  down  as  follows: 
PHASE  I 
Woodside  Petroleum  through  subsidiaries  (Woodside  Petroleum 
Development  Pty.,  Mid-Eastern  Oil  and  Woodside  Oil)  50%,  BP  Petroleum 
Development  Australia  Pty.  Ltd and California Asiatic Oil  Company  each 16 
2/3%.  Shell Development Australia and BHP  through  a  subsidiary  (Hematite 
Petroleum  Pty.)  each  8  1/3%.  In addition,  Shell and  BHP  directly,  and 
indirectly  through  NWS  Development  Pty.  held  between  them  43%  of the 
shares  in  Woodside  Petroleum  the  remaining  57%  being held by  the public 
(see  Figure  1  for  pre-takeover  ownership  structure with post-takeover 
figures). 9 
TABLE  1 
PARTICIPANTS  EQUITY  IN  THE  NWS  PROJECT  (AUGUST  1984)(APRIL  1986) 
A.  AUG  1984 
California Asiatic  ...........................................  . 
BP  ...........................................................  . 
Shell  via  Shell  Development  Australia  ...................  , .. 
via  Woodside  Petlm  Ltd  (13.66%  of  50%  ................  . 
via  NWS  dev.  and  Woodside  (50%  of  15.37%  of  50%)  .....  . 
6HP  via  Hematite  Petroleum  ...............................  . 
via  Woodside  Petroleum  ...............................  . 
via  NWS  Dev.  and  Woodside  (5b%  of  15.37%  of  50%) ......  . 
16,66% 
16.66.% 
8.33%  ) 
6.83%  )19% 
3.84%  ) 
8.33%  ) 
6.83%  )19% 
3.84%  ) 
Public  shareholding - via Woodside  Petroleum  Ltd.(57.31%  of  50%).  ~8.66% 
Shell  +  BHP  direct' equity  in  Woodside  (2  x 13.66%)  .............  27.32% 
\I  \I  indirect equity  in  Woodside  via  NWS 
Deve 1  opment  Pty  .................................... 15.37% 
Total  equity held  in  Hoodside  ................  42.69% 
Foreign  equity  in  project  via  Shell,  BP  &  Cal-Asiatic 
B.  APRIL  1986 
Phas~ I  of  project:  Equity  as  above 
Phase  II  of  project:  Equal  one-sixth  shares  for 
Shell,  BHP,  Woodside,  Cal-Asiatic  and 
Mitsui/Mitsub~shi  (MIMI) 
Shell  +  BHP  total  equity held  in  Woodside  ................... . 
Public  shareholding  Woodside  Petroleum  Ltd ...................  . 
53%  app. * 
====== 
80 .. 06%. 
19.04% 
---- -- ------- -----------------------
Foreign  equity Phase  I  via Shell,  SP,  Cal-Asiatic  .............  53.00%  app .. 
Foreign  equity Phase  II  via  Shell,  SP,  Cal-Asiatic &  MIMI  .....  73.00%  " 
Total  foreign  equity held  in  project ..........................  63.00%  "* 
====== 
* Figures  do  not  account  for  nominee  shareholdings.in  SHP  which  would  raise the 
level  of  foreign  equity held  in  the  project. 
Sources:  Harman,  1984;  Allen,  April  1986 
"Chairmans  address  to  shareholders" 
* Note  no  significant change  in equity structure  since  1986.  (Oct.  '88) Sri ti"sh 
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PHASE  II 
Each  participant  and  the  new sixth party,  MIMI,  equally hold  a  one 
sixth  16  2/3%  equity  holding.  This  situation remained until April  1985 
when  Shell  and  BHP  officially took over Woodside  Petroleum by crossing the 
50%  shareholding  threshold  in the  company.  By  30th April  1986  the joint 
equity  held  by  the  two  companies  in  Woodside  Petroleum  amounted  to 
80.06%.  This  represented an  increase  of approximately  37%  on their joint 
shareholding  prior  to April  1985  (Allen,  1986),  Officially,  the Woodside 
corporate  identity  was  retained which has  meant  that Woodside's  stake in 
the  project  remains  at  pre-takeover  levels.  However,  the  public 
shareholding  in  Woodside  has  been  cut  from  57%  approximately  (January 
1985)  to  20%  in April  1986. 
This  resulted in a  10%  reduction in the public shareholding for  the 
project  as  a  whole  from  approximately  29%  (August  1984)  to  approximately 
19%  (April  1986)  (Allen,  April  1986). 
The  10%  increase in foreign equity holdings  in the  projec~ shown  in 
Table  1  is  recorded  as  a  direct  result of the  divestment of Woodside 
Petroleums  stake  in Phase II and  the  entry of MIMI  as  a  sixth participant 
for  the  LNG  phase.  No  changes  in the foreign/Australian equity balance 
for  the project have been attributed to  the  Shell/BHP  takeover of Woodside 
Petroleum.  The  figures presented are  therefore  approximations  which  are 
not  adjusted  for  the nominee  shareholders  in BHP  which  could have  led to 
an  increase  in  foreign  equity  as  Woodside  shares  were  transferred 
throughout  1985  and 1986. 
PART  C.  A  STRATEGIC  OVERVIEW  OF  NWS  PROJECT  DEVELOPMENT 
Figure  2  sets  out  an  overview of events which held considerable 
significance  for  the  planning  and  development  of the North West  Shelf 
project  during  the period 1973  to  1986.  Each  event  shown is plotted on  a FIGURE  2 
"STRATEGIC  OVERVIEW  OF  PROJECT  DEVELOPMENT" 
Chronological  Order 
Feb  1972  - Major  commercial  finds  ot  natural  gas  and  condensate at  Goodwyn  and 
N.  Rankin  'A'. 
Dec  1972  •  Election of Whitlam  government  advocating  policies ot centralistic 
control,  natural  energy  planning and  new  limitations on  exports and  foreign  equity 
holdings  in Australian  based  resource  projects. 
April  1974  - Return  of  Liberal/NCP  government  in  WA  under  the  leadership ot 
Sir Charles Court. 
Dec  1975  - Election of  Frazer  Liberal/NCP,  Federal  goverl,ment.  Liberals express  a 
commitment  to attracting  foreign  investment  and  launching  the North  West  Shelt 
project. 
Aug  1976  - Burmah  sells shares to "BHP",  raising Australian held  equity  in  the  project 
to around  48$.  Entry of  "BHP",  provides  the  foreign  participants with  a  new  vehicle 
with  which  to access  the Australian government. 
Nov  1977  - SECWA  with  the concurrence of  the WA  State government,  enter  into a 
Memorandum  of Understanding  (MOUl,  with  the  JVPs.  for  the  purchase of  250  million 
cubic  teet  a  day  (MMCFOl,  tor  selling  in  the South  West  of  the State.  Alcoa's con-
commitent  (MaUl  with the  SECWA  to  take over 50$  of  the  gas  seen as crucial  to  the 
lauch  of  the Domestic  phase  of  the  project. 
June  197'8  - Loan  Council  agrees  to  new  guidelines on  State  loans  for  prescribed 
purposes,  notably  for  the development  of  indigenous  resources. 
Oct  1978  - Go  ahead  tor Alcoa's Wagerup  refinery seen  as  positive  indicator  that  the 
company  may  exercise  the  MOU  option  to  increase their gas  take  from  the  SEC  by 
40  MMCFO  to a  total of  190  MMCFO. 
Nov  1978  - Loan  Council  approval  tor  SEC  to  raise  finance  to build  the  Dampier  -
Wagerup  pipeline. 
*  Critical Event. 
J9§4. 
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Important  or significant event. 
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1977  1978  I Nov  1979  - SEC  essumes  responsibility  tor  70  MMCFD  ot gas  originally desig-
neted  tor se1e by  the JVPs  to end  users  in  the  Pilbarra·. 
Dec  1979  - The  North  West  Gas  Development  (Woodside)  Agreement  Act  is  rati-
tied as  an  Act  of  Parliament. 
Dec  1979  - Federal  government  export approvals  for  North  West  Shelf  LNG. 
for  20  years  from  1986. 
Sept  1980  - Sales contracts  tor a  total of 370  MMCFD  Signed  between  the 
SEC  and  the JVP, 
Jan  1981  - Woodside  Petroleum  sign a  USS  1400m  loan  agreement  with  a  syndi-
cate of 62  Australian and  overseas  banks  lead  by  the M9rgan  Guarantry 
Trust Co. 
June  1981  - JVPs  sign a  mem~randum of  intent  (MOl)  with  eight  Japanese  power 
utilities for  4m  tonnes of  LNG  p.a.  This  amount  was  scheduled  to rise to 
an  anticipated  peak  of  6m  tonnes  in the early 1990s. 
*  Mar  1982  - First  postponement  of  scheduled  LNG  delivery dates  to Japan. 
Construction work  is  rescheduled  for  Phase  II  and  the date  tor  the  first 
shipment  of  LNG  is changed  from  April 86  to April 87. 
*  Jul  1983  - Second  postponement  ot scheduled  LNG  delivery dates  tor Japan. 
Delivery date  put  back  from  April 87  to April 88. 
*  Dec  1983  - JVPs  claim that  returns  on  the  project are becoming  increasingly 
marginal  in  the  tace of  increasing  l~bour and  capital costs coupled  with  a 
consistantly soft market  for oil.  Sets  up  an  event string whereby  several 
technical  and  financial  solutions are  proposed. 
i)  Abandonment  of  LPG  production on  the Burrup  Peninsula site. 
ii)  Redesign  of  LNG  cooling system.  shifting  from  the  "W"  concept,  water 
cooled  steam  turbine  system  to the  SIR>1  "Y"  concep~ air cooled  gas 
turbine system. 
iii)  Proposal  to bring Goodwyn  field onstream  prior  to any  secondary  de-
velopment  of  Notth  Rankin. 
iv)  Stripping condensate at  N.  Rankin  wellhead  and  reinjecting surplus  gas. 
Inflationary Spiral 
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Aug  1984  - Commissioning  of  N.  Rankin  'A'  platform.  First gas  supplied to 
consumers  through  the Dampier  - Wagerup  pipeline. 
Oct  1984  - Third  postponement  of  LNG  delivery date  for  Japan.  Dates  changed 
from  April 88  to Oct  89. 
*  Mar  1985  - Announcement  that  agreement  has  been  reached  between  SECWA  and  the 
JVPs  over alterations  to the existing gas  sales contracts.  The  new  package  is 
agreed  in  the  light of  new  governmental  provisions which  invole  the  transfer of 
S315m  in State and  Federal  government  to SECWA  to ensure it can  meet  its tinan-
cial commitments  to the JVP. 
*  Apr  1985  - Shell  and  BHP  successfully take over Woodside  Petroleum.  (Crucial 
event  which  may  have  been  part of  an  established Shell corporate strategy.) 
May  1985  - Woodside  secures a  USS1.6  billion  loan originally sourced  to help 
finance  the  company's  commitments  to Phase  II.  Loan  managed  by  59  financial  in-
stitutions. led  by  Chase Manhattan  of  New  York.  who  replaced  the  Phase  I  finan-
ciers Morgan  Guarantry Trust Co. 
July  1985  - Sales and  purchase  agreements  for  Phase  II,  executed  with  repre-
sentatives of  eight  Japanese  power  utilities. 
Aug  1985  - Woodside  in one  for  three  renouncable  rights  share  issue attempt  to 
raise S208.3m. 
~ 
w 
Jan  1986  - Further  two  floating  share  issues  under  umbrella  of  the  Phase II loan. 
Woodside  attempts  to  raise  S840m. 
Downward  Trend  in Oil  Prices 
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chronological  scale  which  also  shows  some  major macroeconomic  changes 
which  had  an important bearing on  the strategic thinking of the  NWS  joint 
venture  participants  (JVP)  throughout  the period indicated.  The  thesis 
serves  to  provide  a  descriptive  catalogue  of these  events  which  can be 
usefully  employed  by  students  seeking  a  comprehensive historical account 
of  the  development  of Australia's  largest resource project.  However  the 
main  thrust  of  this  work  is  to provide key  insights  into  the nature of 
corporate  strategy  within  multinational  resource  based joint ventures, 
using the  NWS  project as  a  case study. 
In  view  of  the  scale  and complexity of such  an undertaking it was 
necessary  to  identify  a  small  number  of Critical Events  for  analysis. 
These  were  a  series  of  processua1  changes  which  unfolded  over  an 
identifiable  period  of  time,  and  were  considered  by  20  interview 
respondents  to have  influenced a  major policy change  or strategic shift on 
the  part  of the joint venturers  (see 1.3).  (Strategic milestones marking 
the  relevant  time  periods  are  designated  by  a  *  on Figur,e  2.)  The 
analysis  of these  events  is undertaken in an effort to place JVP  corporate 
policy  in  the  period  1980-1986  within a  broader political and  economic 
perspective. 
In  the  thesis,  attention  is  focused  on  the essential  interface 
between  private  sector,  corporate  policy and public policy as  the major 
determinant  of  change  in the planning and ongoing  development  of the  NWS 
proj ect.  A  series  of  key  policy  decisions  taken  by  the  NWS  joint 
venturers  and  the  WA  government  are  examined within the  context of  a  broad 
institutional  network.  This network spans several conceptual levels  from 
within  the  NWS  project  organisation itself'up to  the worldwide  arena of 
the  international petroleum network  (see  2.3). 15 
In  the  analysis  of critical events  set out in Chapters  6  and  7  of 
the  study,  a  number  of key organisations within the network are  identified 
as  exerting an identifiable influence  on JVP  policies over  the  time period 
specified. 
departments 
These  nodes  in the  institutional network range  from  government 
and  independent  organisations  within  Western  Australia, 
through  to  multinational corporations with direct links  to  one  or more  of 
the joint venture participant companies  (see Section I,  Conceptual Map). 
A  multidisciplinary  theoretical  framework  is set out in Chapters  1 
and  2  to  facilitate  the  study  of  corporate  policy  within a  complex 
institutional  environment.  This  conceptual  environment  incorporates 
detail  on the  internal structure of the joint venture project organisation 
although the principal focus  is on external influences  on JVP  policy. 
The  'Decision  making'  or  Institutional  environment of the joint 
venture  policy  makers  is  set out in a  conceptual map  developed in seven 
sections  I-VII.  It  provides  an  essential contextual backdrop  for  the 
events  described  in  the  text and serves  as  a  visual reference point for 
the  reader  throughout  Chapters  2  to  5.  A final objective of the work is 
to  develop  some  of  the  more  salient and generalisable features  of the 
'map'  into  a  simple  'model'  with  broader  application in the field of 
strategic and policy analysis. 16 
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CHAPTER  ONE 
AN  OVERVIEW  OF  THE  STUDY 
1.1.  The  North West  Shelf in Context 
In  September  1980  following  severr years  of political debate  in 
the  Federal  and  West Australian parliaments,  the national press  reported 
the  official  start-up  of  construction  on  the North West  Shelf offshore 
natural  gas  (NWS)  project.  The  'Melbourne  Age'  covered the  event by 
focusing  on  an  agreement  established  between  the  NWS  joint  venture 
participants  (JVP),  Shell,  BP,  BHP,  California Asiatic,  Woodside  Petroleum 
and  representatives  of  the  Western  Australian  government. *1  The  Age 
stated:  "The  West Australian Premier,  Sir Charles  Court,  and the  chairman 
of  Woodside  Petroleum,  Mr.  J.G.  Donaldson,  will sign an agreement  and hold 
a  press  conference  to  explain it.  The  State Energy  Commission will then 
make  the Shelf project a  marketing reality by  signing a  contract to buy up 
to  10.9  million  cubic  metres  of  Shelf  gas  a  day  for  the  next  20 
years. ,,*2 
In  November  1979  when  the  NWS  gas  development  (Woodside) 
Agreement  was  ratified  as  an Act of Parliament in Western Australia,  the 
State  government  had  effectively  paved  the  way  for  the  launch of the 
nation's  largest  ever  capital  venture  (see 4.2.4).  However,  it was  not 
until  the  signing  of  the  "take  or pay"  sales  contracts with the  State 
Energy  Commission  of  Western  Australia  (SECWA),  in September  1989,  that 
the  joint  venturers  obtained the virtual monopoly  on natural gas  sales to 
the  West Australian domestic market,  which  they had  sought  since  the early 
seventies. 18 
The  SECWA  contracts covering sales to the Pilbara region,  Perth 
metropolitan  area and major  industrial users  in the  South West  represented 
the  bankable  document  which  the joint venturers  (JVP)  required to  secure 
investment  capital  for development  of the  two-phase  NWS  project.  The  Age 
commented  on  the  essential link between the  1980 sales contracts and  the 
future  development  of  the  potentially  lucrative North West Shelf  (NWS) 
liquified  natural  gas  export  programme  servicing Japanese  customers ... 
"Signatures  from  Japanese  industrial and utility companies  for similar  20 
year  contracts  are  expected  to follow quickly despite quibbling by  some 
Japanese  negotiators  in  the  past  two  weeks  over  the  possibility of 
industrial  disruption  in  the  already  notorious Pilbara ...  ".  "Japan is 
expected  to  take up  to six million tonnes  a  year of 1iquified natural  gas 
(LNG),  beginning in 1986.*3  (Age,  September  30th 1980) 
A  series  of  subsequent  political  and  economic  changes  which 
occurred  in  the  seven  years  (1979-1987)  since  the  LNG  programme  was 
approved  by  the  Federal  government,  have  lent  weight  to  the  joint 
venturer's  (JVP)  argument  that  the  NWS  project could not be  developed 
solely  as  a  gas  producer for  the W.A.  market  (see 4.1).  Key  macroeconomic 
and  political  shifts  which  have  affected  the  development  of the  NWS 
project since  December  1979  include: 
(i)  The  emergence  of a  massive  shortfall in demand for piped natural 
(ii) 
gas  in  W.A.,  set against optimistic sales projections tabled by 
the  SECWA  in the late seventies  (see 7.2.1). 
The  downward  revision  of  projected  Japanese  LNG  import 
requirements  for  the early 1990's by MITI,  the Japanese Ministry 
for  International Trade  and Industry. (iii) 
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A  steady  drop  and  eventual  slump  in the  LNG  indexed price of 
crude oil (see  6.12.  and 6.1.3)*4. 
(iv)  A  substantial  blow-out  in  original  costing estimates  for  the 
construction  of  the  Domestic  and Liquified natural gas  plants 
and associated infrastructure  (see 6.1.3 and Appendix 1). 
The  implications of the broad changes  outlined above  for  the  NWS 
joint  venturers,  the  W.A.  government  and  other major parties directly 
concerned  with  the  planning  and  development  of  the  NWS  project are 
examined  in  considerable  detail  in  this  work.  Particular emphasis  is 
placed  on  the  analysis  of  three  'critical  events'  which  had  an 
identifiable  influence on JVP  corporate policy  durin~ the period 1980-1986 
(see  1.3).  The  thesis  employs  a  multidisciplinary approach  to  the  study 
of  corporate  policy within a  multinational  joint venture  or~anisation and 
aims  to  highlight  the  essential connection between policy.  strate~y and 
environment. 
1.1.1.  Key  contributors  to the  study 
The  current  work  deals  with  the broad political and  economic 
context  of  corporate  policies  and  decisions  produced  by  senior  JVP 
management  which  have  significantly affected the planning and development 
of  the  NWS  project.  Both the internal and external environments of the 
NWS  project  organisation are examined.  Analysis  of the  former however  is 
severely  limited  by  lack  of  available  information  on  the  internal 
functioning  of  the  joint  venture  project  organisation.  It is an area 
which  falls  within  the  domain  of  commercial  intelligence,  but  also 
mainstream  organisation  theory  with  its concern with structure,  process 
and  group  dynamics  within  organisations.  The  thesis acknowledges  the 20 
importance  of  this  perspective  and  draws  selectively  on  the work of 
Mintzberg  (1979)  and  Thompson  (1967).  However,  the main concern is with 
the  interorganisational  network  in  the  external  institutional 
environment.  This  environment is assumed to extend to encompass  the macro 
level  of  State,  Federal  and  ultimately  International,  political  and 
economic  frameworks.  At  these levels policy outcomes  on the development 
of the  NWS  project can be  assessed in broad terms  (see 1.3). 
To  date,  no  study  has  been  attempted  which  examines 
multinational  corporate  policy  within such  a  broad context.  Problems  of 
manageability  and  the  need to cross several disciplinary boundaries have 
always  served  as  a  major deterrent to academics  who  feel most comfortable 
within  the  confines of their own  discipline.  Starting from  the bottom up, 
Organisation  Theorists  have  traditionally  preferred  to  concentrate on 
group  dynamics  and  other intraorganisation elements  affecting structure, 
process  and design. 
This  limited  perspective  was  extended  in  the 1960's by  Open 
Systems  theorists  who  encompassed  environmental  influences  on 
organisational  functioning  into  their theoretical gambit  (Parsons,  1960; 
Thompson,  1967). 
In  the  1970's  network  theorists  (mainly sociologists)  and  the 
proponents  of  Organisational  Ecology  stimulated  interest  in  studying 
organisational  interfaces  shifting  the focus  of analysis  from  the single 
organisation  to  the  multi-organisational  field  (Trist,  1977). 
Inter-organisational  communication  and  networks  became  objects of major 
concern,  but did not always  result in conceptual clarity. 21 
Several  writers  in  this  field  have  influenced the  conceptual 
framework  of  the  thesis  and  their  contribution  will  be  discussed in 
Section 1.4. 
A  major  failing  of  the  organisation ecologists  is that their 
theories  do  not  adequately  explain  macro  level  phenomenon  like  the 
policies  of  national  governments  and  the  dynamics  of the  international 
economic  and political environment. 
Some  of  the  authors  make  their focal  point of analysis at the 
intermediate  level  between  the  socially  micro  (i.e.  groups  and 
sub-systems)  and  society at an aggregate level.  Social theorists working 
at  this  level  are  often  political economists  who  view governmental  and 
corporate  behaviour  as  the  outcome  of competition for power  and scarce 
resources  (see 1.4). 
The  work  of Benson  (1977)  partially bridges  the  gap  between the 
political  economists  at  the  macro  level and  the  organisational ecology 
theorists  at  the  intermediate  inter-organisational  level.  His  network 
theory  examines  linkages  and  communications  between  public  service 
agencies  in  terms  of  vertical  and lateral flows  of power  and resources 
(Benson,  1975:p247). 
Finally,  areas  such  as  strategic  planning  in the public  and 
private  sectors,  economic  policy  and world market behaviour have  in the 
past  divided  up  between  the  Strategy/Business  Policy analysts  and  the 
macroeconomists.  Work  from both these broad disciplines  is incorporated 
into  the  NWS  study.  Key  writers  examined  include Johnston & Scholes 
(1984),  Taylor  and  Hussey  (1982),  Palia  &  Hitt  (1982)  in the  area of 
corporate  strategy  and  Odell  (1982)  the principal writer cited under  the 
broad  heading of Macroeconomics.  In summary,  no  individual theory appears 22 
adequate,  but useful insights may  be obtained from  an amalgamation of such 
approaches. 
1.1.2.  A multidisciplinary study of the  NWS 
Broadly  defined,  the central theoretical concern of this thesis 
is  to  develop  a  multidisciplinary  approach  to  the study of strategic 
decision  making  in  multinational resource based joint ventures.  This  is 
in  no  way  incongruous with the  study of corporate policy in the  NWS  joint 
venture,  in  view  of the essential connection between strategy and policy 
which  is  cited  by  a  number  of writers  including Mintzberg  (1979),  Quinn 
(1980)  and  Summer  (1980)  (see 1.2.3).  (See  also general literature review 
2.4) . 
However,  prior  to  defining  the essential relationship between 
Strategy,  Policy  and the  third key word for  the study,  Environment,  it is 
important  to address  the question  "Why  undertake  a  multidisciplinary study 
of the North West  Shelf project?" 
There  are numerous  reasons  which could be cited for conducting a 
broad  socio/scientific  study  of  the  planning  and  development  of 
Australia's largest capital project: 
(i) 
(U) 
Economic.  In  terms  of  the  impact on the W.A.  and Australian 
economies,  i.e.  the  multiplier  effect  on  employment,  the 
expansion  of  markets  for natural  gas/LNG  and other costjbenefit 
considerations  (see Brown  and Copeland,  1985). 
Political.  The  important  debate  at  State and Federal level 
surrounding  the  planning  and  ongoing  development  of the  NWS 
project,  the  legislative  and public policy framework  governing 
this  and  the  controversy  which  has  been associated with the 
project since 1973. (iii) 
(iv) 
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Strategic.  The  important  implications,  in terms  of national 
sovereignty  and  social rate of return of the  ongoing bargaining 
process  between  a  multinational  joint  venture  and  host 
governments,  over  a  major  petroleum  resource  (see  Brown  and 
Copeland,  1985). 
Historical.  The  need for  a  complete  catalogue  and  commentary  on 
key  events  in  the  history  of  the  NWS  project,  since initial 
plans were  presented to  the Whitlam  energy ministry in 1973. 
The  current  study  encompasses  aspects  of  the  above within a 
theoretical  framework  which  draws  on  the work of writers  in the fields  of 
Business  Strategy,  Organisation Theory,  Macreoconomics  and Public Policy. 
Certain  areas  are  afforded a  more  in-depth treatment  than others,  with the 
major  emphasis  on the political and organisational environment  of the  NWS 
joint  venture.  Strategic factors  are  considered in relation to  a  number 
of  key  policy  decisions  undertaken  by  the  JVP  between 1980  and  1986. 
These  relate  to  the  ongoing  development  of the  NWS  project,  the, marketing 
of  natural  gas  in W.A.  and  the export market  for  LNG  based on projections 
from  October  1989  to  2005  (3.3,  8.1  and 8.2). 
The  study  aims  to  provide  the  student,  academic,  resource 
industry  executive  and public sector planner with an holistic view of the 
development  of  the  NWS  project.  However  in order to  avoid-the  danger  of 
pursuing  too many  diverse  themes  which are  only tentatively connected,  JVP 
corporate  policy  has  been  chosen as  a  focal point.  The  central  'raison 
d'etre'  of the thesis  is  "To  provide  an  improved  insight and understanding 
of  JVP  corporate  policy  through  an analysis  of critical events between 
1980  and  1986"  (see 1.3  'Study goals'). 24 
It  is  anticipated that the  theoretical  framework  and conceptual 
tools  employed  will  have applications for  future  research into corporate 
policy and strategy within multinational joint venture resource projects. 
The  clearly  defined  goals  of this work  (see 1.2)  and  the tight 
conceptual  boundaries  set  out  in  Chapter  2  ensure  that the apparently 
diverse  themes  pursued in Chapters  3  and 4  are relevant to  the core of the 
thesis.  This  contextual  material  is  included to provide  the essential 
historical,  political  or  economic  background to key  JVP  policy decisions 
analysed later in the work. 
1.1.3.  Primary working definitions 
As  indicated  in  1.2.2  three key words  to be  used in the  study 
are  Strategy,  Policy  and  Environment.  Specific usages  for these  terms 
apply  throughout  the  thesis  and definitions  are  required at this  stage  to 
avoid  ambiguity  and  ensure  that the  reader has  a  clear understanding of 
the  theoretical content of the  thesis. 
The  terms  Strategy,  Corporate  Strategy and Strategic Analysis 
are  examined  at  length  in  the  Business  Policy  literature  with  a 
comprehensive  overview  of these definitions  to be  found  in Palia and Hitt 
et al.,  1982:p8-24). 
Haner  (1976)  in  Palia and Hitt et.al.  (1982)  provides  a  useful 
definition  of  Strategy  and  Policy.  "A  Strategy  is  a  multiple-step 
approach  to  achieve  a  specific  objective.  It is controlled by  a  plan, 
involves  coordinated  use  of selected components  and resources  and covers 
the  time  frame  necessary  to  meet  the  objective."  "A  Policy  is  a 
statement,  verbal,  written  or  implied of those principles  and rules that 
are  set  by  managerial  leadership  as  guidelines  and  constraints  for 
organisational  thought and action." 25 
The  study  will employ Haner's definition of Strategy and Policy 
as  a  point  of  departure.  However,  it also follows  the  logic of Quinn 
(1980)  and  Summer  (1980)  who  view policies as  essential increments of an 
overall  strategy  which  can  be adjusted to deal with political,  economic 
and  other environmental  contingencies  over  time.  Summer  (1980:p38)  states 
that  "Strategies  are logically connected networks  of policies."  ...  "They 
are  only  approximations  of reality to be  tested in a  real work of policy 
formulation.  Strategy  and  policy  formulation  influence  each  other. 
Strategy  precedes  policy  but  after this,  adjustments  are made by senior 
executives  to fit the realities of the world ....  "Po1icy formulation works 
out  increments  or  pieces  of  strategy taking into account the strategic 
whole." 
Summer's  conception  of policy and strategy supplement  the basic 
definition  supplied  by  Haner  but  does  not  indicate  the  essential 
connection  with  Environment.  Hofer  and  Schendel provide  this link in 
their  definition of Organisational Strategy:  "The basic characteristics of 
the  match  an  organisation  achieves  with  its environment."  (Hofer  and 
Schendel,  1978:p4). 
The  theoretical  scheme  of Mintzberg  (1979)  also recognises  the 
key  area  of the organisation's interface with its environment.  Mintzberg 
views  strategy  as  itA  mediating  force  between the organisation and its 
environment".  He  states that "Strategy formulation therefore  involves  the 
interpretation  of  the  environment  and  the  development  of  consistent 
patterns  in  streams  of organisational decisions  (strategies)  to deal with 
it."  (Mintzberg,  1979:p25). 26 
Mintzberg  addresses  the  question  "What  does  the word environment 
really  mean?"  The  broad  definition  is  "The  aggregate of surrounding 
things,  or  influences."  (Random  House  Dictionary).  In this sense  the 
environment  of  an  organisation  comprises  all  its  surroundings,  its 
technology,  markets,  products,  economic,  political  and even ecological 
climate. 
Mintzberg  cites  the  idea  that  the literature in Organisation 
Theory  focuses  on  certain characteristics of organisational environments 
and  associated  variables.  Examples  quoted include Stability (Stable to 
Dynamic) ,  Complexity  (Simple-Complex),  Market  Diversity  (Integrated-
Diversified),  Hostility (Munificent-Hostile)  (Mintzberg,  1979:p269). 
The  view  adopted  about  organisational environment  employed in 
this  study  is  more  specific  than  popular usages  in the literature and 
encompasses  elements  both  Internal  and  External  to  the  project 
organisation (see 1.3.1 secondary definitions). 
In  the  thesis  the  term  "Decision  Making  Environment  or 
.=I-",n,-,=s,-"t"",i~t::.::u~t::.:i~o:::..!n~a~l~_-,=E~n~v-=i-=r.:=o~nm!!!!.::e~n!:..=.t  is  used  to  refer  to  "a  set  of  abstract 
boundaries  which  enclose  all the major political,  economic  and  technical 
influences  which  impinge  upon the decision making processes of the joint 
venturers  over  a  set  duration."  The  terms  internal  and  external 
environment  are  used  to  distinguish between those activities which  take 
place  within the corporate structure of the joint venture,  the  operational 
core  of  the  organisation  and those undertaken by external organisations 
and  government  agencies.  This  conception of environment is illustrated in 
Figure  1  which  provides  a  visual clarification and removes  the charge of 
tautology  in  the  use  of the  terms  Internal and External.  Section 1.3.1 
provides  a  more  detailed definition of the  "Decision Making  Environment", 27 
demarcated  on  the  "Conceptual  Map"  which is explained in 1.3.  The  next 
major  concern,  however,  is to clearly delineate major study goals  and  the 
research framework  to be  employed. 28 
1.2.  Study Goals  and Research Framework 
In  the  preceding sections key working definitions  and the broad 
objectives  of  the  study were  established.  However,  prior to setting out 
the  research  framework  employed  in  the  study,  the major goals  of the 
thesis  must  be  clearly  explained.  Clarification  of these  goals  is a 
prerequisite  to  understanding  the discussion of research methodology set 
out in 1.2.2 and 2.1. 
1.2.1.  Study  goals 
The  work  which  follows  can be split into  two broad areas:  the 
Analytical  component  and  the  Descriptive  component.  This distinction 
becomes  apparent when  the broad goals of the  study are  examined. 
(i)  To  afford  a  clearer understanding of key policy decisions  taken 
by  the  NWS  joint  venture  participants  (September  1980  - July 
1985),  which have had  a  crucial impact  on the  development of the 
NWS  gas  project. 
This  objective,  which  suggests  a  research structure dedicated to 
policy  analysis,  is complemented by an objective which broadens 
the  scope of the  study. 
(ii)  To  combine  published  material  and  interview  data  using  an 
original  methodological  framework  to  produce  a  comprehensive 
commentary  on  the  major  political  and  economic  events  in the 
history of the  NWS  project 1973-1986. 
A  third  objective  provides  a  means  to  synthesise  (i)  and  (ii), 
producing a  descriptive study with an analytical core. (iii) 
(iv) 
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To  develop  a  "Conceptual Map  which  sets  out  the  key  components 
of  the  Internal  and  External  institutional environment of the 
NWS  project  (see 1.3). 
Extend  this  map  to  an  analytical  model,  incorporating 
generalisable  features  which  can be  applied to  future  research 
on  policy  or  strategic  planning within multinational resource 
based  joint venture projects. 
These  broad study goals set out  above  were not precise  enough  to 
form  the  basis  for  a  tightly structured research programme.  In order  to 
meet  this  requirement,  more  clearly  defined sub-objectives were  needed 
which  could  provide  stepping  stones  towards  the  attainment of broader 
objectives,  These  second  level  objectives  which  provided a  point of 
departure for  the  research programme  were: 
(i)  To  define.  identify  and  analyse  a  series of Critical events  in 
the history of the  NWS  project(see 1.3),  and 
(ii)  Clarify  the  principal  corporate,  political  and  commercial 
linkages  which  existed  between  key  organisations  in  the 
institutional  environment  of the  JVP  between September  1980  and 
July 1985  (see 1.3  and 2.1.1). 
1.2.2.  Research  framework  (synopsis) 
The  research  programme  employed  in  the  study is described in 
detail  in  Chapter  2.  At  this point it should be noted that research drew 
on  both  interview  material  and  a  broad review of secondary sources which 
were  combined  to  produce  the  descriptive  and  analytical  content  of 
Chapters  3  to  8. 
The  research  framework  encompassed  the  following broad steps: 30 
(i)  Definition of broad study objectives. 
(ii)  Collection  of  preliminary  information  and  review of existing 
(iii) 
(iv) 
literature broadly relevant to  the  study. 
At  this  point,  material  to  support  the theoretical content of 
the  study was  selected according to  a  number  of key search terms 
including:  Strategy,  Policy,  joint-ventures,  multinational, 
petroleum and natural  gas. 
Background  material  (political and  economic)  and technical data 
on  the  NWS  project were  collected from  a  wide variety of sources 
including government publications  and Woodside  press releases. 
Collation of information and  refinement  of study objectives. 
Draw  up  an  outline of economic  and political background of the 
NWS  project.  Collated detail  on  the physical  dimensions  of the 
project.  the  structure  of  the  joint  venture  and  the major 
internal  systems  of the project organisation. 
(v)  Production  of  an  interview  schedule  (Stage  I)  and selected an 
initial  sample  of  30  interview  respondents  according  to  set 
criteria  (see 2.2.1). 
This  represented  the  preliminary stage of a  two  part interview 
programme,  which  following  withdrawal  of several  interviewees 
spanned  35  interviews  with  20  respondents  over  the  two  stages 
(see  2.2). 
New  information  obtained  from  Stage  I  interviews was  combined 
with  secondary  data  (published material  and media reports)  and 
used  to  (a)  identify critical events  which  respondents perceived 
to  have  had  a  crucial  impact  on  the  development  of the  NWS 31 
project;  (b)  build the first five sections of the  schematic plan 
and  (c)  supplement  existing  information  on  the political and 
economic background to  the project. 
(vi)  On  the  basis  of  information  obtain  at  Stage  I,  a  second 
interview  schedule  (Stage II)  was  drawn up  to produce detail on 
specific  critical  events  and  major  political  and  economic 
pressures  affecting  JVP  decision making between September  1980 
and July 1985  (see 2.2.2). 
The  research  steps  set  out  above  are  intended to provide  the 
reader  with  an  outline  of  how  the  information used in this study was 
collected,  collated,  structured  and  ultimately  used  to  provide  the 
descriptive  detail  in  Chapters  3-5  and  support  the  policy  analysis 
presented in Chapters  6  and 7.  Further detail is provided in Chapter  2. 32 
1.3.  Analytic Tools:  Critical Events  and the  Conceptual  Map 
The  research  methodology  employed in the study is discussed in 
condiderable  detail  in Chapter  2.  At  this  stage,  the  only section of the 
research  format  set out in 1.2.2 which requires  further  explanation is the 
isolation  and  analysis  of  specific  critical  events  as  a  means  to 
understand  the  policies  and  planning  processes  of the joint venturers. 
They  are defined as  "Specified periods"  in the history of the  NWS  project. 
where  identifiable  political and economic  forces  within the  institutional 
environment  of  the  joint venturers,  have  led them  to  introduce key policy 
changes  affecting future project development." 
This  apparently  tenuous  definition  was  employed  for  several 
reasons:  (i) it encouraged interview respondents  to  consider  a  wide  range 
of  economic  and political pressures  from within and outwith the structure 
of  the  project  organisation  which  affected  JVP  policy  making  over  a 
clearly  defined  time  period;  (ii)  a  detailed  definition  allowed 
respondents  to  distinguish  between  critical  events  which  reshaped  the 
future  planning  of  the  project  and  broader  historically  significant 
events.  Significant  events  refer  to  any  broad political or  economic 
changes  which  may  have  influenced the  development  of the  NWS.  They may 
encompass  broad macroeconomic  change,  adjustments  to  the  State or National 
economy,  broad  political  change,  i.e.  election of  a  new  Federal or State 
government,  and public policy changes  introduced on either tier.  Examples 
include:  the election of Sir Charles  Court's coalition government  in W.A., 
April  1974,  or  the  signing  of  the  Memorandum  of Understanding  (MOU) 
between the  JVP,  the  SECWA  and Alcoa  in November  1977. 33 
Three  of  the  original  significant  events  selected  were 
subsequently  upgraded  as  a  majority of interview respondents  stated that 
they  should  be  designated  as  critical  events.  None  of  the  other 
significant  events  outlined  were  deemed  to  fall  within  the  given 
definition  of  a  critical  event  in the history of the  NWS  project,  i.e. 
there  was  insufficient  evidence  or  agreement  to support the point that 
these  events  had an identifiable impact  on major policy shifts introduced 
by  the JVPs  between September  1980  and July 1985. 
The  first  two  critical  events  identified  were:  (i)  the 
renegotiation  of  the  SECWA  contracts  in March  1985,  (ii)  the string of 
three  postponements  in specified LNG  delivery dates  to Japan in 1982,  1983 
and  1984,  both  of  which  represented  a  considerable departure  from  the 
plans  which  the  JVPs  had  been  publicly  pursuing  prior to  each event 
developing  (see  7.2  and  6.1).  (iii)  The  third critical event selected, 
namely  the  She11/BHP  takeover  of Woodside  Petroleum differs slightly in 
the  sense  that it is hard to  identify any explicit policy by Shell or BHP 
in  the  public arena which suggested the  takeover was  imminent,  apart from 
some  press  commentary  during  March  and April 1985.*5  This  latter event 
relates  more  to  intramural discussions between the  NWS  participants behind 
closed  doors.  (The  corporate relationship between Shell and BHP  prior to 
the  takeover  is  examined  in  6.2.3 and combined with existing published 
material  to  present  a  thorough  analysis  of  this  turning point in the 
history of the  NWS  project.) 
At  this  point it is  important  to reiterate that critical events 
were not arbitrarily selected by the writer but identified by respondents. 34 
The  three  events  chosen  were  those which  a  majority of the  20 
respondents  interviewed  at  Stage  I  perceived to be critical events,  i.e. 
they  met  the  criteria set down  in the definition of critical event.  The 
critical  event  methodology  employed  in  this study is elaborated in 2.1 
which  covers  the  development of the thesis research plan. 
The  interpretation  and  analysis  of  critical  events  and the 
influence  they  brought to bear on JVP  policies over specific time periods 
is  dependent  on  two  other crucial components  of this study.  Firstly,  it 
relies  on  a  solid understanding of the history of the  NWS  project and the 
events  which  shaped  its development  from  the earliest planning stages  in 
1972.  The  history  of  the  project is essentially a  political one with 
ongoing  negotiations  and  disputes  between the joint venturers,  the W.A. 
government  and  the  Federal government playing an important role in shaping 
project  plans which have been operationalised since 1980.  The  politics of 
the  project  has  not  been  restricted  to negotiations between the JVPs, 
governments  and  other  external  bodies  but  has  also  been  evident in 
inter-mural disputes between the joint venturers  (see 6.2.2.  and 6.2.3). 
The  second major area which must be  explored prior to gaining an 
understanding  of  JVP  policies  is  the  institutional environment of the 
joint  venture  project  organisation.  Each  of the  seven diagrams  which 
comprise  the  conceptual  map  employed in this thesis effectively provide 
the  reader  with a  picture of a  section of the institutional network which 
spans  both  the  internal  and  external  environment of the joint venture 
organisation. 
For  analytical  purposes,  the  map  is  split into Internal and 
External  environment  and four  other conceptual levels:  Systems.  Project. 
State,  National  and  World.  Systems  and  Project  level encompass  the 35 
structure  of  the  joint  venture,  the  project  organisation  which  the 
participant  companies  operate  and the major project management  functions 
which  are  carried out under  the umbrella of this organisation.  The  State 
and  National  levels  cover all governmental  and  independent organisations 
operating  within W.A.  and Australia which have  an identifiable interest in 
planning.  financing.  managing  or  regulating  the development of the  NWS 
project.  World  level  covers  the multinational corporations with direct 
links  to  the  NWS  joint venture  through subsidiaries or divisions,  client 
governments,  notably  the  Japanese  major petroleum producer and  importer 
governments  represented  through  OPEC  and  the  OECD  and  finally 
international  bankers  and  project  financiers  (see  Figure  3  and 
Section 2.3). 
The  conceptual  map  is  essential  to  the  study for  a  number  of 
reasons: 
(i)  It  provides  a  simplified picture of the  complex decision making 
environment of the joint venturers. 
(ii)  It  maps  out  the  institutional  network  which  links  the  NWS 
(iii) 
project  to  a  variety  of  other  key  bodies  in  its external 
environment  and  in  diagrams  VI  and  VII highlights the major 
corporate  and  commercial  connections  which exist between each 
organisation. 
It  shows  the  institutional  network  described  in 3.1 and 5.1 
which  serves  as  an  important  integrating  device linking the 
various  themes  developed in Chapters  3  to  7  of the  study. 36 
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1.3.1.  Summary  and definitions  (1.1  - 1.3) 
Restating  the  principal  objectives  of  the  study we  have  the 
following:  (i)  To  facilitate an  increased understanding of a  number  of 
key  policy  decisions  taken  by  the  JVP  between September  1980  and July 
1985;  (ii)  Production  of an original and  comprehensive  commentary  on the 
history  of  the  NWS  project  1973  to  1986;  (iii) Develop  a  'Conceptual 
schema'  of  the  JVP  decision  making  environment  and extend this  into  a 
model  with  applications  for  policy/strategic  analysis  relating  to 
multinational resource based joint ventures. 
The  research  methodology  and  conceptual  framework  employed  to 
facilitate  these objectives  draws  upon  two  major heuristic devices:  (a)  A 
modified  critical  event  approach  to  the  study of planning and corporate 
policy;  (b)  A  schematic plan or  conceptual map  of the  JVP  decision making 
environment  developed  in  seven  stages  throughout  the  study.  These  are 
used  to  produce  information which is integrated in a  broad chronological 
account  of the major  events which have  shaped the planning and  development 
of the project between 1973  and 1986. 
Figure  4  illustrates  the  synthesis between  the analytical core 
(critical  event  analysis),  conceptual background  (schematic plan)  and  the 
broader  descriptive  framework  which  is  suggested  by  the  two  other 
components.  Critical  events  are  demarcated by  the bold lines  on  a  time 
scale  which  covers  the period September  1980  to July 1985.  It should be 
noted  that  these  events  are processual unfolding over  time.  In view of 
this  the  black dot in Figure  4  represents  the start and finish of crucial 
policy periods for  the JVP. 
Throughout  1.1-1.3  a  number  of  concepts  were  introduced as 
components  of  the  theoretical  framework  of  the  study.  These  included 
critical  events,  the  schematic  plan with its five  conceptual levels  and 38 
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the  institutional network spanning  from  Systems  level at the bottom of the 
hierarchy through  to World level at the  top. 
In  the  course  of explaining the critical event methodology  and 
the  application  of  the  plan,  a  number  of terms  were  used which  require 
clarification  at  this  stage.  Figure  3  illustrates the  "Decision Making 
Environment"  of  the  joint  venturers.  Drawn  from  the  language  of 
organisation  theory  (Mintzberg,  1971),  the  term  refers  to  a  set of 
abstract  boundaries  which  enclose  all the major political,  economic  and 
technical  influences  impinging  upon  the decision making processes  of the 
joint  venturers.  The  concept of a  decision making  environment  is applied 
as  an  attempt  to gain a  clear insight into areas  of an extremely complex 
reality.  The  Conceptual  Map  presents  a  simplifed representation of this 
reality  showing  a  number  of important  government  agencies  and corporate 
bodies,  a  few  common  links between  them  and  any visible direct or indirect 
trading  or  corporate  connections  to  the  joint  venture  project 
organisation. 
The  plan  simplifies  the  complex web  of political and  economic 
influences  on  JVP  decision  making by  focusing  on institutional factors, 
notably organisations  and their policy outputs. 
The  terms  internal  and  external  environment  are  used  to 
distinguish  between those activities which  take place within the  corporate 
structure  of  the  joint venture,  the  operational project organisation and 
those  undertaken by external organisations  and  government agencies.  Terms 
such  as  corporate structure,  project system,  institutional environment  and 
policy  output  are  based on concepts  developed in the works  of mainstream 
organisational  theorists  notably  (Simon  1960;  Parsons  1960;  Mintzberg 
1979).  The  language  employed by  these writers has  been adopted for  use  in 40 
this  study  as  the  most  effective  means  of describing the relationship 
between  the  joint venture project organisation,  contractor bodies working 
for  the  joint  venturers  and various key external parties like  SECWA,  the 
State  Department  of  Resources  Development  and  the  principal  project 
financiers  (see 5.1.1). 
For  analytical  purposes  a  distinction is made  between the  joint 
venture  corporate  structure  and  the  project  organisation.  The  term 
corporate  structure  refers  to  the  formal  organisational relationships 
which  exist  between the joint venture participants.  These  are defined in 
the  contractual  conditions  which  bind  all  the  parties  wishing to be 
incorporated  into  the  joint venture.  The  structure reflects the balance 
of  share  equity  and other interests held by Shell,  BP,  BHP,  Cal-Asiatic, 
Woodside  and  MIMI  in each phase of the project.  The  operational core of 
the  joint  venture  corporate  framework  is referred to in the study as  the 
project  organisation.  *6  (See  Parsons  1960).  It reflects  a  series of 
ongoing  processes  and relationships between those parties responsible for 
coordinating  and  operating  various  project  systems,  i.e.  Design, 
Procurement,  Construction,  Commissioning  and Maintenance  (see 2.3).  These 
parties  include  JVP  planners  and  senior  executives,  employees  of the 
project  operator  Woodside  Offshore Petroleum  (WOP),  engineers,  management 
and  other  operatives  employed  by  the major subcontractors Kellog/Japan 
Gas/Raymond Engineering  (KJR).  (See  2.3) 
The  information  which  could  be  obtained  on  these  internal 
processes  was  limited and difficult to test against published sources.  As 
a  response  to  this,  the  study is primarily concerned with identifiable 
policy  outputs  produced  by  the joint venturers.  These  outputs refer to 
policy  statements  or  actions  on the part of representatives of the joint 41 
venturers  which have been identified through media coverage,  parliamentary 
debates  and  other  publicly  accessible  sources.  Policy  outputs  from 
external  bodies  and  government  agencies  are  also  integral  to  the 
descriptive and analytical framework of the study. 
It  should  be  noted  that  this study does not employ  a  totally 
mechanistic  black  box  approach to the study of JVP  policy and its effect 
on  the development of the  NWS  project.  The material produced acknowledges 
the  importance  of  internal  processes  and  informal  organisational 
influences  in  shaping  high  level  policy  decisions.  However,  this is 
qualified  by  the  fact  that  only  limited  access  could be obtained to 
publicly  verifiable  information  on  the  internal  mechanics  of the  NWS 
project organisation (see  2.3). 42 
1.4.  Precedents  in the Literature 
In  Sections  1.1.1  and 1.1.3 there  is an outline of some  of the 
key  concepts  developed by  the  cross section of writers whose  work  is drawn 
upon  in  the  theoretical  framework  of this  study.  In the  following  four 
sections  (1.4.1-1.4.4)  there  is  a  brief  discussion  of the precedents 
established  by  a  number  of these writers and the contribution which  they 
made  to  the literature in their own  field.  The  relevance of this work to 
a  multidisciplinary  study  of  corporate  policy  within  a  multinational 
resource based joint venture is indicated throughout. 
1.4.1.  The  organisational  and  the  environment 
As  indicated  in  1.2.2  the theoretical  scheme  employed in this 
study  aims,  in  part,  to bridge  a  gap  which exists between writers  in the 
field  of Business  Policy/Strategy and Organisational Theory.  Following an 
extensive  review  of the literature in these  two  broadly defined areas,  it 
became  apparent  that  many  overlaps  do  exist in the  work of a  number  of 
writers  with  widespread  recognition  of  the  essential  interdependence 
between  organisational,  structure,  technology,  policy and strategy and the 
wider  "Task  environment".  Dill  (1958)  in one  of the earliest studies of 
environmental  influences  on  organisational  planning  defined  Task 
environment  as  those  parts  of  the  environment  which are  "Relevant or 
potentially  relevant  to  goal  setting and goal  attainment"  (see Thompson, 
1967:p27). 
Dill  (1958)  paved  the way  for later organisational writers who 
moved  increasingly  towards  an  'open-systems'  view,  with the  organisation 
interacting  with  its  wider  environment.  Thompson  (1967)  and Mintzberg 
(1979)  present  divisionalised  process  models  with  the organisation split 43 
into  distinct  spheres  or  tiers  of  responsibility,  i.  e. 
technical/production,  administrative,  planning/external  liaison,  support 
services.  Mintzberg  (1979)  extends  the  ideas  of earlier writers  like 
Simon  (1957),  Parsons  (1960)  and  Thompson  (1967)  into  a  five-part model 
and  retains  the  basic  idea  of  a  central operating core  supported and 
protected  by  administrative  and specialist sub-organisations  (Mintzberg, 
1979:p22). 
The  writings  of  both  Mintzberg  and  Thompson  provide  a  good 
bridge  into  the traditional realm of Business  Policy and Strategy which  is 
usually  concerned  with  Environmental  scanning,  identification  of  key 
environmental  variables,  the  development of typologies  reviewing  a  range 
of  strategies  to  cope  with  environmental  change,  i.e.  Summers  (1980), 
Johnston and  Scholes  (1984). 
Both  Thompson  (1967)  and Mintzberg  (1979)  discuss  the  importance 
of  the  organisation's  "boundary  spanning"  functions  which help  assimilate 
it  to  prevailing  environmental conditions.  Mintzberg discusses  the role 
of  senior  management  at  the  "Strategic  Apex"  of  his  five-part 
organisation,  stressing  the  importance  of developing a  strategy to  deal 
with  changes  in  the  external  environment.  "Middle  Line"  management,  who 
link  the  "Operating  Core"  to  the  policy makers  at the  top  and serve  a 
primarily  administrative  function,  carry out boundary spanning  functions 
within  the  organisation's  internal  environment.  This  coordinative role 
ensures  a  flow  of  lateral  communication with  the  "Technostructure"  and 
"Support  Staff"  and  vertical  communications  with  the  "Operating Gore" 
(Mintzberg,  1979:pp20-29). 44 
Thompson  (1967)  stresses  the  importance of the  interface with 
the  external  environment  as  a  means  to attain knowledge  of environmental 
characteristics  and  hence  reduce uncertainty.  This  is seen as  the key to 
successful  managerial  policy  making  and  strategic  planning.  Thompson 
extends  his theory to  the point where he  produces  four basic environmental 
classifications:  (i)  stable  and  homogeneous;  (it)  stable  and 
heterogeneous;  (iii)  unstable  and  homogeneous;  (iv)  unstable  and 
heterogeneous.  Thompson's  major  hypothesis  centres  on  the  idea that 
heterogeneity  and  instability  in  the  environment  have  significant 
implications  for organisation structure  (Palia and Hitt,  1982:p27). 
American  strategy  writers  Hambrick  and  Snow  (1977)  have 
developed  some  of  Thompson  (1967)  in  their  efforts  to  produce  "A 
Contextual  Model  of  Strategic  Decision  Making  in Organisations".  They 
cite  the  idea  that  "In  order  to  understand  fully  why  a  particular 
strategic  alternative  is  chosen  also  requires  knowledge  of  the 
environmental  and  organisational  context in which the decision is made." 
(Palia and Hitt:p34.) 
Hambrick  and Snow  (1977)  developed their model  (see Figure  5)  to 
support  the  idea  that  managerial  perceptions  of  environmental  and 
organisational  variables  in  the strategic decision making process are of 
prime  importance.  They  follow  Simon  (1957)  in recognising his concept of 
"bounded  rationality".  This  suggests  that managerial  decisions are based 
on  a  limited  field  of vision which cannot  encompass  every aspect of the. 
organisation and its environment  (Palia and Hitt:p34). 
The  current  study  acknowledges  the  important  point outlined 
above  and  the  implications which this holds  for corporate policy making. 
It  is  anticipated  that the broad multidisciplinary approach to  the  study 45 
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of  corporate  policy employed in the  NWS  study will provide  a  guideline to 
help  overcome  the  problem  of  limited managerial vision.  The  'Map'  and 
broader  conceptual  schema  of the  study is designed to provide  the reader 
(manager  or  academic)  with  a  more  holistic  view  of  the  NWS  project 
organisation  and  its  environment.  It is anticipated that the  conceptual 
framework  and  associated  model  may  provide  a  precedent  for  similar 
research into  a  wide  range  of organisational phenomena. 
1.4.2.  The  relevance of the  organisational  ecology perspective 
The  origins  of  "Organisational Ecology"  appear  to  date back to 
the  mid-sixties,  when  work  on  multi-organisational relations was  being 
conducted  at  the  Tavistock  Institute in London.  At  that time Trist and 
Stringer  were  the  major  exponents  of  the  prescriptive  value  of  an 
Organisational  Ecology  approach  to  the  study  of  a  variety of social 
scientific  phenomena.  The  former  went  on  to  develop his  ideas within an 
American  open  systems  framework  focusing  on means  to  improve  institutional 
cooperation  and  communication  within  an  equilibriating network  (Trist, 
1977) .  Stringer  (1980,  1982)  chose  to  delimit  the  application  of 
organisation  ecology  concepts,  adopting  them  for  use  in the  study of 
management  problems  in large scale engineering projects. 
Although  the  latter  suggests  a  clear relevance  to most  studies 
concerned  with  the  management  of  a  large  scale construction venture, 
Trist's  work  is also  of value  in contributing to  the  theoretical framework 
of the  current study. 
Trist  (1977)  stresses building an  increased understanding of the 
intermediate  level  (interorganisational)  as  opposed  to  group  or single 
organisational  processes.  This  perspective  delineates  the need for  a 47 
multi-tier  analysis  of  the  organisational  world.  He  assumes  a  fair 
measure  of  complexity  within  any  large  organisation's  internal  and 
external  environments.  However,  the  major  concern  is to study the 
interface  between  various organisations which comprise an "organisational 
field"  (Trist,  1977).  The  latter  suggests  a  system  or  network of 
organisational  influences  similar  to  that  described in the  theoretical 
scheme  adopted  in  the  NWS  study.  The  distinction  between  the 
"Transactional"  or  "Task  Environment"  and  "Contextual  Environment"  is 
another  key  point  of relevance in Trist's work.  The  importance lies not 
so  much  in the distinction between the  two but in the great stress that he 
places  on  the  conceptual division of the organisational environment.  The 
"Transaction  environment"  in Trist's scheme  refers  to the organisations of 
direct  relevance  to  the  task  of  a  focal  organisation  whilst  the 
"Contextual  environment"  refers  to  a  broader  field  of  interwoven 
organisational relations. 
The  theoretical  scheme  in  the  NWS  study  does  not make  this 
distinction  but  uses  the  Organisational  Network  and  five  conceptual 
divisions  from  Systems-World  level  to  facilitate  analysis of distinct 
sectors  of  the  organisational  environment.  This parallels the work of 
Stringer  (1980)  more  than  that of Trist  (1977).  Stringer developed the 
concept  of  the  Project  Multi-Organisation  (PMO)  to describe  the broad 
field  of  organisations  which are directly or indirectly connected with a 
central referent organisation engaged in achieving  some  end result. 
Taking  Stringer's  case  study  example  of  a  large  project 
organisation  established  to  build  power  stations,  we  can see  a  clear 
analogy  with  the  NWS  project.  Stringer's project organisation has within 
its  broader  environment  the client,  contractors,  subcontractors,  national 48 
industry  bodies,  trade unions,  political lobbies,  and interest groups  and 
numerous  agencies  representing  the  interests  of  the  local  economy. 
Stringer  (l980:pl2)  describes  the  Multi-Organisation  as  "Situations in 
which  parts  of  several organisations,  each with its own affiliation,  its 
own  goals  and its own values  - are  involved in the achievement of some  end 
result.  None  of  the  components  is in a  position of dominance,  all are 
strongly  affected  by  others,  and  all share in a  joint culture which is 
more  than the  sum of the  component parts"  "A  multi-organisation might 
be  of  a  temporary nature  (as  lasting for  the life of a  project)  or a  more 
continuing one  (as  is  a  general hospital)"  (Stringer,  1980:pS). 
The  general  idea of the  PMO  is adopted in the  NWS  study although 
not  expressed in quite  the  same  terms.  Certain ideas which are central to 
both  Trist  and  Stringer's  scheme  of  an Organisational Ecology are not 
included,  In the  NWS  study,  the Project Level,  where  strategic decisions 
and  key  policies  are  formulated  represents  the  starting  point  for 
analysis.  However  it  would be over-simplistic to  assume  that all final 
policy  decisions  or strategic planning initiatives on the  future direction 
of  the  NWS  project  are  taken  in the project administration centres  in 
Melbourne  and  Perth.  There is also  a  flow of influence  coming directly 
from multinational HQ's  at World Level,  i.e.  The  Hague,  LA  and London. 
The  five-tier  conceptual  map  which  forms  the  basis for  the 
analytical  model  (8.1)  facilitates  the study of organisational phenomena 
at  any  of  these  levels.  Lateral  and  Vertical  interphases  between 
organisations  within  the  broader  environment  of  the  NWS  project are 
highlighted for analysis. 49 
A  final  quote  from Trist  (1977)  should serve  to illustrate the 
potential  for  application  of  organisational ecology thinking to  the  NWS 
project:  "A  critical feature  of systems  of organisational ecology as 
contrasted  with bureaucracies,  is that they  involve  the  evolution of a 
negotiated  order,  founded  on collaboration rather than competition."  He 
adds  in a  later paragraph that ...  "Joint ventures  and  the clustering they 
produce  are  organisational ecological phenomena." 
At  first  glance,  this  type  of thinking appeared to fit in well 
with  the  theoretical  base of the  NWS  thesis.  The  fact that any  academic 
had  undertaken  a  study of multi-organisational phenomena,  interfaces  and 
advocated  the  idea  of  producing an holistic cognitive map  was  in itself 
very  seductive.  However,  whilst  Trist's  ideas  provide  some  useful 
guidelines  for  devising  a  conceptual  scheme  to  study a  multi-national 
resource  project,  his overall theoretical argument  is too  distant from  the 
subject  matter  at  hand  to be  applied directly to  the  NWS  thesis.  Trist 
(1977)  adopts  a  highly  prescriptive  approach  and  seems  to  be  more 
concerned  with  devising  a  grand social theory rather than improving  the 
study  of  large  scale  organisational networks  as  such.  Stringer  (1980, 
1982)  is more  illuminating in that direction and may  be  developed further, 
probably  through  a  largely  empirical  approach,  possibly  based  on 
"operational research"  and  computer networking principles. 
To  conclude,  it can be  stated that the  "Organisational Ecology" 
perspective  still  holds  currency in Australia and Europe  as  evidenced by 
recent  literature,  i.e.  (Jarilla,  1988).*7  However,  it is likely to be 
limited  to  studies  where  the political component  is not as  pronounced as 
is  the  case with the  NWS  project,  and  some  form  of empirical research can 
be undertaken. 50 
1.4.3.  Insights  from  economics  and political science 
The  study  encompasses  a  limited amount  of material drawn  from 
writers  who  can  be  broadly categorised as  Macroeconomists  and political 
scientists.  The  latter  are  not referred to  as political economists  as 
this  refers  to  a  well recognised body of theory which has  only been paid 
lip service  in this  study. 
Previous  works  concentrating  on  clearly demarcated aspects  of 
the  NSW  project  have  drawn,  primarily on  the  language  and methodology of 
classical  economics.  Studies  conducted by  Gray  (1976)  Bambrick  (1977)  and 
Brown  and  Copeland  (1985)  all  devote  considerable  attention  to  a 
costjbenefit  analysis  of the  NWS  project with returns  to  the national and 
W.A.  economies  based  on  standard  measures  like  labour,  capital  and 
construction  costs,  offset  against  potential  returns  to  the W.A.  and 
Federal  governments  through royalties  and tax revenues.  Broader benefits 
to  the W.A.  and national  economy  are  seen to  accrue  through  the  employment 
multiplier  and  technology transfer.  Gray  and Bambrick concentrate  on  the 
latter  whilst  the  Brown  and  Copeland  study  covers  a  wider  range  of 
indicators  including  oil  indexed  LNG  pricing.  (For full discussion see 
General Literature Review  2.4). 
With  the  exception  of  Gray  who  addresses  the  topic of host 
government/multinational  company  (MNC)  relationships  in relation to  the 
NWS,  these  writers  pay  little  attention  to major political influences 
which  shaped the project's development.  Harman  (1984)  partially rectifies 
this  oversight  in  a  paper  covering the history and politics of the  NWS 
project during  the period 1973  to  1983. 51 
The  descriptive  component  of  this  study  draws  widely on the 
Harman  paper,  updating  it  and  supplementing  the  broad  coverage with 
additional  detail.  Research for  the current work  drew  on information from 
a  diversity  of  sources  including  press releases,  newspaper  and journal 
articles.  There  is  also  a  reliance to  a  lesser degree  on the  type of 
macroeconomic  indicators  employed  in  the  Brown  and  Copeland  study. 
However,  in  contrast  to  traditional  types  of  economic  analysis  the 
approach  adopted  in  this  work  incorporates  language  and concepts  drawn 
from  macroeconomics,  organisation  theory  and  policy studies.  It is an 
examination  of  powerful  state and multinational bodies  and  the  interplay 
between corporate  and public policy. 
Harman  (1984)  and  Odell  (1981)  are  the  two  major contributors 
from  the politico/economic writers.  Odell's work  on the macroeconomic  and 
geopolitical  influences  on  the world oil industry provides  the basis for 
the  international  petroleum  network  discussed  in  the  current  work. 
Detailed  explanation  of  Odell's  contribution  and that of other writers 
like Danielsen  (1982)  and  Zorn  (1983)  is provided in Section 2.4. 
1.4.4.  Review of international dissertation extracts 
In  order  to  support  the  idea  that  the  current  thesis  on 
corporate  policy  making  within  a  multi-national  joint venture project 
displayed  originality in methodology,  theoretical concepts,  analytical and 
descriptive  content,  a  review of previous doctoral  theses was  undertaken 
for  the years  1972  to  1986. 
The  search  undertaken  over  the  period  of  one  week used the 
following  key  words:  Petroleum,  Resource,  Strategy/Strategic,  Decision 
Making,  Energy.  The broad disciplinary headings  covered were:  Business 
and Economics,  Sociology.  Law  and Political Science. 52 
A  large  number  of studies fell  into  the  Petroleum bracket,  but 
were  mainly  economic  analyses  based on standard economic  or econometric 
models  and  techniques  for  examining  commodity  markets.  Harman  (1977) 
deviated  slightly  from  this  norm  in his  study of investment policies  in 
the  Canadian  Oil  and  Gas  industry,  but  retained  a  highly empirical 
approach  using  statistical  measurement  as  the basis for his analysis  of 
the  impact of these policies. 
Only  two  doctoral  studies had been undertaken on joint ventures 
within  the  International  Petroleum Industry  (Sturgeon,  1974  and Munkirs, 
1973).  Both  these  works  used interviews  and reviews  of three major Oil 
and  Gas  journals  as  the primary source of data on joint ventures.  Stugeon 
concentrated  on  the  Exploration  and  Drilling  end of the  international 
petroleum  industry  whilst  the  sister  study  submitted  in 1973  covered 
downstream  operations.)  (Munkirs,  1973).  Empirical  techniques  were  used 
to  correlate,  quantify and analyse  this  data for  definite characteristics 
of joint venture organisations spread over  ten  ge~graphic areas. 
including: 
(i) 
Some  interesting  conclusions were  drawn  from  the  Sturgeon study 
Joint  venture  activity  was  widespread  across  ten  major 
geographic  regions between participants including Oil Majors  and 
Minors,  local private capital,  'local'  governments  (National  and 
State),  non-host  governments  and  'others'. 
(ii)  The  majors  control  more  joint  ventures  as  a  group,  but joint 
(iii) 
interlocking  ownership  arrangements  are  so  numerous  as  to  limit 
unilateral action by  one  company. 
Joint  ventures  represent  a  significant,  if not  dominant,  part of 
the market  structure in the  international petroleum industry. 53 
These  conclusions were  informative as background information for 
the  NWS  study but would not be used as  a  starting point for  investigation 
or  as  primary  evidence  to  support  any  arguments  in the course of the 
research programme. 
Hampson  (1982)  on  "The  Political Economy  of Petroleum Policies 
in  Canada  and Mexico",  was  of interest in that it placed petroleum policy 
and  associated  legislation  brought  into force  in these nations within a 
broader  political  and  economic  context.  However  the main body of the 
thesis  which  is  in  effect  a  critique  of existing economic  theory and 
theories  of  the  state  held  limited relevance  to  the current work.  Two 
other  studies  of  the  Canadian  oil and gas  sector set out a  theoretical 
framework  which  had applications for  a  study of corporate policy within a 
multinational joint venture petroleum project. 
The  most  recent  of these is the work of Doern and Toner  (1985) 
on  the  politics of Canada's Natural  Energy  Programme  (NEP).  The  study is 
conducted  within a  public policy framework  and examines  the history of the 
NEP  since  1945  and  the shifts in the all important balance between private 
and  public  energy  interests  since that time.  The  analysis is conducted 
within an Energy Politics Framework which comprises: 
(i)  INTERESTS  - defined as  "Those  economic  and political actors that 
(ii) 
have  the  capacity  to  exercise power  in order to achieve their 
objectives  and  exercise  their  will."  (p12)  These  include  the 
government  of  Canada,  two  provincial governments,  Oil companies. 
(Multi-national  and  Canadian  majors)  and  service  companies 
referred to  as  second line Canadian firms. 
MATERIAL/PHYSICAL  FACTORS  Geographical,  spatial,  climatic, 
world markets. 54 
(iii)  NORMATIVE  FACTORS  - Ideologies  and dominant  ideas. 
(iv)  KEY  INSTITUTIONS  - Capitalism,  Federalism,  Cabinet-parliamentary 
democracy. 
The  Doern  and  Toner  (1985)  analytical framework  offers certain 
parallels  with  that  employed  the  NWS  study,  although the  emphasis  is 
primarily  political,  with  economic  factors  seen  as  secondary 
considerations.  The  key  contribution of this work however,  undoubtedly 
lies  in  its  illumination  of  the  largely  neglected  area  of  public 
policy/private  sector  interface.  This  area  receives  considerable 
attention  in  the  NWS  study,  but from  the starting point of JVP  corporate 
policy  rather  than  an  examination  of  how  public policy influences  the 
private sector. 
The  final  example  in the Canadian trilogy which  influenced the 
theoretical  basis of the current study is the work of Patton  (1973)  on the 
effect  of  foreign  ownership  and control on government-business  relations 
in  the  Canadian  petroleum  industry.  This  study  is perhaps  the most 
significant  of  the  three  in  that  it  addresses  the key areas  of:  (a) 
Government-business  relations  and  (b)  Multinational/Host  government 
relations  within  the  context  of the Canadian petroleum industry.  It is 
also  important  from  a  methodological  point of view and in terms  of the 
conclusions it draws  about factors  (a)  and  (b)  above. 
The  research  methodology  is  largely  qualitative  based  on 
extensive  interviews  with  heads  of  private  firms,  government 
representatives,  employees  of  industry  associations  and  individual 
observers  of the oil and gas  scene.  Patton  (1973)  stresses the need for  a 
range  of  perspectives  on the central issues being examined,  notably  "The 
degree  to  which  foreign  ownership  and  control  influence  channels of 
communication  that  are  used,  the  content  of  communication on certain 55 
issues,  and  the  weight  given  to  information  by  government  decision 
makers." 
Secondary  data  was  drawn  from  a  range  of sources  including 
testimony  at  hearings  on  a  series  of energy related matters raised by 
Royal  Commissions  and government  agencies between 1957  and 1971. 
Key 
exhibited  by 
include: 
conclusions  and  illustrations  of  behaviour  patterns 
foreign controlled subsidiaries.as opposed to  Canadian firms 
(1)  Foreign  based  parent  companies  tend  to  restrict  the 
subsidiaries'  decision  making  powers  (Parallels with SIPM  and 
Shell Australia on the  NWS  project)  (see 5.2.4). 
(2)  The  subsidiary's  policies  relating  to  the  Canadian petroleum 
industry  were  seen  to  be  strongly  influenced  by its status 
within  a  larger international business unit and the attitudes of 
foreign managers. 
(3)  Foreign  ownership  is  seen to have unequivocally influenced the 
channels  of  and  content  of  business  communication and it is 
assumed  that this has  significantly altered the private Canadian 
Petroleum sector. 
The  above  is  supported by  a  series of examples  drawn by the authors  from 
documented  hearings  involving  Canadian  and  foreign  owned  companies. 
Patton's  rigorous  but  largely qualitative approach provides  the clearest 
example  of  a  study and methodological  framework  similar to that employed 
in  the  NWS  thesis.  It serves  to support and if necessary,  legitimise the 
multi-disciplinary  approach  adopted  in  the  above  which is intended to 
contribute to the broad band of literature headed  "Management Theory". 56 
1.5.  The  Structure of the Thesis 
The  first  section  of  this  chapter  (Chapter 1)  is designed to 
present  the reader with an overview of all the major elements of the  study 
which  are  incorporated  into  Chapters  2  to  8.  It  sets out a  brief 
description  of  the  topic,  broad themes  to be  developed in later chapters 
and  the  major  study objectives.  The  research methodology employed in the 
study  is  discussed briefly and the key concepts which are embodied in the 
theoretical  framework of the study.  are defined. 
Following  a  summary  of  1.1.1  and 1.1.3,  which clarifies the 
relationship  between  the  descriptive  and  analytical  components  of the 
study  and its conceptual base,  there is a  short presentation of precedents 
in  the  literature.  This  section discusses  the work of key theorists  from 
several  fields  who  have  influenced  the  theoretical base of the study. 
Areas  covered  include  Business  Policy/Strategy,  Organisation Theory and 
Economics. 
Chapter  2  is  primarily concerned with  the research methodology 
and  the  application  of  the major  tools  and concepts outlined in Chapter 
1.  It incorporates  a  discussion of the design of the  interview programme 
and  its  application  within  a  broader  research  plan  which  combined 
information  drawn  from  interviews  and secondary sources.  The first five 
diagrams  of  the  conceptual  map,  which  when complete  forms  the central 
reference  point  in  the  study,  are described in Chapter  2.  The  relevant 
Section  2.3  covers  diagrams  I-V  in  detail  in  order  to  clarify the 
hierarchical  relationship between organisational systems,  the main project 
organisation  and  the  external  institutional  environment.  The  network 
which  links  these  bodies  is  described  in Chapters  3  and 5.  Chapter  2 
concludes  with  a  general  literature  review covering a  cross section of 57 
published  texts  and  reports which have been consulted prior to embarking 
on  the  main  body  of  the  research.  This has been set out as  a  guide  to 
future  research  on  the  NWS  project or multinational activity within the 
international petroleum industry. 
Chapters  3  and  4  offer a  descriptive commentary starting with 
the  nature of the worldwide petroleum network of which  the  NWS  project and 
its  client  and service organisations  form  an integral part.  The  focus  of 
the  commentary  then  shifts  to  the  legal  and  contractual  framework 
operating  at State and Federal level which regulates  the activities of all 
the  parties  involved  with the development of the  NWS  project.  Chapter  3 
examines  the  international production,  distributional trading network for 
natural  gas  and associated products  like LNG,  spanning world,  Japanese  and 
Australian markets.  The  NWS  is seen as  a  nodal point within this network. 
Chapter  4  covers  historical  detail  on  the  role  played  by 
government  in influencing the direction and pace  of development of the  NWS 
gas  reserves.  The  major  focus  is  on  Federal  and  State  petroleum 
legislation  introduced  by the Whitlam and Fraser governments  during their 
respective  terms  in  office.  Consideration is also given to  the  NWS  Gas 
(Woodside)  Development Agreement,  co-signed by the W.Ao  government  and the 
JVP  in 1979. 
Chapter  5  contains  a  purely  descriptive  account  of how  the 
schematic  plan  developed  in  the  study can be used to provide  important 
insights  into  public  policy  and  the  strategies  adopted by the JVP at 
crucial  turning  points  in the history of the  NWS  projecto  In Chapters  6 
and  7  an analysis of three critical events is presentedo  The first event 
or  "event  string"  covered  is  the three successive postponements  of the 
agreed  delivery  dates  for  NWS  LNG  consignments  to  Japan.  These  are 58 
considered  from  a  strategic  point  of  view in the  context of world oil 
prices,  the  Japanese  market  for  LNG  and  internal  problems  being 
experienced  within  the  JVP  organisation at the  time.  The  second event, 
the  Shell/BHP  takeover  of Woodside  Petroleum is viewed in the  context of 
internal  pressures  being brought to bear on  the project operator Woodside 
Offshore  Petroleum  (WOP),  by the other participants and external pressures 
emanating  from  the  principal  project  financiers  and  investors.  The 
position  of  the  Japanese  government  on  import  quotas  for  NWS  liquified 
natural  gas  is also  examined in the light of changes  in the  demand  for oil 
and  LNG  in the  industrial sector of the nation's  economy. 
In  Chapter  7  a  detailed  analysis of the renegotiation of the 
SECWA  sales  and purchase  agreement  signed with the  JVP  in September  1980, 
is  presented.  Published material,  extracts  from parliamentary debates  and 
interview  data  were  assembled  to  provide  a  profile  of the principal 
economic  changes  and political arguments  which brought  representatives of 
the  JVP,  the  SECWA  and Alcoa back to  the negotiating table between January 
and  March  1985.  The  research findings  and  the analysis  of this critical 
event  provided  a  revealing  insight  into  the  nature  of the political 
relationship  which  had  existed  between  the  JVP  and  the W.A.  government 
between 1977  and 1985. 
The  final  chapter  covers  several major  concerns.  Sections  8.1 
and  8.2  set out  a  strategic overview of key  influences  on JVP  policy over 
the  next  decade.  The  major  area examined in 8.1 is the  WA  energy  economy 
the  structure  of  the  domestic market  and  the  impact of new  industrial 
developments  on  the  Dowding  government's  energy equation.  Section 8.2 
covers  NWS  LNG  export  markets  - future  market  windows,  market structure 
and  LNG  prices  and potential competition from  new projects 1995-2005. 59 
In  the  concluding  section an outline model  for  the analysis of 
'Corporate  Policy'  within  multinational resource based joint ventures is 
presented  and  the  main  components  reviewed.  This  is  followed  by 
conclusions  and recommendations  for  future  research. *1. 
*2. 
*3. 
*4. 
*5. 
*6. 
*7. 
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ENDNOTES 
In  1984  the Mitsui/Mitsubishi consortium  (MMI)  joined the joint 
venture as  a  sixth participant in the  LNG  phase of the project. 
The  Melbourne  Age  "$5000m Shelf Project Starts",  30.9.80. 
This  date  was  subsequently  put  back  to March  1987  in 1982, 
March  1988  in 1983  and October  1989  in 1984. 
In  September  1980  the  joint  venturers planned to develop  an 
integrated  Domestic  gas  and  LNG  project.  This  plan  was 
abandoned  in  1982  due  to  rising  construction costs and the 
massive  front  end  loading  of  capital  required  for  such a 
venture.  A  new  plan  was  devised  proposing  a  two  phase 
development  (Phase  I)  Domestic  gas  to be  completed in 1984 and 
(Phase  II)  LNG  export  programme  (Phase  II)  was  to  be 
commissioned  in  1986.  Three  subsequent  amendments  to this 
latter  date  followed  during  1983  and 1984 with the  scheduled 
start-up  for  the  LNG  programme  currently set at October 1989. 
Full  capacity  will  be  reached  in  the  mid-1990s  when 
construction  work  on  LNG  trains  2  and  3  is scheduled for 
completion  (Woodside,  May  1985). 
"The  Australian"  newspaper,  19th April  1985.  "West Australian" 
newspaper editorials,  16th-19th April 1985. 
For  a  more  detailed  account  of the work of Simon  (1957)  and 
Parsons  (1960)  see  the general literature review 2.4. 
At  the  time  of  writing  (November  1988)  theory embodying  the 
"Organisation  Ecology  Perspective"  is  being  taught  in  the 
Advanced Management units at UWA  and the University of NSW. 61 
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CHAPTER  TWO 
THE  STUDY  IN  DETAIL 
2.1.  Developing an Approach  to Study Multinational Corporate Policy 
The  study  of  corporate  policy within a  complex institutional 
environment  presents  a  number  of problems  which have been addressed in the 
writings  of  prominent  organisation  theorists,  notably Simon  (1957)  and 
Mintzberg  (1967).  To  date,  however,  no writer in this field has  developed 
a  composite  model  of policy making processes within a  multinational joint 
venture  organisation  operating  in  the  international petroleum industry 
(see 1.12 and 1.4). 
Economists  Brown  and  Copeland  (1985)  and geopolitical writers 
including  Odell  (1981),  and  Zorn  (1983)  have  developed  a  range  of models 
and  typologies  relating  to the  international petroleum industry,  some  of 
which  touch  upon  the  institutional  aspects  and  bargaining processes. 
However,  none  of this work deals directly with managerial or policy making 
processes  active  within  the corporate structure of the multinational oil 
companies. 
In  some  respects  the problems  associated with such a  study are 
self  evident,  multinational  oil  companies  are  security  conscious 
organisations  operating in a  highly political environment,  where  diplomacy 
and confidential information are at a  premium. 
Limited  information  may  be  surrendered by senior management  to 
government  agencies,  accountants  or  economists  conducting cost-benefit 
type  analyses.  However,  studies proposed by external parties examining 
in-house  managerial  and  policy  making functions  are unlikely to receive 
open endorsement. 63 
The  research  programme  adopted  in  this work was  designed to 
fulfil  objectives  which did not encompass  the standard hypothesis  - model 
building 
studies. 
empirical  testing  format  adopted  in  many  organisational 
In  practical terms  the programme had to address  the problem of 
how  to  effectively  describe  and  analyse multinational corporate policy 
within  a  highly complex,  politically sensitive environment.  The  research 
framework  and  methodology  employed in the thesis  (outlined in Chapter 1) 
are  described in detail in this chapter.  Sections  2.1  and 2.2 provide  the 
major  coverage  of interview techniques,  design of the  interview schedule, 
collation,  interpretation and use of interview and secondary material.  It 
should  be  noted  at  this  point  that although the  interviews provided a 
significant  component  of  the  original material produced in this thesis, 
the  descriptive  content  is  primarily  based  on  a  review  of  a  broad 
cross-section of published information  (see 2.4). 
2.1.1.  Barriers  to effective research 
As  stated  above  there  are  a  number of potential difficulties 
which  confront  the  researcher  attempting  to  obtain information on the 
policy  making  processes  of  a  multinational joint venture organisation. 
Three  of  the  common  difficulties facing  the social scientist conducting 
research in this area are as  follows: 
(i)  The  need for prior knowledge  of internal issues 
A  common  problem  facing many  academic  researchers  is the  fact 
that  they  may  have  no first hand experience of working  in the 
type  of  business or organisation which is the  subject of their 
study.  This  need  not  be  a  major problem in some  instances; 
however,  first  hand  experience  is likely to be  an asset when 64 
studying  the  internal mechanics  and policy outputs of a  complex 
multinational  organisation.  In the case of the  NWS  project the 
highly  political  nature  of  its  operational  environment has 
meant  that  very  little  publicly  accessible  material  is 
available  on  the  internal technical and managerial  systems  of 
the  project  organisation.  This  limitation on the  amount  of 
data  available  on internal organisational processes would make 
a  traditional  empirical  hypothesis  and  model  based  study 
difficult  to  conduct.  No  comprehensive model  could be created 
on  the  basis  of  the  published  material available and it is 
difficult  to  formulate  a  firm  hypothesis  under  these 
conditions.  In  view  of this it was  concluded that the study 
devised  would be of an exploratory nature  taking in information 
in  increments  or  manageable  amounts  and building a  picture of 
the policy making  environment of the JVPs  step by step. 
(ii)  Access  to required information: 
Assuming  that  the  researcher  is  attempting  to  obtain 
information  for  an  exploratory  study  based  partially  on 
interview  or questionnaire material,  information may  be blocked 
if  the  respondent perceives it to be of a  politically sensitive 
nature.  It is often the case that even apparently unimportant 
information  which  is common  knowledge  in the upper echelons  of 
the  organisation will not be divulged to  a  researcher even when 
assurances  of confidentiality are offered. (iii) 
2.1.2. 
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"Political loading": 
The  third main danger associated with research conducted within 
a  politically  sensitive  environment  is  that  any  responses 
gained  through direct interviewing or survey techniques,  may be 
heavily  censored  and  lead to  a  badly distorted picture of the 
way  in which  the  organisation in question actually operates. 
The  use  of 
questionnaires 
broad  survey  methods  based 
is  particularly  susceptible 
on  mailshot 
to  political 
loading.  The  executive who  has  received a  mailed questionnaire 
with  a  written assurance of confidentiality has plenty of scope 
for  collaboration  with his colleagues  and superiors as  to what 
would  be  politically  expedient  to  put  in  the  replies.  A 
questionnaire  of  this  type probing into the  internal decision 
making  processes of a  large joint venture undertaking is likely 
to  stir  sufficient  interest  to ensure that the  responses  are 
screened  by senior organisational officials.  Consequently,  the 
results  drawn  from  the  survey are likely to be misleading and 
may  lead to  the creation of a  completely false  cameo  of certain 
microcosms  of  organisational  life  (Mintzberg  (1979:p224  and 
270). 
The  corroborative interviewing technique 
The  research  framework  employed  in  this  study  attempts  to 
ameliorate  the  effects of the problems  outlined above,  through the use of 
direct  corroborative  interviewing  and  comparison  with  a  broad base of 
published  material.  The  term  'corroborative'  refers  to  the fact that the 
various  perspectives  offered  by respondents  on  a  specific critical event 
were  compared  and  checked for consistency.  It should be noted,  however, 66 
that  in  the final  analysis  no  single account was  rejected outright.  This 
follows  Allison  (1971)  in his  contention that key events  and policies  can 
be  considered  through  a  variety  of  "conceptual  lenses"  (Allison 1971: 
p.S). 
The  interview  programme  which was  designed to elicit detail on 
the  JVP  corporate  structure,  the  project organisation and its external 
environment  and  provide  insight  into  specific  'critical  events'  was 
divided into  two  stages: 
Stage  I  was  designed  to  a)  facilitate of critical events by 
respondents;  b)  provide  general  information  on  the  internal systems, 
corporate  structure  and  external  environment  of  the  NWS  project 
organisation. 
At  Stage  II  respondents  were  asked  to  answer  a  number  of 
questions  relating  to  the  critical  events  identified  at  Stage  I. 
Information  relating  to  critical  events  was  supplemented  by material 
recorded  from  the  open  comment  section  included  at  the  end of each 
interview.  Other  more  specific information obtained at Stage II related 
to  the policies and activities of various  key  governmental  and  independent 
organisations  operating  in  the  external  environment of the  JVP  project 
organisation. 
Prior  to  the  initiation  of  the  interview  programme  each 
respondent  was  placed  in  one  of three categories,  which related to  the 
level  and  nature  of  involvement  they  had with the  NWS  project and its 
operators  (see  2.2).  Each  category  "External  parties",  "Political 
operatives"  and  "Internal parties"  covered the relative objectivity which 
individual  respondents  were  likely  to  display when  answering questions 
relating to  JVP  policies  and the  operations  of the project organisation. 67 
After  information  had  been  collected  from  each category of 
respondent  interviewed  at  Stages  I  and II, it was  possible to  compare  a 
range  of  different  perspectives  on  a  particular  critical event.  The 
corroborative  technique also allowed information gathered at each stage to 
be  checked for  internal inconsistencies and screened for obvious bias. 
This  approach  proved  effective  in  producing  detailed 
information  on  JVP  corporate policy which could not have been obtained by 
a  mailed  questionnaire  or  a  purely  literature  based study.  Material 
obtained  from  the  interview  programme  when  checked  against secondary 
sources  made  an  important  contribution to the analysis of corporate and 
public policy presented in the Chapters  6  and  7  of this study. 2.2. 
2.2.1. 
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The  Interview Programme  in Detail 
Selection of the  interviewees 
The  interview  programme  employed  in the study was  initiated by 
drawing  up  a  list  of 30 people who  were  likely to have knowledge  or job 
experience  relating  to  the  planning and development  of the  NWS  project. 
Each  potential  interviewee  was  mailed  initial  outline  details of the 
research  to  be  conducted  and later contacted by  telephone.  Respondents 
were  requested  to  grant  an  interview  if they could meet  the  following 
criteria: 
(i)  They  possessed  a  sound  understanding of the key  economic  and 
political  issues  which had affected the development of the  NWS 
project,  or 
(ii)  Could  provide  information  relating to JVP  corporate policy or 
the planning of the  NWS  project. 
Of  the thirty original respondents,  eight declined an interview 
on  the grounds  of insufficient knowledge  of the  issues  to be  addressed.  A 
further  two  refused  to  grant  an interview for confidentiality reasons. 
The  final  sample  of twenty respondents  remained and was  split into three 
broad  categories.  The  category  assigned to  each respondent was  set in 
accordance  with  how  much vested interest an individual was  likely to have 
in  the  project at the  time of each interview.  It was  assumed that people 
without  an  identifiable  direct  involvement  with  the management of the 
project  may  lack  an  in-depth  knowledge  of the internal systems of the 
project  organisation.  However,  it was  these people who  were more  likely 
to  offer  a  relatively objective account of critical events  in the history 
of  the  project.  It was  also  the case that some  ex JVP  or service company 
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the  project,  even  though  they  were  no  longer working directly for  the 
joint  venturers  or  a  major client or subcontractor.  This broad group of 
respondents were  labelled "External Parties"  and placed in Category 1. 
CATEGORY  1:  Academics,  journalists,  business  consultants not 
working directly for  the JVPs,  ex-JVP  and service  company  employees  . 
The  second  category  of  respondents  was  labelled "Political 
Operatives"  since  they  were  seen  to have  a  measure  of direct political 
interest  in  the administration,  coordination,  planning and development of 
the  NWS  project. 
CATEGORY  2:  Union  officials,  representatives  of employers 
organisations  and  Civil  servants  working  with  the  government  agencies 
charged  with administering the  terms  of the  1979  Woodside  (North West  Gas) 
Development  Agreement  and  relevant  Federal  legislation  (see  4.1.2 
4.1.6). 
These  people  were  in  a  position  to  offer  an  insider's 
perspective  on  a  number  of  issues  related  to  past  and  current JVP 
policies.  The  government  agencies  and  independent organisations  from 
which  political  operatives were  drawn  included the  DRD,  the  SECWA  and  the 
TLC  which  represented  all  unionised  labour working  on the  NWS  project. 
Information  supplied by union representatives offered a  useful alternative 
perspective  on  a  number  of  events  recounted by public servants  and JVP 
representatives. 
The  third  category  of  respondents  used  in  the  study were 
"Internal Parties". 
CATEGORY  3:  Direct  employees  of  the  NWS  joint  venture 
organisation  or  service  companies  contracted  by  the JVPs  to undertake 
specific  project management or engineering tasks.  In view of their direct 70 
involvement  in  the  day  to  day  administration and operation of various 
project  subsystems  it  was  assumed  that internal parties were likely to 
offer  politically  expedient  and possibly contentious  accounts  of some  of 
the events  on which  they were  asked to comment. 
2.2.2.  The  two  interview stages 
Prior  to reaching any final agreement  on interview formats  with 
the  20  specialist respondents  they were  informed that: 
(i)  The  interview programme  would be divided into  two  stages: 
Stage  I:  Identification  of  critical  events  and  general 
information  on the  NWS  corporate structure,  project systems  and 
institutional environment. 
Stage  II:  Specific  detail  on  critical  events  and  related 
corporate and public policy measures. 
(ii)  Interview  would  be  based  on  standard questions  drawn  from  a 
(iii) 
pre-prepared  schedule  and  would  allow  for  a  degree  of 
flexibility in response. 
The  sessions  would  be  taped and would last approximately  one 
hour at each stage. 
(iv)  Stage  I  and  II  interviews  would  be  conducted  in separate 
sessions,  wherever  possible,  in  order  to  allow  time  for 
collation of Stage  I  data.*l 
(v)  Information  drawn  from  these  sessions would be  transcribed and 
sources would remain confidential. 
Once  each  respondent was  satisfied with these arrangements  the 
Stage  I  interview programme  was  initiated,  running between March  and July 
1986.  The  second stage of the programme  was  carried out later in the year 
between August  and October. 71 
STAGE  I:  Interviews  were  conducted  with  the  sample  of  20 
respondents  covering  10  Category  1  respondents,  5  Category  2  and  5  in 
Category  3.  The  interview  schedule  which had been drawn  up  after the 
preliminary  data  gathering  exercise,  was  delivered on  a  direct dialogue 
face-to-face  basis,  with  each  question  allowing  the  interviewee  a  fair 
measure  of  flexibility  in  response.  These  questions  encouraged 
respondents  to  designate  a  list of significant events  in the history of 
the  NWS  project,  detailing  those  organisations which  they perceived had 
played  an  important  role  in  influencing  JVP  policy  since 1973.  The 
respondents  were  also  asked to  comment  on  the  internal mechanisms  of the 
joint  venture  organisation.  Finally,  each respondent was  asked to pick 
out  'critical events'  in keeping with the definition supplied.  These  were 
designated  for  further  analysis  at  Stage  II.  Stage  I  interviews  also 
provided the basic  components  for  Sections  I-V of the  schematic plan. 
STAGE  II:  After the  information obtained from  respondents  in 
Categories  1-3  at  Stage  I  was  compared  and checked against data from 
secondary  sources,  a  second  interview  schedule  was  drawn up.  On  this 
occasion  only  15  of  the  20  respondents  interviewed at Stage  I  felt that 
they  could  offer the more  in-depth knowledge  required for  Stage II.  This 
meant  that the total number  of interviews  conducted was  limited to  35. 
The  Stage  II  questionnaire  was  based  on  a  more  tightly 
structured  format  than  had  been used at Stage I.  The  questions  focused 
primarily  on  critical  events  and the political and  economic  forces  which 
had  impinged on JVP  policy making processes at the  time.  Respondents  were 
asked  to  identify  the  key  organisations  which  were  active  in  the 
institutional  environment  of  the joint venture  organisation and  the  role 
which  they  played  prior  to  and for  the  duration of each critical event. 72 
An  open  comment  section was  included at the  end to  encourage  respondents 
to  pull  together  the  arguments  they had pursued during  the  interview and 
to promote  open discussion of broader issues relating to  the  NWS  project. 
For  Stage  II  it  was  possible  to establish an equal ratio of 
Category  1,  2  and  3  respondents.  This  was  made  possible by  the fact that 
all  the  Stage  I  respondents  who  had professed too little knowledge  to 
answer  Stage II questions had been  'External parties'  (Category 1). 
Stage  II  yielded  sufficient  information  to  facilitate  the 
completion  of  the  two  most detailed sections  of the  conceptual map  (see 
Diagrams  VI  and  VIII).  It also  generated a  body of information which, 
used  in  combination  with existing published material,  provided the basis 
for  an analysis  of the  three critical events  identified at Stage I. 
Once  the  material  from  Stage II was  collated,  it was  possible 
to  compare  a  range  of different perspectives  on each critical event.  The 
accounts  offered  by  individual respondents  could then be  checked against 
secondary  sources  i.e.  relevant  published  material,  notably government 
debates,  media  reports  and  documents  released  by  the joint venturers. 
This  approach provided the basis for  the critical event analysis presented 
in Chapters  6  and 7. 2.3. 
2.3.l. 
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The  Conceptual Map  in Detail 
The  development of the  map 
The  central  importance  of  the broad conceptual  schema  to  the 
theoretical  framework of this study was  highlighted in 1.3 which discussed 
its  conceptual  basis and application as  a  tool of analysis.  The  contents 
of  this  section  go  beyond the superficial coverage of 1.3 by describing 
each  conceptual  division  or clearly defined locus within Sections  I-V of 
the  plan  in  detail.  The  final  Sections VI  and VIII are discussed in 
Chapter  5.  However,  prior to describing the major features  of Diagrams 
I-V  it is  important to understand their relationship to the  conceptual map 
as  a  whole  (see  2.3.2 for content of diagrams). 
Each  of  the  first  five  diagrams  were  developed  from  Stage  I 
interviews  and  the  limited amount  of published material available on  the 
NWS  project  in  early  1986.  Each  of these diagrams  shows  only sparse 
visual  information  which  had  to be  supplemented in order to  support any 
meaningful  study  of  the  internal  and  external forces  which  shaped JVP 
policy throughout critical periods  in the history of the  NWS  project. 
Diagrams  VI  and  VII  were  developed several months  later when 
the  interview  programme  was  completed  and all Stage II information had 
been  collated  and  compared  to  a  secondary  database.  These  diagrams 
reflect  information  compiled in the final stages of the research process. 
They  have  effectively  evolved  from  Diagrams  I  and  V showing in more 
precise  detail key corporate and governmental  relationships which affected 
JVP  planning  during  two  specified time periods  (1980-1985  and 1985-1986). 
Some  of  the organisations  shown  in Diagram  I  do  not feature  in VI  and VII 
as  they  were  only  influential during the preliminary planning stages of 
the  project  (1973-1979).  The  systems  level activities shown  in Diagrams 74 
II  and  IV  are  discussed as  an integral part of the theoretical basis of 
the study. 
However,  the  measurable  impact of these  technical processes  on 
JVP  policy  is not covered in the later stages of the study due  to lack of 
publicly available information relating to this subject matter. 
The  next  subsection  (2.3.2)  will  commence  with  a  brief 
description  of  the  main  boundaries  and institutional components within 
Diagram  I  in order to clarify the  idea of conceptual levels within a  broad 
plan  of  the  JVP  Decision  Making  Environment.  The  relationship between 
various  interest  groups  and  organisations  operating  at  each of these 
levels will then be  elaborated with reference  to Diagrams  I-V. 
2.3.2.  The  five  conceptual levels  (Diagram I) 
Diagram  I  of  the  map  sets  out  each  conceptual  boundary 
discussed  in  1.3 with the exception of systems  level.  The  major  internal 
organisational  processes which  take place at this level are  illustrated in 
Diagrams  II-IV.  In  Diagram  I  we  see  a  simple  illustration of the 
corporate  relationship  which  exists  between the six participants in the 
NWS  joint  venture.  On  the left hand side of the  diagram three principal 
multinational  participants  are  grouped  in order to  show  the direct link 
with  parent  companies  (in the case of direct subsidiaries)  or world level 
operations.  Shell  and  the  Australian  steel and minerals  corporation, 
Broken  Hill Propriety Co.  are linked through  a  common  holding company,  NWS 
Development  Pty.,  which until March  f985  provided indirect share equity in 
the  NWS  project through its 15%  stake  in Woodside  Petroleum  (Introduction 
Table  1  and  Figure  1).  Woodside  Offshore  Petroleum  (WOP)  and Hematite 
Petroleum,  the operating subsidiaries of Woodside  Petroleum and BHP  in the DIAGRAM  I  Page  75 
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NWS  project  are  not  shown.  The  sixth participant Mitsui-Mitsubishi or 
MIMI  is  only  active  in  the  development  of  phase  II,  LNG  related 
operations  and  officially  holds  no  direct equity in the Domestic  phase 
(see Table 1,  Figure 1). 
The  external  environment boundary demarcates all those sectors 
of  the  institutional network which fall outwith the joint venture project 
organisation.  The  diagram  shows  a  selection  of  the  most  important 
governmental  and  independent  corporate  bodies  operating  at  State and 
National  level  during  the  planning  and  construction  period  for  the 
Domestic  gas  plant,  SECWA  pipeline,  North  Rankin  'A'  platform and all 
associated  land  based  and  subsea  infrastructure  required  for  Phase  I 
(1973-85).  In  the  early  planning  stages  of  the  project,  Federal 
government  bodies  were  of  particular  importance,  notably BMR,  DRE  and 
Treasury.  These  bodies  liaised with W.A.  State  government  agencies  who 
would  take  over  responsibility for various  administrative  and regulatory 
functions  relating  to  the  NWS  project  once  Federal  approval has  been 
granted  for  the  joint  venturer's  development plans.  The principal W.A. 
State  government  body  charged  with  administering  the  terms  of the  NWS 
Development  agreement  signed with the joint venturers  in December  1979  is 
the Department of Resources  Development  (DRD)  (see 4.1.3  and 4.1.5). 
At  World  level  the  major  concern  in this  study is with the 
multinational  parent  companies  of  Shell Development  (Australia)  Pty,  BP 
Developments  Australia  Ltd  and  California  Asiatic  Oil  Company  and  the 
influence  which this parent-subsidiary relationship has brought  to bear on 
planning  and  policy  making  within  the  joint venture organisation  (see 
6.2.1-6.2.4).  The  influence  of  these  parent  companies  and the major 
project  investors  and financiers  on JVP  policy is discussed in Chapters  6 77 
and  7.  Finally.  the  role  of  OPEC,  the  Japanese  and other foreign 
governments  as  key  actors  in  the  international petroleum network is a 
theme which is raised in Chapter  3  and pursued throughout the study. 
2.3.3. 
A. 
Systems  and project level  (Diagrams  II-V> 
Systems  level: 
Systems  level  is  used  in this study to refer to  the range of 
technical  and  project management  functions  which are necessary 
for  the  ongoing  planning  and  development  of  a  large scale 
resource  project.  It  is  at  this  level  that  a  number  of 
technical  decisions  are  taken  to  implement  the  broader 
development plans  laid out at Project level. 
Examples  of  individual project systems  shown in Diagrams  II-IV 
include  Planning.  Design,  Procurement/Selection of materials, 
capital  equipment  and  manpower,  Construction,  Operation and 
Maintenance of completed plant. 
When  considering  the various Project systems  shown  in Diagrams 
II-IV),  it should be noted that the  NWS  project splits into  two 
distinctive  phases:  (i)  The  Domestic  Gas  phase supplying piped 
gas  to  the Western Australian commercial  and household market, 
and  (ii)  The  LNG  phase  established  primarily  to  produce 
liquified natural gas  for export purposes. 
Diagrams  II-IV  reflect  this  two-phase  development  scheme  for 
NWS  gas  and  condensate  reserves.  Diagram II concentrates  on 
the  procedures  necessary  for  the  construction  of the North 
Rankin  'A'  platform which will be  the sole producer of gas  for 
both  phases  of  the  project  until  the  Goodwyn  platform is 78 
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DIAGRAM  IV 
LNG  EXPORT  PHASE 
PLANNING 
- Secondary 
., r. 
DESIGN 
- Advanced 
PROCUREMENT/SELECTION 
Additional  Plant,  M'tIs 
and  Specialised Manpower 
t' 
CONSTRUCTION 
Infrastructure 
Civil Work 
LNG  Plant 
Platforms 2  & 3 
LNG  Loading  Facilities 
COMMISSIONING 
LNG  Plant 
Platforms 2  & 3 
Onstream** 
OPERATING  &  MAINTENANCE 
r-
I 
! 
l 
b. 
" 
,  , 
I 
i  Tenders 
I 
I  to 
I 
Contractors  .. 
Selection 
of 
Contractors 
VARIOUS  SUBSYSTEMS 
Plant Hire/ 
Lease 
Purchasing/ 
Q.C. 
Onshore  -
Civil 
Mech/Inst'mt 
Elec/E'tnc 
Pipework 
H 
-
Personnel. 
Unions 
Offshore 
Civil 
Mech/Inst'mt 
Elec/E'tnc 
Pipework 82 
commissioned  in 1993.  Diagram III shows  the processes  relevant 
to  the  Domestic  phase,  whilst Diagram  IV  concentrates  on the 
LNG  phase.  Each  system  can  be  broken  into smaller,  more 
specialised  groups  of  activities  referred  to  as  subsystems. 
These  include  Tendering  procedures  (see  Diagram IIA) ,  Plant 
Hire/Lease,  Purchasing/Quality  Control,  Personnel 
Management/Industrial  Relations,  Planning,  Design,  Procurement, 
Construction,  Commissioning  and  post-commissioning activities 
like  Maintenance  and  Operations  can  also  be  broken  into 
specialised  subsystems.  A  simple  example  is  'Construction' 
which  breaks  down  into  Civil,  Mechanical,  Electrical, 
Electronic  and  Piping work for  onshore infrastructure like the 
LNG  and  Domestic  gas plant and the onshore pipeline.  Offshore 
work  can  be  split  into  the  same  disciplines  covering the 
production  platform  (jacket and modules)  and  submarine pipeline 
carrying gas  and condensate  to shore. 
Diagrams  II-IV  have  been assigned secondary  importance  in the 
study,  which  concentrates  primarily on external political and 
economic  influences  rather  than  managerial  and  technical 
determinants  of  JVP  policy.  Systems  level influences  on JVP 
policy  have not been researched in any detail in this work,  due 
to  problems  of  access  to the required information.  However, 
these  are  still  considered  in  the  conceptual  scheme  of the 
study  which  acknowledges  the  importance of both internal and 
external  pressures  in shaping those policy outputs  (see Figure 
3,  1.1.3:  "Simplified  Diagram  of  JVP  Decision  Making 
Environment). B. 
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The  schematic  plan  incorporates  Systems  level activities and 
draws  broadly on  some  of the  traditional conceptions  of Systems 
theory  found  in  sociological  and  organisational  studies 
literature  (Parsons,  1960;  Simon,  1957).  Subsystems  are  seen 
to  function  in  their own  right as  essential components  of the 
main  project  body.  From an holistic perspective they are seen 
to  have  a  direct  functional  relationship  with  other 
interdependent  subsystems  which  are  essential  for  the 
maintenance  and  development  of the main project body  (Parsons 
1960).  For  analytic  purposes,  Systems  level functions  are 
simply  viewed  as  any  series of interrelated activities which 
are depicted in the  schematic plan below Project Level. 
Project level: 
The  analysis  of  critical  events  presented  in this study is 
based  on  the  assumption  that  the major project planning and 
policy  making  functions  of  the JVP  organisation are based at 
Project  level.  Any  commentary  or  analysis relating to JVP 
policy  begins at Project level and broadens  out to consider the 
influence  of  external  organisations  and  where  possible 
pressures  from  within  the  joint  venture  organisational 
structure.  Project  level is of particular importance  in this 
study  as  it  is  identified as  the point of interface with the 
external  environment  (see 1.1.1 and 1.4,  Thompson  (1967),  Trist 
(1977». 
Although  the  study  uses  JVP policies devised at Project level 
as  the  focal  point  of  analysis,  this  broadens  out into a 
consideration  of  influences at other conceptual levels.  World THE  HAGUE 
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intunationale 
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level  institutions  in  particular  seem prima facia to be very 
distant  from  the  policy  making  mechanisms  of  the  joint 
venturers.  However,  many  major planning decisions  relating to 
the  NWS  project  are  assumed  to have  originated at this level. 
The  influence  of  the  international  headquarters  of  the 
multinational  subsidiaries  participating in the  NWS  project is 
an  important  issue which is raised in Chapters  3,  5  and  6.  Of 
particular  interest is the pervasive  influence  exerted by Shell 
Internationale  Petroleum  Maatschappij  (SIPM)  over  Shell 
Development  Australia  Pty.  Ltd.,  the  company which  assumed  the 
lead  role  in  the planning and  development of the  LNG  phase  of 
the  NWS  project  (see  5.2.3). 
The  principal  decision making body for  the  NWS  joint venturers 
is  the  Project Committee,  made  up  of representatives  from  each 
participating  company,  voting  in proportion to  equity held in 
the  venture  (see  Diagram  V).  This  Committee  devises  JVP 
policies  for  the  ongoing  development  of  the  project.  Two 
separate  bodies  report  to  the  project  committee,  Woodside 
Petroleum  Ltd. ,  through  its  subsidiary  Woodside  Offshore 
WOP  as project operator is responsible for  Petroleum  (WOP). 
the  design,  construction  and  operation  of  the  project, 
coordinating  development,  activities  in  accordance  with the 
terms  and  conditions  set  down  in  the  project  development 
agreement  ratified  by  State  parliament in December  1979  (see 
3.1.3).  The  second  body  shown  in Diagram V  is the  Project 
Coordination  Group,  based  in  Melbourne.  This  group  has 
representatives  from  each  of  the  joint  venture participant 86 
companies  and  acts  as  an executive secretariat to the project 
committee  (Allen  1983:p12).  The  Project Coordination Group 
assumes  particular  importance  in that its members  communicate 
with  and receive directives  from senior executives at the World 
level  operations  centres  of  each  multinational participant. 
This  is  illustrated  in  Diagram  V  which  indicates  a  linkage 
between  the  international operations of Shell,  BP,  Cal-Asiatic 
and  their  Australian  based operators which are represented on 
the  Melbourne  based  joint  venture  coordination  group.  The 
Mitsui-Mitsubishi  (MIMI)  consortium has been included at World 
level  to  show  their significance as  a  powerful Japanese based 
participant  in  Phase II of the project.  A notable omission at 
World  level is BHP,  which has been excluded as it is considered 
for  the  purposes  of this study as  an Australian based company 
rather than an  incoming foreign multinational. 
An  important body depicted in Diagram V which serves  to provide 
an  essential  interface between the JVP policy makers  and their 
external  environment  is the National Liaison Group.  This body 
was  established  in  1985  to  provide  a  regular  forum  for 
discussion  between  JVP  executives  and representatives  from  the 
unions,  employer  groups,  industrial  and commercial  interests 
linked  to  the  NWS  project.  Shown at State level in V,  the 
group  is  jointly  chaired by both the State and Federal energy 
ministers  (see 5.2.2). 
Following  the  scheme  laid  out  in  Diagram  V  the  Project 
Committee  makes  all the major policy decisions relating to the 
project,  following  the  recommendations  of  the  Coordination 87 
Committee  and  representatives  of Woodside  Offshore  Petroleum. 
These  decisions  are  then  implemented at the Perth operations 
centre  and  on  site  at  Dampier.  The  Perth operations base 
carries  out  major  project  planning functions  and coordinates 
systems  level or modular planning and development activities on 
site  at  Dampier  and Withnell Bay.  There  is constant interface 
between  Perth  and  onsite  project  managers  and engineers  in 
relation  to  all  Systems  level  activities,  i.e.  planning, 
procurement/selection,  construction,  commissioning,  operations 
and maintenance. 
The  decisions made  by  the Project Committee  are  influenced from 
above  by  the  multinationals  and  their  Australian  based 
representatives  on  the  JVP  Coordination Group.  The  input  from 
Project  level  comes  from  Woodside  Offshore  Petroleum and  BHP 
(Diagram  V).  Any  change  in the  long term planning strategy for 
the  NWS  project  resulting  from widespread policy changes,  is 
seen  to reflect feedback  from parties operating at World level, 
Project  level  and  Systems  level.  Major macroeconomic  changes 
in  the  world  petroleum  markets  will  lead to changes  in the 
strategies  adopted by the multinational oil companies  operating 
at  their  level.  Political  change  which  is  also of major 
importance  will be reflected in the policies of the Federal  and 
State governments. 
C.  External environment  - State.  National  and World Levels 
The  external  environment  of  the  joint  venture  corporate 
structure  is  split  into  three  conceptual levels.  These  are 
labelled  in  Diagrams  I  and  V·  ,  however,  the major detail on 88 
organisations  operating  within the external environment of the 
NWS  project organisation is presented in Chapter  5  (Diagrams  VI 
and VII). 
At  present  a  brief discussion of the external bodies  shown  in 
Diagrams  I  and V will serve  to clarify the relationship between 
each  conceptual division discussed in 2.3.2.  At World level we 
find  the world governments,  financial leviathans like the major 
banking  and  insurance  groups,  powerful  politico-economic 
agencies  like the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC)  and  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development  (OECD).  The  other key power brokers at this level 
are  the  world  operations  of the multinational oil companies. 
World  level  organisations  are  linked by shared political and 
economic  interests  to  lower  level organisations which are in 
turn  connected  by  a  tighter  and  more  clearly  defined 
institutional  network.  This  network encompasses  organisations 
operating  at  every  hierarchical  level  shown  in  the  model 
although  it  is  most concentrated at State and National level. 
The  organisations  operating at these  levels can be part of the 
State  or  Federal government bureaucracy,  quasi-governmental  or 
totally  independent  organisations.  They  are all assumed  to 
operate  within  a  broad legal framework set up by the State and 
Commonwealth  parliaments  (see 4.1).  Examples  of key operations 
at  Federal  level include  the Department of Minerals  and Energy 
(DME).  the  Australian  Council  of  Trade  Unions  (ACTU) ,  the 
Confederation  of  Australian  Industry  (CAl)  and  the Federal 
Treasury.  Other  organisations  which were  important prior to 89 
1980  but  have  since lost any major significance in relation to 
the  NWS,  were  the  Bureau  of Mineral Resources  (BMR)  and the 
Foreign  Investment  Review  Board  (FIRB)  (see 4.2.3  and 4.3.3). 
The  key  organisations  at  State  level  like those at Federal 
level  have  changed  over  the years  (see Diagrams  VI  and VII). 
However,  since  the  election  of the Burke  Labor  government  in 
Western  Australia  (February 1983),  the Department of Resources 
Development  (DRD)  has  been  the  major  body  responsible for 
administering  the  State's  interests  in the  NWS.  The  Western 
Australian  Department  of  Mines  and  Department of Industrial 
Development  which  respectively  held  responsibility  for  the 
issue  of  production licences  and surveying local manufacturing 
input  into  the  project,  have  had  all  their  other 
responsibilities  relating  to  the  NWS  subsumed under  the  DRD 
umbrella  (see 3.1.5). 
The  principal  State level body representing the unions  on site 
at  Dampier  and  Withnell  Bay is the Trades  and Labour  Council 
(TLC) ,  with  the  Confederation  of  West  Australian  Industry 
(CWAI)  representing  employer  and small business  interests  (see 
4.1.5  and 5.2.2). 90 
2.4.  General Literature Review 
In  view  of  the  interdisciplinary nature of the  study and the 
diversity  of  themes  covered,  it was  necessary to consult a  broad base of 
published  material  throughout  the  research  process.  Accordingly  the 
review  which  follows  is subdivided under four broad headings  each of which 
covers  texts  and publications which contributed to  a  distinct part of the 
work  set  out  in Chapters  1  to 8.  The headings  are:  A.  Research Design 
and  Methodology;  B.  The  International Petroleum Industry;  C.  The  NWS 
Project  Political  and  Economic  Aspects,  and D.  The Australian Petroleum 
Sector. 
Section  'A'  is limited to  a  discussion of those  theorists whose 
work  was  not covered in 1.1.1-1.1.3 and 1.4.  Section  'B'  is  important for 
framing  the  NWS  project  within  a  worldwide  context:  the vertically 
integrated,  multinational  dominated  world  petroleum  industry.  Major 
detail  is  provided  in  Section  C  on  a  number  of  writers  who  have 
contributed  to the description of the political and economic background to 
the  NWS  project covered in Chapters  3  to 7.  The  final section deals with 
writers  on  the  Australian  petroleum  sector relevant areas of which are 
reviewed in 3.4,  3.5  and Appendix I. 
The  broad  scope  and detail contained in the Literature review 
goes  beyond  that  which  is  normally  required  for  a  thesis.  In this 
instance  the  intention  is that the  overview of texts and other materials 
cited  will  provide  a  useful reference point and synoptical guide for  the 
student  of  multinational  operations  within  the international petroleum 
industry.  Section  'c'  will  be  of particular use  to  those undertaking 
further research on the North West  Shelf project. 91 
A.  Research Design  and Methodology 
Embarking  on  a  study of multinational corporate policy within a 
complex  institutional  environment  was  a  task  which  required  careful 
thought  and  planning.  From  the  earliest stages it was  evident that a 
multidisciplinary  approach  would  be  required  to  satisfy  the  major 
objectives  and  that  it  would  be  necessary  to  develop  a  research 
methodology  which  could  accommodate  this  (see 1.1.2).  A number  of texts 
were  consulted  to  provide  assistance  in the  adoption of an appropriate 
methodological  and  conceptual  basis  for  the  study.  The  final  research 
methodology  adopted  was  influenced  by  the  works  of  several  writers 
including  Selltiz,  Jahoda  et  al.  (1971),  Quinn  (1980)  and  Chalmers 
(1980). 
approaches 
phenomena. 
Selltiz,  Jahoda  et al.  set out  a  broad commentary  on different 
and  methods  for  the  study  of  social  and  organisational 
In  keeping  with  their  typology  for  a  formulative  or 
exploratory  study  the current work places  an emphasis  on  the discovery of 
ideas  and  insights  and  employs  a  research structure which  is flexible 
enough  to  permit  consideration  of  several  different  aspects  of  a 
phenomenon  (see  1.1.2  and  2.2.2).  More  specifically,  Selltiz,  Jahoda 
et  al.  made  a  useful  contribution  to  the methodology  employed  in this 
study  through: 
(i)  Mapping  out  a  clear  picture of alternative research methods, 
their  application  in  previous  studies  and  the  basic steps 
required to  apply  them. 
(ii)  Provided  a  guide  to  the broad steps which can be  followed in 
(iii) 
social  scientific  research  and  how  to  organise  the  text in a 
thesis. 
Highlighted  the  major  problems  which  are often associated with 
commonly  used field research and data collection methods. 92 
Quinn's  study  of  the  decision making behaviour of executives 
within  three  leading  American  corporations  during  periods  of 
organisational  change  was  another  reference point for  the  current work. 
His  research  structure,  which  was  based  on  a  series  of  in-depth, 
structured interviews,  encouraged respondents  to: 
(i)  Talk  freely  about  the organisational  issues  most pertinent to 
their own  situations. 
(ii)  Return  to  mainstream issues  raised by  the  interviewer whenever 
they  felt  that  they  had fresh  information to offer.  All  the 
material  generated  by  Quinn's  interview  programme  was  then 
compared  to  a  large  file  of  secondary  data  collected  by 
research assistants  (see  Quinn 1980). 
The  current study  draws  on a  number  of techniques  employed by Quinn  (1980) 
including: 
(i)  Use  of  a  flexible  interview format based on standard questions 
but  allowing  for  a  measure  of  open  discussion  of matters 
broadly relevant to  the major  subject matter of the  study. 
(ii)  Cross  checking  of  data  drawn  from  interviews against  a  large 
secondary database  (see  also Patton  (1973),  1.4). 
The  research  problems  encountered in the early stages  of this 
work  encouraged  consideration  of  a  number  of  alternative 
approaches  and  methods  for  the  study of the  subject matter. 
Chalmers  (1980),  provides  a  stimulus  for this  type  of thinking 
in  his  historical overview of the work  of major writers  in the 
philosophy  of  science.  In his  commentary  on social scientific 
research  he  highlights  the  inherent weaknesses  of a  number  of 
traditional  positivist approaches  to  studying social phenomena, 93 
which  have  been  adopted  from natural science.  His  review of 
concepts  like  the scientific paradigm and  theory dependence  is 
a  useful  guide  to  theories  on the  advancement of scientific 
knowledge  and  raises  a  number of ideas which  can be usefully 
applied in any  form of social scientific research. 
The  major  concepts  incorporated into the  theoretical  framework 
of  this  study are drawn  from  the field of organisation theory.  A notable 
contribution  is  made  by Parsons  (1960),  a  leading exponent of the  systems 
based  approach  to  organisational  analysis.  The hierarchical schematic 
plan  employed  in  the  study  which  shows  the  interphase between the  NWS 
project  organisation  and  its  environment,  draws  on Parsons  three tiered 
model  of complex organisations.  Parsons  (1960)  discusses  the relationship 
between  three  distinct  levels  of  responsibility and control within the 
organisation:  i)  Technical,  ii)  Managerial  and  iii)  Institutional. 
Parsons  technical  sub-organisation  is  similar  to the technical systems 
shown  in the  schematic plan.  The  former  is serviced and controlled by the 
Managerial  sub-organisation  whilst  Systems  level activities are  guided by 
broader  policy prescriptions made  at Project level.  Parsons Institutional 
level  refers  to  the  interphase  with  the  organisation's  external 
environment,  an  area  covered  in  the  discussion  of  the institutional 
network  and  schematic  plan.  This  broad  scheme  was  advanced by later 
writers  notably  Thompson  (1967)  and Mintzberg  (1979),  whose  contributions 
to  the  study are covered in 1.1.1 and 1.4. 
Simon  (1957)  provides  an alternative framework for  the  study of 
corporate  policy  within  a  complex  organisational environment.  Through 
elaboration  of  the  idea of bounded rationality,  he  explains how managers 
learn  to  cope  with  decision making  in a  complex  environment by limiting 94 
the  number  of variables  they have  to deal with at anyone  time.  His work 
concentrates  primarily  on  internal  factors  which  shape organisational 
policies;  however,  he  also  acknowledges  and discusses  the  importance of 
external environmental factors. 
The  work  of Simon,  Parsons  and other organisational theorists, 
notably  Mintzberg  (1979),  provides  a  useful reference point for  the  study 
of  managerial  decision  making  and  the  interphase  between the  complex 
organisation  and  the external environment.  However,  none  of these writers 
have  provided  a  fully  developed  model  which could form  the basis for  a 
study  of  multinational corporate policy in relation to the development of 
a  large  scale  petroleum  development.  It is anticipated that this  study 
may  lay the  foundations  for  such  a  model. 
B.  The  International Petroleum Industry 
When  examining  the  activities  of multinational oil companies 
within  any  nation,  it is important to  remember  that these are 
linked  to  a  much  wider corporate network with operations based 
in  various  locations  through  the world.  In this  study the  NWS 
project  is  seen  to  be  linked  to an international petroleum 
industry  through  trade in petroleum products  and  the corporate 
structures  of  the  multinational  joint  venture participants. 
Chapter  3  describes  the nature of the  international petroleum 
network  and  the  influence which major organisations operating 
within  it  can  exert over  the decision making processes of the 
joint  venture  participants.  Topics  covered  include  the 
importance  of  OPEC  and  OECD  governments  and the role of the 
Japanese  government within the world  LNG  trade. 95 
A  number  of texts are available dealing with individual aspects 
of  the  world  petroleum  industry.  However,  the  most 
comprehensive  overview  covered  in  the  literature search for 
this  study was  provided by Odell  (1981).  Other  texts consulted 
included  Sampson  (1981),  Danielsen  (1982)  on the evolution of 
OPEC,  and  Zorn  (1983).  Relevant theses extract material is 
reviewed in 1.4. 
Odell's  work  is  devoted to  an examination of the structure of 
the  world  petroleum industry,  its evolution since World War  II 
and  the  underlying  political  battles  between major producer 
nations,  oil  companies  and  the  governments  of the major oil 
importing  countries.  The  book is of considerable  importance 
for  this  work  in that it introduced the concept of a  worldwide 
network  of nodes  and connections  to represent the  international 
petroleum  trade.  This  was  adopted as  an integral part of the 
conceptual  framework  employed in the study.  Odell  (1981)  also 
makes  the  important distinction between the  trade in crude oil 
and  natural  gas  which is conducted through different channels 
within the worldwide petroleum network  (see 3.2.2 and 3.3.1). 
Danielsen  (1982)  and  Sampson  (1981)  provide  a  useful general 
background  to major structural changes  in the  international oil 
industry  in  the  past 50  years.  Sampson  traces  the history of 
the  oil  industry  from  the  1930's,  when  seven  major 
multinationals  held  an  oligopolistic  stranglehold  on  the 
market,  through  to the post 1979  period which marked  a  decline 
in  the  importance  of  oil as  the developed world's  singlemost 
important  energy  source.  Danielsen and Sampson  trace  the role C. 
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of  OPEC,  the  DECO  and the major multinationals  in controlling 
the  world  oil  industry  and  the  shift to alternative energy 
programmes  which  introduced gas  as  a  premium fuel  rather than a 
by-product  of  oil  exploration.  This  was  crucial  for  the 
development  of  the  NWS  project as it was  the move  towards  the 
use  of piped gas,  LPG  and LNG,  as  major power  sources.  This  in 
turn  led  to  the expansion of the international trade in these 
products  and  provided  an incentive for  the joint venturers  to 
develop  the  massive  North  Rankin  field  some  130  km  off the 
North West  top of Australia  (see  3.2.2 and 3.2.3). 
The  study  draws  on  Zorn  (1983)  when explaining some  of the 
major  political  and  economic  links between various  governments 
and  organisations  operating  within  the  world  petroleum 
industry.  As  an ex-UN  advisor on transnational corporations, 
Zorn's  work  reflects  a  good understanding of the relationships 
which  exist 
governments 
operations. 
the  study 
between  multinational  oil  companies  and  the 
of  host  nations  within  which  they  locate 
This  type  of relationship is a  central  theme  of 
which  examines  the  corporate  policy  of  a 
multinational  joint  venture  organisation,  the  interplay with 
Federal  and  State  government policy and  the broad legislative 
framework 
Australia. 
governing  the  petroleum  and  minerals  sector  in 
The  North West  Shelf:  Politics and Economics 
A  number  of reports  and academic papers have been issued since 
the  late  1970's  which  have  attempted to assess  the potential 
costs  and  benefits  which  would  accrue  to the Australian and 97 
Western  Australian  economies  from  the  development  of the North 
West  Shelf.  This  topic  has  been  addressed in the work of 
Bambrick  (1977),  Gray  (1978),  Brown  and Copeland  (1985).  All 
three  studies  devote  space  to  cover  a  cost benefit analysis  of 
the  project  using  standard  measures  like labour,  capital and 
construction  costs,  offset  against potential returns  to State 
and  Federal  governments  through  royalties  and  tax revenues. 
Broader  benefits  accruing  to  the  national  and  Western 
Australian  economies  through  increased  employment  levels, 
national  income  and  technology transfer are also  examined. 
The  most  recent  study  by  Brown  and  Copeland,  a  firm  of 
consulting  economists,  considers  the major  sources  of costs  and 
benefits  in  considerable detail,  covering Phase  1  construction 
and  operation,  the  SECWA  pipeline,  Phase  II construction and 
indicators  relating  to  the  Domestic market  for natural gas  and 
the  international  market  for  LNG.  All results produced  from 
research  in these  areas  are  subjected to  a  sensitivity analysis 
to  produce  a  series of cost(benefit profiles in the  event of a 
major  change  in  important  variables like oil prices,  oil/LNG 
price  relativities and exchange  rates for  the Australian dollar 
(Brown  and Copeland 1985). 
The  Bambrick  and  Gray  papers  do  not  offer  the breadth of 
coverage  offered  in  the  Brown  and Copeland report,  although 
they  deal  with  the potential multiplier effect of the project 
on  national  income  and  employment which  is not addressed in the 
1985  study.  Brown  and Copeland's  work has been subject to  some 
criticism  (see  Field  1985)  relating  largely  to  sourcing of 98 
figures.  However,  it provides  the most  comprehensive update  on 
the  costjbenefit  economics  of the  NWS  project.  Although these 
economic  studies  are primarily employed as  background reading, 
some  of  the  material from  Brown  and Copeland is considered in 
the study. 
A  number  of  basic  variables  employed  in  the  sensitivity 
analysis,  i.e. oil prices and  indexed LNG  prices are considered 
in  Chapters  3  and  6,  where  there is  some  discussion of broad 
macroeconomic  influences  on  JVP  policy.  Although the figures 
presented  by  Gray  (1978)  and  Bambrick  (1979)  must  now  be 
qualified  by  broad changes  in the planning of the  NWS  project, 
and  massive  shifts in the  international oil market since 1978, 
they  provide  a  useful  source  of  comparative data and gauge 
energy  price expectations of the post 1973  oil crisis period to 
those of the mid 1980's. 
One  of  the  critical  events  designated  for analysis  in this 
study  relates  to  the  renegotiation  of  the  Domestic  gas 
contracts  by  SECWA  at  the  time  (March  1985)  which was  facing 
severe  financial  problems  due  to  a  large inventory of unsold 
gas  which  it  had  accrued under  the  take or pay conditions of 
the  agreement  with  the  JVPs.  The background to this major 
political  headache  for  the Western Australian State government 
is  dealt  with in considerable detail in three papers  issued by 
the  "Energy  Policy  Research  Group"  at  Murdoch  University. 
Brotherton  (1982)  considers  some  of  the  key  political and 
economic  factors  which  have  affected  SECWA  forecasting  of 
energy  use  in Western Australia from  the mid-1970's  through to 99 
1982.  The  author points  to  a  number of weaknesses  inherent in 
the  forecasting  techniques  employed by the  SECWA  economists  and 
that  these  have  contributed  to  the  apparent  inaccuracy of 
SECWA's  medium  and  long  term energy demand estimates.  Apart 
from  problems  associated with forecasting methods,  he points to 
the  organisational  structure  of  the  SECWA  and the prevailing 
political  climate  in  Western  Australia  during  the  1975-82 
period  as  major  influences  on  the  contents  of SECWA  energy 
demand forecasts  during these years. 
Brotherton  (1982)  and  Brotherton  and Newman  (1983)  provide  a 
considerable  quantity  of  background  information  tracing the 
major  reasons  for  SECWA's  current financial  dilemma.  In the 
1983  paper,  SECWA's  position is examined in the context of the 
original  development proposal for  Phase I.  The  major financial 
aspects  and market prospects  for both phases  are covered and in 
the  case  of  Phase  II,  compared  to  a  series of alternative 
proposals  which  were  mooted prior to  LNG  export  ~pprovals from 
the Federal  government  in 1979  (Brotherton and Newman  1983). 
These  alternative proposals are significant in the current work 
in  that  the  plan  for  a  transcontinental pipeline originally 
proposed  by  R.F.  Connor  in  1972,  was  one  of several major 
political  issues  which would directly affect the JVPs  decision 
on whether to proceed with the  NWS  project. 
In  another  key paper  in the energy policy in Western Australia 
series,  Harman  (1984),  documents  a  short history of the  NWS 
project  from  the  early planning days  in 1972  through to 1983. 
Acknowledging  the  political  nature of the subject matter,  the 100 
paper  relates  the history of the project through an overview of 
relevant  State  and  Federal  government  policy in the  1972-83 
period.  Areas  of conflict between State and Federal policy are 
examined,  focusing  on  the  impact  which  these  political 
struggles  had  on  the  development  of  the  NWS  project.  An 
attempt  is  made  to  explain some  of the problems  inherited by 
the  Western  Australian State government  and the  SECWA  by 1983, 
through  reference  to  a  series  of  policy  measures  taken by 
respective  State and Federal ministers since  the Whit1am  era of 
1972  to  1975.  The  history of the project is divided into four 
distinct  periods  and  a  number  of major decisions  taken by the 
joint  venturers  and  governmental  agencies  are set against the 
prevailing political background of the  time. 
The  current study draws  on a  number  of observations outlined in 
the  Harman  paper  relating to key events  in the history of the 
project  and  the  historical linkages which exist between them. 
In  addition to providing the basis for  a  more  in-depth analysis 
of  some  historically  significant  events,  the  paper  also 
establishes  the  importance of a  number  of pieces of key Federal 
legislation  in  shaping  the policies of the JVPs  over specific 
periods  of time.  Examples  include  the  Seas  and Submerged Lands 
Act  1973,  the Pipeline Authority Act  1973  and the  Petroleum and 
Minerals  Authority  Act  1974  (see Chapter 4).  Details on these 
acts  and  other pieces of key Federal legislation affecting the 
joint  venturers  over  the past thirteen yeas  are presented in a 
public  policy  analysis  paper  by  Layer  (1985).  Layer's work 
places  a  number  of pieces of key Federal legislation relating 101 
to  the  petroleum and minerals  sector of the Australian economy 
into  a  broader  framework  for  analysis.  This  shows  the 
relationship  between  individual  policy  initiatives  and  how 
various  pieces  of key legislation have  emerged  as  a  product of 
political  debate  over  the  years.  His  work  is instructive in 
that  it  highlights  the  ongoing power  struggle between Federal 
and  State  governments  over petroleum and minerals  deposits  and 
administration  of  resource  sector  activity.  This  ongoing 
conflict  best  illustrated by  the  contestation by  the States of 
the  Seas  and  Submerged  Lands  Act  in the  High  Court,  provided 
some  of  the  important  dynamics  for  development  of the  NWS 
project. 
Following  a  period  between  April  1984  and April  1985,  which 
witnessed  a  series of major  adjustments  to  JVP  project planning 
the  renegotiation  of  the  SECWA  contracts  and  the  She11/BHP 
takeover  of  Woodside  Petroleum,  a  series  of  documents  was 
issued  by the  JVPs  and Western Australian government  to  account 
for  these  changes  and outline policies for  the  future. 
Parker  (August  1985)  presents  the current State  government's 
account  of  how  the  SECWA  was  eventually forced  to renegotiate 
the  terms  of  the  original  "take  or pay"  contracts with the 
JVPs.  Consideration  is  given  to  the original Memorandum  of 
Understanding  (MOU)  between  the  SECWA,  Alcoa  and  the JVPs  and 
the  role  of  the key actors  like the  DRD  under Ministers Jones 
and  Mensaros.  A profile of original  SECWA  demand projections 
for  natural  gas  in  Western  Australia  is  presented and set 
against  an  outline of actual  demand  for natural gas  in Western 
Australia during  the early to mid 1980's. 102 
The  W.A.  Energy  Minister's  statement  is  useful  in that it 
provides  a  useful  point  of  reference for comparison to data 
relating  to  the  SECWA  issue.  The  information contained in the 
policy  document is,  however,  subject to qualification.  In view 
of  this,  all  the material drawn  from  the  document  and used in 
Chapter  7  is checked against other published sources.  The  most 
contentious  issues relating to the  SECWA  contracts are  examined 
by  comparing  the  minister's  account  to  the  public debates 
published  in  WA  Hansard,  covering  the  period when  relevant 
issues were being discussed. 
Two  months prior to  the  issue of the August  1985  statement both 
the  DRD  and  the  joint  venturers  issued documents  outlining 
plans  and  background  information relating to the  LNG  phase of 
the  NWS  project.  The  Department of Resources  Development  "LNG 
Study  Mission"  document  covers  a  number  of areas which are 
touched  upon  in  this  study  including  State  government 
involvement  in resources  development  and ongoing changes  in the 
Japanese market for  LNG. 
In  order  to  provide  a  comparative measure of capital costs, 
sourcing  of  materials  and  labour,  and  levels  of  State 
participation  in  large  LNG  projects,  data is drawn  from visits 
to  the  Arun  plan  in  Indonesia and the Binitulu LNG  plant in 
Malaysia.  Market  prospects  for  these projects and the North 
West  Shelf  were  compared  with  a  focus  on the sole customer, 
Japan. 103 
Information  on  the  structure  of  the  Japanese  LNG  market 
(1982-1985)  provided  a  good  indicator  of  past,  current and 
possible  future  Japanese  policies  on sourcing of LNG  supplies 
and  is employed  in. Chapters  3  and  6  of the  study.  The  document 
issued  by  the  joint  venturers  in  May  1985,  Woodside  (1985) 
covered  some  similar  ground  to  the W.A.  government  study but 
from  the  perspective  of the  NWS  participants.  The  main areas 
of  concern  include  project  management  and codes  of practice, 
the  Phase  II  schedule  and market prospects  for  NWS  LNG.  The 
section  on  the  scheduling  of  the  project  is of particular 
interest  in  the  current work,  in that it represents  the first 
comprehensive  public  statement  by  the  JVPs  on  project 
restructuring  since  1984.  They  outline  a  series of revised 
technical  and  financial  arrangements  to  stimulate cash  flow  in 
the  short  term  and  ensure  the  long  term  viability of the 
project.  The  current  work  covers  this  ground  when 
consideration  is  given  to how  the strategic development plans 
for  the project have  altered over  the years  (see  6.1  and 6.2). 
Other  important  information  on  the  political  and  economic 
background  to  the  development  of the  NWS  project was  drawn  from 
various  publications  issued  by  the  SECWA  and  the  joint 
venturers.  The  annual  reports  of  the  SECWA  and Woodside 
Petroleum  (operator  for  the  NWS  project)  were  reviewed for 
information  on  formal  corporate policies  in the  ten year period 
from  1977  through  to  1987.  During that time,  the  SECWA  issued 
a  series  of  reports under  the heading  "Natural Gas  in Western 
Australia".  These  were  reviewed  along with the  contents  of D. 
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three  lectures  on future  development of the natural gas  market 
associated  infrastructure  in  Western Australia,  issued by the 
past  W.A.  State  Energy  Commissioner:  Kirkwood  (1974,  1977, 
1980).  Woodside  also  issued a  series of lecture papers  dealing 
with  various  aspects  of the  NWS  project between 1977  and 1984. 
These  were  reviewed in order to  gain a  perspective on the  long 
term  planning framework  which  the joint venturers were  formally 
employing  at  various  points  in  the  development  of the  NWS 
project  (see  Dixon  1978,  1980;  Allen 1978,  1980,  1981,  1983, 
1984). 
The  Australian petroleum sector 
In  Section  3.4  consideration  is  given  to  examining  the 
evolution  and  current  structure  of  the Australian petroleum 
sector.  This  is  important to  the  study as  the  development of 
the  NWS  project  is  seen  to  take  place  within  a  broader 
Australian  and  international  context.  Thus  the project is 
linked  with  both  a  national  and  international  petroleum 
network. 
A  number  of  issues  which  have  influenced the development of 
previous  projects  within  Australia,  i.e.  levels  of foreign 
investment,  export  quotas,  domestic  oil  and gas  pricing are 
relevant  to  the  discussion  of the history of the  NWS.  Links 
also  exist between the corporate structure of the joint venture 
and  other  projects  through the sizeable stake held by leading 
multinationals  like  Shell  and  BP  in upstream and downstream 
operations  at  various  levels  in  the  vertically  integrated 
industry structure. 105 
A  number  of  publications  are  available  which  attempt  to 
document  the  history  of  the Australian oil and gas  industry. 
examining  the  development  of  Australia's  major  petroleum 
resources  and  offering commentary  on the mainstream fiscal and 
legislative  issues  which  have  shaped  the  industry over the 
years.  A text produced by Australia/NZ Bank  (1983)  provides  a 
broad  description  of  the  history of the Australian petroleum 
sector  and  its  development  through  fiscal  and  legislative 
change.  Every major aspect of the  industry is briefly covered 
including  exploration and production,  offshore licensing,  major 
State  and  Federal  legislation  covering onshore  and offshore, 
product  pricing.  refining.  marketing  and  distribution 
networks.  This  publication provides  a  useful overview of the 
economic,  fiscal  and legislative background to the  development 
of  the  Australian oil and  gas  industry.  However.  it offers no 
analysis  or  critique  of  government  policy  in  this  area. 
Saddler  (1981)  attempts  to  do  this  through addressing  a  number 
of  broader  issues  which he refers  to as  the  "Energy question" 
looking  at  how  energy policies have  evolved to maintain energy 
supplies  and  regulate  energy  consumption  by  end  use.  He 
considers  how  energy  policies  have  shaped the  development of 
the  Australian  petroleum  sector  over  the  past 20  years  and 
suggests  alternative  policy  options  which  could  have  been 
adopted  by  successive  State  and Federal governments  (Saddler 
1981:pl).  Saddler's  critique  offers  a  useful insight into a 
number  of  economic  and  political  questions  which are still 
relevant  to  Federal  policy  in  areas like foreign investment 106 
controls,  State  participation  and the broad set of guidelines 
for developing new petroleum and minerals projects. 
Saddler  (1981)  and  McKern  (1976)  both  discuss  other major 
petroleum  projects  in  Australia  including  the  Bass  Straight 
fields,  the  Cooper  Basin  development  and  Barrow  Island. 
Saddler's  political  commentary  and  McKern's  largely economic 
perspective  on  these  developments  provide  instructive examples 
addressing  a  number  of broad issues relevant to  the North West 
Shelf. 
The  arguments  presented by Saddler and McKern have  to  a  degree 
been  overtaken  by  changes  within  Australia's  oil  and  gas 
industry  in  the  past  five  years.  With  the  exception of 
Wilkinson  (1983)  the  absence  of  new  texts  updating  these 
arguments  has  meant  that all post 1983  data used in the study 
is  drawn  from  reports,  consultancy  documents  and  academic 
papers.  These  papers  focus  on more  specific issues although 
the  depth  of  coverage  is  greater  than  in a  standard text. 
Major  sources  used  in the  study include:  Esso  Energy Outlook 
(1984),  Ausoil  Annual  Review  (1985),  Oil  and Gas  Australia 
Magazine  (1984-1988),  Petroleum Gazette  (1985-87)  and The  South 
East Asia Pacific Energy  Symposium  Papers  (March 1986). 107 
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CHAPTER  3 
THE  NORTH  WEST  SHELF  PROJECT  FROM 
AN  INTERNATIONAL  PERSPECTIVE 
INTRODUCTION 
In  Chapter  2,  reference was  made  to  a  number  of key institutions 
operating  within a  worldwide network which have  influenced the planning of 
the  NWS  project  at various points  since 1973.  The first two  sections of 
this  chapter,  3.1  and 3.2,  identify some  of the key parties operating at 
world  level  and  consider  the  nature  of  the  international  petroleum 
network,  which  links  them  to  major  resource  developments  like the  NWS 
project. 
Sections  3.1  and  3.2  incorporate  a  discussion of the worldwide 
petroleum  based  energy  situation  since  1979  and  the  influence  on 
Australia's  fossil  fuel  energy sectors.  The  commentary uses  the  NWS  as  a 
reference  point  and  attempts  to  place  the  development of this project 
within a  broader economic  and geopolitical context. 
Section  3.3  is  an  extension  of the earlier commentary  on  the 
international  petroleum  network  with  a  specialised  emphasis  on  the 
structure  of  the  world  market  for  LNG  in the years  up  to  1985.  This 
section,  which  concentrates  on Japanese  dominance  of the  LNG  trade since 
the mid-seventies,  is updated in Chapter 8. 
Section  3.4  describes  the Australian natural gas  network as  an 
integral  part  of a  broader vertically integrated,  international petroleum 
network.  Section  3.4.1  concentrates on key project locations,  upstream 
and  downstream  operations  and  associated  pipeline  infrastructure 
throughout  Australia.  This  sub-section  is supplemented by Appendix II 
which  deals with  LNG  and LPG  production and transportation.  Section 3.4.2 109 
covers  gas  exports,  due  to become  an increasingly important contributor to 
Australia's  economy  with  the  advent  of  LNG  exports  to Japan set for 
October  1989  (Woodside,  May  1985). 
Section  3.5  returns  the  emphasis  to the multinationals as key 
controllers  of  the  worldwide  and  Australian  based petroleum industry. 
This  point  is  emphasised by an examination of multinational ownership  in 
several of Australia's major petroleum projects. 3.1. 
3.1.1. 
110 
The  Project Within a  Worldwide  Network 
Odell's concept of the  international network 
The  concept  of  the  international petroleum network employed in 
this  study  is  drawn  from  the work of Odell  (1983),  which deals with the 
evolution  of  the  international  oil  trade  and  the shifting balance of 
political  and  economic  power  which  prevails  within  it.  Odell's 
macroeconomic  and  geopolitical  study employs  the  idea of a  network which 
connects  various  corporate  and political interests operating at a  number 
of  key  locations or nodal points  throughout  the world.  Power  groups  like 
the  multinational  oil  companies  and  the  major  producer  and  importer 
governments  are  assumed  to  consolidate their control at selected nodes. 
This  extends  their influence over  trade within the  network.  The political 
and  corporate  power  of  the  multinationals  is viewed as  a  reflection of 
their  ability  to  control activities at every level within the vertically 
integrated  petroleum  industry.  Producer nations  and the  governments  of 
major  industrialised  countries  contribute  to  the  powerp1ay  through 
political  and  economic  strategies  devised to consolidate their position 
within  the network.  The  collective interests of these parties are  assumed 
to  be  broadly  represented  by  OPEC  (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries)  and  the  OECD  (Organisation  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development)  (Odell,  1983). 
Odell's  concept,  although  primarily  concerned  with  oil 
production  and distribution,  provides  a  useful  framework for  examining  the 
link  between  the  political  and  economic policies of world level parties 
and  the planning of the  NWS  project. 111 
3.1.2.  The  link with the North West  Shelf project 
The  NWS  project  is  connected  to  an  international petroleum 
network  through  two  principal channels:  (i)  the multinational corporate 
structure  of  the joint venture organisation;  (ii)  the future  trade in LNG 
and  condensate  with  international buyers.  High levels of foreign equity 
in  the  NWS  venture  indicate the level of multinational  involvement in the 
project.  At  present the  considerable shareholdings of Shell,  BP  and Cal 
Asiatic  (Phases  I  and  II)  and the Mitsui-Mitsubishi consortium holdings 
(Phase  II)  take foreign equity in the project as  a  whole  to over  60%  (see 
4.2.2).  This  figure  is  above  the  50%  Federal  investment guideline for 
petroleum  developments.  The  issue  of  foreign ownership of Australian 
based  resource  projects  will be considered in 3.5.  However,  the current 
concern  is  to  highlight the  link between price adjustment,  corporate  and 
political powerplay  (Peden,  May  1985,  Woodside,  April 1986). 
A  series  of  corporate  linkages  connect  the Australian based 
operations  of  the  foreign  joint  venture  participants,  Shell,  BP,  Cal 
Asiatic  and  the  MIMI  partnership,  with  an  international  business 
infrastructure.  This  may  span  a  number  of vertical levels within the 
petroleum  industry  with  upstream  and downstream activities located at a 
number  of  points  in the world.  It may  also span horizontally into other 
industries  which  in the case of Mitsui and Mitsubishi,  include electronics 
and  steel  production.  This vast network of activities is too  complex  to 
be  usefully  discussed  in  this  study  which relies on  the fact that the 
existence  of  centralised  head  offices  coordinating  international 
activities  is  tangible  evidence  of the existence of such  a  network.  As 
shown  in  Sections  V,  VI  and  VII  of  the  conceptual  map.  the Shell 
International  group's headquarters are based in the Hague  (Holland),  BP  in 
London  (UK),  Cal Asiatic through the parent company  Chevron  in Los  Angeles 112 
(USA)  and  the MIMI  partnership  in Yokohama  (Japan)  (see 2.3.3  Section V  of 
map) . 
The  organisational  structure  of the multinational participants 
spans  all  the  levels  depicted  in these  sections,  i.e.  world,  national, 
state  and  project. 
project  level  will 
As  a  result,  the policies  adopted by  the JVPs  at 
be  influenced  by  directives  from  the  central 
headquarters  of the  foreign based venturers. 
Shell  Australia provides  the best illustration as  a  large  amount 
of  technical  direction  has  been channeled  from  the  Shell Internationale 
Petroleum  Maatschapiij  (SIPM)  offices  in the  Hague  over  the construction 
period  for  the  domestic phase,  and  during preliminary design work  on  the 
LNG  plant. 
and  other 
During  the design and construction of the  domestic  gas  plant 
Phase  1  infrastructure  the  influence  of  the  Hague  was 
highlighted  by  some  intramural  difficulties which were  reported to have 
arisen  between Woodside  and Shell senior management.  These  centred on  the 
latter's  efforts  to  impose  standard  Shell  procedures  and 
specifications.*[l]  As  technical  advisers  for  Phase II the  influence of 
SIPM  within  the  Woodside  project  management  framework has  become  more 
evident  in  recent  years  with  large  numbers  of  SIPM  specialists and 
engineers  working  in  Perth  or on site at Dampier  in the North West  (see 
5.2.3).  The  influence  of  BP  and  Cal Asiatic on  the management  of the 
project  should  not  be  overlooked  as  all  the participants have voting 
strength  on  the  project  committee  in  line  with  their  stake  in the 
venture.  However,  Shell  has  emerged  as  the  dominant participant,  a 
position  consolidated since 1985  through the acquisition of  a  40%  stake in 
Woodside  Petroleum,  the  parent of the project operator Woodside  Offshore 
Petroleum  (WOP)  (Woodside,  April  30  1986). 113 
Apart  from  the  corporate  linkages established between the  NWS 
joint  venture  and  the international petroleum network,  there is also the 
important  trade connection which will become  more  evident once  LNG  exports 
to  Japan  begin  in  1989.  The  signing  in  September  1985  of the  LNG 
contracts  by the joint venturers  and representatives of the eight Japanese 
power  utilities  purchasing  the  LNG,  has  established the official trade 
channel  between  exporter and importer.  The  Japanese have backed up  their 
intent  to  purchase  up  to  5.8  million tonnes  of LNG  per annum  from  the 
joint  venturers,  through  a  commitment of $5  billion to a  regasification 
plant,  receiving  terminals  and other infrastructure  (Australian Financial 
Review,  August  26  1985). 3.2. 
3.2.1. 
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Changes  in the  International Petroleum Network 
Key  agents  of change 
Over  the  past  thirty years,  major  changes have  occurred in the 
structure  of  the  international  petroleum  network.  These  have  largely 
reflected  shifts  in  the  balance of political and  economic  power between 
key  parties  operating within the network.  The  principal agents  of change 
which  have  featured  most  prominently  in  the  history  of the post war 
international  petroleum  industry  have  been  the major multinational oil 
companies  "The  Seven Sisters",  the world's major oil producing nations  and 
the Western block oil importer  governments  (Danielsen,  1982:p6). 
Prior  to World War  II,  the  international oil trade was  dominated 
by  five  American  based  multinationals:  Exxon,  Mobil,  Texaco,  Socal  and 
Gulf  and  the  long  established  European  based giants Shell  and British 
Petroleum  (BP).  These  companies  had established operations  in nearly all 
the  major oil producing regions  of the world at that time with large scale 
production from  the  Persian Gulf and the  Gulf of Mexico. 
By  the  mid-1950's,  the  oligopolistic  stranglehold  of  these 
companies  was  starting  to  weaken  in the  face  of serious  challenges  from 
the  major  producer  governments  which were  seeking increased returns  from 
the  exploitation  of their national resource.  The  first serious  challenge 
had  come  in  1949  when  the  "American Arabian Oil  Company"  (ARAMCO)  was 
forced  to  concede  a  50:50  production  sharing  agreement  to  the  Saudi 
Arabian  government.  This  set a  precedent for other Persian Gulf producers 
which  obtained  improved  contractual  conditions  from  the  oil  majors 
throughout  the  fifties  and  sixties.  During  the  1970s  the  major 
middle-eastern  producers  extended  state  sovereignty  through  outright 
nationalisation  of  all  petroleum  based operations.  At  the  same  time,  a 115 
number  of  other  producers  outside  the  Gulf  states  extended  state 
participation  in  domestic  oil production and downstream activities.  The 
oil  majors were  forced to produce oil under participation agreements which 
often  incorporated  buy-back  clauses,  where participation oil was  sold to 
the  companies  at  the  wellhead  with  a  separate quota for  independently 
produced  equity  oil.  Other  countries  retained traditional concession 
contracts,  but  with  higher  royalties  and  a  higher  tax  levy  (Zorn, 
1983:p.32l). 
The  net  effect  of  widespread nationalisation,  the creation of 
state  oil  companies  and  increased  competition from  the  independent oil 
companies  in  the  seventies was  a  significant reduction in the bargaining 
power  and  market  share  of  the  major  multinationals.  Zorn  (1983) 
illustrated  this  phenomenon when he noted that  "Between 1972  and  1980  the 
proportion  of  world  crude oil (excluding North America and the  Communist 
block)  sold by State petroleum countries,  increased to  33%.  Over  the  same 
period  the  proportion  of  crude  oil  under  the  control  of  the  seven 
transnational oil majors  decreased from  89%  to  43%  (Zorn,  1983:p.322). 
Another  important  counter  to  the  power  of the multinationals 
came  with  the  formation of OPEC  (the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries)  in  1960.  Representatives of the five  founder nations:  Saudi 
Arabia,  Iran,  Iraq,  Kuwait  and Venezuela,  had  formed  the organisation at a 
meeting  in  Baghdad  in  an effort to gain more  control over the price and 
volume  of  oil  being  traded  on the world market.  The  organisation grew 
steadily  over the next decade  (11 full members  in 1971)  but basic economic 
and  political  divisions  between  member  nations  proved  to  be  a  major 
obstacle to unified action  (Danielsen,  1982:p.5).*[2] 116 
Although  divisions  between  member  nations  have  consistently 
undermined  OPEC's  ability  to  gain  strong  control over oil pricing and 
production  levels,  in  the  period between October  1973  and January 1974, 
cartel type action was  evident on the part of the Arab  members. 
Common  unity  amongst  OAPEC  (the Organisation of Arab  Petroleum 
Exporting  Countries)  members  against  American  intervention  in  the 
Yom-Kippur  Arab-Israeli  conflict  resulted  in a  sustained embargo  on oil 
exports  to  the USA  and Holland.  Apart  from  the  dramatic effect this 1973 
oil  crisis  had  on  prices  (an  increase  from US$3  ~o US$12  bbl in three 
months)  it was  a  powerful warning to  the Western industrialised nations of 
the  dangers  of over  dependence  on oil as  their principal energy source. 
The  Western governments  responded quickly to  OPEC's  challenge by 
forming  the  International  Energy  Agency  (lEA)  to devise  a  strategy for 
securing  the  long-term  energy  requirements  of  member  nations.  The 
alternative  energy  programmes  which were  subsequently established in the 
USA,  Japan and the major  industrialised nations of Europe,  were  to provide 
an  impetus  for  increased exploitation of non-OPEC  natural gas  reserves.  A 
similar  stance  was  adopted by the Australian Federal  government who  were 
concerned  with  maintaining  high  levels  of  petroleum self-sufficiency. 
Figures  produced in 1984  indicated that this level rose  from  approximately 
60%  in  the  mid-seventies  to  over  70%  in the early eighties  (Esso  Energy 
Outlook,  1984). 
By  the  end  of  1979  growing  world demand  for natural gas  and 
predictions  of  a  continuing upward trend in oil prices,  provided the  NWS 
joint  venturers  with  a  major  incentive to rapidly develop  the major  gas 
discoveries  they had made  in the early seventies.  Both the  Federal and WA 
State  governments  were  eager  to see  a  two  phase  domestic  gas/LNG  export 117 
programme  get  off the  ground.  The  WA  government ratified this commitment 
to  the  project  by  finalising  the  1979  North  West  Gas  (Woodside) 
Development  agreement  with  the JVPs.  In the  same  month  as  the Agreement 
was  passed  as  an  Act  in  the  WA  State parliament  (December  1979),  the 
Federal  government  cleared a  major obstacle to  the project by issuing LNG 
export permits  to the joint venturers  (see 4.1.3  and 4.2.4). 
3.2.2.  The  growth of natural  gas  as  a  primary energy source 
The  formation  of  the  lEA  was  an  important step  towards  the 
development  of  an  alternative energy strategy to be  adopted by Japan and 
the  Western  industrialised  nations.  Under  the umbrella of the  DECO,  a 
number  of  energy  programmes  were  coordinated  to  reduce  reliance  on 
imported  oil in the  economies  of the 16  member  nations.  The  lEA  developed 
policies  to  encourage  energy conservation and fuel  switching from oil to 
natural  gas  or  coal  for  electricity  generation  and  major  industrial 
purposes.  In  the USA,  Japan and  a  number  of European countries,  nuclear 
energy  programmes  were  established or stepped up.  Attempts were  also made 
to  secure  oil  inventories  to  meet  the short-term energy needs  of OECD 
nations,  prior  to  the  introduction of new alternative energy programmes. 
However,  this  policy,  which  would  involve  fuel  sharing during times  of 
crisis,  was  partially undermined by the attempts of certain member  nations 
including  Japan,  France,  the  UK  and  the USA,  to negotiate special oil 
deals with the  OPEC  producers  (Odell,  1983). 
The  increasing  trade-off  between  oil  and  natural gas,  which 
occurred  in America,  Japan and a  number  of European nations  throughout  the 
seventies,  saw  a  steady rise in natural gas  production in the North Sea, 
the  Gulf  of Mexico  and other major  gas  producing regions  outwith the  OPEC 118 
sector.  However,  the major boost to natural gas  production and processing 
for  LPG  and  LNG  followed  the  1979  oil price shock.  This  occurred in 
January  1979  when  a  shortfall  of  5  mbd  of crude oil stemming  from  the 
October  1978  revolution in Iran,  led to panic buying with prices reaching 
more  than  US$30  bb1  on  the  spot market.  This  represents  an effective 
doubling  of  the  November  1978  price  of around US$15  bbl.  A  number  of 
leading  market  analysts  at the  time predicted a  continued upward rise in 
oil  prices  throughout  the eighties.  A  1981  survey of analysts  conducted 
by  Stanford  University's  Energy Modelling  Forum  (EMF)  took in a  range of 
forecasts  from  US$42  to  US$92  per barrel  (1981  dollars)  (Odell,  1985). 
Projects  of  this  nature,  which  assumed steadily rising oil prices in the 
short  to  medium  term,  and  the effects of OEeD  domestic  energy policies, 
gave  a  number  of  oil  importer/producers  like  the  US  and the  UK  and 
incentive  to  expand  production  of  natural gas.  Piped gas,  LNG  and LPG 
could  be  used as  premium fuel alternatives displacing oil products  in the 
industrial  sector,  the  transport  sector,  and  wherever  commercially 
acceptable,  could be used for  power  generation. 
3.2.3.  Changes  in Western Australia and Japan 
Western  Australia  in  1979  was  a  good  location  for  a  major 
natural  gas  production project from  the multinational point of view.  The 
high  levels  of  proven gas  reserves  on the  NWS  (240,000 million m3)  (1979 
figure)  and  the  relatively  benevolent  Federal  and  State,  fiscal  and 
legislative  regime  for  petroleum development provided a  strong incentive 
for  multinationals  seeking  to  invest  in a  politically stable producing 
region  (ANZ  1982:p.38).*[4]  (See  3.4.1 for update  on reserves.) 119 
By  the  end of 1978  the  NWS  participants had received a  number  of 
incentives  from  the Fraser Federal government  and  the  Court  government  in 
WA  to  push  ahead with the  development  of the project.  Federal Treasurer 
Anthony's  budgetary package  of August  1977  provided a  series of incentives 
to  boost  the  progress  of  the project.  Major  construction work did not 
begin  until  early  1980,  after the North West  Gas  (Woodside)  Development 
Act was  passed in 1979  (see 4.1.3). 
Throughout  the  mid to late seventies,  the Japanese Ministry for 
International  Trade  and  Industry  (MITI)  had been encouraging substitution 
of  oil  by  coal  and  natural  gas  in the nation's  energy mix.  Given  the 
limited  supply  of  indigenous  petroleum  resources  in Japan.  most of the 
nation's  natural  gas  supply  was  imported  as  LNG  or  LPG.  The  LNG 
importation  programme  had been stepped up  during  the mid-seventies with an 
additional  9.5  million  tonnes  imported in 1977  under  new  contracts with 
Indonesia and Abu  Dhabi  (WA  Govt.  1985:p.6l). 
In  the short  to medium  term  (5-10 years),  the Japanese planned a 
continued  growth  in  LNG  use  as  a  basic feedstock fuel  for electricity 
generation  and other industrial and domestic users.  The  use  of regasified 
LNG  for electricity generation was  seen as  a  stop  gap  measure prior to  the 
initiation  of  an  efficient nuclear power  programme.  However,  LNG  use  in 
other  sectors  was  scheduled  to  be  a  longer term proposition,  a  factor 
reflected  in  a  supply  period  of  20  years  written  into Japanese  LNG 
contracts  signed after 1976  (WA  Govt.,  May  1985:p.61). 
In  the  years  which  elapsed  between 1977  and  the  launching of 
construction  on  the  LNG  export phase  of the  NWS  project in 1985  a  number 
of  important  shifts have  taken place within the Japanese  and world market 
for  LNG.  A considerable  drop  in real oil prices  and  the  indexed value  of 120 
LNG  coupled  with  a  downward  revision  in MITI's  demand  projections  for 
Japanese  LNG  requirements  in  the  1990s,  had  led  to  a  considerable 
alteration  to  original expected returns  from  Phase  II of the  NWS  project. 
When  construction  began  on  the  first  phase  of  the  project in 1980, 
expectations  for  returns  on  domestic  gas  sales were  tempered by  lowered 
demand  projections  for  natural  gas  in WA.  However,  the  export phase  of 
the  project  which was  viewed to be  the big money  earner in 1979  became  an 
increasingly  marginal  proposition  in terms  of anticipated returns  of the 
JVP's  investments,  throughout  the  1982  to  1984 period  (Allen,  1984). 
The  strategic  position  of the  NWS  joint venturers  as  exporters 
of  LNG  to  a  shifting Japanese market underwent  some  significant changes  in 
the  period  between  1979  and September  1985  when  the  sales contracts were 
finally  signed by  the Japanese buyers.  These  changes  in the pre-September 
1985  period  and  subsequent adjustments  in JVP  strategy,  will be  discussed 
in  Chapter  6  of this work.  In Section 3.3,  an attempt is made  to  describe 
the  broad  economic  background to  these  changes  through  discussion of (i) 
the  major  features  of the world trade in LNG;  (ii) price regulation in the 
market  for  natural  gas  citing the US  as  a  major  example;  (iii)  trends  in 
the  Japanese  market  for  LNG  in  the  period  1982-1985.  Recent  trends 
1986-1988  are discussed in Chapter  8. 3.3. 
3.3.l. 
(i) 
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The  World  ~rade in LNG 
Distinctive features  of the  U~G trade 
The  concentrated market 
To  use  the  term  'world'  LNG  market  in the  same  sense  as  one 
would  use  the  term  world  oil market,  would be  something of a  misnomer. 
For  although  the  twelve  existing  projects  currently exporting  LNG  are 
scattered  throughout  the  world,  the market which  they service  is highIy 
concentrated  when  comparisons  are  drawn wi.th  the  trade  in crude oil.  The 
worldwide  trade  is  based  on  7  exporting nations  and  7  import:ing nations 
(see  WA  DRD  LNG  Status Report,  Nov.  1987). 
At  present;  (1988),  there  are many hundreds  of mc:.jor  crude oil 
producers  throughout  the  world,  most  of  which  feed  crude  and refined 
products  into  an  international  trading  network.  However,  whilst  LNG 
projects  are  operating  in such diverse  locations  as  Abu  Dhabi,  Malaysla, 
Indonesia  and  Alaska,  a  large proportion of their output goes  to  .q  single 
buyer  - Japan.  Other projects  in Libya  supply outlets  in Europe  and until 
the  mid·,1980's  Algeria  supplied  LNG  to  two  major  power utilities in the 
Eastern  states  of  the  USA.  The  larger of the  two  supply contracts has 
recently  been resumed  following  a  3  year  suspension  (1983-1987)  with plans 
in  place  to  ship  85  bern  (65.5 million tonnes)  of LNG  from Algeria to  Lake 
Charles  Louisiana  over  a  20  year contract period  (LNG  Status Report,  VIA 
Govmt  DRD  Nov.  1987).  However,  despite  these alternatj.ve outlets and  a 
growing  trade  in  the  S.E.  Asian region Japane.se  imports  still accounted 
for  over  70%  of the world  LNG  market  in 1987  (Prospect No.4/87,  HA,  DR]). 
The  distinctive  LNG  market  structure  whereby  a  number  of 
suppliers  mus·t  negotiate  directly  with  a  limi·ted nu.rnber  of end users  is 
best:  understood  when  a  number  of  other  factors  are  taken  into 122 
consideration.  These  relate to  the  technology  involved in the processing 
and  transportation  of  the  product,  the unique nature of individual  LNG 
supply  contracts  and  pricing structure which  influences  these at a  given 
point in time. 
(ii)  Technological  and contractual limitations 
As  suggested above  a  number  of important factors  which  influence 
LNG  trading  patterns  relate to  the  technological specifications for  each 
contract and the general contractual provisions  governing each party. 
The  nature  of  LNG  supply contracts are such that they can only 
be  set  up  following  a  substantial financial  commitment by both parties to 
supply  the  technological hardware necessary for  the production,  shipping, 
receiving  and  storage  of  LNG.  The  sophisticated  technology  and 
infrastructure  necessary  for  receiving  shipments  of LNG  from  cryogenic 
tankers  with  capacities  of  up  to 165,000 cubic metres at flow rates of 
50,000  gallons  per  minute,  severely  restricts  the number  of end users 
(Drake,  1977:p.5).  (Tankers  for  NWS  project average  capacity l25,OOOm3, 
Petroleum in WA  Jan 88.) 
To  date it is only some  of the more  developed nations which have 
had  the  ability  to finance  this type of undertaking;  which requires  them 
to  absorb  a  rigidly  defined  'minimum  drop'  over an  extended period with 
little allowance  for fluctuations  in domestic  demand  for natural gas. 
The  unique  nature of the  infrastructure and technology employed 
when  developing  individual projects and the normal fifteen to twenty-five 
year  commitment  between importer  and supplier dictate that the market for 
LNG  will  demonstrate  a  number  of  features  quite  distinct from  those 
relating  to  the  international  trade  in  crude  oil.  Crude  is marketed 
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companies,  nation  states  or a  variety of other commercial parties.  This 
creates  a  situation  quite  distinct  from  the direct relationship which 
exists  between  the  LNG  producer  and  client  nation.  Whilst  the oil 
producer  has  the  option of selling his product to  a  number  of purchasers 
through  the  spot  market  or  at  fixed  prices determined by other power 
brokers  within  the  network,  the  LNG  producer must  source  a  market  and in 
most  cases  negotiate  directly  with prospective buyers.  Thus  whilst oil 
supply  contracts  tend  to  operate on an open market basis,  LNG  contracts 
are  characterised by  "closed chain"  relationships between the supplier and 
the  customer  (Arai,  1984:p.26).  (See  Chapter  8  for update  on spot market 
trade.) 
(iii)  Unique pricing structure 
As  suggested  above  the relative inflexibility of LNG  contracts 
and  the associated technology are elements which can partially account for 
the  fact  that  LNG  has  failed to displace oil as  a  premium  fuel within a 
diverse  market.  Other reasons  are  tied in with the limited scope of end 
uses  for  a  light  product  which has  been restricted for usage  as  a  base 
load  or  peak  shaving  feedstock  for  electricity  generation  or 
regasification  for  pipeline distribution.  These  factors have  always been 
reflected  in the price of this clean high energy fuel which  some  producers 
have  claimed  has  always  sold  at  prices which fail to reflect its true 
market  value.  Traditionally LNG  prices have been discounted against oil 
based  indices  although  in recent years  they have  made  considerable gains 
on  the price of fuel oil and basic crudes  imported into Japan  (see Chapter 
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The  highly  specialised  nature  of  each  individual  LNG  supply 
contract  is  another  factor  which has  strongly influenced price profiles 
for  the product over the years.  Whilst differences in infrastructural and 
shipping  costs are an important consideration in determining the final  CIF 
price,  the  relative  needs  and  thereby,  negotiating strength of the  two 
parties  is  often  a  major  element  in the price differences which exist 
between  individual  contracts.  Even when  long haul shipping is taken into 
account  some  price  variations  between  contracts  have  been  quite 
pronounced.  A  notable  example  can be  drawn  from  the November  1984 price 
index  when  the  CIF  price  of  LNG  imported  into  Italy from Libya was 
estimated  at  $3.45  MMBTU,  a  $1.56  difference  from  the Malaysia to Japan 
import price of $5.01  MMBTU  (see Table  2)  (WA  Govt.  DRD,  May  1985). 
3.3.2.  Price regulation in the  LNG  trade 
As  stated  most  price differences  are linked to infrastructural 
needs,  technology,  shipping  costs.  Other  major  considerations  are 
specified  end  use  for  the  product  and the availability of alternative 
energy  sources  which  are  two  of  the  major  determinants of bargaining 
strength  for  the  importing nation.  Whatever  the exact reasons  for intra 
contract  price  differences  are,  the  price  distribution illustrated in 
Table  2  indicates  that  none  of the major power brokers within the world 
petroleum  scene  have  been able to regulate LNG  prices to  the  same  extent 
as  crude oil prices,  over the past decade. 
In  the  past  there  have  been  attempts  by certain parties to 
devise  a  cohesive  policy  for  the regulation of LNG  prices.  In the late 
seventies  both OPEC  and  the US  government were  considering the possibility 
of  intervention  into  the  LNG  market in order to instigate stronger price Table  2 
LNG  PRICE  HISTORY 
1972  1976  1978  1979  JAN  80  JAN  81  JUL  81  JAN  82  JUL  82  NOV  84  ~ 
Algeria  - UK  N.A.  N.A.  0.95  1.10  4.40  4.60  CIF  prices as of  1980. 
Trade  terminated on 
November  1,  1981 
Algeria  - France  0.36  1.00  1.20  1.30  3.05  3.75  4.28  5.12  4.77  3.70*  FCB  price. 
Algeria  - Belgium  1.30  4.80  4.77  3.70*  FCB  price. 
ALgeria  - Spain  0.67  1.36  2.50  3.42  4.50  4.58  3.91  3.85  2.70*  FCB  price. 
Algeria  - Distrigas  1.57  2.67  2.67  3.35  4.12  3.95  3.92  3.50*  FCB  price. 
Algeria  - TrunkLine  3.95  3.92  FCB  contract. 
Libya  - Spain  0.54  1.21  1.52  3.20  3.40  4.35  3.40*  CIF  prices as  of  July 80. 
Libya  - Italy  0.90  1.10  1.45  2.80  3.45*  CIF  price. 
Alaska  - Japn  0.57  1.55  2.15  2.36  3.36  5.88  5.99  5.97  5.79  4.85  CIF  price. 
I-' 
Brunei  - Japan  2.15  2.36  3.14  5.84  6.38  5.90  5.73  4.91  CIF  price.  N 
lJ1 
Abu  Dhabi  - Japan  1.90  2.05  2.05  2.40  6.63  6.63  6.17  6.07  5.24  CIF  pri  ceo 
Indonesia  1 - Japan  2.80  3.45  4.69  5.78  5.07  6.00  5.49  4.74  CIF  price. 
Indonesia  2 - Japan 
Malaysia  - Japan  5.01  CIF  price 
'*  Estimates  only 
Saudi  Arabian  Light  Crude  at $29/Bb1  is equivalent  to abo  $5.0rMMBTU* 
Reproduced  Courtesy of  the "ORO"  May  1985. 126 
controls.  Both  parties  failed  to  impose  any effective limitations  on 
pricing  for  a  number  of reasons.  In the case of OPEC  it is difficult to 
determine  the  reasons  for  the  very limited effort made  to  introduce  an 
effective  price  regime  within  the  LNG  market.  However,  control of the 
basic  resource  and the distinctive trading patterns for  LNG  were probably 
the  predominant factors.  Taking the first example it should be noted that 
whilst  the  middle-eastern  members  of  OPEC  controlled  over  60%  of the 
world's  known  oil  reserves  at  the  time,  the  figure  for natural gas 
reserves was  22%  (AFR,  November  18  1977). 
The  concentrated  market  for  the product and rigid contracting 
structures  were  also  key  limiting  factors  on  any party attempting to 
regulate  prices  throughout  the world LNG  industry.  Over  the years  since 
the  1973/74  oil  crisis  OPEC  have  only  enjoyed  limited  success  in 
regulating  prices within the  international oil network  (see 3.2.2).  Thus, 
in  view of the less integrated nature of LNG  related activities throughout 
the  world,  it  is  unlikely  that  a  body like OPEC  could ever  introduce 
effective price regulation throughout the  LNG  industry. 
The  factors  cited  above were  also  important in determining the 
failure  of  US  proposals  for  price  regulation  within  the  LNG  trade. 
However,  internal  energy  policies  relating  to natural gas pricing were 
also  relevant  in the US  case.  During 1977,  the Carter administration had 
toyed  with  the  idea  of  extending  tighter  controls  over the price for 
natural  gas.  As  a  potential major  importer of piped gas  from Mexico  and 
LNG  from  Australia  to  supplement  an existing contract with Algeria,  the 
USA  could  have  become  an  important  buyer within the international LNG 
trade.  The  extension  of  US  powers  in this area may  have  resulted in a 
form  of  price  regulation introduced by  the  US  government.  In the event, 127 
however,  inconsistencies  between  existing  price structures domestically 
produced  gas  and  imported  gas  were  to undermine  any attempts  to extend 
price  regulation  beyond the US  domestic market for natural gas.  (AFR  Nov 
18  1977) 
3.3.3.  The  US  market for  LNG 
During  the  late  seventies  the  US  natural  gas  market  was 
scheduled  to undergo  a  considerable expansion with the  introduction of LNG 
imports  to  supplement  a  possible  supply  shortfall  on  the West  Coast. 
Several  Californian  power  utilities  undertook initial negotiations with 
the  Indonesian  government  and the  NWS  participants who  were  identified as 
possible  suppliers.  The  major hurdle  to  LNG  imports was  the cost when  set 
against  regulated  prices  for US  domestic  gas.  Indonesian LNG  was  quoted 
at  US$3.59  per  thousand cubic feet  (MCF).  more  than double  the regulated 
domestic  gas  price  of  US$1.45  MCF.  NWS  LNG  was  estimated to cost more 
than  the  Indonesian price,  with a  consequent reduction in the possibility 
of a  US  contract for  the joint venturers  (AFR,  16  December  1977). 
Despite  deregulation  measures  for  the  US  natural gas market 
taken  by  the Reagan administration total contracted supplies of LNG  to  the 
USA  peaked at 2.83 million tonnes  in 1983,  with a  subsequent suspension of 
one  of  the  two  Algerian contracts with East Coast utilities reducing the 
figure  to  0.78  million  tonnes  in 1984  (WA  Govt.  May  1985:p.64).  Since 
1978  LNG  supplies to West  Coast utilities from  Indonesia or Australia have 
been  ruled  out against the more  cost effective alternative of importation 
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3.3.4.  Trends within the Japanese market.  1982-85 
Since  1969,  when  the  Japanese  arranged  for  their  initial 
shipments  of  LNG  from Alaska,  they have  dominated the market consistently 
accounting  for  over  50%  of total world trade.  The  rapid expansion within 
the  Japanese  economy  up  to 1973,  fuelled a  steady demand for  a  number of 
energy  sources,  notably oil and coal.  However,  it was  not until after the 
first  oil  shock,  with  the  rapid escalation in energy prices that Japan 
witnessed a  rapid growth in demand  for  LNG  as  a  basic feedstock fuel. 
Throughout  the  1970s  a  number  of  large  metropolitan  power 
utilities  began  to  switch to  LNG  as  their primary feedstock,  recognising 
its  advantages  as  a  clean  burner over high sulphur fuels  like coal and 
oil.  This  lead to  a  situation where  by  1977  Japan had established three 
additional  contracts  sourced in Brunei,  Indonesia and Abu  Dhabi,  adding an 
additional  14.7  million  tonnes p.a.  to their existing imports  of 960,000 
tonnes  p.a.  from Alaska  (Arai 1984:p.5).  By  1985  the Japanese market was 
serviced  by  a  total  of  7  LNG  projects  bringing  total  imports  to 
approximately  26,660  tonnes  (WA  Govt.,  DRD,  May  1985). 
An  estimate  made  in  1977  by  the  Japanese  "Ministry  for 
International  Trade  and Industry",  "MITI" ,  projected that by 1990  LNG  was 
to  account  for  7.7%  of  the  total  Japanese  energy supply with annual 
imports  of 44 million tonnes by that year.  In 1982,  three years after the 
second  oil  shock,  the  1990  figure was  readjusted to 11.5%  of total energy 
supply  with the lower projected total LNG  requirement of 43 million tonnes 
p.a.  reflecting  an  anticipated downturn  in energy growth  (WA  Govt.,  DRD, 
May  1985:p.52). 
At  the  time  of  the  second MITI  estimate in 1982  LNG  demand  in 
Japan  was  very  high  providing  a  ready  market  for  five suppliers with 
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However,  in  common  with most other industrialised nations,  the  economy of 
Japan  went  through  a  sharp  downturn during the early eighties,  a  factor 
which  was  to strongly influence  demand levels for  LNG  within the country. 
A  downturn  in  the basic metals  industry had led to  a  situation where  the 
large  electricity utilities were  no  longer requiring such large quantities 
of  LNG  to  fuel  industrial power usage.  This heightening concern amongst 
the  power  companies  was  reflected  in  an  MITI  statement  released in 
September  1983  which  referred  to  the problems  associated with both the 
pricing  structure  of  LNG  supplied to Japan and  the  inflexible nature of 
the  traditional  "take  or  pay"  LNG  contract  (see 6.1.2  and 8.2).  The 
statement  reproduced  in  a  recent document put out by the West Australian 
government  as  a  result  of a  trade mission incorporating visits to Japan 
and  two  recently  developed  LNG  plants in Indonesia and Malaysia,  made  a 
number  of  recommendations  for  the  structuring  of  future  trade  in LNG 
between  Australia  and  Japan.  These  included a  recommendation that the 
existing  crude  oil  parity  pricing formula for  LNG  should be revised and 
that  more  flexible contractual conditions  should be  introduced to  account 
for  fluctuations  in  demand  within  the market sector of the major power 
utilities  (WA  Govt.,  May  1985:p.53). 
The  1983  MITI  statement was  followed by a  downward revision of 
projected  LNG  demand  for  1990  to  36.5 million tonnes per annum,  causing 
some  consternation  for  the  JVPs  and  other prospective suppliers.  The 
Japanese  by  this  stage had entered what was  essentially a  buyers market. 
The  joint  venture  planners  would be  aware  of this,  recognising that the 
Japanese  had  the  power  to  exercise  a  number  of  options which would 
determine  the  future of the  NWS  as  a  major export project.  Options which 
still  exist  to date  include possible commitments  to the  "Dome"  project in 130 
Canada,  the  "Sakhalin"  project  in  the  USSR,  several  other  proposed 
proj ects  and  the  possibility  of  extending  contracts  with  existing 
suppliers  (WA  Govt.,  May  1985).  However  to  date  (1988)  both these 
projects  have  been  shelved.  The  Dome  project was  scrapped at the  end of 
1986  following  a  series  of  financial  and legislative problems  and the 
"Sakhailn"  project  has  been  mothballed by  the Russian government  in the 
face  of  limited  openings  in  the  Japanese  LNG  market to  the year  2005 
(Petroleum in WA  Jan 88). 3.4. 
3.4.1. 
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Australian Natural  Gas  Network 
Major  gasfields 
The  first  natural  gas  discovery  in Australia was  made  as  far 
back  as  1900  in a  water bore  in Roma,  Queensland.  Later,  gas  finds  in the 
Roma/Surat  basin area led to  the  establishment of a  small pilot project in 
1961,  to  supply  natural  gas  to  an electricity generating plant in Roma. 
Subsequent  developments  did not  take place until 1969  when  a  pipeline was 
built  from  Roma  to Brisbane  supplying natural gas  to  the city.  This  was 
followed  by  a  number  of other pipeline projects  to  establish natural gas 
supplies  to  Melbourne  and Adelaide  (1969),  Perth  (1971)  and  Sydney  (1977) 
(ANZ,  1982) .  Since that time,  smaller spur line developments  have  taken 
place,  except  in  Perth  where  the  original West Australian Natural Gas 
Pty.,  WANG,  415  km  pipeline  from  the  Dongara field to Perth has been 
superceded  by the  State Energy  Commission line running  from  Dampier  in the 
North  to Wagerup  in the  South West  (SECWA,  October 1983:p.43)  (Natural Gas 
in WA  Report No.5). 
The  first major  offshore natural gas  reserves  to be  developed in 
Australia  were  those  in the Bass  Straight,  which during 1985  provided more 
than  85%  of Australia's natural gas  output  (Woods,  1986).  The  development 
of  the Marlin,  Barracouta and  Snapper fields  established a  ready  supply of 
natural  gas  for  the  Victorian market,  through  a  174  km  pipeline running 
from Longford near  Sale  to  Dardenong  (ANZ,  1982). 
In  South Australia a  number  of small fields  in the  Cooper  Basin, 
jointly  owned  by  an operating consortium led by Santos,  a  South Australian 
company,  have been used to  supply Adelaide  since 1969.  Since that time,  a 
series  of  new  discoveries  has  been  developed and  tapped into  a  piping 
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to  Adelaide,  Peterborough,  Angaston and Port Pirie.  In 1980,  the  Cooper 
Basin  consortium  established  contracts  with  the  South  Australian 
government  for  the  development of a  large liquids project drawing  on the 
production  from  six  oilfields and fourteen gasfields situated within the 
State.  The  $1.4 billion project was  established to  supply LPG,  condensate 
and  crude oil for  the  domestic  and export markets  along with ethane,  which 
is  currently  being  used  to  fuel  the Port Bonningthon processing plant 
(Erskine 1985:p.68).  (Further detail Appendix I.) 
Whilst  the  Bass  Straight and  Cooper basin projects are of major 
importance  in  terms  of  Australia's  current natural gas  and hydrocarbon 
liquids  supplier,  the  single  most  important producer of natural gas  in 
Australa is the  NWS  project. 
Although  the  North  Rankin  'A'  is  the  only Woodside  platform 
operating  on  the  Rankin  Trend  during  the year ending December  1987 it 
produced  3486  x  of  gas  and  859,629  ki1o1itres  (k1)  of 
condensate.  Given  that  gas  and condensate production from  Goodwyn  and 
North  Rankin  'B'  should  be  supplementing this output in the early 21st 
century,  the  potential  exists for much  higher production levels  from  the 
NWS  project.  This  assertion is supported by recent reserve estimates for 
North  Rankin  and  other Woodside  fields  scheduled to  come  into production 
in  the  next  decade.  Working  on  a  90%  probability North Rankin has 
identifiable  recoverable  reserves  of  188.5  109m3  of  gas  and  20.7  106 
kl  of  condensate.  Goodwyn  Main has  estimated recoverable  reserves  of gas 
at  70.60  x  109m3  and  condensate  at  14.30  x  106  kl.  The  figures  for 
Goodwyn  North  are  36.50  x  109m3  and  18.60  x  106  k1  (Petroleum in WA 
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The  estimates  presented above  represent only a  small portion of 
the  overall  hydrocarbon  bearing potential of the Rankin Trend formation. 
Figures  released  in  1985  for  estimated  recoverable  reserves  within 
Woodside  permit  areas  based  on  a  total of 11  fields placed natural gas 
reserves  at  852  109m3  (Erskine  1985:p22).  At  the  time  this accounted 
for  60%  of  Australia's proven reserves  of natural  gas,  making  the Rankin 
Trend a  significant gas bearing region in world  terms  (Woods  1986:p54). 
3.4.2.  Gas  exports 
At  present  the  future  of  gas  exports  from Australia's major 
fields  remains  uncertain.  Price  formulas  for  LNG  and LPG,  which link 
these  products  to  a  crude oil marker,  has  resulted in a  considerable  drop 
in  export  revenues  for  LPG  since 1985.  Federal policies  on pricing and 
export  quotas  will  shape  the  future  for  LPG  and  LNG  exports whilst 
condensate is marketed as  a  light crude. 
Until  1985  LPG  exports  from  the  Bass  Straight to Japan were  the 
main  source  of  government  revenue  from  gas  exports.  However,  with the 
recent  expansion  in  Cooper  Basin,  LPG  production to  an output of over 
450,000  tonnes  in  1985,  there  could  soon be  a  considerable excess  for 
export.  Initial export approvals were  granted to  the  Santos  consortium in 
1984  wo  have  secured  contracts  with  Identsu  of  Japan  and  Total 
International  (Erskine  1985:p.68).  Total  export value of Australian LPG 
exports  in 1984 was  estimated at $260  million in dollars of the  day  (Esso: 
1984:  p.12).  Although  LNG  exports  from  the  NWS  are not  due  to begin until 
1989,  a  1985  estimate held the value  of the  supply contracts  to be US$75 
billion  over  the initial 18  year delivery period.  NWS  gas  production for 
1985  was  valued at $2  billion per annum  although recent price adjustments 
will reduce  this  figure  for  1986  and  1987  (Petroleum in WA  Jan 1988). 134 
Esso  projections  for  energy exports  from  1990  to  the year  2000 
held  the  value of LNG  exports well  above  that for  LPG  or Uranium with LNG 
export  values  averaging out at approximately three  times  the value for  LPG 
exports  and twice  the value of Uranium exports  (Esso 1984:p.18). 3.5. 
3.5.1. 
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Multinational Ownership  in the Australian Petroleum Industry 
The  industry in general 
Throughout  the  post  war  years,  Australia's petroleum industry 
has  been dominated by a  number  of foreign multinationals.  In recent times 
the  companies  with the largest stake  in Australian oil and gas  production 
and  downstream  activities  have  been  BP,  Shell,  Mobil,  Caltex,  Esso  and 
Total.  Until  1984,  when  it acquired the assets of Amoco  Australia for 
$250  million,  BP  Australia  ran  second  to  Shell Australia in terms  of 
percentage  share of the market for petroleum products.  However,  since the 
Amoco  buy-out  when  the  company boosted its market  share to over  25%,  BP 
Australia has  retained the position of market  leader  (Erskine,  1985). 
Until  1987  when  the  UK  government  sold  off  part of its BP 
shareholding  the British public were majority shareholders  in BP.  Private 
investors  now  hold  the  majority.  However  the British government has 
retained  joint  control  of  Shell  with  the  Dutch  government  on  a  40/60 
basis.  Other  major  multinationals operating in Australia are mainly US 
controlled  with  the  exception  of  Total which  is one-third owned by the 
French  government  through  Compagnie  Francaise  des  Petroles  (CPF).  The 
American  companies,  Mobil,  Caltex  and  Esso,  like  Shell  and BP,  have 
interests  in  every  level  in  the  Australian  petroleum  industry  from 
exploration  through  to  refining  and marketing.  The  only company with a 
sizeable  Australian shareholding which has assets  in all phases of the oil 
and  gas  industry  exploration,  production,  processing/refining,  marketing 
and  distribution  by  land  and  sea,  is Ampol.  This  company  is no  longer 
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Some  appreciation  of the extent to which foreign multinationals 
dominate  the  Australian  petroleum  sector  can  be  gained through brief 
consideration  of  the  ownership profile of Australia's largest oil and  gas 
production  facilities.  Supplementary information relating to the refining 
industry  will  be  presented  to  offer  a  more  composite picture of the 
powerful  influence  of  foreign  multinationals  within  the  Australian 
petroleum sector as  a  whole. 
3.5.2. 
(i) 
Ownership profile in four major petroleum producing projects 
Barrow Island 
Barrow  Island  serves  to  illustrate  how  the  foreign 
multinationals  established  their  pattern  of dominance  in Australia from 
the  earliest  days  of commercial oil and gas production.  The  operator for 
the  onshore  fields  "West  Australian Petroleum Exploration Pty"  (WAPET), 
was  established in the early fifties as  an exploration company assisted by 
Federal  government  funding  through the  1957  Petroleum Search  Subsidy Act 
(ANZ  1982:p.17).  The  Barrow Island fields discovered in 1964 have proven 
to  be  a  consistent  revenue  earner  and  in  1985  still supplied  7%  of 
Australia's total crude oil requirements. 
In  addition  to  this  WAPET  controls  sizeable  commercial  gas 
discoveries  both  onshore  (Barrow  Island)  at Biggada,  Barrow Deep  and 
Perentie  and offshore at Gorgon,  N.  Gorgon,  Central Gorgon,  W.  Tyral Rocks 
and  Spar  (see  Petroleum  in  WA  Jan 1988:p22).  The  ownership profile of 
WAPET  breaks  down  as  follows:  Caltex Petroleum 80%  and Ampol  Petroleum 
20%  interest. 
Asiatic  Oil 
Australia  each 
one-seventh. 
The  Barrow  Island  joint  venture  comprises  California 
Co.,  Texaco  Overseas  Petroleum  Co.,  Shell  Development 
two  sevenths  interest  and  Amp 0 1  Exploration  Ltd. 137 
The  familiar  names  of Ca1tex  and Shell represent  a  major stake 
in  one  of  many  petroleum related interests in Australia.  A majority of 
Caltex  interests  are  concentrated  in downstream operations.  Shell also 
has  considerable  interests  at this level.  Shell's high profile interest 
in  the  NWS  project  represents  the  company's  largest single stake in a 
major  Australian  based production project.  The  project is however highly 
integrated  and  encompasses  the  whole  spectrum  of  operations  from 
exploration  and  production,  through  to  shipping.  In keeping with this 
structure  all  the  NWS  venturers,  have  an interest in both upstream and 
downstream  activities.  Apart  from  Shell,  one  other  Barrow  Island 
participant  has  a  major  stake in the  NWS  project.  California Asiatic Oil 
Company,  a  subsidiary  of  Chevron  (which has partial control of Caltex) 
holds  a  16.67%  interest  in  the  project  as  a  whole.  Unlike  the  NWS 
project,  the  Barrow  Island  venturers  must  go  to  an external party to 
undertake  crude  oil processing which is carried out at the  BP  refinery in 
Kwinana,  20  KID  south of Perth  (ANZ  1982). 
(ii)  The  Bass  Straight 
The  development  of the Bass  Straight fields  provides  an example 
of  how  a  single multinational obtained a  large stake  in what has  emerged 
as  Australia's largest oil producing region.  The  Esso/BHP partnership was 
formed  after an ex-Esso  geologist was  hired by  BHP  to assess  the petroleum 
prospectivity  of the Gippsland basin.  Following favourable  survey results 
BHP  decided  to bring in an operating partner with technical knowledge  and 
experience  of  petroleum exploration and  development  in difficult offshore 
conditions.  A  contract  was  established with Esso,  whereby  the American 
major  would  finance  all  exploration  until a  find was  made  and  then BHP 
could  exercise  an  option  on a  50/50 partnership  sharing all development 
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For  a  number  of  commercial  reasons,  not  least  the  high 
prospectivity  of the Gippsland Basin and other reasons  relating to foreign 
investment guidelines  the  50%  formula was  adopted. 
With  hindsight,  it  is  easy  to  criticise  the  Federal  and 
Victorian  governments  for  allowing  50%  of  this  prolific  petroleum 
producing  area to fall under foreign control.  However,  whilst BHP  and the 
government  agencies  concerned  were  clearly  outnegotiated the situation 
should  be  viewed  in the context of the mid-sixties.  At  that time it was 
still  commonplace  for  governments  to engage  the services of an oil company 
as  an  operating partner,  to provide expertise in offshore exploration and 
development.  Australia's offshore industry was  embryonic at the  time  and 
the  lack  of  expertise,  technology  and  existing infrastructure in this 
field  would  have made  independent exploration and development of the Bass 
Straight area a  slow and difficult task. 
The  debate  over  State  control  in  the petroleum industry has 
continued  into  the  eighties  with  industry  representatives  like  the 
Australian  Petroleum  Explorers  Association  (APEA)  and  the  Australian 
Institute  of  Petroleum  (AlP)  standing in opposition to  the Federal ALP's 
attempts  to  extend  direct  government control in this area  (see Saddler, 
1981:p.172-190)  (APEA,  March 1985:p.9). 
(iii)  The  Cooper basin 
The  Cooper  Basin  provides  the  only current example  of a  major 
oil  and  gas  bearing  region  in  which there is a  significant government 
interest.  The  consortium  which  established  the  $1.4 billion liquids 
scheme  which  will  draw  on  the  resources  of 20  gas  fields  and six oil 
fields,  includes  the South Australian Oil and Gas  corporation in which the 
South  Australian  government  has  a  controlling  interest.  An  original 139 
agreement  signed  in  1976  pertaining only  to  gas fields  in the basin gave 
the  operator  Santos  a  46%  stake,  SAOG  18%.  Delhi Oil was  the  only other 
partner  with  a  large  shareholding,  although  there  were  several other 
smaller  participants.  In 1979  the  South Australian government legislated 
to  protect  Australian equity in the project through  the  introduction of a 
ruling  which effectively prevented the  takeover of the Australian operator 
Santos  (Saddler,  1981:p.10l).  Since that time,  Santos has  remained  the 
biggest  shareholder,  followed  now  by  Delhi  and  the Woodside  subsidiary 
Vamgas.  SAOG  is  the  fourth biggest shareholder,  but  does  not hold more 
than  12%  of  anyone block currently being explored or developed  (Erskine 
1985:p.69). 
(iv)  North West  Shelf 
Whilst  the  North  West  Shelf serves  only a  domestic market for 
natural  gas  at  present,  the  project  is  well  integrated  into  the 
international  petroleum  network  through  corporate  channels.  This  is 
evident  from  the  ownership  profile  of  the  project with international 
majors  like  Shell,  BP  and  Chevron  through  Cal Asiatic holding sizeable 
stakes  in both the  domestic  and  LNG  phase  (see Table  1  in Introduction). 
Following  the  Shell/BHP  takeover of Woodside  Petroleum in April 
1985  Shell increased its stake in Phase  1  from  8  1/3%  to  approximately  28% 
and  Phase  II  equity from  16  2/3%  to  approximately  24%.  These  changes  in 
the  equity  balance  give  Shell  over  25%  share  in  the joint venture. 
Although  this  did  not significantly affect foreign equity,  the permitted 
foreign  shareholding  is  75%,  25%  higher  than existing Federal  guidelines 
for  minerals  and  petroleum  projects which  specify 50%  Australian equity 
with  50%  Australian  voting strength on the board of directors  (see 4.2.1 
Fraser's concessions  to  the JVPs). 140 
The  strength  of  the major multinationals within the North West 
Shelf  venture  has  been a  long standing issue in State and Federal debate 
relating  to  corporate  policy  and the national interest.  Major  concerns 
include  returns  to the nation through taxation,  employment and  technology 
transfer  and  the  extent  to  which  the State and Federal  government  can 
regulate  the  activities of foreign multinationals  to ensure  that they are 
not  acting against the national interest  (Peden AMWU,  May  1985).  A  number 
of  arguments  have been raised for  the creation of an Australian State oil 
company  to  monitor  the activities of all the operators at every level in 
the  Australian  petroleum  industry  and  extend  the  public stake in the 
industry  through  participation  in  oil  and  gas  production,  processing, 
product  marketing and distribution (see  Saddler 1981).  The  creation of an 
"Australian  Hydrocarbons  Corporation"  to carry out these functions  was  an 
important  part  of  the  ALP  Federal  government election platform in 1979. 
However,  there  has  been  little  movement  in  this  direction since the 
re-election of the Hawke  government  in 1984. 141 
ENDNOTES 
*[1]  Sourced  from  Stage  I  interviews. 
*[2]  OPEC  currently has  13  full members  (1987). 
*[3]  For  current  (1988)  reserves  for  Woodside  gasfie1ds  see 
'Petroleum in WA'  (Jan.  1988),  'WA  Dept  of Mines'. 142 
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CHAPTER  4 
THE  POLITICAL  AND  LEGISLATIVE  BACKGROUND 
TO  THE  NORTH  WEST  SHELF  PROJECT 
INTRODUCTION 
In  the  previous  chapter  an  attempt was  made  to place the  NWS 
project  within  a  worldwide  economic  and  geopolitical  context.  This 
chapter  serves  to  bring  the  focus  down  from World level to National and 
State level  (see Chapter  2,  Section I  of the  conceptual map). 
The  broad  aim  of the chapter is to examine how  the policies of 
the  Federal  and  WA  governments have  influenced the development of the  NWS 
since 1972. 
Section  4.1  outlines  some  important pieces of Federal and State 
legislation  which  composed the legislative framework which  influenced JVP 
policy  and  strategic  planning between 1972  and 1980.  This  influence was 
both  direct (i.e.  Procedures set out in the  1979  NWS  Development Agreement 
(Act)  and  indirect  by  bringing  about  structural  change  within  the 
Australian petroleum industry. 
Section  4.2 considers  some broader aspects  of Federal government 
policy  which  affected  the  NWS  project  in  the early planning years  to 
1980.  These  include taxation provisions,  foreign investment guidelines, 
farm  in/farm  out  rulings  and  export controls.  In the final section of 
Chapter  4.3,  these  government  policies  will  be  placed  in  a  broader 
historical  context  through  consideration of a  list of significant events 
identified  by  interview  respondents  prior  to  identifying  the  three 
critical events  analysed in Chapters  6  and  7  (see 2.1). 
Broad  historically  significant  events  identified  by  Stage  1 
respondents  will  be used as points of departure for  an examination of the 144 
Federal-State  relationship  on  matters  relating  to the North West  Shelf 
development  between  1972  and 1980.  This period was  of crucial importance 
for  the  joint venturers  as  the  time  to clear away  all the major political 
obstacles to  the  launch of a  2  stage natural gas/LNG  export project. 145 
4.1.  The  Legislative  Framework 
4.1.1.  Key  legislation of the  Whitlam era 
During  the period between the election of the Whitlam  government 
in  1972  and  its  fall  in  December  1975  a  series  of new legislative 
provisions  was  introduced  to  extend Federal control in the petroleum and 
minerals  sector.  Legislation  which was  introduced under  three of these 
Acts  was  to  influence  the  Federal-State debate  on  the North West  Shelf and 
the  petroleum  sector  in  general,  throughout Whitlam's period in office. 
These  Acts  were  (i)  The  Seas  and  Submerged  Lands  Act  1973,  (ii)  The 
Pipeline  Authority Act  1973  and  (iii)  The  Petroleum and Minerals Authority 
Act  1974. 
(i)  The  Seas  and  Submerged  Lands  Act.  This  Act was  introduced by 
the  Whitlam  government  in 1973  as  an attempt  to  extend Federal  sovereignty 
over  offshore minerals  and petroleum resources.  The  terms  of the Act  laid 
down  that  the  Commonwealth  be  given power  over both the territorial sea 
(from  the  low  water  mark  to  the  three mile limit)  and  the  continental 
shelf.  Prior to  the passing of the 1973  Act  a  series of attempts had been 
made  by  the  Federal  government  to  demarcate  the  limits of State and 
Federal jurisdiction over offshore areas  adjacent to State boundaries. 
From  1953  when  the  Commonwealth  government proclaimed rights 
over  the  resources  of the continental shelf through  to  1967,  the  issue of 
Commonwealth-State  responsibility for  the offshore was  left open.  In 1967 
a  compromise  agreement  was  drawn  up  between the States  and the  Federal 
government  and  encompassed  into  the  Petroleum  (Submerged Lands)  Act  1967. 
This  intergovernmental  agreement  empowered  State  ministers  to  grant 
offshor  exploration  permits  and  production  licences  under  State  and 
Federal  Acts  (Layer,  1985).  The  States effectively administered the joint 146 
Federal-State  legislation and collected all rents  and fees.  A 10%  royalty 
on  oil  and  gas  production was  split on a  40/60 basis between the Federal 
government  and the State adjacent to the producing area.  In many  respects 
the  terms  of this Act  gave  the State governments  a  large amount  of control 
over  offshore  resource  exploration  and  development  with  the  Federal 
government  taking  a  back  seat.  An  important rider to the Act helped to 
secure  the  State's  position  by  specifying  that in the event of a  High 
Court  decision  giving  the  Commonwealth  power  over the  offshore,  the  1967 
agreement  would  not  be  overturned  (see Layer,  1985).  However,  despite 
this  apparently  favourable  outcome  for  the States the Federal  government 
retained  an  important  power  of veto  on State applications for permission 
to  issue  offshore titles.  Joint Federal-State approval was  necessary for 
granting  offshore  exploration  or  production  permits.  This  arrangement 
allowed  the  Federal  government  to exercise its regulatory powers  in the 
areas of foreign affairs,  customs,  defence  and navigation  (ANZ  1982:p.20). 
Although  the  1973  Act  did not expressly contradict the  terms  of 
the  1967  agreement,  it clearly represented an attempt by the  Commonwealth 
to  exert  legal  power  in  areas for which the States had previously been 
responsible.  The  State governments  came  to view the new  legislation as  an 
infringement  on  their  rights  and  challenged  the Act  in the High Court 
(Layer,  1985).  Harman  (1984)  states  that the litigation which lasted 
through  to  January  1976  was  one  of the uncertain elements which delayed 
negotiations  on  the  North West  Shelf project  (Harman  1984:p196).  Whilst 
it  is  difficult  to  gauge  any direct affect that the  Seas  and  Submerged 
Lands  case  may  have  had  on the plans of the  NWS  joint venturers at the 
time,  it  clearly  contributed  to  the  prevailing climate of uncertainty 
which affected petroleum related enterprises between 1972  and 1976. 147 
Throughout  its  term  in  office  the  Whitlam  government  had 
introduced  a  series  of Acts  to  impose  controls on foreign  investment  and 
resource  exports  as  components  in a  broader scheme  to consolidate Federal 
power  in  the  Australian  minerals  and energy sectors.  Whitlam's  energy 
minister  Rex  Connor  had established the basis for  a  national energy plan 
which  would  facilitate  extensive  centralist  control  over  Australia's 
energy  resources.  The  plan  was  to  be  advanced  through  a  revised 
legislative  framework  for  minerals  and  energy,  but  was  never clearly 
articulated  throughout  Connor's  period  of  office.  Two  key pieces of 
legislation  were  introduced  by Connor  to support his plan:  the  Pipeline 
Authority Act  1973  and  the Petroleum and Minerals Authority Act  1974. 
The  introduction  of  the  Pipeline Authority Act had particular 
significance  for  the  North  West  Shelf joint venturers as it provided an 
instrument  through  which  Connor  would try to  advance his proposal for  a 
national  gas  pipeline  grid.  The  proposed grid would link gas production 
points  at  various  locations across Australia which would be  controlled by 
the  Federal  Pipelines  Authority.  The  Authority  was  given widespread 
powers  which went beyond  the construction and operation of pipelines.  The 
Federal  Act  included  provisions  to  allow the Authority to buy  and sell 
petroleum,  regulate  natural  gas  prices  and  supplies  and  retain 
domestically  produced  petroleum,  condensate  and  gas  for  use  in  the 
Australian  transport  sector  (Brotherton  1982:p.l26).  Connor's  proposal 
was  that  oil and gas  should be purchased at the wellhead,  distributed and 
sold  through  the  national  grid.  Further  powers  would be  extended to 
control  the development of refineries and gas processing facilities linked 
to major points of production. 148 
The  powers  vested  in the  new  Federal body  and Connor's natural 
grid  proposal were  seen to present a  severe  threat to  the  interests of the 
North  West  Shelf  joint venturers  and other foreign multinationals within 
the  Australian  petroleum  sector.  Industry representatives  attacked the 
proposal  which  would  remove  the right of private  companies  to pursue free 
market  pricing  and  production  policies  for  their products.  The  joint 
venturers  were  particularly  concerned  that  Connor's  legislation might 
remove  the possibility of the major  gas  export programme  which  they viewed 
as  essential  to  ensure  adequate  returns  from  the  North  West  Shelf 
development  (see 4.3.1.). 
The  other  policy  measure  introduced by  the Whitlam  government 
which  was  perceived  to  pose  a  threat to  the  interests of the States  and 
the  major  oil  companies,  was  the creation of the  Petroleum and Minerals 
Authority  or  PMA.  The  PMA  was  established to  explore  for,  produce  and 
market  petroleum and minerals,  it was  also assigned the  task of increasing 
Australian  equity  in  the  resources  sector.  This broad initiative was 
supported  by  statutory  powers  which were  the major  source of concern for 
the  State  governments  and the oil companies.  The  PMA's  statutory powers 
were  contested  by  the  major  oil  companies  on  the basis that no  other 
competitor  had  the  power  to  regulate  the  industry.  The  States  also 
objected  to  a  number  of sections  in the  PMA  Act which  infringed on powers 
previously  held  by  the  State governments.  Although  the states had been 
unanimous  in their challenge to  the  Seas  and  Submerged Lands  Act,  only the 
non-labour  states  supported  court action over the  PMA  Act.  In the  event 
this  limitation  was  overcome  and  the  legal challenge  over  the  PMA  was 
successful  with  the  Act  invalidated  on  a  technicality.  However,  this 
verdict  was  not repeated in the  case of the  Seas  and  Submerged Lands  Act, 149 
which  was  upheld  by a  court decision in January 1976,  giving the  Federal 
government effective sovereignty over  the  offshore  (Harman  1984:p.203). 
4.1.2.  Legislative  change  in the petroleum sector since Whitlam 
The  entry  of  the  Fraser government  in December  1975,  heralded 
the  end  of  the  Federal  campaign  to assert control in the Minerals  and 
Energy  sector.  Of  the  two  new  statutory bodies  created by  the previous 
government  to  extend  control  in these  areas  only the Pipeline Authority 
was  retained.  This  body is still operating in 1988  although its powers 
fall  well  short of those  designated under  the  1973  Act  and largely relate 
to  the  operation and maintenance  of the Moomba  to  Sydney  gas pipeline. 
However  the  upholding  of  the  "Seas  and  Submerged Lands  Act", 
presented  a  problem  for  the  Fraser  government with its policy of  "New 
Federalism" .  This  emphasised  increased  cooperation  and  sharing  of 
responsibilities  between  the  Federal and State governments  in an attempt 
to  move  away  from  the  centralist  policies  of the Whitlam era  (Haward 
1988). 
As  part  of  an initiative to  resolve  the  issue of Federal/State 
control  over  offshore areas  adjacent  to  State boundaries,  Fraser's energy 
minister  Lynch,  established an Offshore  Constitutional Settlement  Package 
(O.C.S.)  (Layer 1985). 
The  package which was  agreed at the  Premier's  conference  in June 
1979  was  promoted as  an  important achievement  in the  cause  of cooperative 
Federalism,  with  a  notable devolution of power  to  the  States with regard 
to  control over territorial waters.  According  to Haward  (1988),  the major 
legislative  and  administrative structure of the  O.C.S.  covered seven main 
areas,  three of which were  directly relevant  to  the  Petroleum and Minerals 
sector.  These were: 150 
(i)  A  legislative  package  which  aimed at extending the legislative 
power  of the  States with regard to  the adjacent territorial sea, 
vesting  the  title of the  seabed in the  designated waters  to  the 
State  and  amending  the  Seas  and  Submerged Lands  Act  1967  (see 
below). 
(ii)  An  Offshore  Petroleum Package which  established that operations 
(iii) 
outside  the  3  mile  territorial  baseline would continue  to be 
regulated  by  the  Commonwealth,  with day  to  day administration to 
continue  (as  with  the  1967  agreement),  to be undertaken by  the 
States. 
A  new  package  for  offshore  mining  of  minerals  other  than 
petroleum. 
legislative 
Under 
provisions 
the  proposed  regime  a  number  of  new 
were  to  be  introduced  including 
Commonwealth  and  State  legislation  embodying  a  common  mining 
code. 
Haward,  (1988)  comments  that despite  the  apparent devolution of power  to 
the  States,  facilitated  by the  new  package,  the  Federal  government still 
retained  an  important  brokerage power  in certain areas  and could enforce 
this  when  necessary.  He  cites the  example  of new fisheries provisions, 
although  the  comment  is  relevant  to  a  number  of  areas  relating to 
Petroleum  exploration  and  development,  where  the  Federal  government has 
retained  the  balance of power.  This point appears  to be borne out by  the 
actions  of  the  Hawke  Labor  government,  who  despite overt opposition to 
O.C.S.  and  the  inception  of  several reviews  of the package,  have still 
retained  its  major  provisions  with  regard to State/Federal sovereignty 
over  the  offshore  (1988). 151 
The  second  part of the Fraser government's  initiative to extend 
a  policy  of  cooperative Federalism in the petroleum sector,  relates to a 
series  of  changes  made  to  the  Petroleum  (Submerged  Lands)  Act  1967, 
embodied in the  Petroleum  (Submerged Lands)  Amendment Act 1980. 
Under  the  terms  of the  new Act  the Federal  government  was  given 
the  power  to  regulate  all  petroleum related activity outside the three 
mile  territorial  sea.  The  States  were  given control over all waters 
adjacent  to  their  boundaries  which  fell within that limit.  In keeping 
with  the  terms  of the  1967  agreement all revenues  were split 40:60 between 
the  State  and Federal governments.  In addition a  new joint authority was 
created  to  deal  with a  number  of important matters  relating to  the  issue 
and  renewal  of exploration permits  and production licences  (ANZ  1982).  In 
the  event  of  a  disagreement within the joint authority,  the view of the 
Federal  minister  prevailed.  The  only State granted the right to contest 
this  was  Western Australia where  the Federal minister was  required to  show 
cause  in  relation  to  the national interest if his view was  challenged by 
State authorities  (Layer 1985). 
Since  the  introduction  of  this  Act  in  1980  and subsequent 
amendments  in  1981,  the  existing  Federal ALP  government has  made  a  few 
attempts  to  extend  Federal powers  in the petroleum and minerals  sectors. 
However,  despite  recent debates  over assertion of Federal power under  the 
Seas  and  Submerged  Lands  legislation of 1973,  the only major changes  in 
Federal  policy  in  the  petroleum  sector  since  1982  have  been  the 
introduction  of  the  RRT,  Resource Rent Tax  and adjustments  to oil pricing 
and export quotas  (Erskine 1985). 152 
None  of  these  measures  introduced by the Hawke  government has 
had  a  strong  visible  impact  on the development of the North West  Shelf 
which  is  now  largely  the concern of the  WA  State government  through the 
Department  of  Resources  Development  (DRD).  This  department,  under  energy 
minister  Parker,  is responsible for  the  day  to day regulation of the JVPs 
activities  in  keeping  with  the  terms  of  the  development  agreement 
established in 1979. 
4.1.3.  The  North West  gas  development  (Woodside)  agreement 
The  Act referred to as  The  North West  Gas  Development  (Woodside) 
Agreement  Act  1979,  is the mechanism for  laying out the  framework  of terms 
and  conditions  which  the  joint venturers  and the State authorities must 
observe  in  relation to onshore  development.  The  offshore relationship is 
handled  by  the  Department  of  Mines  under  the  terms  of the  Seas  and 
Submerged  Lands  Act  (Petroleum)  (Harman  1984).  The  Woodside  Act was  one 
in  a  chain  of  subsequent  special  development  agreements  established 
between  the  WA  government  and private minerals  developers  during the 60s 
and  70s.  In  the  mid 1960s  the  WA  State government had come  to realise 
that  WA's  legislative  structure  was  not entirely geared to effectively 
regulate  the  development  of  mining  projects.  The  company-government 
agreement  system  was  established  as  an  "enabling"  instrument for the 
contracting 
legislation. 
parties,  and  avoided  extensive  modification  to  existing 
The  agreement Act was  seen to help in project planning and 
financing  by  clearly  laying  out the rights  and responsibilities of each 
party  in  key  areas  including provision of infrastructure,  environmental 
management,  royalty  provisions  and  use  of  local  labour materials  and 
industry  (WA  Govt.  May  1985).  Harman  (1984)  reports  that the major 153 
distinction  between  the  Woodside  Act  and previous  development  agreements 
was  the  emphasis  on the State's responsibility to provide infrastructure 
to  support  the project.  This  resulted in the WA  government providing $45 
million  (1979)  for  infrastructure in Karratha in addition to funding  for 
the  SECWA  pipeline  and  a  serviced  site  at Jervoise Bay  (Harman 1984, 
p.2l8) . 
4.1.4.  Criticisms of the Act 
Harman  (1984)  states  that the  1979  Woodside  agreement  received 
bipartisan  endorsement  in  parliament  and  was  passed without excessive 
debate.  However,  the ALP  did attempt to delay the passage of the bill on 
matters  relating  to prospective returns  to  the nation  (Harman 1984:p220). 
This  major  issue  has  been raised in relation to the North West  Shelf at 
several  points  in  the  project's development.  The  major  questions  to be 
addressed  related  to  use  of  local  services,  goods  and manufacturing 
capacity,  the  amount  of new jobs  the project will create over its lifetime 
and  financial  returns  to  the  State  and  Commonwealth  governments.  The 
latter  is  dealt  with  in  a  recent  report  commissioned  by  the joint 
venturers  which deals with direct financial  returns  from  Phase  I  and Phase 
II  and  a  "social  rate  of  return"  for  the project as  a  whole based on 
scenarios  using  different  discount  rates  (Brown and Copeland 1985).  An 
earlier  study by Bambrick  (1977),  contained estimates of financial  returns 
to  the State and Federal  governments  and examined the multiplier effect on 
employment  in  Western Australia arising from  the  development of the North 
West  Shelf.  The  figures  in the Bambrick study have been rendered obsolete 
by  considerable  changes  in  the project structure and worldwide  economic 
conditions  since  1977.  The  Brown and Copeland report has also received 154 
some  criticism  centering  on  the  source  of  the  figures  on which  the 
consultants  based  their  calculations  (see  Field Editorial,  Oil and Gas 
Australia,  March  85). 
The  major  ongoing debate  on the North West  Shelf relates to  the 
level  of local content in the project.  Peden  (1985)  cites the position of 
the  AMWSU  Amalgamated Metal Workers  and Shipwrights Union by referring to 
Section  12  of  the  Woodside  agreement  dealing  with  nUse  of  local 
professional  services  labour  and materials"  (WA  Govt.  Act No.104,  1979). 
He  states  that  Section 12  has been subject to flexible  interpretation by 
the  joint  venturers  and  the State  "Department of Resources  Deve10pmentn 
(DRD).  As  a  result of this the  AMWSU  have  run a  campaign to boost local 
content  since  work  began  on  the  Domestic  gas  phase  in 1980.  Union 
representatives  from  both  the  TLC  and  AMWSU  when  interviewed for this 
study  maintained  that Australian companies  have not been given sufficient 
opportunity  to  act as  suppliers of finished  goods  and basic materials  for 
use  in both the  domestic  and  LNG  phase.  Peden is particularly critical of 
provisions  made  for  Phase II where  Shell Development Australia Pty  through 
SIPM  a  major  foreign  multinational,  has  been given responsibility for 
engineering  procurement,  construction  and operation of the  onshore plant 
under  the  Construction  Services  and  Operations  Services  agreements 
established  with  the  DRD  (Peden May  1985).  On  the  question of adequate 
opportunity  for  local industry to participate in the project Peden states 
that  Australian  industry  cannot  hope  to  compete  on a  free market basis 
against  suppliers  in  low-wage  Asian  countries  or  countries  heavily 
protected  by  tariff  barriers.  In order to help redress  the balance in 
favour  of  local  industry  in  WA,  the  unions  are  pushing  for  the 
establishment  of  an  Industrial  Supplies  Office  (ISO)  which  will 155 
independently  monitor  the  sourcing of materials  and finished products  for 
use  in  the  North  West  Shelf project and attempt to encourage  the joint 
venturers  to gear procurement policies  towards  greater local content.  The 
DRD  currently  is  opposed  to  this  move  as  it encroaches  on their own 
statutory  responsibilities under  the  terms  of the  1979 Act.  However,  they 
have  endorsed  a  programme  established  by  the  Confederation of Western 
Australian  Industry  (CWAI)  to  supply  local  industry  with  up  to date 
information  on  the  procurement  requirements  of  SIPM  and  the  major 
contractor KJR  (CWAI  1986). 
4.1.5.  The  DRD  and  the  joint venturers 
Under  the  terms  of the  1979  Agreement Act  the WA  Department of 
Resources  Development  (DRD)  has been appointed as  the major  coordinating 
body  for  the  project,  taking  responsibility  for  putting  together  a 
cohesive  project  package  to be  agreed with the joint venturers.  The  DRD 
acts  as  the  main  liaison  body  with  all  the  other State and Federal 
departments  who  must  be  contacted in relation to various aspects of the 
project,  i.e.  the  DRD  will deal with the Department of Mines  over leasing 
and  licencing,  the  State and Federal  treasuries  on financial matters  and 
the  Department  of  Immigration  and Ethnic Affairs  on matters relating to 
use of expatriate labour. 
This  single  package  'one stop  shop'  approach is favoured by the 
DRD  as  a  means  of facilitating the  smooth operation of the project through 
the  elimination  of a  lot of bureaucratic delay.  Harman  (1984)  notes  that 
the  single window approach to company-government  relations appears  to have 
been  fairly  efficient throughout  the  development of Phase  I.  However,  it 
has  been  subject  to  the  criticism  of  excessive  secrecy removing  the 
actions of both major parties  from public scrutiny  (Harman 1984:p.220). 156 
The  DRO's  handling  of  the North West  Shelf agreement has been 
subjected  to direct attack by the unions  who  claim that the department has 
sat  back  and  allowed  the  joint  venturers  to dictate their terms.  Two 
major  criticisms  for  Phase  II  relate to the large number  of expatriate 
staff  employed  in  key  positions  within  the  joint  venture  project 
organisation  and  the  acceptance  by  the  DRO  of  the  joint venturer's 
arrangement  to  locate  the  WOP  design  offices  for  the  LNG  phase  in 
Yokohama,  Japan.  The  latter decision was  defended by the joint venturers 
on  the  grounds  of technical necessity and the existing infrastructure and 
expertise available in Yokohama  (see Woodside  May  1985:p.6). 
4.1.6.  Environmental  legislation 
Since  the  early  seventies  increased  public  awareness  of the 
potential  ecological problems  which  could result from  large scale resource 
developments  prompted  State  governments  to  draft  legislation  for  the 
protection  of  the  environment  in  the  vicinity  of these projects.  At 
Federal  level  the  Environmental Protection  (Impact of Proposals)  Act was 
introduced  in  1974,  requiring  the  submission  of  Environmental  Impact 
Statements  (EIS)  covering  any  planned  projects  which could (i)  have  a 
significant  impact  on  the  environment,  (ii)  draw on Federal  government 
funds  or  were  subject to the constitutional power of the  government  (ANZ 
1982:p.22).  Each  State  also  drafted  EIS  legislation  to ensure  that 
environmental  considerations  are always  reviewed prior to the endorsement 
of any development proposals. 
The  North  West  Shelf development  agreement makes  provision for 
environmental  protection  by  requiring  the  submission  of environmental 
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(EPA).  Prior  to  the  issue of this report two  major parties  involved in 
the  Domestic phase of the project,  the  SEGWA  and Alcoa,  were both required 
to  submit  Environmental  Impact in Statements  and  Environmental  Review and 
Management  Programmes  to the  EPA  and  the State government.  When  the  EPA, 
SECWA  and  Alcoa reports were  finally tabled in 1979  no  major objection to 
the  project  was  raised.  The  only major criticism put forward was  that 
little  consideration  had  been  given  to  the  impact  of the project on 
Dampier  and  Karratha.  In  view  of  the  increased  pressure  on local 
community  facilities  a  report was  commissioned by the Shire of Roebourne 
outlining  future  requirements  in  the  area.  This  resulted in the joint 
venturers  contributing  $25  million for  the upgrading of facilities in the 
Karratha area  (Harman  1984). 4.2. 
4.2.1. 
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Fiscal Policy and  the North West  Shelf.  1972-1985 
Tax  concessions  for  the North West  Shelf 
The  companies  participating in the North West  Shelf venture are 
taxed  under  the  broad  range  of  provisions  laid  down  by the Federal 
government  for  the  petroleum  and  minerals  sectors  (ANZ  1982:pp.18-20). 
Western  Australian  State  taxation  provisions  and royalty levels  are set 
out  in  the  terms  of the  1979  development  agreement  (WA  Govt.  ACT  No.104, 
1979).  However,  whilst the JVPs  must operate within this broad taxation 
framework  they  have  managed  to  negotiate  a  series of concessions  and 
special  provisions  which  they maintained were  essential to  the  commercial 
viability  of  the  project.  It is these provisions which have had  a  major 
influence  on  the  joint  venturers'  decision  to  commit  large  amounts  of 
capital  to  the  project  and  the series of development policies  they have 
pursued  since  the  late seventies.  Prior to  1977  the  future  of the North 
West  Shelf  project  still  hung  in  the  balance  in anticipation of the 
outcome  of  ongoing negotiations which were  taking place between the joint 
venturers,  the West Australian government  and several Federal bodies.  The 
talks  were  taking  place  in a  climate of uncertainty which was  in part a 
legacy of the Whitlam era. 
Throughout  1976  Charles  Court,  the  WA  State premier of the  time, 
and  the  joint  venturers  had  negotiated  with the newly elected Liberal 
Federal  government  for  the  concessions  they  felt  were  essential for 
launching  the  project.  Court  pressed  for  a  change  in Loan  Council 
guidelines  to  allow  him  to  source  sufficient  funds  to  support the  WA 
government's  infrastructural  commitment  to  the project  (see 4.2.3.).  At 
the  same  time  the  joint venturers  stressed that the  future  economics  of 159 
the  project  would  be largely determined by the Federal tax regime  and in 
particular  provisions  relating  to  investment  allowance  and  write off 
periods  for  capital  expenditure  (Harman  1984).  By  August  1977  the 
Commonwealth  provisions  for  the  North  West  Shelf were  in place in the 
shape  of eighteen letters which constituted a  formal  agreement between the 
Federal  government  and  the  joint  venturers.  Harman  (1984)  states that 
this  new  taxation  package  introduced by the Liberals provided incentives 
to  the joint venturers in three major areas: 
(i)  The  existing  20%  investment  allowance  for  new  capital 
expenditure  was  extended for  two  years  to  a  cut-off date of June 
30th  1986.  This addition to  deductions  available under existing 
write-off  provisions  in  the  petroleum  sector,  applied to  the 
whole  industry.  However,  it was  of specific importance  to the 
future  of  the  North  West  Shelf in that it served to boost the 
cash  flow of the participants throughout the construction stages 
of the project. 
(ii)  A  second  incentive  which  may  have  been  an  attempt to help 
Woodside  service  its  project debt,  was  set out relative to the 
onshore  infrastructure  for  Phase  II.  Federal  treasurer Anthony 
ruled  that  the  LNG  plant  was  not  to  be  considered  as 
manufacturing  infrastructure.  This  in  turn  meant  that JVP 
capital  invested  in  the construction stages,  an estimated $2.5 
billion  (1985),  could  be  partially  written  off  under  the 
accelerated  depreciation  allowances  available  to  petroleum 
companies  under  income  tax law. (iii) 
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A  tax  rebate  of 30c  in the dollar was  offered on subscriptions 
to  shares  in  offshore  exploration  and  development projects. 
This  provision  favoured  large  exploration companies,  but also 
provided  some  additional  security  for  public shareholders  in 
Woodside  Petroleum  who  were  important for  upholding levels of 
Australian equity in the project  (Harman 1984:p.208). 
In  the  1977  budget Anthony had introduced a  $3  bb1  levy on crude 
oil  production.  Condensate  produced  on the North West  Shelf was  to be 
exempted  from  this levy.  This has  proven to be  a  major  concession as  the 
estimated  condensate  reserve  of North Rankin  'A'  and to  a  greater extent 
Goodwyn  have  increased considerably since 1977.  Condensate stripped from 
the  North  Rankin  'A'  gas  flow provides  a  useful source of early profit 
from  exports  or conversion to motor spirit for  the domestic market  (Harman 
1984:p.187) . 
Finally  the  ever  present  threat  of a  Resource  Rent  Tax  (RRT) 
which  the  JVPs  had  feared  throughout  the  seventies  was  at  least 
temporarily  removed by Anthony's  statement that the North West  Shelf would 
be  explicitly  exempted  from  the tax.  The  current ALP  Federal  government 
upheld  Anthony's  promise  when  the  RRT  was  finally introduced in 1984. 
Under  the  new  provision both the Bass  Straight and North West  Shelf were 
exempted  from  RRT  which  would only apply to  "greenfield"  offshore areas 
(not developed by July 1984)  (Erskine 1985:p.76). 
4.2.2.  Foreign investment policy and the  FIRB 
During  the  Whit1am  era  a  number  of  measures  were  taken to 
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Petroleum  sectors.  Whitlam's  energy  minister  Rex  Connor  pursued his 
nationalistic  line  by  ruling  for  a  minimum  of  50%  Australian equity for 
new  resource  projects  and  100%  Australian equity in the  energy sector. 
The  latter  guideline  proved  to  be unrealistic in relation to  petroleum 
projects  and was  eventually applied only to Uranium  developments.  Another 
important  limitation  on  foreign  investment  imposed  by  Connor  was  a 
variable  deposit  requirement  (VDR)  that  25%  of foreign funds  had to be 
deposited  with  the  reserve  bank  (Layer  1985).  These measures  presented 
serious  stumbling  blocks  for  early negotiations  on  the North West  Shelf 
and  as  Layer  points  out,  induced  considerable  hostility  in  Western 
Australia  following  the  suspension of negotiators  on  the  ALWEST  aluminiwn 
smelter  (Layer  1985). 
In  1975  the Whitlam  government  introduced the Foreign Takeovers 
Act  which was  an  amended version of the  Co!!!]?anies  (Foreign-.Takeovers)  Acts 
of  1972-74  (ANZ  1982:p.25).  Under  the provisions  of the  1975  Act  the 
Federal  treasurer  was  empowered  to  examine  takeover proposals  in any  area 
of  Australian  business  and  consider whether  the  takeover would result in 
loss  of  Australian  control  to  foreign  interests  (i.e.  foreign  investors 
would  determine  the policy of the business).  If the  treasurer deemed  this 
to  be  the  case  he  may  then prohibit the  takeover  as being against the 
national interest. 
When  the Liberals  entered office in December  1975  they made  some 
changes  to  the  1975  Act  guidelines.  The  major  change  was  the creation of 
the  Foreign  Investment  Review  Board,  FIRB.  This  new  statutory body  was 
made  responsible  for  screening foreign investment proposals  and assessing 
them  on  a  case by  case basis.  Three major  requirements  for  FIRB  approval 
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the  venture,  (ii) That proposals  involve  economic benefits to Australia in 
particular  to  offset losses of Australian ownership  and control and (iii) 
Australian  equity  participation  guidelines  for  certain  sectors  are 
observed  (Layer  1985). 
The  Federal  government was  at pains  to point out that those were 
not  rigid  rules  but  essentially  guidelines which allow each case to be 
assessed  on  its  merits.  The  Fraser government's  interpretation of these 
guidelines  has  since  been  criticised by  some  commentators  as  leading to 
decisions  which  were  contrary  to  the  national  interest  (see  Chambers 
1978). 
The  national interest issue relating to  the North West  Shelf was 
still  being  debated  into  the  early  eighties.  However,  Fraser's 1976 
decision  on foreign equity levels for  the project could be  seen at best to 
be  a  very flexible interpretation of the 1975  guidelines.  Foreign equity 
levels  in  the  North  West  Shelf  had  changed  over  the  years  from  an 
estimated  75-82%  prior to  the  Burmah buy-out in 1976  to  approximately  52% 
when  BHP's  newly acquired shares boosted Australian equity to  48%.  Since 
the  entry  of  MIMI  at  the  end  of  1984  and the  Shell/BHP  takeover of 
Woodside  in  1985,  exact figures  relating to  foreign equity in the project 
as  a  whole  have been difficult to obtain.  Estimates  from available data 
set  foreign  equity in Phase  I  at approximately 53%  and  73%  for  Phase II  -
giving  a  project total of 63%  foreign ownership  (Commonwealth Record,  June 
1985:p.920).  (These  figures  may be below true foreign equity levels as 
they fail to reflect nominee  shareholdings  in BHP  and Woodside.) 
The  key  event  relating  to  foreign  investment  for  the joint 
venturers  had  been  Anthony's  announcement  in  July  1976  that  a  25% 
Australian  equity  guideline  would  be  accepted for  the North West  Shelf 163 
despite  the  prevailing 50%  guideline for petroleum developments.  Anthony 
had  retreated  from  his  original  stance  following  a  period of intense 
lobbying  from  Charles  Court  and representatives of the joint venturers. 
Court  had  vehemently  sought  to  remove  all  major  obstacles  to  the 
development  of  the project and the major JVP  participants.  Shell,  BP  and 
Cal  Asiatic  .had  pursued  the  argument  that a  reduction in their existing 
equity  in  the  North West  Shelf project would undermine  their position as 
integrated  oil  companies,  as  opposed to exploration companies  or merchant 
bankers  (Harman  1984:p.208).  Whilst  Anthony's  decision may  have been 
viewed  at  the  time  as  a  sellout  by certain factions  of the Federal 
opposition,  with  hindsight it proved to be crucial for  the  development of 
the  North  West  Shelf.  The  Fraser government  through compromising their 
own  guidelines  had  effectively  cleared  away  all  of  the  final major 
obstacles  which  had  obstructed purposeful negotiations  on the North West 
Shelf since 1973. 
4.2.3.  Other fiscal controls 
Two  broad  areas  of Federal policy which had  some  bearing on the 
planning  of  the North West  Shelf project between 1972  and 1975  related to 
farm  in,  farm  out arrangements  and export controls.  Farm  in arrangements 
had  originally been introduced to facilitate more  intensive exploration of 
large  tenement  areas which had been leased to  small numbers  of exploration 
companies.  As  most  of  the  known  petroleum bearing regions were under 
tenement  by  the  early 1970s,  new  explorers were  faced with the option of 
buying  shares  in companies holding existing leases or arranging a  farm in 
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In  March  1973  the  Whitlam government banned  farm  in,  farm  out 
agreements  between  companies  where  "There  was  a  significant degree  of 
foreign  interest  in  areas  covered  by the agreements"  or "the agreement 
transferred  control  from  one  overseas  interest  to  another"  (ANZ 
1982:p.25). 
This  new ruling was  introduced following  a  move  by Rex  Connor  to 
defer  consent  on  a  proposed farm  in agreement between Woodside-Burmah  and 
Mt.  Isa Mines  Ltd.  (MIM). 
In  1974  Woodside-Burmah  had been due  to relinquish half of its 
original  exploration  leases  to  the  State  government.  In view of this 
statutory  requirement  the  company had been anxious  to  step up  exploration 
in  the vast 144,000 square mile permit area prior to  the expiry of half of 
its  leases.  Farm  in  arrangements  to assist with this goal had already 
been  established  with  Shell,  Amax  and  BHP.  This  did  not  help 
Woodside-Burmah's  position when  the  company's  request was  presented to  the 
Federal  energy  minister.  Connor  opposed the  MIM  arrangement on  two  main 
fronts:  (i)  he  resented panic  farm in arrangements by a  company which he 
felt  had  received  a  massive  permit  area  which it could never hope  to 
adequately  explore;  (ii)  he  wished  to uphold his principles on foreign 
investment  by  preventing MIM  52.56%  American owned  (American Smelting and 
Refining  Co.)  from  gaining  access  to  a  promising Australian offshore 
permit area. 
Connor's  decision  was  never  reversed  despite  the  apparent 
contradiction  that  a  farm  in between MIM  and Woodside-Burmah,  which was 
75%  foreign owned,  would have  reduced the level of foreign holdings  in the 
North  West  Shelf  (Harman  1984).  The  farm  in system was  subsequently 
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never  as  widely  used  as  in  the  early seventies  due  to  the  increasing 
number  of tenements  becoming available under  the  compulsory relinquishment 
terms  applied by  the States  to all exploration leases. 
4.2.4.  Export  controls 
The  ongoing  threat of export controls was  always  a  thorn in the 
flesh  of the joint venturers  in the  late seventies.  However,  this problem 
was  largely  eliminated  in  December  1979  when  the Fraser government  gave 
the  joint  venturers permission to export  53%  of estimated recoverable  gas 
reserves  in the existing North West  Shelf fields.  These  approvals  covered 
a  20  year period from  the first export of LNG  to Japan over  the  operating 
life of the project. 
In  1973  the  Whitlam  government  had  introduced  export price 
controls  in  the  minerals  sector to  force producers  to  agree  a  base price 
which  would  be  presented to all purchasers.  An  alternative solution was 
limiting  exports  to  prevent  overproduction,  and by virtue of this hold 
prices  at  a  level which would ensure  good revenue  levels  for  the  Federal 
government.  However,  this  policy  was  consistently  undermined  by 
differences  between  mineral  producers  in different States  (Layer  1985). 
As  a  result,  no  coordinated across  the board export policy was  extended to 
the  petroleum sector,  although Layer  (1985)  notes  that the conservationist 
lobby  in  the  post  1973  oil  crisis  period  made  this  an  ongoing 
possibility.  The  joint venturers were  always  aware  of any  threat to  the 
export  component  of  the  project  which  they maintained was  essential to 
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consistent  lobbying  paid off with the  1979  export approvals  ensuring that 
they  would  not be committed to Charles Court's original idea of a  project 
solely to meet  the domestic  gas  requirements  of Western Australia. 167 
4.3.  Significant Events.  1972-1980 
This  section  will  consider  some  of the key  influences  in the 
history  of  the  NWS  project  during  the period 1972-1980.  The  material 
present~d  will  be  based  on both available published historical accounts 
and  interviews  conducted for  the  programme  outlined in Chapter  2. 
In  4.3.1.  detail is drawn  from  the accounts  of Stage  1  interview 
respondents  (2.2.2.)  on  their  personal  perceptions  of these  important 
political  events.  Section  4.3.2.  describes  the process  of negotiation 
which  led  to  the final signing of the Phase  1  Domestic  Gas  Contract.  The 
focus  is on  a  series of historically significant events which collectively 
provide  a  broad  background for  the critical events which are  examined in 
detail in Chapters  6  and  7. 
The  major  concern in Chapter  4  is with the  legislative framework 
and  political  factors  which  shaped  the  development  of the  NWS  project. 
Later  chapters  focus  largely  on  economic  factors  and  the  institutional 
context  within  which  JVP  policy  and  strategy evolved between 1982  and 
1986. 
4.3.1.  Whit1am.  Fraser  and the  North West  Shelf 
The  effect  which  public  policy  measures  introduced  by  the 
Whit1am  and  Fraser  government  had  on  the  development of the North West 
Shelf  project  is  covered  in  considerable  detail  by  Harman 
1984:pp.192-222.  The  key  legislative  and fiscal  changes  made  by  these 
governments  which  had  a  definable  influence  on  the planning strategy of 
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In  the  course of the thirty-five interviews  conducted to  support 
the  study the election of the Whit1am and Frazer governments  and  the Court 
government  in  WA,  were  identified as  significant events  in the history of 
the  North  West  Shelf  project.  A  number  of perspectives were  offered on 
the  impact  which  the policies introduced by these  governments  had on  the 
development  of the project.  A majority of these accounts  corroborated the 
view  expressed  by  Harman 1984 in her account of the political background 
to  the  NWS  project.  The  broad  conclusions  that  can  be  drawn  from 
published sources  and interview material are as  follows: 
(i)  The  political  and fiscal regime under Whit1am served to hold up 
negotiations  on  a  tripartite development strategy for the North 
West  Shelf  which  was  acceptable  to the Federal  government,  the 
WA  government  and the joint venturers. 
(ii)  By  contrast  the  Frazer  government  through the  introduction of 
generous  tax  concessions  and financial  incentives  for  the joint 
(iii) 
venturers  eagerly  encouraged  the  rapid  development  of  the 
project. 
The  WA  government under Sir Charles  Court adopted a  similar line 
although  they  took  issue with both the joint venturers  and  the 
Fraser  government  on  a  number  of matters relating to the end use 
and  pricing  of  North  West  Shelf gas.  These broad assertions 
will  be  explained  in  more  detail  in  this  subsection  and 
subsection  4.3.2  which  focuses  on  the role which Sir Charles 
Court's  Liberal NCP  coalition government played in launching the 
North West  Shelf project. 169 
The  Whitlam  era  was  described  by  many  of  the  interview 
respondents  as  a  time  of  great  uncertainty  for  investors  and major 
operations  in  the  Australian resource sector.  Connor's pipeline concept 
and  his stated intention in October  1973  to  take  over North West  Shelf gas 
were  cited  as  a  major  source  of  concern  for  both  Australian  and 
multinational  companies  operating  in  the Australian petroleum sector at 
the  time.  In addition it was  agreed that the Pipeline Authority Act  and 
the  Petroleum  and Minerals Authority  (PMA)  Act were viewed throughout  the 
Australian  petroleum  industry  as  a  threat to private enterprise in the 
resources  sector.  A  common  point  made  by  a  number  of Liberal party 
speakers  and  petroleum  industry  representatives  was  that  the Federal 
government  was  competing with private companies whilst tightly regulating 
their  corporate activities.  Whitlam's policies on foreign investment were 
seen  by  these  parties  to  create  a  hostile  and  uncertain investment 
climate,  a  fact  reflected  as  a  drop off in the high levels of foreign 
capital  inflow  which had  come  into Australia in the  five years  up  to  1972 
CAPEA  May  1985:p.10). 
The  reduction  in  expenditure  on  Australian  based  petroleum 
exploration  programmes  and development  in the period between 1972  and 1976 
may  also  have  been a  reflection of Whitlam's  foreign  investment policies 
(ANZ  1982:p.1S).  The  strong nationalist philosophy upheld by Whitlam and 
the  centralist  policies supported by Rex  Connor  and other leading figures 
like  Lennox  Hewitt  of  the Bureau of Mineral Resources  (BMR)  was  seen by 
the  petroleum industry lobby  to represent a  threat to  the  interests of the 
North  West  Shelf  .  .  *1 
Jo~nt venturers.  Connor's policies for  the petroleum 
sector  were  also challenged by the  WA  government under Court,  which joined 
with  the  other  States  in  a  legal battle against the  Seas  and  Submerged 170 
Lands  Act.  However,  despite  the problems  which  Connor's  legislation may 
appear  to  have  created  for  multinational  interests  in the Australian 
petroleum sector it is easy to overstate  the  importance  of these measures. 
The  multinational  participants  in  the  North West  Shelf joint 
venture  like  all  multinationals in the petroleum industry were vastly 
experienced  in  dealing  with governments which laid down  a  more  stringent 
set  of  tax rules and foreign investment guidelines  than those established 
under  the Whitlam government.  The  joint venturers were  clearly opposed to 
Connor's  plans  for  a  national energy grid and proposals  to extend Federal 
regulation  in  the  petroleum  industry.  However  a  number  of interview 
respondents  suggested  that  the  delay in negotiations over  a  development 
strategy  for  the North West  Shelf in the mid seventies may have been more 
a  product of what the venturers  did not know  than the direct effect of new 
legislation.  Fears  expressed in the  industry relating to nationalisation 
of  oil  company  assets  and  Connor's  failure  to clearly articulate his 
proposals  for  future  change  in  the resources  sector were major factors 
identified  as  responsible  for  creating  the  tense political climate in 
1974.  This  did  not  favour  ongoing  negotiations  with several of the 
world's  largest  multinational  oil  companies  on  a  detailed plan for  the 
development of Australia's largest natural gas  resource.*2 
4.3.2.  Negotiations  in Canberra.  1973-1980 
From  the  outset of negotiations  in 1973  the  NWS  joint venturers 
had  made  it  clear  in  their  company  reports  to  Canberra and through 
representation  by Sir Charles  Court,  that they were  unwilling to  commit  to 
a  large  scale  feasibility  study unless  they obtained certain assurances 
from  Canberra.  Foremost  on the list was  permission to create an export 171 
based  project,  although  even  at this stage  the  JVPs  were probably aware 
that  the  Canberra and Perth governments would not agree  to  a  project which 
did not service the domestic market in WA  or Australia wide. 
Rex  Connor  continued  to  push  his  national pipeline proposal 
right  up  to  his dismissal  over  the  Loans  affair in June  1975,  whilst Sir 
Charles  Court stood firm  in his determination to keep  North West  Shelf gas 
for  the  WA  market  (Harman  1984:p.236).  In the event it was  not until 
November  1977  that the five project participants were  finally persuaded to 
commit  $50m  for  a  large  scale  feasibility  study  for  the North West 
Shelf.*3  The  same  month  witnessed  the  signing  of  a  Memorandum  of 
Understanding  (MOU)  between Alcoa,  the  SECWA  and  the joint venturers.  The 
terms  of  the  MOU  amounted  to  a  conditional agreement whereby  the  SECWA 
proposed  to  purchase  a  total  of  250  MMCFD  of North West  Shelf gas  for 
onse11ing in the south west of the state  (Parker,  August  1985). 
Whilst  these  developments  did  not  guarantee  that  the  NWS 
participants  would  in  fact  proceed with the project,  they made  it clear 
that  Frazer's  fiscal  regime  and conditions  for project development were 
more  acceptable  than  those  created  by  the  previous  Federal 
administration.  The  Frazer  government had exposed its eagerness  to  see 
the  North  West  Shelf  project  underway  as  far  back as July 1976 with 
Anthony's  announcement  on foreign equity restructure for  the project  (see 
4.2.2.).  This  measure  was  significant  in  that  it brought the joint 
venturers  back  to  the negotiating table.  However,  the major catalyst for 
action  from  the participants came  in August  1977 with the  announcement of 
Commonwealth  conditions  for  the  development of the North West  Shelf  (see 
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The  Frazer  government's  1977  package  provided  a  positive 
incentive  to  the  joint venturers  to proceed.  The  Federal administration 
cleared  away  many  of the major legislative and political hurdles  created 
for  foreign  investors  in  the petroleum industry and created the  FIRB  as 
the  statutory  body  to  assess  proposed foreign  investment in Australian 
resource  projects on a  case by case basis.  This policy and other measures 
relating  more  directly  to  the  North West  Shelf have been criticised as 
examples  of Frazer's attempts  to attract foreign capital at the expense of 
the national interest  (Layer 1985,  Saddler 1979). 
Both  the Whitlam and Frazer governments  played an  important role 
in  influencing  JVP  planning  through  legislation and fiscal measures  to 
control  or support the multinational interests which  came  to exert so  much 
power  within the joint venture structure.  However,  this assertion largely 
ignores  the  central  role  of  the  WA  government under Sir Charles  Court 
which  conducted  widespread  negotiations  with the joint venturers  in the 
period  between  April  1974 and  September  1980 when  the sales contracts for 
the  Domestic phase were  finalised. 
4.3.3.  The  Court  government  and the North West  Shelf project 
The  election  of  Sir  Charles  Court  as  State premier in Western 
Australia  in October 1974 was  an event which proved to have  a  considerable 
bearing  on  the  future  development  of  the  North  West  Shelf project. 
Court's  predecessor,  Tonkin,  had endorsed the  development of the  regions 
gas  resources  as  a  source  of  cheap  fuel  to  support  new  industrial 
developments  in  the  North  and South west of the State.  However,  it was 
Court  who  consistently  promoted  the  development of the West Australian 
resource  for  West  Australians  and  maintained  this firm stance against 
Whitlam's centralist policies. 173 
Sir  Charles  Court had vehemently opposed Connor's pipeline plan 
which  he  saw  as  draining a  West Australian resource  to fuel Eastern States 
markets.  Like  Tonkin,  Court  originally planned to support a  number  of 
major  industrial  developments  using  cheap  North  West  Shelf  gas  (see 
4.3.4.).  He  was  to clash with both the joint venturers  and the Federal 
government  over  the pricing and distribution of the  gas  at several points 
in the future. 
Court's  plan  for  a  wholly domestic project providing gas  to  the 
West  Australian  market  was  challenged by the joint venturers who  lobbied 
for  a  purely export based project.  Connor's pipeline plan was  opposed by 
Court  and  the  joint  venturers  on the basis that it undermined their own 
aspirations  for  North  West  Shelf gas.  However,  by the  time  the Whitlam 
government  was  dismissed  in  November  1975 it was  becoming apparent that 
these  original proposals put forward by Court and Conner were not going to 
come  to  fruition in the forseeable  future.  By  the  end of 1977,  Court was 
forced  to relinquish his plan for  a  project serving only Western Australia 
in  the  face  of  Federal  approval  for  the JVPs  to export  53%  of existing 
North West  Shelf reserves. 
Despite  this  apparent  setback  Court's  determined  efforts to 
launch  a  major resource project supplying natural gas  to Western Australia 
received  a  major boost with the  signing of the Memorandum  of Understanding 
(MOU)  between  the  SECWA  and  the joint venturers  in November  1977.  The 
establishment  of  the  MOU  between  the  two  parties and the major client 
Alcoa  has  been  identified as  a  crucial event in the history of the North 
West  Shelf  project.  Although it did not represent a  final contract the 
MOU  was  an important statement of intent by  SECWA  to buy  250  MMCFD  of gas 
from  the joint venturers.  Alcoa were  included in a  back to back agreement 
in which  they would take up  over half the total contracted volume  of gas. 174 
The  signing of the  1977  MOU  was  significant in that it moved  the 
joint  venturers  towards  the  signing of the final sales contract for  the 
domestic  phase  of  the  project.  However,  in the  interim period of three 
years  which  lay between the establishment of the  MOU  and the final signing 
in  September  1980,  Charles  Court had to continue  a  series of negotiations 
with  the  JVPs  to  establish  contractual  conditions  acceptable to both 
seller and purchaser. 
Prior  to  the  establishment  of  the  MOU,  Court was  forced to 
retreat  from  his  original  stance on  cheap  gas.  The  joint venturers had 
consistently  opposed  the  idea that the North West  Shelf would be  a  source 
of  low cost fuel  for new  developments  in the Pilbara and  the  south west of 
the  State.  International  gas  prices  were based on an oil index which 
remained  high  throughout  the late seventies  and the joint venturers were 
unwilling  to  significantly  undercut  prices  for  the Western Australian 
market.  Although proposed prices for North West  Shelf gas were never made 
publicly  available.  Harman  (1984)  reports  that Court had accepted the 
fact  that  the joint venturers would not supply Western Australia with low 
cost fuel by the middle  of 1977  (Harman 1984:p.210). 
With  hindsight it is easy to criticise Court's premature retreat 
from  his  original  position  on  gas  pricing.  The  sheer volume  of gas 
discovered  on  the  North West  Shelf and the  subsequent glut which  emerged 
in  the  West  Australian and international markets  revealed that the joint 
venturers'  longer  term  bargaining  position  was  not  as  strong  as it 
appeared  to  be  in 1977.  The  failure  to obtain cheap  fuel also served to 
further  undermine  the  viability  of  new  industrial  development in the 
Pilbara and the  south west of the State. 175 
Following  the  signing of the MOU,  the joint venturers maintained 
their  long standing argument  that the West Australian government  should be 
responsible  for  the  construction  of  the  Dampier  to Wagerup  pipeline. 
Court  had  accepted  this  position  as  far back as  1976  when he had first 
approached  the  Loans  Council  with  a  request  that  they  should relax 
constraints  on  the  borrowing  limit  imposed  on  Western Australia.  He 
finally  achieved  this goal  in 1978  when  the council gave  approval  for  the 
SECWA  to  borrow  $416m  from  foreign financiers  (Harman 1984:p.212).  In 
1979,  Court  obtained  permission  for  further  spending  on  a  serviced 
industrial  site at Jervoise Bay near Perth  ($6.85m)  and new  infrastructure 
in Karratha  ($45m)  (Harman 1984:p.218). 
By  1980  Court  was  drawing close to his objective of seeing the 
initial  stage  of  the  North  West  Shelf project launched.  The  SECWA  had 
sufficient  funding  to  begin work on the pipeline and the joint venturers 
were  largely  satisfied  with  the results of their feasibility study.  In 
September  1980,  the contracts were  signed and the major project financiers 
had  the  bankable  document  required to provide  the security needed for  the 
project  financing  arrangement.  From  that  point  onwards,  work on the 
offshore  infrastructure  domestic  gas  plan and  SECWA  pipeline progressed 
steadily  with  the  first  commercial  supplies  of  North  West  Shelf gas 
reaching Perth in August  1984. 
Charles  Court  and  leading  figures  in  his  government  have 
received  a  fair  measure  of criticism over their handling of negotiations 
with  the  joint  venturers  in  the  four year period between 1976  and  the 
signing  of the  "take or pay"  contracts in 1980.  The most  common  criticism 
of  Court was  that he was  too  sympathetic  to  the  arguments presented to him 
by  hard  bargaining multinationals.  A  number  of the  interview respondents 176 
expressed  the  idea  that  he  was  politically  outmanoeuvred  by  astute 
negotiations  on  the  issue  of  prices  and  the  financing  of the  SECWA 
pipeline. 
the  North 
'd  1  *4  ~  eo  ogy. 
It  was  postured that Court was  blinded by his  own  vision for 
West  and  his  powerful  belief  in  a  developmentalist 
These  ideas  have  never been  s 1.lpported by carefully collated 
historical  evidence  and  must be weighted against Court's major political 
achievement  in  bringing  a  megaproject off the  drawing board and  into  the 
development stage. 
4.3.4.  The  Pilbara study 
When  considering  Court's  aspirations  for  major  resource  and 
industrial  development  in  WA  it is useful  to  consider  the original plan 
for  bringing  industry  to  the  Pilbara region.  Consideration of this plan 
places  Court's  thinking  within its  true historical context:  a.nd  goes  some 
way  to  explaining the location of current new  developments  in the  State's 
South West. 
The  original  Pilbara  concept  was  developed  by  the  Tonkin 
government  as  an  attelilpt  to  establish  processing  facilities  for  the 
region's  major  natural  resources,  notably salt,  magnesimn  and iron ore. 
The  North  West  Shelf  project which was  in its embryonic  planning stages 
when  the  concept  was  developed,  was  to provide  a  source  of cheap  gas  for 
the  basic  fuel  and  feedstock  requirements  of  the  industries  to  be 
established.  The  1972  document proposed that a  Pilbara industrial complex 
should  be  created to  support  a  variety of processing activities.  Possible 
developments  included an  aluminium smelter,  a  giant steel plant,  a  uranium 
enrichment  plant  and  iron ore pellitising facilities.  Also  included for 
integration  into  the  industrial  complex  were  petrochemical processing 177 
facilities  for  the  production  of  fertilizers,  caustic soda for alumina 
treatment  and  a  number  of  other  chemical products  (see  WA  Govt.  (DDD) 
1972). 
The  overall  scheme  of  the  1972  proposal depended on  the  idea 
that  demographic  decentralisation  should  be  encouraged  to  build up  a 
stable  workforce  in the Pilbara through the creation of a  new  town with a 
population  of 130,000.  The  town  and industrial complex would be  supported 
by various  services  including a  4400 megawatt  power station. 
Whilst  the  Court  government  took  up  the cause of industrial 
development  for  the  Pilbara  after  entering office in April  1974,  Court 
himself  did  not  wholly  endorse  the  Tonkin  government's  plan.  Court 
favoured  the  development  of  a  giant  steel  mill  with  supporting 
infrastructure  and  considered the possibility of a  petrochemical  industry 
in  the  Pilbara drawing fuel  and feedstock  from  low cost supplies of North 
West  Shelf gas. 
Following  the  issue  of a  600  page  report entitled "The  Pilbara 
Study"  in October 1974,  the Court  government  was  offered some  insight into 
the  commercial  viability  of  the  broad  plan  set  out  by  their  ALP 
predecessors.  The  report  considered  the  prospects  for  a  total of 40 
distinct  industries  from  various  technical  and  economic  viewpoints. 
Analysis  of  efficiency  and  projected returns at different output levels 
meant  that a  total of 70 plants were  considered.  Various  assumptions  were 
also tested relating to  a  small,  medium  and large scale development. 
Findings  from  the  report  pointed  to  the  production  of 
petrochemicals  and  general  chemicals  including caustic soda and ethylene 
dichloride  as  the most profitable option.  Aluminium smelting and uranium 
enrichment  were  excluded as  non profitable at existing price levels whilst 178 
steel  production  was  considered  a  marginal  proposition  (Spooner 
1974:pp.8-9). 
The  report  partially  supported  Court's  plans  for  steel and 
petrochemical  developments  in  the  Pilbara although it did not cover the 
proposed  expansion  of bauxite  and alumina processing in the south west of 
the  state.  The  long  standing aluminium smelter debate was  also raised 
during  the  latter  part  of  Court's  term  in  office, with the emerging 
possibility  of sales to the Korean market which was  projected to grow into 
the  eighties.  The  Korean  company  Kukje  ICC  expressed  a  measure  of 
interest  in  the  smelter  proposal  and  associated  power  generating 
facilities  following  the  award of a  contract from  the  SECWA  to construct a 
major  section  of the Dampier  Wagerup  pipeline.  There is no  firm evidence 
that  the  company  had  contracted  to undertake  the work  on the  aluminium 
smelter  on  receipt  of the  SECWA  pipeline contract in 1980.  However,  the 
collapse  of  the  company in 1984 raised a  number  of questions  relating to 
the  terms  of the original agreement established with the  SECWA. 
Towards  the  end of Court's  term in office it became  increasingly 
apparent  that his proposals  for  the Pilbara were not going to be  developed 
in  the short term.  The  key  idea underlying his plan  - the availability of 
cheap  gas  had  proven  unacceptable  to the joint venturers who  had viewed 
the  Domestic  phase  of  the  project  as  little  more  than  a  political 
compromise  (Harman  1984).  In the event,  WA  domestic  consumers  pay more 
for  their  gas  per unit than consumers  in the Eastern States  (SECWA  1985). 
Contract  rates  for  NWS  gas  are  not publicly available,  although it is 
known  that  Alcoa  were  seeking an improved deal with the  SECWA  during the 
renegotiation  of  the  terms  of  the  take or pay contracts in March  1985 
(Parker  (DRD)  August 1985).*5 179 
The  downturn  in worldwide  demand  for steel and aluminium during 
the  late  seventies  served to undermine  Court's plans  for  developments  in 
these  areas.  The  existing iron ore processing industry in the Pilbara was 
encountering  problems  as  a  result of prices being undercut by other major 
producers,  notably  Brazil.  This  trend  took its toll in 1979 with the 
mothballing  of  the  Hammersley  Iron,  pelletising facility at Dampier  and 
subsequent closure of the Cliffs-Robe River plant at Cape  Lambert. 
At  the  end  of  1979  the  joint  venturers posted a  vote of no 
confidence  for  future  developments  in  the  Pilbara  by  passing 
responsibility  for  70  MMCFD  of  North  West  Shelf gas,  originally to be 
marketed  directly  to  Pilbara customers,  back to  the  SECWA.  The  decision 
of  Mr.  Mensaros  to  accept this responsibility has  subsequently been the 
subject  of  considerable  political  debate  (see Parker  (DRD)  August  1985) 
(also 6.4). 180 
ENDNOTES 
1.  and  2  in  4.3.1.  based on transcripts of Stage  1  interviews  conducted 
October  1985  to May  1986.  Tapes  available  from Murdoch University School 
of Social Inquiry subject to authorisation by interviewee. 
3.  Prior  to  December  1984 there were  five rather than 6  joint venture 
participants in the  NWS  project. 
4.  Stage  I  Interview Transcripts. 
5.  Stage  I  Interview Transcripts. 181 
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CHAPTER  5 
THE  INSTITUTIONAL  NETWORK  IN  DETAIL 
INTRODUCTION 
This  chapter  describes  the  institutional  network  and  the 
conceptual  map  in  detail.  The  map  is developed into its final stages 
(Sections  VI  and  VII)  and the visual and conceptual  information shown in 
these  sections  is  tied  in  with  the  detail  shown  in I-V.  This  is an 
important exercise for  a  number  of reasons: 
(i)  It  serves  to  clarify  the  conceptual  framework which has been 
used to  guide  the  development of the thesis in Chapters  3  and 4. 
(ii)  This  is  a  prerequisite  to  undertaking  an  analysis  of  the 
(iii) 
components 
critical events  covered in Chapters  6  and  7. 
A  clearly  developed  Conceptual  Map  of the  NWS  joint venturer's 
decision  making  environment  will provide  the basis for  a  model 
applicable  to  Corporate  Policy  making  within  large  scale 
resource based multinational joint ventures. 
This  chapter  through  presentation and description of the major 
of  Sections  VI  and  VIII  and  their  relationship  to  I-V 
effectively  'sets  out  the institutional context within which the critical 
events  identified in the  interview programme,  occurred.  Additional detail 
on  the  institutional  network is furnished in Appendix II which employs  a 
colour  coding  system  to  highlight  the status and corporate connections 
between  various  public  and  private  sector  bodies.  Each of these is 
assumed  to  have  exerted  some  influence  on  JVP  policy in the periods 
1976-1985  and 1985-1987. 5.1. 
5.1.1. 
sourced 
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The  JVP  Decision Making  Environment 
The  JVP  decision making  environment:  internal  and external 
Sections  VI  and  VII  have  been  constructed  from  information 
in  35  interviews  conducted  with  a  broad  cross-section  of 
respondents  (see  Chapter  2).  The visual information displayed in the  two 
Sections  VII  and  VII  shows  aspects  of  the  external  environment  and 
corporate  structure of the joint venture  organisation.  Earlier Sections  I 
to  V  show  some  of  the  internal  structures  and processes within this 
organisation  and  the  interface that exists between organisations  operating 
at Project level and  the  external environment. 
Diagrams  VI  and  VIII  are  important in that they were  evolved 
from  earlier  Sections  I  to V but contain considerably more  detail drawn 
from  Stage  II  interviews  and  secondary  sources.  These  do  not  in 
themselves  constitute  the  full  conceptual  map  of  the  joint  venture 
participants'  (JVP)  decision making  environment.  The  map  is  comprised of 
eight  sections  I,  II,  IIa-VII  and  two  transparencies  which  overlay 
additional  information  on VI  and VII  (see Appendix III).  Each  diagram or 
section  is  connected  to  the others by virtue of a  network of overlapping 
institutional relationships. 
The  basic  objective behind the creation of the plan was  that it 
should  help  to  facilitate  a  better understanding of the highly complex 
decision  making  environment with which  the  JVPs  must  operate.  It aims  to 
present  a  simplified  picture  of  the  major  corporate  and  commercial 
relationships  which  existed between selected organisations within the  JVP 
decision  making  environment  over  specified  periods  of  time.  The 
construct,  comprised of diagrams  I  to VII  fulfils  these objectives  in that 
it  presents  a  simplified  picture  of  (a)  internal  project management 184 
systems;  (b)  the  corporate structure of the joint venture organisation and 
(c)  the  relationship  of  organisations  within  this  structure  to  the 
external institutional environment. 
Certain  generalisable  features  can  be  drawn  from  the map  or 
incorporated  into  the  model  presented in Chapter 8.  It is intended that 
the model  should throw  some  light on  two  major areas of concern: 
(i)  The  analysis  of  corporate  policy  within  resource  based 
multinational joint ventures. 
(ii)  To  highlight  the  interface between the public policy domain of 
host  governments  and that of multinational interests developing 
a  major national resource. 
In  diagrams  I  and  V  lines are  drawn between organisations  to 
indicate  if  an  important  corporate  or  commercial  relationship exists 
between  them.  Sections  VI  and  VII  are  more  detailed  but  show no 
connections.  In  order  to  overcome  the  limitations  on the  information 
presented  on  individual  schematic  diagrams  a  method  was  devised  to 
superimpose  additional visual information onto  diagrams  VI  and VII  through 
the  use  of  colour  coded  transparencies. 
conjunction with VI  and VII  serves  to: 
Each  transparency  used in 
(i)  Illustrate  the relative importance of each organisation shown in 
terms  of its influence on the JVP's  planning process. 
(ii)  Highlight  and  identify  different  types  of linkages  that exist 
between  various  organisations  within  and  outwith  the  joint 
venture  project  organisation  corporate structure  (see Appendix 
III). DIAGRAM  VI  Page  185 
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Key  Organisations  in the  JVP  Decision Making  Environment 
Project level 
The  organisations  depicted  at  this  level  fall  within  the 
corporate  structure  of  the  joint venture organisation and are viewed as 
internal  operatives.  For  Phase  I  the joint venture participants were 
Shell  (Australia)  Pty Ltd.,  BP  Developments Australia Ltd.,  BHP  Petroleum 
Pty  Ltd.,  the  California  Asiatic  Oil  Co.  (Subsidiary of Chevron)  and 
Woodside  Petroleum Ltd.  Shell  (Australia),  BP  (Australia)  and Cal-Asiatic 
are all subsidiaries of major  foreign based oil companies  (Diagram VI». 
Each  Australian based subsidiary has  significant holdings at each level in 
the  vertically  integrated structure of the Australian petroleum industry. 
BHP  is  an  Australian  based company with major  operating subsidiaries in 
steel  production,  coal  mining  minerals  and petroleum development.  The 
company  also has  a  portfolio of foreign interests,  largely in the minerals 
sector  (see  3.4.3). 
Prior  to  April  1985  Woodside  Petroleum was  a  small  independent 
Australian  exploration  and  development  company acting as  operator for  the 
North  West  Shelf  project.  Since the April  1985  takeover,  BHP  and Shell 
have  increased  their  joint equity in this  company  from  43%  to  80%  making 
Woodside  a  She11/BHP  subsidiary and nominal  operator for  the project  (see 
6.2). 
Comparison  of  diagrams  VI  and  VII  indicates the entry of the 
Mitsui/Mitsubishi  MIMI  partnership  as  a  sixth participant for  Phase II. 
The  strategic  significance  of  this  change  within  the  JVP  corporate 
structure  relative  to  Japanese  commitment  and  investment prospects  for 
Phase  II  is  discussed  in  6.2.  Other organisations  depicted at project 
level  for  the  Domestic  phase  are KJR,  F1uor/Maunsell  and  the  Saipem/ICC 188 
joint  venture.  KJR  is a  consortium comprised of three major engineering 
service  companies:  Kellog Overseas  Corporation,  JGC  Corporation  (Japanese 
Gasoline)  and  Raymond  Engineers,  the  Australian  based  partner.  The 
consortium  was  appointed  main  contractor for  the Domestic phase  and was 
made  responsible  for  selecting  subcontractors,  procurement of materials 
and  coordinating  work on all onshore  infrastructure with the exception of 
the  SECWA  pipeline.  The  Kellog  company had an established track record 
working  on petroleum and petrochemical projects  throughout  the world.  JGC 
and  Kellog  both had previous  experience working on LNG  projects,  a  factor 
influencing their selection as  contractors for both phases. 
During  the  Domestic  phase  JGC  acted  as  a  virtual sleeping 
partner  but  has  subsequently  assumed  a  key role in the detailed design 
work  on  the  LNG  plant  and  associated  facilities.  Fluor/Maunsell was 
appointed  by  the  WA  State government as  the major engineering consultant 
for  work  on  the  Dampier Wagerup  pipeline.  This  company  conducted all the 
early  surveying  and  civil  work  and  were  responsible for coordinating 
construction on three separate stretches of pipeline. 
Saipem  Australia  Pty  Ltd.  were  initially awarded the contract 
for  the  Northern  leg  of  the  pipeline  but subsequently  formed  a  joint 
venture  with  the  Korean  company  Kukje/ICC  to undertake work on all three 
legs.  At  the  time  when  the joint venture was  formed  (1982),  ICC  were 
undertaking  a  $3m  feasibility  study  for  a  power station and aluminium 
smelter  in  WA,  a  factor which is assumed  to have  influenced the selection 
of this  company  for work  on the  SECWA  project  (Brotherton 1984:p.148). 189 
5.2.2.  State level 
The  major  government  departments  shown at State level in diagram 
VI  are  the  State  Treasury,  the Department of Resources  Development,  the 
Department  of  Mines  and the Department of Industrial Development.  Prior 
to  and  throughout  the  construction  stages  for  the Domestic phase,  all 
these  departments  worked  closely with each other assuming responsibility 
for  the  administration  of public policy relating to  the North West  Shelf 
project.  In the early days  when initial exploration and development work 
was  being  undertaken  by  the joint venturers  the Department of Mines  was 
important  as  the  body  responsible  for  the  issue  of  exploration and 
production  permits,  monitoring  the  development  of  leased  areas  and 
administering  the  royalty  agreements  established  with  the  operating 
companies.  The  Department  of  Industrial  Development  (DID)  was  made 
responsible  for  surveying local industry to assess  the potential for  input 
into  the  NWS  project and promoting the  growth of the  small manufacturing 
sector in WA. 
The  significance of Mines  and DID  for  the  ongoing  development  of 
the  NWS  project is now very limited.  The  Department of Mines  is consulted 
by  the  joint  venturers  over  royalty  payments  and  any  change  to  the 
original  leasing  agreements  governing  the  North  West Shelf.  Although 
these  issues  are  important,  Mines  have  little  say  in the  day to day 
management  of the project.  Since  the early eighties,  the responsibilities 
held  by  the  DID  relative  to  the  North West  Shelf have been gradually 
reduced.  Following  the  introduction  of  the  1979  Agreement  Act  the 
Department  of  Resources  development  has become  the central coordinating 
body  for  public  policy  on  the  North  West  Shelf.  The  one  stop  shop 
approach  used  by this department gives  the  DRD  responsibility for putting 
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terms  of  the  1979 Act  (4.1.3).  The  DRD's  responsibilities under  the Act 
included  monitoring  of  local  input  into  the project,  a  responsibility 
previously charged to  DID. 
State  Treasury liaise with DRD  on all matters relating to public 
subsidies  and  financing  of infrastructure related to the project.  Mines 
and  Treasury  are  also  linked through  the royalty payment  and collection 
system  which operates  for  resource projects in WA.  In a  recent example of 
"Cooperative  Federalism"  Layer  (1985)  noted  how  the State and Federal 
treasuries  worked  to  produce  a  royalty concession package  for  the North 
West  Shelf  project,  in return for revision of the 1980 sales contracts  on 
more  favourable  terms  for  the  SECWA  (see 7.1.2). 
The  SECWA  is the sole distributor of North West  Shelf gas  in the 
state  and  is  formally  designated as  an independent body responsible for 
its  own  internal  financing  and policy making.  In effect,  the  SECWA  is a 
State  instrumentality  guided  by  the  energy  policies  of the ruling WA 
administration.  This has  become  more  apparent in recent years  as  the debt 
crisis  has  forced  the  organisation  to  become  more  dependent  on public 
sector  funding  (see  7.1.2).  In  diagram  VI  the  SECWA  is  shown  to be 
contractually  linked  with  the  bauxite/alumina  processing operations of 
Alcoa.  This  link was  formally established in a  back to back agreement for 
the  sale of gas  to Alcoa as  a  third party customer in 1985.  Prior to this 
Alcoa  made  no  final  commitment  to their gas  take  in the eight years  since 
the  establishment  of  the  MOU  with  the  SECWA  and the joint venturers. 
Alcoa  currently  contract over  50%  of NWS  gas being piped to  the  SW  of the 
State.  This  makes  the  company  the  SECWA's  major customer drawing down 
large  volumes  of  gas  to service alumina refineries at Kwinana,  Pinjarra 
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Two  totally  independent  bodies  depicted  at  State  level  in 
diagram  VI  are  the Trades  and Labour  Council,  TLC  and the Confederation of 
West  Australian Industry.  As  the major representative of organised labour 
in  WA,  the  TLC  has  responsibility for  advising 87  affiliated unions  on a 
wide  range  of  matters.  Working  within  a  policy framework set by the 
national  council  the  ACTU,  the  TLC  has  had  extensive  involvement in 
advising  unions  on  policy  matters  relating to work  on the  NWS  project. 
Both  the  ACTU  and  TLC  have  taken a  strong stance  on the  issue of local 
content  in  the  project  and  have  consistently agitated for  the  JVPs  to 
employ more  local labour,  materials and manufacturing capacity.*l 
The  CWAI  is  the major representative of local employers  in the 
State  with  members  drawn  from  the small business  and larger industrial 
sectors.  The  CWAI's  role is primarily to promote  the  interests of local 
traders  and  manufacturers.  However,  the body has worked in liaison with 
DRO  to  issue  a  number  of reports  and undertake  survey work  on key issues 
relating  to  the  NWS  project.  The  CWAI'more  significant involvement  in 
recent  years  has  been to act as  an  information forum  for  local suppliers 
of  manufactured  goods,  materials  and  capital  equipment which could be 
employed  in  the  second  phase of the project.  A  scheme  was  developed in 
1985  to  inform local suppliers of the procurement needs  of the main joint 
venture  contractors  and  facilitates  interphase between potential vendors 
and  KJR  or SIPM  procurement staff.  The  scheme partially fulfils  the role 
of  the  Industrial  Supplies  Office  which  the  TLC  has  sought to have 
introduced in WA  (see  Peden 1985  and 4.1.5). 
The  most  recently  established body  shown  in diagrams  V,  VI  and 
VII  is  the  National Liaison Group  (NLG).  Shown  at State level the  group 
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State  minister  for  resources  and energy.  Established in 1985  the  group 
has  representatives  from  the  joint  venturers,  the  ACTU,  TLC  and West 
Australian  employers.  Its  main  function has been defined as  "Ensuring 
close  liaison  and  regular  exchanges  on progress with local sourcing for 
the  LNG  phase  of  the  project  (Commonwealth  Govt.  June  1985:p.905; 
Commonwealth Record 10-16 June 1985). 
5.2.3.  National  level 
The  two  key  government  departments  shown at Federal level are 
Treasury  and  the  Department  of  Minerals  and Energy  (DME).  The  Federal 
Treasury  has  a  range  of  duties  relating to the  resource sector of the 
national  economy.  Major  responsibilities  include budgeting and allocation 
of  revenues  and  royalties  collected  from  the  developers  of resource 
projects.  The  investment  controls  and taxation framework which govern 
these  developments  is  meant  to ensure equitable returns  to  the  companies 
and  the  nation.  The  issue of profits accrued by multinational companies 
in  the  petroleum  and  minerals  sectors  and actual returns  to  the nation 
from  large  resource  projects  has  always been a  contentious one  and the 
source  of  ongoing  debate  in  Australian  parliamentary circles  (Saddler 
1979). 
For  a  brief  period  in  1976  the  Federal Treasury and the  FIRB 
worked  together  to  devise  a  taxation  and investment  framework  for  the 
North  West  Shelf.  The  FIRB  was  ultimately responsible for ensuring that 
the  project proposal fell within pre-established foreign equity guidelines 
established  to  limit  the participation of offshore capital in Australian 
resource  projects.  However,  in  the months  that followed Anthony's  25% 
minimum  Australian  content  ruling  (see 4.2.2),  the  influence of the  FIRB 193 
on  the  project's  development waned significantly.  Today  FIRB  policy has 
little  direct  influence  on  the  NWS  project as  evidenced by the Federal 
government's  approval  of  the  Shell/BHP  Woodside buy over in April  1985 
(see  6.2)  and the endorsement of increased Japanese participation under  a 
one-sixth sharing scheme  for  Phase II (see 1.1). 
The  Department  of  Minerals  and  Energy  (DME)  is the central 
Federal  body  which  liaises  with  the  State  governments  on a  number of 
issues  affecting  resource  developments  within  their  boundaries. 
Multinational  companies  with mineral or petroleum interests in the States 
must  liaise  with  both  the  relevant  State  body  and  the  DME  prior to 
establishing  any  new  resource  projects.  Once  the construction work is 
underway,  the major responsibility for  the coordination of policy relating 
to  the  project  lies  with the State.  However,  the  DME  and other Federal 
bodies  like  the  FIRB  and  the  Bureau  of Mineral Resources  (BMR) ,  will 
continue  to monitor  the project to  ensure  that any changes  in the original 
development proposal are consistent with the national interest. 
Two  major  independent bodies  operating at Federal level,  diagram 
VI  and  VII,  are  the  Australian  Council  of Trade Unions,  ACTU  and the 
Confederation  of  Australian  Industry  (CAl).  The  CAl  represents  a  wide 
range  of  employer  interests at national level.  Its major  function is to 
inform  governments  of changes within the  commercial,  industrial and small 
business  sector,  highlighting  the  needs  of employers.  The  ACTU  as  the 
peak  council  of  trade  unions  in Australia,  has established a  number  of 
broad  policy  guidelines  to be  followed by affiliated bodies whose members 
are  working  in  the  resource sector.  The  national body has  established a 
broad  set  of policy guidelines  on the North West  Shelf and ACTU  policy is 
implemented  at  State  level  through the  TLC.  The  ACTU  has been involved 194 
with  the North West  Shelf project since the earliest development proposals 
were  drafted in the early seventies.  More  recently,  this organisation has 
used  the  National  Liaison Group  as  a  medium  for direct negotiations with 
the  joint  venturers  on  a  range of issues relating to Australian content 
and  employment created by the  LNG  phase. 
5.2.4.  World level 
The  three  major  organisations depicted at world level,  Section 
VI,  which  are  linked  directly to  the corporate structure of the project 
are  Shell  Internationale Petroleum Maatschappij  (SIPM),  Woodside  Offshore 
Petroleum  (WOP)  a  subsidiary  of Woodside  Petroleum and  the KJR,  Kellog, 
Raymond,  Japan Gasoline  consortium. 
Section  VI,  depicts  the  international operations of Shell which 
are  coordinated  from  the Hague  in Holland  (see 3.1.2.).  SIPM  played the 
important  official role of technical adviser  to  the joint venturers during 
the  design  and  construction  stages  of  Phase  I.  Throughout  the later 
construction  stages  of  the  Domestic  gas plant,  1983-85,  Shell began to 
assert  its  role  as  the  most  powerful  joint  venture participant with 
increasing  numbers  of  SIPM  international staff being drafted to Perth to 
gear  up  for  Phase II  (6.2).  The  worldwide  structure and organisation of 
the  Shell  international  operations  has meant that Shell  (Australia)  has 
been  guided by  SIPM  policies since work began on the domestic phase of the 
North  West  Shelf  project.  This has  become  more  apparent in recent years 
with  SIPM  engineers  supplying cryogenic expertise and coordinating all the 
major construction work  on the  LNG  plant  (see  6.2  and Figure 6). 195 
WOP  and  KJR  are  shown  at  world  level  in  VI  as  a  joint 
operation.  This  indicates  the close functional relationship between WOP 
and  KJR  staff  working  in  the  WOP  design offices.  During the earlier 
design  stages  of  the  Domestic phase,  KJR  carried out preliminary design 
work  at international offices in Japan and the USA.  WOP  functioned mainly 
at  project  level with a  large percentage of the  design and administrative 
staff  based  in  Perth or Melbourne.  However,  as  operator for  the project 
WOP  was  given  ultimate responsibility for overseeing design work carried 
out  by  KJR.  Prior to preliminary design work starting on the  LNG  plant 
and  other Phase II infrastructure,  WOP  had only small scale representation 
in  Japan.  By  May  1985  the total number of WOP  staff working out of the 
Yokohama  design office stood at 18,  SIPM  19,  with two  local subcontracting 
engineers.  This  complement  of 39  represented only a  minor proportion of 
the  total  number  of  design  staff  working  on  the  job  with  the  KJR 
representation  of  269  bringing  this  total  to  308  (WA  Govt.  DRD  May 
1985:p.94). 
The  Morgan Guarantry banking group  is the other major body  shown 
at  world  level in Section VI.  Morgan Guarantry served as  lead banker for 
a  syndicate  of  62  Australian and overseas banks which raised the US$1.4 
billion  loan required by Woodside  Petroleum to finance  their commitment  to 
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5.3.  Changes  in  the  Institutional  Environment  of the  NWS  Project. 
Phase  I-Phase II 
5.3.1.  Outline 
The  discussion  in  5.2.1  offered  a  brief coverage of the role 
played  by  a  number  of major  governmental  and  independent institutions in 
relation  to  the  development of the  Domestic phase of the North West  Shelf 
project.  In some  cases this role was  not sustained over  the entire period 
from  1976  to  1985.  This  period witnessed the completion of the final 
feasibility  study  for  the  project  and  development  of  Phase  I  to the 
commissioning stage in August 1984. 
In  this  study  it will not be possible to trace minor shifts in 
the  importance  of  a  number  of organisations for  the planning of the  NWS 
project  over  an extended period of nine years.  Comparison of detail  shown 
on  VI  and  VII  shows  some  of  these  changes  which  took place in the 
institutional  network  between Phase  I  and Phase II.  Additional detail on 
these  status  changes  and inter organisational connections  is presented in 
the  transparencies  which  supplement  VI  and VII  (see Appendix III).  In 
diagram  VII  a  reduction in the  importance  of an organisation in relation 
to  the  JVP  planning  for  the project is indicated by  a  broken line drawn 
over  the  box  border.  Organisations which had no  significant involvement 
with  the  'Domestic  phase  but  are directly linked with the  LNG  phase are 
also  indicated  in Section VII.  The  major  changes  which  took place in the 
institutional network when work began on Phase II are as  follows. 
5.3.2.  Changes  at Project level 
A  sixth  participant,  MitsuifMitsubishi  (MIMI),  has  entered the 
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participants  to  (i)  divest Woodside  Petroleum's  interest in Phase II;  (ii) 
extend  Japanese  involvement  in  Phase  II  by  introducing  a  Japanese 
consortium  at  the  operations  end of the project  (Woodside  Annual Report 
1984:p.7).  The  only  other  notable  change at project level as  seen on 
diagram  VII  is the  absence of F1uor/Maunse11  and  the other contractors who 
had  completed  work  on the main  SECWA  trunk1ine  from  Dampier to Wagerup  by 
early  1986.  Laterals  were  added  throughout  1986  and others at later 
stages  to  service any  new  developments  in the North  and  South West of the 
State.  KJR  are  the main contractor for  the  LNG  phase of the project with 
Japanese  Gasoline  supplying  225  out of the total of 308  KJR  staff working 
at the Yokohama  design centre  (WA  Govt.  DRD  May  1979:p.94). 
5.3.3.  Changes  at State level 
A  number  of  changes  are  shown  to have  occurred at State level 
during  the  period  when  construction  work  for  Phase  I  was  close to 
completion,  and  the major  resources  of the joint venture organisation were 
being  channeled  into  the  LNG  phase.  By  the  time  this transition began at 
the  end  of  1983  both  the  Department  of  Mines  and the Department of 
Industrial  Development  had  a  very minor role to play in the planning of 
the  project  (see  diagram  VII,  +  5.2.1).  The  SECWA  had also lost the 
central  importance  which  it  had  held  for  project planning during the 
Domestic  phase.  The  contractual agreement between the JVPs  and  the  SECWA 
had  provided  the  launching  pad  for  the  project.  These contracts had 
provided  the  JVPs  with  the sales  revenue  to  support the capital raising  . 
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capital  for  the joint venturers but beyond this financial connection does 
not  have  a  major role to play in the  development of the  LNG  phase of the 
project. 
5.3.4.  Chan~es at National  level 
The  only  major  status change at national level shown  on VII  is 
the  reduction  in  importance  of  FIRB.  The  Department of Minerals  and 
Energy  (DME)  has  assumed  a  backseat role in Phase II allowing the State 
level  DRD  to  coordinate public  involvement in the project.  No  change is 
indicated  from  the  Domestic  phase  as  DME  have maintained this position 
since 1979  when  the Development Agreement Act was  passed  (see 5.2.1). 
5.3.5.  Chan~es at World level 
Comparison  of  diagrams  VI  and  VII  will  reveal  a  number  of 
significant  changes  in  the  institutional structure at world level.  For 
the  duration  of  the  LNG  phase,  the  joint  venturers are dealing with 
international  clients  rather  than  a  West Australian based organisation. 
The  eight  Japanese  power  utilities  which  may  be contracting up  to 5.8 
million  tonnes  of  North West  Shelf LNG  per annum by  the mid-l990s  are as 
follows:  Kyushu  Electric Power  Company,  Chugoku Electric Power  Company, 
Kansai  Electric  Power  Company,  Chubu  Electric  Power  Company,  Tokyo 
Electric  Power  Company,  Tokyo  Gas  Company,  Osaka Gas  Company  and Toho  Gas 
Company  (Woodside  May  1985:p.20).  The  import  programme  established by 
these  bodies  through  the  contracts  with  the  joint venturers has  been 
subject  to  regulation  and  guidance  by  MITI,  the Japanese Ministry for 
International  Trade  and  Industry.  MITI  is  an  extremely influential 
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recommendations  for  structuring  the  indigenous  industrial  base  and 
improving  foreign  trade  links.  Changes  in MITI's projections for total 
LNG  demand  in  the  Japanese  market  of the  1990s have been an important 
influence  on  JVP  decisions  to  restructure  certain  aspects of the  NWS 
project since the early 1980s  (see  3.3.4). 
The  major parties  involved with design work for the  second stage 
of  the  North West Shelf project are WOP,  KJR  and  SIPM.  Japanese Gasoline 
(Japan  Gas),  and  Shell  are  shown  together as  the parties undertaking a 
major  part  of  the  detailed  design work  on the  LNG  plant and associated 
infrastructure.  The  Shell  staff  working  at  Yokohama  are both Shell 
Australia  personnel and  SIPM  secondees.  SIPM  has been  shown separately to 
highlight  its  role  as  cryogenic  specialist and designer of the new  'Y' 
concept  gas  turbine  air  cooling  system to be  installed in the  LNG  plan 
(see Woodside  May  1985). 
The  final significant change at world level shown in Section VII 
is  the  replacement of Morgan Guarantry by Chase Manhattan as  lead project 
financier.  At  the  end of 1984 Morgan Guarantry withdrew as  lead banker 
for  commercial  reasons which were not clearly articulated in press  reports 
or  joint  venture  literature  at  the  time.  Chase  Manhattan took over 
responsibility  for  raising  project  finance  for  Phase  II  leading  a 
syndicate  of  13  banking  groups,  most  of whom  had been involved in the 
Domestic  phase  loan  agreement.  The  second stage of the rollover loan to 
finance  Woodside's  commitments  to  the  LNG  phase  amounted  to  US$1.6 
billion.  The  loan documents  were  signed in May  1986,  less than one month 
after  Shell  and  BHP  had  mounted  a  successful  takeover bid for Woodside 
petroleum  (see 6.2). 200 
International  financiers  and  investors  have  always had a  key 
role  to  play  in  the  development  of  the  North  West  Shelf  project. 
Collectively,  these  bodies  can raise large amounts  of capital which would 
be  difficult  to  source  within  Australia.  Chase Manhattan and Morgan 
Guarantry  are  large  American based multinational financial organisations 
with  sufficient  resources  to  underwrite  loans  in  the  US$I.5 billion 
bracket  on  the  strength  of  anticipated  long  term  returns  from  the 
production stages of the project  (see 6.3). *1 
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ENDNOTES 
Information  sourced  from  TLC  and  AMWSU  representatives during 
Stage  1  interviews. 202 
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CHAPTER  6 
AN  ANALYSIS  OF  CRITICAL  EVENTS:  1-2 
INTRODUCTION 
In  this  chapter  a  short series of critical events  identified and 
commented  on  by  Stage  I  and II interview respondents will be  subject to 
in-depth  examination.  The  commentary  and analysis will focus  initially on 
a  string  of three key events,  notably the  successive postponements  of the 
commencement  date  for  LNG  deliveries  from  the North West  Shelf to Japan. 
In  the  text  these  are referred to  as  event string number  one.  (This  is 
viewed as  a  single processual event for analytical purposes.) 
The  second  critical  event  singled  out  for  examination  is the 
successful  Shell/BHP  takeover  of  Woodside  Petroleum  launched in April 
1985.  The  third  and  final  event which was  selected for analysis,  the 
renegotiation  of  the sales agreement established between the JVPs  and the 
SECWA,  is covered in Chapter 7. 
Each  critical  event  designated  for  analysis is the  outcome  of a 
bargaining  process  taking  place  between  a  number  of key parties both 
within  and  outwith  the  corporate structure of the joint venture i.e.  for 
event  No.1  the  key parties are  the JVPs  and the Japanese,  No.2  is viewed 
as  the  result of intramural contestation between Shell,  BHP,  Woodside  and 
the  other  NWS  joint  venture participants,  No.3  negotiations between the 
JVPs,  the  SECWA  and other W.A.  government  agencies. 
The  broad  objective  of  analysing specified critical events  is to 
afford  an  improved  understanding  of  how  changes  in  JVP  policy were 
affected  by  the  interplay of political and economic  forces active within 
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Through  an  examination  of  the  LNG  postponements  an attempt is 
made  in  Section  6.1  to  (i)  establish clear historical links between the 
three  important  JVP  planning  changes  and  the  policy  rationale which 
underlay  them;  (ii) consider any possible strategic advantage  to be gained 
by the Japanese  and/or the JVPs  at the  time  of each delay. 
In  Section  6.2  the coverage of the  Shell/BHP  takeover considers 
the  rationale  which  underlay  this  action.  Section 6.2.1 provides  the 
general  background  to  the  takeover.  In 6.2.2  two  major questions are 
raised:  (i)  why  the  takeover  took  place;  (ii) when the  takeover was 
planned.  In  the following  sections 6.2.3  and 6.2.4,  these questions  are 
addressed  through  an  examination  of the relationship between Shell,  BHP 
and  Woodside  since 1976  and consideration of the  loan agreement which was 
used  to  finance  Woodside's  participation  in  both  phases  of  the  NWS 
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6.1.  Critical  Event  String No.1:  Delays  in the  LNG  Delivery Dates  to 
Japan 
6.1.1.  Background to  the delays 
In  December  1979  the Federal  government  issued licences  to  the 
joint  venturers,  permitting  them  to  export up  to  6  million tonnes  of LNG 
per  annum  over  a  twenty year contract period  (Woodside  May  1985).  At  the 
time  the proposal put forward by the JVP  to  the  Department of Minerals  and 
Energy  (DME)  ,  had outlined a  scheme  to  develop  an integrated Domestic  gas 
and  LNG  export  project.  However,  by  the  end of 1981  the joint venturers 
had  decided  to  change  this plan in order  to  reduce  the massive  financial 
burden  which  would  have  been  carried  by each participant in the early 
years  of this project. 
Rapid  wage  and price inflation in Australia  throughoui:  1981 had 
greatly  increased  the  overall cost of the project,  adding  to  the massive 
front  end  loading of capital which  vlaS  required for  the  integrated scheme 
(Allen  1984).  Throughout  the  early  part  of 1982  the joint venturers 
returned  to  the  drawing  board  in an attempt  to  devise  a  viable project 
plan,  which would minimise risks  and ensure  satisfactory financial  returns 
for  each  participant.  By  the middle  of that year  they had settled on  a 
scheme  for  developing  the project in two  distinct phases. 
Work  on  the  Domestic  gas  plant  had begun in 1981.  However, 
under  the new  scheme,  the  LNG  plant was  not scheduled for  completion until 
1987,  three  years  after the Domestic  phase  was  due  to  corne  onstream.  The 
introduction  of  this  new  plan  led  to  the postponement in the original 
scheduled  delivery  date  for  LNG  to Japan,  which was  set at April 1986. 
The  decision  to  institute  this delay was  the first in a  string of three 
interrelated  events  which  represented  a  marked  change  in the original 
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6.1.2.  The  postponements  of March  1982  and July 1983 
In  March  1982  the  JVPs  made  the first of three decisions  to 
change  the  proposed  date  for  the  first  shipment  of LNG  to Japan and 
reschedule  work  on  the  LNG  plant.  There were  a  number  of key  economic, 
political  and  technical  factors  underlying this decision,  some  of which 
were  not  explained  in the  formal  statements  issued to  the press when  the 
first  delay  was  announced.  At  the  time  when  the  1982  and  1983 
postponements  were  announced,  the  principal  explanation offered by  the 
JVPs  was  that the Japanese were  reassessing their future  demand  for  LNG  in 
response  to reduced energy consumption in the industrial sector.  There  is 
no  question  that  the  Japanese  needed  time  to  revise  their pre  1979 
projections  for  LNG  demand  in the  1990s.  Energy  demand  in the Japanese 
economy  had  fallen  by  3%  per  annum,  from  the  end of 1978  to  the  end of 
1981  and  there was  little indication of a  significant improvement  in 1982 
or  1983.  Up  to  77%  of LNG  previously  imported by the Japanese  had been 
used  for  power  generation.  However,  in the  face  of a  significant decline 
in  the production of basic metals  and the  impact of conservation measures, 
electricity  consumption in the Japanese  industrial sector was  considerably 
reduced in the period from  1979  to 1982  (DRD  May  1985:p.52.)*[1] 
(i)  Alternative explanations 
The  simple  economic  explanation for  the  1982  postponement  (April 
1986  to April  1987)  and 1983  postponement  (April  1987  to April  1988)  tends 
to  ignore  the  broader strategic considerations which may  have  influenced 
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Throughout  1982  and  1983  the JVPs  were  engaged in negotiations 
with  both  the  Japanese  and  the  West  Australian  government.  The  WA 
government  were  exerting considerable pressure to gain favourable  pricing 
conditions  for  third  party  consumers  in WA.  They had begun to express 
some  concern  over  a  possible  shortfall in demand for  the  gas  which had 
been  purchased  through  sales  agreements  established  with  the JVPs  in 
September  1980  (see  Chapter  7).  At  the  same  time  the Japanese were 
negotiating  with  the JVPs  on a  number  of key issues relating to  the final 
contractual  agreement  to  be established for export of LNG  to  a  number  of 
metropolitan power utilities in Japan. 
When  the  original  Memorandum  of Intent  (MOl)  was  co-signed by 
the  JVPs  and  the  Japanese  in  June  1981,  there  had been preliminary 
agreement  on  quantities  of NWS  LNG  to be  imported  - 4  million tonnes per 
annum  (mtpa)  for  1986  rising  to  6  mtpa  in the early 1990s.  In keeping 
with  the  format  for  previous  LNG  contracts  established  between  the 
Japanese  buyers  and  foreign  exporters,  there was  to be  a  "take or pay" 
provision  obliging  the  importer  to  pay  for up  to  100%  of the original 
contracted quantity,  regardless of annual  fluctuations  in demand. 
Throughout  1982  the Japanese negotiated with the JVPs  to  seek a 
more  flexible  take  or  pay structure than those established in the past. 
The  other major  focus  of the negotiations was  the discussion of a  suitable 
formula  for  indexing  the  price  of  imported  LNG  to  competing energy 
sources.  As  early as January 1981 it was  reported that representatives of 
BHP,  BP.  and  Shell  had  arrived  in  Japan  to discuss  LNG  pricing,  the 
extension  in  the start-up period requested by the Japanese,  and an easing 
of  take  or  pay  conditions  from  the  100%  drawdown set in the past  (Tex 
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These  issues  were  at  the  centre of JVP/Japanese negotiations 
from  1981  to  1984.  The  Japanese  worked  towards  an extension of the 
original  two  and a  half year period which was  to  elapse prior to peak  LNG 
delivery  levels  of 6  mtpa being reached.  They also  sought  to establish a 
take  or  pay  system  which would allow for fluctuations  in LNG  demand  and 
the  price  of  competing fuels.  These were points of contention where  the 
bargaining outcome  could favour  one  or other of the parties. 
The  price  formula  for  NWS  LNG  was  the  issue which  the JVPs  were 
most  eager to settle.  However,  the Japanese  adopted a  position which left 
this  open  to  negotiation,  allowing  them  time  to assess their strategic 
options.  When  the  MOl  was  established  in 1981 between the JVP  and 8 
Japanese  power  utilities,  a  provision was  made  to apply the  average price 
of  LNG  being imported into Japan to shipments  of Australian LNG.  This was 
accepted  by  both  the JVP  and the Japanese at the  time but problems  arose 
in  relation  to the escalation clause which applied after the average base 
price  was  established.  The  JVPs  had sought to  employ  a  similar formula  to 
that  applied  in  existing Japanese  LNG  contracts with Brunei  and  the USA. 
However  rather  than  settling  for  this formula based on  indexation to a 
mixed  barrel  of  20  crude  oil  varieties,  the Japanese left the pricing 
issue open to further discussion  (Tex Report  8th February 1982).**[2] 
(ii)  Comment 
The  outcome  of negotiations  on the major  issues discussed above 
would  have  an  important impact on the potential long term returns  to  the 
JVPs  from  the  NWS  LNG  export programme.  Alterations to  the take or pay 
provisions  or  an  extension  of  the  start  up period could have  serious 
adverse  effects on long term financial returns  and crucial early cash flow 
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to  assess  the  optimum  strategy  to  adopt  at  a  time  when  there was 
considerable  uncertainty  concerning  future movements  in the price of oil 
and other competing energy sources. 
The  Japanese  had  tentatively agreed to  the  two  and a  half year 
start-up  period  proposed  in the  1981 MOl.  However  a  year later with the 
announcement  of  the  second postponement,  little progress had been made  on 
LNG  pricing  or  take  or  pay  provisions  (Tex Report 4th June 1982).  In 
September  1982,  three  months  after  the  JVPs  had  announced that they 
planned  to delay work  on Phase II,  the Japanese Ministry for International 
Trade  and Industry  (MITI)  issued figures  indicating a  downward  revision of 
estimated  Japanese  LNG  requirements  for  the 1990s.  The  revised figure of 
36.5  mtpa  for  1990  represented a  drop  of 3.5 mtpa  on  the 1982 projection 
of 40 mtpa for  the  same  year  (WA  Govt,  DRD  May  1985:p.53). 
By  the  end of 1983 it would be clear to  the joint venturers that 
the  Japanese  were  in  a  strong  bargaining  position  as  the production 
capacity  of  existing LNG  projects began to outstrip demand.  In 1983  20.6 
million  tonnes  of LNG  was  supplied to Japan.  No  significant increase was 
forecast  for 1984 and by 1985  the  seven existing projects supplying LNG  to 
Japan  were  estimated  to have  a  total production capacity in excess  of 28 
mtpa.  In  addition  to  this,  in 1984  there were  six LNG  projects being 
studied  or planned which on completion could supply additional capacity of 
over  22  mtpa.  In the  same  year  the  LNG  projects being operated or planned 
to  supply  Japan's  future  needs,  were  estimated  to  have  a  productive 
capacity  of  47-48  mtpa  in 1990 with forecast  demand  for  1990  standing at 
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By  early  1984  the Japanese had established a  clearer picture of 
their  future  energy requirements  than had been the case in 1982  and 1983. 
They  now  had a  basis for  developing an energy plan for  imported fuels  and 
derived  strength  in  negotiations  with  the JVPs  from  the apparent shift 
towards  a  buyers market for  LNG  in the 1990s.  Indicators that pointed to 
this  in  1984  were:  (i)  advanced design and preliminary construction work 
was  underway  on  the  Canadian  Petro-Canada  project  and  initial 
infrastructure  for  the  NWS  LNG  plant,  with both developments  scheduled to 
come  onstream  in  1990,  providing  a  peak load of 8.740 mtpa to Japanese 
customers;  *[4]  (ii)  four projects based in the USSR,  Thailand,  Qatar and 
Alaska  were  scheduled for  development,  supplying the Japanese market with 
up  to  12,500  tonnes  of  LNG  by  1990  (DRO  May  1985:p.61);  (iii) no  spot 
market  existed  for  LNG,  forcing major  suppliers  to obtain a  direct one  to 
one  contract  with  a  buyer or mothball their project.  Japanese  dominance 
of  the  world  LNG  market  (74%  of world trade in 1980)  dictated that the 
majority  of  new  suppliers must deal with  them or try to  source  a  contract 
from  smaller  importers  in  Europe  or  the  USA  (see  8.2  for  current 
situation). 
The  long  term  energy  outlook  devised by MITI  in 1982  made  it 
apparent  that  the  Japanese  government  wished  to  continue  with  a 
diversified  energy  mix  in  the  1990s.  Official  figures  released in 
November  1983  revealed  that the Japanese planned an extension of natural 
gas  use,  largely  through  importat~on  of  LNG  in the eighties.  In the 
longer  term  up  to 1995  no  further  expansion was  planned with the  emphasis 
placed  on  greater  use of nuclear power.  The  figure  for  the market share 
of  natural  gas  in  the  Japanese  energy mix  for  1990 was  set at 12%,  an 
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increase  by  3.9%  over  the  same  period,  and was  to  grow by  a  further  3.2% 
by  1995  (DRD  May  1985:p.56). 
The  ability  of  the  Japanese  to  adjust  their  energy mix  to 
displace  LNG  with  competing base  load fuels  was  limited by existing long 
term  take  or  pay arrangements with major  exporters.  However  in 1984  the 
Japanese  were  still  in  a  position to negotiate  adjustments  to  standard 
take  or  pay  provisions  which  the  JVPs  wished to  apply to  NWS  LNG.  They 
continued  to  pursue  this  goal until one month prior to  the  signing of the 
NWS  sales  contracts  in  July  1985  and  were  able  to obtain a  series of 
concessions  relating  to  the  provisions  laid  out in the  1981 MOl.  Two 
major  changes  were  made  in  1985.  In  early  June  a  new  take  or pay 
arrangement  was  introduced which allowed the Japanese  to vary their annual 
uptake  of  LNG  to  account  for  fluctuations  in  energy  demand  in the 
industrial  sector  (AFR  7th  June  1985).  A  few  weeks  prior to  this 
concession  the  Japanese  had  successfully extended the proposed start up 
period for  the  LNG  export programme  from  2  1/2  to  4  years. 
6.1.3.  The  third postponement  (October  1984) 
When  the  "Sales  and Purchase Agreement"  (SPA)  was  finalised with 
the  Japanese  in  July  1985,  it  made  provision for  the  agreed four year 
start  up  period running  from  October  1989 until the  end of 1993  when peak 
delivery  of  6  million tonnes  was  to be  introduced.  This  revised shipping 
schedule  was  the  result of a  third postponement of the  commencement  date 
for  LNG  deliveries  to Japan,  from April  1988  to October 1989. 
(i)  Rationale  for  the  third delay: 
The  decision  to push back the programme  for  the third time  made 
by  the  JVPs  in October 1984,  was  prompted by  a  number  of major 
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(a)  A  package  of  major  technical changes was  being planned to 
reduce  the  construction  costs  of the  LNG  plant and boost 
cash flow  levels over  the pre-operational years  of Phase II 
(b)  The  structure  of  the  joint  venture was  being changed to 
accommodate  a  new participant for  Phase II  . 
(c)  The  project  financiers  and major  investors were  expressing 
doubts  about  the  financial  stability of Woodside  and  the 
State Energy  Commission of Western Australia. 
(d)  The  price  of  oil  and LNG  was  declining with  a  consequent 
reduction  in  the  levels  of return from  the project which 
had been anticipated by the JVPs  in the early eighties. 
The  first  set  of major  changes  which followed the  introduction 
of  the  two  phase  plan  in  1982,  were planned throughout  the following 
year.  Three  major  technical  changes  to  be  introduced for  Phase II, 
firstly  a  shift from  the  'w'  concept water cooled steam turbine  system for 
driving  refrigerant  compressors  in the  LNG  plant,  to  a  new air cooled gas 
turbine  named  the  SIPM  'Y'  concept.  A  second modification introduced with 
the  new  $60  million  design  package,  was  to eliminate earlier plans  to 
produce  LPG  from  the plant on  the  Burrup  Peninsula  (Woodside  March  1985). 
This  process  is  now  being undertaken by Wesfarmers  who  are in the final 
stages  of  constructing  an  LPG  plant at Kwinana  in the  South West of the 
state,  using North West Shelf gas  as  feedstock  (Oct 88).  The  total saving 
to  the  JVPs  from  the  new  design  package  was  estimated in 1985  to be 
approximately $1  billion (Woodside  May  1985), 
A  further  measure  introduced  to  boost early cash flow levels 
prior  to  Phase  II  being  brought  onstream,  was  the  introduction  of 
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condensate  as  a  light crude for  domestic  and export markets  are viewed as 
an  important  source  of  income  for  the JVPs  prior to receiving revenues 
from  LNG  sales in the  1990s  (West Australian,  January 7th 1987). 
At  the  end  of  1984  a  decision  was  made  to divest Woodside 
Petroleum's  50%  interest  in  Phase  II  selling  a  16  2/3%  stake in the 
project  to MIMI  and an  8  1/3% holding to Shell and BHP.  The  total capital 
raising  of  $320 million from  the  transaction was  seen to benefit Woodside 
and  ensure  that  the  company could support its commitments  to  the project 
under  the  one-sixth  sharing  scheme which  gave  each participant an equal 
stake  in  Phase  II  (Woodside  March 1985).  This  arrangement was  formally 
maintained  following  the  Shell/BHP  takeover  of  April  1985,  although 
Woodside  Petroleum  remains  as  a  nominal  operator  and  an  effective 
subsidiary of these  two  other major participant companies  (see  6.2). 
(ii)  Comment 
The  large  scale  changes  which  affected  the  joint  venture 
organisation  and  project  planning  in  1984  have been identified as  the 
major  reasons  behind  the  postponement  decision  in  October  of  that 
year.**[5]  The  Japanese  had by that time  arrived at an  import plan for 
LNG  in  the eighties and early nineties  and sought to finalise  the  take or 
pay  conditions  for  the  final  contracts.  Whilst  the  take or pay and 
pricing  issues  may  have  provided  the Japanese with reasons  fo~ further 
delays,  the JVPs  had a  number of clear cut reasons for pushing work  on the 
LNG  plant  back  by  one  year.  They  were  still  involved  in ongoing 
negotiations  with  the  SECWA  over the conditions set out in the Domestic 
sales  contracts.  At  the  same  time  they were  attempting to preserve the 
take  or  pay  conditions,  start up  period and pricing provisions which had 
been  set  out  in  1981 when  the Japanese  initialled the MOl  to purchase  a 214 
set  quantity of NWS  LNG.  Oil and  LNG  prices had been declining since  1982 
presenting  the JVPs  with the possibility of reduced long  term returns  from 
LNG  sales  at  the  end of the decade  (DRO  May  1985:p.57).  As  a  result of 
these  pressures  the  JVPs  clearly  required  time  to adjust their profit 
estimates  to  reflect the  impact of contractual amendments  for  Phase  I  and 
II  and  a  possible  long  term decline in oil indexed LNG  prices stretching 
into the 1990s. 
The  factors listed above all contributed to  a  prevailing climate 
of  uncertainty  which  affected  the  NWS  project  in  October  1984. 
Substantial  foreign  investment  in  the  project  and the finalisation of 
Woodside  Petroleum's  $1.6 billion project loan,  were prerequisites to  the 
launch  of  the  LNG  export  phase.  In the  event  the project loan was  not 
extended  until  after  Woodside  had  been  co-opted  into  the  Shell/BHP 
corporate  structure.  However,  once  the loan was  granted in May  1985  the 
eight  Japanese  power  companies  followed  through with the final  commitment 
by  signing  the  LNG  sales  and purchase  agreements  (SPAs)  two  months  later 
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6.2.  Critical  Event  No.2:  The  She11/BHP  Takeover  of  Woodside 
Petroleum 
6.2.l.  Details  of the  takeover 
In  April  1985  Shell  and  BHP  mounted  a  successful  takeover bid to 
buyout  a  substantial share of Woodside  Petroleum's  existing holdings  in 
the  North  West  Shelf project.  Prior to  the  takeover at the beginning of 
1985  the  two  companies  held a  joint shareholding of 43%  Woodside  stock. 
By  the  middle  of April  the  50%  threshold had been crossed with  the joint 
Shell/BHP  holding  in  excess  of  250  million  Woodside  shares.  At  the 
beginning  of  that  month  the  two  major  NWS  project participants had put 
forward  a  j oint offer of $459.2 million at $1.60  a  share.  Both  companies 
had  indicated  at. the  time  that  they  were  willing to buy  as  far  into 
Woodside  as  the public  shareholding would allow  (West Australian Editorial 
19th  April  1985).  The  buy  in  continued  throughout  1985  with  80%  of 
Woodside  equit';T  under  Shell/BHP  control by  the  end of the year.  Figures 
issued  in  April  1986  reveal  that  the  joint shareholding had risen to 
80.06%,  almost  double  the pre-takeover equity level  (Woodside  30th April 
1986)  (see Table  1  Introduction). 
6.2.2.  Questions  surrounding the  takeover 
At  the  time  of  the  takeover  Shell  and  BHP  issued statements 
justifying  their  action on  the  grounds  that Woodside  was  a  weak  financial 
link  in  the  joint  venture  and  the co-optation measure was  necessary to 
secure  investment  confidence  for  the  export phase  of the project.  There 
is  a  certain amount  of superficial historical evidence  to  support  the  idea 
that  Woodside  had struggled to support their financial  commitments  to  the 
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end  of  1980.  The  decision  taken  by  the  JVPs  early in 1984  to divest 
2/3rds  of Woodside's  50%  stake  in Phase II could be  taken as  an indication 
of  the  company's  fragile  financial base at the  time.  Such  an idea appears 
to  be  borne  out  by  Morgan Guaranty's vote of no  confidence  in Woodside 
when  they  withdrew  as  chief  project financiers  at the  end of that year 
(see  6.1.3  and 6.2.4). 
These  events  lend  some  credence  to  the  Shell/BHP  argument  for 
the  takeover.  However,  it is not possible to  reach any  firm conclusion on 
the  matter  in the  absence  of direct information relating to  the  financial 
and  other  contractual  obligations  which Woodside held relative to major 
creditors between 1980  and early 1985. 
Through  consideration  of  a  number  of  policy  initiatives 
undertaken  by  the JVPs  since  1976  and  the  reaction of external investors, 
it  should  be possible to view  the  Shell/BHP action from  a  broad strategic 
standpoint.  The 
takeover  period 
Shell/BHP  position  was  sharply opposed  throughout  the 
by  a  group  of senior Woodside  executives  who  maintained 
that  their  company  could  continue  to  function  independently  and was 
capable  of financing its commitments  to  the  second stage of the North West 
Shelf  project.  They  demonstrated their opposition to  the  takeover  in a 
letter  issued  to  Woodside  shareholders  in  April  1985  stating that the 
Shell/BHP  offer  of  $1.60  a  share was  an undervaluation of Woodside  stock 
and  that  selling  would  be  contrary  to  their  own  and  the  company's 
interests. 
At  the  shareholders  meeting  of  1st  May  1985,  Chairman D.W. 
Rogers  upheld  the  executives'  argument reiterating that the  independent 
directors  believed  that  "The  shares are worth substantially more  than the 
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more  than  a  week  after Shell and  BHP  had received FlRB  approval  for  the 
takeover  and had announced that they intended to appoint  two  new  directors 
to  the Woodside board.  This  gave  the  two  companies majority voting rights 
in line with their existing 51.9%  holding in Woodside  Petroleum. 
Although  Shell  and  BHP  held effective control over Woodside  by 
the  end  of  April,  the  Chairman,  in his address  to shareholders  (1st May 
1985)  expressed  a  measure  of  defiance  to  the  Shell/BHP buy  in.  The 
statement  published  in  the Australian press  on May  4th contained clauses 
which  challenged  the rationale behind the  Shell/BHP action and questioned 
the  circumstances  under  which  the  takeover had received FlRB  approval. 
Woodside  shareholders  were  advised  that prior to making  any decision on 
whether  to  sell  existing public stock they should wait for  the report on 
the  adequacy  of  the  Shell/BHP offer to be drafted by Morgan  Grenfell who 
were  appointed  to review the matter  (Woodside Address  to Shareholders 1st 
May  1985). 
Whether  the  rear  guard  action  on  the  part  of  the  Woodside 
directors  was  based  on  sentiment for  the  fiercely independent Australian 
exploration  company  or  a  sound business  strategy is a  difficult question 
to  address  without  knowledge  of boardroom proceedings  over  the past five 
years.  However  using material drawn  from  interview respondents with some 
inside  knowledge  relating to  the joint venture organisation and secondary 
information  it  may  be possible to offer some  insight into the  following: 
(i)  The  corporate  and  financial  rationale which underlay the  Shell/BHP 
decision  to  initiate  the  Woodside  takeover in April 1985;  (ii) Whether 
this  move  was  part of a  broader corporate strategy planned several years 
in  advance? 
subsections. 
These  questions  will  be  addressed  in  the  next  two 
In  6.2.3  background  material  will  be  presented on  the 218 
corporate  relationship which existed between Shell,  BHP  and Woodside  since 
the  entry  of BHP  into  the joint venture in 1976.  In 6.2.4 the discussion 
centres  on  how  the structure of the rollover project financing  agreement 
established  with a  large international banking syndicate may  have had  some 
bearing on  a  Shell/BHP  takeover strategy. 
6.2.3.  The  corporate relationship Shell.  BHP,  Woodside  1976-85 
The  cross  section  of interview respondents  asked to  comment  on 
the  Shell/BHP  takeover  of  Woodside  Petroleum in April 1985,  provided a 
range  of  perspectives  on  this critical event.  In a  number  of cases  the 
general  viewpoints presented concurred and when related to recorded events 
in  the  history  of the North West  Shelf project offered some  insight into 
the  corporate  relationship  which  has  existed  between  Shell,  BHP  and 
Woodside  since  1976.  The  relationship evolved from August  1976,  when  BHP 
bought  the  Burmah Oil stake in the Woodside-Burmah  company  (Harman,  1984: 
p.236).  Prior  to  this  change  the  multinational  participants Shell, 
Cal-Asiatic  BP  and  Burmah  had  recognised  the  political  necessity of 
maintaining  Woodside  as  a  significant  Australian  participant  in  the 
project.  The  Whitlam  era  had served as  a  clear warning  to the  foreign 
multinationals  of  the  risks  involved  when  dealing  with  a  Federal 
government  seeking  to  impose strict limitations  on foreign investment  and 
multinational activity in Australian resource  projects~ 
Existing  legislation  and  latterly  the  formation  of the  FIRB 
ensured  the  maintenance  of specified levels of Australian content in all 
major  resource  projects.  Maintaining  Woodside's  role  as  a  key 
participant,  operator  and  mouthpiece  for  the  participants  was  a 
prerequisite for  the political survival of the joint venture. 219 
The  Woodside  corporate structure provided an essential interface 
with  relevant  government  departments  in Canberra and Perth.  At  the  time 
Woodside  presented  the  image  of  a  vital entrepreneurial  company which 
built  on  previous  exploration  success  by leading a  multinational joint 
venture  towards  the  establishment of a  major Australian resource project. 
The  major  stake which Woodside held in the venture was  sufficient to keep 
Australian  equity  in  the  project  at  a  level which became politically 
acceptable  to  the  Federal administration,  following  the  dismissal of the 
nationalistic Whitlam  government  in November  1975. 
This  combination  of factors  ensured Woodside's  indispensability 
to  the  venturers  in  the  early years.  However  the first major shift in 
this  position occurred when  BHP  joined the venture  in August  1976  boosting 
Australian  equity  from  an  estimated 18  to  25%  to  an officially accepted 
level  of  48%  (Harman 1984:p.192).  BHP  was  a  large Australian corporation 
with  home  based  and  foreign  interests  in  a  diverse number  of areas, 
including  iron  ore,  coal  mining,  steel making  and petroleum exploration 
and  development.  The  company,  often referred to  as  "The  Big Australian", 
held  corporate interests which were  in many  cases more  aligned to  those  of 
the  multinational  joint  venturers  than those  of Woodside,  an exploration 
company with all its major assets based in Australia.*[6] 
There  is  evidence  to  suggest  that  during  the  mid  to late 
seventies  BHP  had  considerable  corporate  aspirations which it hoped to 
fulfil  through  participation  in the North West  Shelf venture.  A certain 
amount  of intramural wrangling took place in the  early construction stages 
of  the  Domestic  gas  plant,  with BHP  attempting  to  secure  a  role as  a  key 
participant  and major  subcontractor for  the project.  Whilst  BHP  sought to 
secure  contracts  for  civil  and  infrastructural  work  on  Phase  I, 220 
Shell  pushed  for  universal  acceptance of Shell Internationale Petroleum 
(SIPM  )  standards  and  specifications  on  all  jobs.**[7]  This  type of 
action  may  have  antagonised Woodside  and KJR  management  and can be viewed 
as  an  early  indication of the dominant role which Shell,  and to  a  lesser 
extent,  BHP,  were  to  assume within the joint venture. 
Shell's  influence  within  the  joint  venture  has  become 
increasingly  evident throughout  the eighties.  By  1981 with the  LNG  export 
licences  issued  by  the  Federal  government  and  the  Domestic  gas  sales 
contracts  secured,  there was  an air of confidence  regarding the  future of 
the  NWS  project.  The  projections for  LNG  demand in the Japanese market  in 
the  1990s  were  encouraging  and  the shortfall in domestic  gas  demand was 
not  yet  evident  (DRO  May  1985).  However,  by  the  end of the year  some 
concern  had  been expressed over  a  recent downward  revision of SECWA  sales 
projections  for  the  1985-1990 period.  A  SECWA  brief issued to Mr.  Jones, 
the  State  energy minister in September  1981 had pointed to  a  considerable 
reduction  on  the  1977  projections and had  recommended that the  terms  of 
the  1980  sales  agreement  be revised to ensure  the financial  solvency of 
the  commission  (see 7.2). 
The  JVPs  were  concerned  about  possible  disruptions  to  the 
project  resulting  from  attempts  to delay the  issue of the  SECWA  pipeline 
contracts  until  the  SECWA's  position could be  reviewed.  Throughout  the 
early  part of 1982  the JVPs  sent two  senior executives,  significantly from 
Shell  and  BHP  to negotiate with State government  and  SECWA  officials over 
the  financing  and construction of the Dampier  to Wagerup pipeline.  It is 
reported  that  the  State  energy  minister  and  senior  SECWA  executives 
expressed  severe  doubts  relating  to  the  SECWA  ability to finance  the 
project  throughout  the  negotiating  period  from  April  to  June  1982. 221 
However  the  political  power  of  Shell  and  BHP  became  evident as  they 
persuaded  the  State government  to issue the first construction contract in 
June  to  Saipem  Pty.  This was  achieved through conducting negotiations 
behind  closed  doors,  avoiding  a  public  forum which may  have  resulted in a 
political  battle  over  the  terms  of  the  1980  sales  contracts.  The 
venturers  were  well  aware  of  the risk to Woodside  and the project as  a 
whole  if  the  original  contracts  were  altered at that point.  The  $1.4 
billion  financial  deal  which  Woodside  had  established  with  Morgan 
Guarantry  rested  on  estimated  payout  from  the original contracts which 
were  run  from  1985-2005.  Any  major revision of these could have  resulted 
in  the  loan  being  withdrawn  (W.A.  Hansard  Assembly  28th  August 
1985:p.506).**[8] 
By  the  end  of  1982  Shell  had  begun  to  further extend its 
influence  in  the project through the  introduction of Shell Internationale 
Petroleum  (SIPM)  standards  and  procedures  during  the  design  and 
construction  stages  for  Phase  I.  This rationalisation process  could be 
stepped  up  for  Phase II when  SIPM  were  designated to undertake  the pivotal 
role  of  technical  adviser  for  the  construction  of  the  LNG  plant and 
associated facilities  (Woodside  May  1985). 
Shell's  position  as  the most  influential participant within the 
joint  venture  was  effectively  secured  prior to  the  1985  takeover,  with 
SIPM  engineers  and  senior  management  occupying  key  technical  and 
administrative  roles  within  the  project.  Prior to April  1985  Shell's 
influence  within the Woodside  corporate structure was  made  apparent by the 
large  number  of  secondees  in  key  administrative  and specialist roles 
within  the  company.  After  the  takeover  Woodside  became  the nominal 
operator  under  the Shell /BHP  umbrella  (see  Figure  6  JVP  Senior Management 
Structure January 1985). r 
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The  fact  that  Shell's  influence  within  the North West  Shelf 
joint  venture  has  always  appeared disproportionate  to its original equity 
may  be  a  reflection  of  a  broader  Shell corporate strategy  As  a  long 
established  multinational  trading  company  with diverse  interests,  Shell 
Internationale  Petroleum  Maatschapij  has  evolved a  number  of successful 
negotiating  strategies  over  the years.  In the past Shell often bought  a 
limited  stake  in  major  resource  developments  typically producing oil or 
natural  gas  and  proceeded  to  extend their influence within the project 
organisation  if  the  long  term  returns  looked promising.  This  type of 
policy  facilitates  multisourcing  providing  security  of  supply  and 
diversification  of  interests.  Shell appear  to have  adopted this  type  of 
strategy  in  relation  to  the  North West  Shelf project,  with  an original 
equity  holding  in  the  joint  venture  of  19%.  Whilst it would be  pure 
speculation  to  suggest  that  Shell planned the Woodside  takeover  from  as 
far  back  as  1980,  the  measure  may  have  featured  as part of a  broad 
corporate strategy as  early as  1982/83. 
By  the  end of 1981  a  number  of the key political issues relating 
to  the  commercial  future  of  the  North  West  Shelf  project  had been 
overcome.  The  major negotiations with the Federal  government  over export 
approvals  and  the tax provisions  for  the project had been concluded.  The 
State  development  agreement  had been drawn  up  and ratified in parliament 
and  the  SECWA  had  signed  the Domestic  sales contracts  guaranteeing the 
JVPs  the  cash  flow required to support Phase  I.  Oil prices were high at 
the  time  with  Saudi  light crude fetching up  to US$36  (spot trading)  and 
the  Japanese market for  LNG  was  projected to undergo  an  expansion into  the 
eighties  (WA  Govt  May  1985). 224 
These  favourable  conditions  changed  throughout  1983  and 1984 
with  a  consequent  reduction in the  incentive for  any participant to take 
an  increased stake in the joint venture in 1985.  By  the  time  the  takeover 
bid  was  announced  in early April oil prices were  down  to US$28  from  over 
US$30  at  the  end of 1984  (Woodside April 1986).  The  projected demand  for 
LNG  in Japan for  the 1990s had been downgraded  from  1982  estimates  and the 
status  of  the  project had been set at "marginal"  in the official view of 
the JVPs  (WA  Govt May  1985). 
(i)  Comment 
The  prevailing  conditions at the  time  of the  takeover  seemed to 
belie  any  purely economic  rationale behind the  Shell/BHP action.  In view 
of  these  indicators  it  seems  likely  that  the  two  major participants 
initiated  the  takeover  in April as  an attempt to bolster the  confidence of 
project  financiers  and  foreign  investors whose  support was  essential for 
the  launch  of  the  LNG  phase.  Thus  it is reasonable  to assume  that the 
timing  of  the  takeover  reflected legitimate concerns  on the part of the 
JVP  that  Woodside's  apparent  financial  weakness  may  be  a  threat to the 
success  of Phase II.  How~ver,  the question of the broader rationale which 
underlay  the  Shell/BHP decision is a  more  complex matter.  It is difficult 
to  provide  direct  evidence  to support  the existence of a  broad Shell/BHP 
corporate  strategy which had incorporated a  takeover plan years  in advance 
of  the  actual  event.  However,  detail  drawn  from  Stage II interviews 
supports  the  following  assertions:  (i)  The  Shell company had planned to 
extend  its  influence within the joint venture organisation throughout the 
eighties  through  a  rationalisation  programme  based on SIPM  policies and 
procedures;  (ii)  BHP  had  by  1977  emerged as  a  powerful  instrument for 
lobbying  in  Canberra,  usurping Woodside's  role as  the central Australian 225 
company  in  the project;  (iii) Shell and BHP  saw  the need to stabilise the 
investment  climate  for  the  LNG  phase  and acted accordingly.  There  is 
little  evidence  from  the  interviews  to support  the existence of a  long 
term  corporate conspiracy between Shell and BHP  to squeeze Woodside  out of 
the  joint venture.  However  there are stronger grounds  to  support the  idea 
that  both  BHP  and Shell had been pushing to extend their influence within 
the  project  several  years  prior  to  the  takeover.  A majority of the 
respondents  who  were  questioned  on the  Shell/BHP  takeover  supported the 
idea  that  the  measure  was  primarily an attempt  to bail Woodside  out of 
financial problems.*[9] 
6.2.4.  The  significance of the project loan agreement 
The  structure  of  the  rollover loan agreement established with 
the  project  financier  offers  some  insight into the  Shell/BHP decision to 
buy  over Woodside.  In this subsection an attempt will be made  to consider 
how  the  Shell/BHP  action was  influenced by  the way  in which  the original 
loan  was  structured  and  a  series  of financial measures  adopted by the 
joint  venturers  in the year leading up  to  the  takeover.  The  new  financial 
package  for  Phase  II  (see 6.1.3.)  and the  loan agreement will be briefly 
outlined  in  order  to highlight any possible links to  a  broader Shell/BHP 
strategy. 
The  history  of the Woodside  loan agreement goes back to January 
1981  when  the  company  secured a  US$1.4 billion loan from  a  syndicate of 62 
Australian  and  overseas  banks.  This  loan was  of great importance  to  the 
future  of  the  North  West  Shelf project in that it ensured that Woodside 
could  continue  with  its  sizeable commitment  to  the  domestic phase.  The 
loan  rested  on the security of the  SECWA  contracts,  which had been signed 226 
in  September  1980  and  had  effectively  launched  the  North West  Shelf 
project. 
A  major financial link between Shell,  BHP  and Woodside  which may 
have  had  some  direct bearing on the decision to initiate the  takeover,  was 
established  under  the  terms  of the original loan agreement.  The project 
financing  agreement  for  the Phase  I  loan was  based on anticipated returns 
from  the  project  and not the  traditional balance sheet approach based on 
company  cash  flows  and assets.  Only under  this  type of arrangement could 
Woodside  have  hoped  to  secure  such  a  sizeable  loan  in  view of the 
company's  limited  assets.  However,  in anticipation of the considerable 
risks  involved  the financiers wrote  in a  clause which bound Shell and BHP 
to  underwrite  any cost overrun by supplying Woodside with A$300  million in 
additional  capital.  Woodside  supported this agreement by issuing equity 
in  1981  in  an  effort  to  raise  $175  million from  shareholders  (Harman 
1984:p.227). 
From  the  end  of  1981  through to 1985  the project underwent  a 
series  of  structural  changes  made  in  response  to  the rising costs  and 
lowered  projected  returns  from both phases.  The  principal measures  taken 
by  the  joint  venturers  to deal with the situation were  as  follows:  (i) 
1983  Shell  and BHP  cancelled an earlier arrangement with Woodside  whereby 
they  would  purchase  50%  of the latter's LNG  quota on a  freight on board 
(FOB)  basis.  The  original  agreement  would  have  saved  Woodside  a 
considerable  amount  on  shipping  costs  and its cancellation would have  a 
detrimental  effect  on  the  company's  cash flow once  deliveries of LNG  to 
Japan  commenced;  (11)  1984  the JVPs  introduce  a  new  technical package  to 
reduce  condensate  production  from  North  Rankin  'A'  (see 5.5);  (iii) 
November  1984  MIMI  is formally  introduced as  a  new participant in Phase 227 
II;  Woodside's  equity in this phase is divested from  50%  to  16  2/3%.  The 
divestment  of  shares  to  Shell,  BHP  and  MIMI  raises  $320 million for 
Woodside  and  reduces  the company's  financial  commitment  to  the  LNG  phase 
from  $4,250  million  to  $1,416  million  (Harman 1984)  (Woodside 1st May 
1985). 
(i)  Comment 
The  policy  changes  introduced  by  the joint venturers  in 1984 
were  designed  to  attain three  interrelated objectives:  (i)  To  stabilise 
the  financial  position  of  Woodside  Petroleum;  (ii)  increase Japanese 
involvement  in  the  project;  (iii) create an  improved  investment climate 
for  the  launch of the  LNG  phase. 
These  new  policy  measures  were  successful to  the extent that 
Woodside  was  extended the  second part of the rollover loan in May  1985  and 
the  LNG  phase  was  launched two  months  later.  However it is important to 
draw  a  clear  distinction  between  the  achievement  of  joint  venture 
corporate 
company. 
goals  and  those  of  Woodside  Petroleum  as  an  independent 
Woodside  received the  financial  guarantees  required to support 
their  participation  only  weeks  after the  Shell/BHP buy  in.  By  the  time 
the  loan  was  approved  Woodside  had  become  a  nominee  operator for  the 
project and was  effectively a  subsidiary of Shell and BHP. 
The  timing of the takeover and the bankers'  decision to sign the 
agreement  suggests  that  both  the  JVPs  and  the  project financier had 
foreclosed  on  the  possibility  that  Woodside  could  continue  as  a 
financially  independent  participant  for  the second phase of the project. 
Morgan  Guaranty  had indicated their concern about the  financial stability 
of  Woodside  and  the  SECWA  by withdrawing as  lead bankers at the end of 
1984.  They were  replaced by Chase Manhattan which led a  changed syndicate 228 
of  59  banks  which  were  to  raise  the  US$1.6  billion loan for the  LNG 
phase.  At  the  time  however,  the  investment climate for  Phase II was 
uncertain.  No  sales contract had been signed with the Japanese  and there 
was  still  the  ongoing issue of the  SECWA  contracts to be settled.  In the 
absence  of  a  bankable  document  (Sales  contract)  Chase Manhattan were 
unwilling  to  advance  financial  support  to  a  company  which  the other 
participants viewed as  a  weak financial  link in the joint venture. 
The  timing  of  the events which preceded the  Shell/BHP  takeover 
suggest  that  Chase-Manhattan  were  made  aware  of the  forthcoming  shake-up 
within  the  joint  venture  a  number  of weeks  prior to  the initial bid for 
Woodside  stock.  It is likely that this would have  served as  confirmation 
of  an  earlier decision on the part of the financiers  to withhold the loan 
until  a  number  of outstanding details relating to sales contracts for both 
phases were  settled. 
When  Woodside  was  finally absorbed into the corporate structure 
of  two  giant  multi-assetted  companies,  the  bankers were  given a  clear 
assurance  that  the joint venture organisation was  financially stable.  In 
strategic  terms  the  takeover was  probably viewed by the bankers  a  little 
more  than  a  rationalisation  of  the  joint venture financial structure. 
Shell  and  BHP  completed  the  scheme  with  two  additional  measures  to 
strengthen  the financial base of the joint venture organisation by raising 
the  cash flow of the Woodside  company.  This was  facilitated by voting for 
a  $208.3  million  stock  issue in June  1985  followed by  a  double  issue in 
January  1986  to raise $840  million  (West Australian Editorial January 30th 
1986). *  [1] 
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Production  of  aluminum  at  process  which  consumes  large 
quantities of electricity dropped by  70%  from  1979  to 1982. 
[2]  Based  on  commentary  from State II interviews  and published 
sources  indicated in text. 
[3 ]  The 
"The 
an 
and 
figures  for  LNG  Demand  (Japan)  in 1990 were  provided by 
Agency  of Natural Resource  and Energy  (ACE).  This  is 
energy  advisory body which supplies  survey data to MITI 
other Japanese  government ministries. 
[4]  The  Petro-Canada  project was  finally shelved at the  end of 
1986  (ref:  Canadian Consulate,  Perth).  (Details in WA  Jan 
1988,  WA  Govmt.) 
[5]  Information sourced from Stage II interviews. 
[6]  BHP  has  considerable  foreign  holdings  and  investments  in 
coal,  steel,  copper,  iron  ore  and other minerals.  This 
broad  portfolio of important offshore interests will result 
in  certain  policies  more  closely  associated  with  a 
multinational  company  than  an  organisation like Woodside 
Petroleum which is ostensibly Australian based. 
[7] 
Information sourced from  Stage II interviews. 
[8 ] 
[9] 
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CHAPTER  7 
CRITICAL  EVENT  NO.3 
"THE  RENEGOTIATION  OF  THE  SECWA  CONTRACTS" 
INTRODUCTION 
In  September  1980  the State Energy Commission of Western Australia 
entered  into  a  contractual  agreement  with the  NWS  participants for  the 
supply  of  a  fixed  volume  of gas  (10.9 million m3  per day)  in accordance 
with  set  pricing  criteria.  This  contract  effectively underwrote  the 
launch  of  the  Domestic  gas  phase of the  NWS  project.  Less  than 5  years 
later  in April 1985  the  terms  of the original contract had been overturned 
in  favour  of a  new deal negotiated with the JVP  by representatives of the 
WA  government. 
The  above  was  seen  to  be  of major  significance in terms  of the 
future  financial  stability  of  one  of  WA's  key  public bodies  and the 
strategic  position  of  the  JVP  relative to their domestic market for  NWS 
gas. 
In  the  following  chapter  the  'event'  to be  examined is seen to 
unfold  over  the  4~ years between September  1980  and April 1985.  However, 
in  view  of  the  importance  of  historical  context  in  this  case,  the 
chronological coverage  dates back to November  1977  (see 7.2.1.). 
Chapter  7  is effectively an exercise in policy analysis  looking at 
the  essential interplay between public  and corporate policy.  JVP  policies 
are  the  central  referent  although a  large  amount  of space is devoted to 
the  policy of the WA  government  and their respective energy ministers over 
the  period  in  question.  The  role  of ministers Mensaros  and Jones  is 
covered  retrospectively  drawing  on  a  statement  voicing  the  views 232 
of  the  current  minister  (Oct  88),  David Parker,  on  the  SECWA  contracts 
issue.  This  is  in  turn  balanced by commentary  drawn  from  a  number  of 
sources  including  media coverage  and Stage II interviews.  The  importance 
of  the  Alcoa  company  as  a  major  customer  for  piped NWS  gas  is also 
considered. 
It  is  anticipated  that  the  analysis  of  this  key event in the 
history  of  the  NWS  project will afford a  clearer understanding of  (i)  why 
the  renegotiation was  necessary (ii) its impact  on the corporate integrity 
of  the  SECWA  and energy use projections for piped natural gas  in WA  (iii) 
whether  further  contractual  adjustments  will  be necessary as  mooted in 
recent press reports  (ref.  West Australian,  April 6th 1988). 233 
7.1.  Chronology of Relevant Events:  November  1977-March 1985 
November  1977 
November  1978 
1979 
December 
The  SECWA  with  the  concurrence  of  WA  State 
Energy  Minister  Mensaros,  enter into a  MOU  with 
the  JVPs  for  the  purchase  of  250  MMCFD  of 
natural  gas  for  sales in the  South West of the 
State. 
The  SECWA  take  on option contained in the MOU  to 
purchase  a  further  50  MMCFD  of  gas  from  the 
JVPs. 
The  SECWA: 
(i)  Sign  a  take  or  pay contract with Griffin 
coal  to  purchase  3  MTPA  (3 million tonnes 
per  annum)  the  total annual output at the 
Collie 
period. 
(ii) Assume 
open  cut  mine,  over  a  20  year 
responsibility  for  marketing  70 
MMCFD  of  gas which  the JVPs  had previously 
planned 
Pilbara. 
to  sell  to  end  users  in  the 
The  move  raised SECWAs  total gas 
take  from  the original figure of 250  MMCFD 
outlined  in the  1977  MOU  to  370  MMCFD  (10.9 
million m3  per day). 
September 1980  The  SECWA  under  the  direction of State Energy 
Minister  Jones  and  Commissioner Kirkwood,  sign 
contracts  to  consolidate  arrangements  for the 
purchase of 370  MMCFD  from  the JVPs. 234 
September  1981  The  SECWA  issue  a  brief for Mr.  Jones  setting 
out  their  perception  of  the  prevailing  gas 
demand  situation prior to  the  impending  award of 
June  1982 
the  Dampier-Wagerup  pipeline  contract.  The 
report  outlined  a  projected  shortfall  in gas 
sales  for  1985  ranging from  100  to  120  MMCFD  for 
Southern  gas  and  36  MMCFD  for Pilbara gas  (WA 
Hansard Aug  28th 1985). 
Saipem  Pty.  are  awarded  the  SECWA  pipeline 
contract  (Northern leg). 
September  1982  Kukje/ICC  Construction of Korea are brought into 
a  joint venture with  Saipem which will carry out 
May  1984 
November  1984 
work  on  all  three  stretches  of  the  1,500 
kilometres  pipeline  (Newman/Brotherton, 
1982:p.148). 
Lack  of  new  industrial development  in WA  and a 
general  reduction  in  domestic  energy  demand 
growth,  leads  to  a  downward  revision of earlier 
projections  for  natural  gas  use  in the State. 
SECWA  and  the  State  government  foresee  the 
ensuing  debt  crisis  and  form  the Gas  Strategy 
Committee  to address  the problem  (Parker 1985). 
The  SECWA  sign  a  $1  billion  contract  with 
Western  Collieries  to take  26  million tonnes  of 
coal  (approximately  half total production)  over 
a  20 year period  (Western Mail,  August  31  1985). December  1984 
December  1984-
March  1985 
March  1985 
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Morgan  Guaranty  the lead financiers  for  the  NWS 
project,  express  doubts  about  the  SECWA's 
ability  to meet its financial obligations to  the 
JVPs  under  the existing contractual terms.  The 
group  decline to serve as project financiers  for 
Phase  II. 
The  SECWA  try  to  renegotiate the  terms  of the 
1979  Griffin  contract  to  reduce  take  or pay 
obligations  to  2.2  MTPA.  Griffin take  court 
action  resulting  in  litigation  from  November 
1984 to February 1985. 
Following  the  recommendations  of  the  Gas 
Strategy  Committee  the  State  government enter 
into  negotiations  with  the  JVPs  to  initiate 
changes  in  the  terms  of  the  1980  sales 
agreement. 
Announcement  that  agreement  has  been  reached 
between  the  State  government  and  the JVPs  over 
alterations  to  the  existing  gas  sales 
contracts.  The  new  package  is agreed in the 
light  of  State and Federal provision to forfeit 
a  total  of  $315  million  in royalties over  20 
years  to  support  the  SECWA's  financial 
obligations  to  the JVPs.*[l]  (Parker 1985) 7.2. 
7.2.1. 
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Historical Background to  the  SECWA  Contracts Debate 
Key  events August  1977-March 1985 
The  Federal  budget  of  August  1977 heralded the end of a  long 
period  of stagnation for  the  NWS  development.  Treasurer Anthony's  special 
provisions  for  the  export  phase  and  the  retreat  to a  25%  Australian 
content  threshold  had given the joint venturers  a  major  incentive to push 
ahead  with  the  project  (see 4.2.1).  With most of the major obstacles  to 
project  development,  cleared at Federal level,  the stage was  set for more 
detailed negotiations between the  WA  government  and  the JVPs. 
Throughout  1977  a  number  of meetings were  convened between the 
JVPs  and  representatives  of various  WA  government bodies with the  aim of 
(i)  devising  a  detailed  development package  for  the  domestic phase,  and 
(ii)  reaching  agreement  on the pricing and quantity of gas  to be  sold to 
the  SECWA.  The  drafting of the  MOU  between the parties in November  1977 
represented  the  culmination  of  preliminary  talks and paved the way  for 
more  detailed  negotiations.  These  were  to  lead to  the signing of the 
domestic phase  sales contracts  in September 1980. 
A  series  of  events  linked to the  SECWA  contracts  issue,  which 
took  place  prior  to September  1980,  subsequently became  the subject of a 
series  of  parliamentary debates  in August  1985  (see 7.3.4 and 7.4.4).  In 
a  statement  issued  on 23  August  1985  by WA  Energy Minister Parker,  these 
events  are  presented and interpreted in hindsight from  the perspective of 
the  Burke  government.  In  his  statement Mr.  Parker maintains  that the 
SECWA  gas  glut and debt profile are  the  legacy of a  series of poor policy 
decisions  made  by  two  Liberal/NCP  energy ministers.  These  were  Mr.  A. 
Mensaros,  WA  Energy  Minister  for  the coalition government  f~om 1977  to 
1979  and  his  successor  Mr.  P.  Jones  who  held the  energy portfolio until 
the election of the  Burke  government  in February 1983. 237 
Four  major  events  are singled out for  scrutiny in Mr.  Parker's 
published  statement  which  attempts  to illustrate how  poor judgement  and 
political  motives  led  the  respective ministers  to enter into agreements 
with  the JVPs  which were  contrary to  the interests of the state of Western 
Australia.  The  original agreement outlined in the  MOU  whereby  the  SECWA 
would  contract  a  total of 250  MMCFD  of gas  from  the JVPs  is sanctioned in 
the  document  as  a  reasonable  business  arrangement  between  the  two 
parties.  Parker  states  that if the total volume  of gas  contracted from 
the  JVPs  had  remained  at  that level,  the current debt problem would be 
comparatively  small.  This  is  borne  out  in respect of 1985  gas  sales 
estimates  for  1985/86 which were  set at 140  MMCFD  for third party sales in 
the  South  West  of  the State and approximately  40  MMCFD  for use  in power 
stations,  (Parker,  August  1985)  a  total figure of 180  MMCFD. 
Mr.  Parker  suggests  that if the volumes  set out in the  1977  MOU 
had  remained  unchanged,  the quantity of gas  going into inventory in 1985 
could  have  been  about  half  the  amount  which  remained unsold under  the 
terms  of  the  1980  sales agreements.  This  agreement was  operative until 
the  terms  of the domestic  gas  sales contracts were  revised in March  1985. 
A  major  provision  of the original sales agreement was  that the 
SECWA  must  draw  down  351  MMCFD  of NWS  gas  or  95%  of the  total contracted 
volume. 
Over  the  three year period between the establishment of the  1977 
MOU  and the signing of the domestic  gas  sales contracts in September  1980, 
the  volume  of  gas  contracted  by  the  SECWA  rose  from  250  MMCFD  to  370 
MMCFD.  This  increase  was  brought  about  by  SECWA  exercising  two 
contractual  options,  one  in 1978  and another in 1979.  The  first option to 
take  an  additional  50  MMCFD  was  encompassed in the  1977  MOU.  The  SECWA 238 
and  the  Energy Minister  took this decision at a  time when oil prices were 
rising  and  worldwide  demand  for natural gas  was  increasing steadily  (see 
3.2.2.). 
In  Western  Australia  SECWA's  pre-1981 projections for natural 
gas  demand  in  the  industrial  sector  and  as  a  power  station feedstock 
pointed to  a  steady upward  trend throughout  the  1980s  (see Table  3). 
The  1978  decision  was  open to  a  small measure  of criticism in 
the  Parker  document  (see  7.4.2).  However  the  1979  decision to  increase 
the  total  take  from  300  to  370  MMCFD  and  the  subsequent ratification of 
this  in the  1980  sales agreement,  are singled out as  examples  of political 
ineptitude  on  the  part  of the Court  government.  The  principal blame  is 
laid  on  Mr.  Jones  who  signed the  1980  sales contracts  and is assumed  to 
have  been  aware  that  (i)  market  indicators were  already pointing to a 
shortfall  against  original  natural  gas  demand projections for  WA  in the 
1980s,  and  (ii)  Alcoa  had  not  yet finalised their total gas  uptake or 
signed  a  back  to back contract with the  SECWA  (Parker,  August  1985)  (see 
7.2.2). 
Exactly  one  year after Mr.  Jones  signed the sales contracts the 
SECWA  issued  a  ministerial  brief  (September  1981)  advising that  (i)  if 
market  prospects  were  good  there would still be  an unsold surplus of 100 
to  120  MMCFD  in 1985  for  Southern gas  and  36  MMCFD  for Pilbara gas;  (ii) 
the  coal  competitive  price  for  Southern gas was  too high to attract new 
industrial  users;  (iii) the projected financial position of the  SECWA  was 
such  that  consideration should be given to delaying the project;  (iv)  the 
SECWA  may  be unable to raise finance  for  the Dampier-Wagerup pipeline;  (v) 
an  independent  energy  consultant  had  advised  the  SECWA  that the price 
provisions  set  down  in the sales contracts should be renegotiated and had 
advised on how  this exercise may  be carried out  (Parker,  August  1985). Year 
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TABLE  (3) 
1976/77  NORTH  WEST  SHELF  GAS 
MARKET  ASSESSMENT 
(MMCFD) 
1980  1985  1987 
142.3  192.3 
30.0  30.0 
32.0  51.4 
13.0  -
8.7  9.3 
4.3  230.3  4.3 
70.0  70.0 
300.3  371.3 
884  1214  1310 
Source:  WA  Hansard Assembly,  August  28  1985. 
1990 
241.6 
30.0 
64.1 
14.0  - 15.0 
10.3 
301.3  4.3  365.3 
70.0 
435.3 
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Despite  the  warnings  outlined  in  the  1981 ministerial brief 
neither  the  Liberal/NCP  coalition  government nor their Labor  successors 
had  taken  any  firm  steps  towards  the  renegotiation of the  domestic  gas 
sales  agreements  until late in 1984. 
In  the  extensive  three year  time period between the  issue of the 
ministerial  brief  and  the start of the  renegotiation procedures with the 
JVPs,  the  WA  Liberal/NCP  and latterly Labor  governments  had pushed ahead 
with  work  on  the  domestic  phase  of the  NWS  project.  In June  1982  the 
contract  for  the  Northern  leg  of  the  SECWA  pipeline was  issued to  the 
Australian  subsidiary  of  the  Italian  Saipem  engineering company.  The 
Korean  company  Kukje/ICC  were  later  brought  in  on  a  joint  venture 
partnership  with  Saipem,  to  cover construction work on  the entire 1,500 
kilometres  of  the  pipeline  (Harman,  1984:p.230).  All  the  other major 
contracts  for work  on  the Dampier  gas  phase were  issued that year with the 
domestic  gas  plant  and  onshore  pipeline  commissioning  dates  set  in 
mid-1984. 
Comment 
As  was  discussed above,  in the period leading up  to  the  WA  State 
election  of  February  1983  the  coalition  government  had  taken  no 
significant  measures  on  the  SECWA  gas  issue.  The  new  Labor  government 
took  no  firm  action on the matter until May  1984 when it appointed a  Gas 
Strategy  Committee  to  make  recommendations  for  future policy relating to 
NWS  gas.  On  the  advice  of the  committee negotiations were  initiated with 
the  joint  venturers  at  the  end  of  1984  and were  concluded over  three 
months  later  with  the  establishment of the  new sales  agreement  in March 
1985.  The  three  months  between  December  1984  and March  1985 had been 
crucial  for  the  State  government which had to negotiate  a  deal with the 241 
JVPs  and the Federal  government would ensure that the  SECWA  would not face 
a  financial  collapse  in  the  future.  The  pressure on the  government  to 
reach  a  fast  resolution  to  the  SECWA's  problems  was  heightened  by 
concurrent  negotiations  with Alcoa,  the key third party buyer and Griffin 
coal  who  had initiated legal proceedings against the energy commission for 
breach of contract  (see 7.2.2 and 7.2.3). 
7.2.2.  The  role of Alcoa as  a  major  third party client 
The  optimistic  gas  use projections  for Western Australia issued 
by  the  SECWA  in  1977  had been predicated on the  idea that Alcoa as  the 
major  third  party  client  would  be  drawing  down  at least 150  MMCFD  by 
1985.  The  first signs  that Alcoa would require no  more  than this minimum 
quantity  were  evident by November  1978.  At this point the  company had not 
exercised  an  option  set out in the  1977  MOU  to contract an additional 40 
MMCFD  of NWS  gas within one year. 
More  significantly however,  when  the domestic  gas  contracts were 
signed  in September  1980 Alcoa had still not committed to any back to back 
agreement  with  the  SECWA.  Harman  reports that in 1982,  Alcoa expressed 
their  intention  to purchase  a  total of 5.25 million cubic metres  of gas  a 
day  from  the  SECWA,  or  nearly  half  of planned NWS  production for  the 
Pilbara,  Metropolitan  and  South-Western  markets  in  1985  (Harman, 
1984:p.219).  However,  a  formal  agreement  on  the price and quantity of the 
gas  to be purchased from  the  SECWA  was  not reached until 1983  (see 7.3.2). 
Alcoa  is  the  SECWA's  biggest customer,  currently  (Oct  88)  using 
over half the  amount of NWS  gas  consigned for sales  to the South West. 242 
According  to  official  sources at Alcoa  the company's  uptake of 
NWS  gas  has  never  increased beyond the original quantity of 4.4 million 
m3  per  day  (approximately  150  MMCFD)  put in place in a  20  year contract 
signed with the  SECWA  in 1983.**[2] 
Despite  a  sharp  upturn  in Western world prices  and  demand for 
both  aluminium  metal  and alumina in 1987  and 1988,  no  additional  NWS  gas 
is  reported  to  have  been contracted to supply the additional electrical 
power  required  by  Alcoa's  three refineries in the South West of WA.  All 
three  refineries  (Pinjarra,  Kwinana,  Wagerup)  were  working  at  full 
capacity  throughout  1988  and  drew  high wattage  output from on-site gas 
fuelled power  stations  (see Appendix  IV). 
Throughout  the  five years  since the signing of their $5 billion 
(1983  dollars)  contract with the  SECWA  in 1983,  Alcoa have  claimed that at 
no  point  have  they  been able to  employ  the total gas  consignment of 150 
MMCFD.  This  point  was  likely to have been tabled during the  1985  SECWA 
contract  renegotiations  and  coupled with successive years  of low alumina 
output  and  profit  returns  in 1983  and  1984,  may have  gained  some  pricing 
concessions  from  the  JVP  (see 7.3.4).  It is only in the past  two  years 
(1987  and  1988)  that  the  Alcoa  drawdown of NWS  gas  is reported to have 
come  close  to  the original contracted volume  avoiding the high inventory 
costs of the previous  three financial years. 
7.2.3.  An  important trade off:  gas  v  coal 
The  problems  facing  the  SECWA  in relation to  the domestic  gas 
market  were  compounded  by  the  uneasy  trade  off  which had to be  made 
between  coal  and  natural gas  as  a  power station fuel.  Back in 1979,  the 
SECWA  had  signed  a  take  or  pay contract with Griffin coal  to  take  the 243 
total  production  from  the  Collie open-cut pit,  some  3  million tonnes  per 
annum  (MTPA)  over  a  20  year period. 
In  November  1984  the  SECWA  increased  its commitment  to  coal 
producers  in  the  State  by  signing  a  $1 billion contract with Western 
Collieries  to  take  26  million tonnes  or half of the  company's  output over 
a  20  year period.  This  commitment was  made  at a  time  when  the  SECWA  were 
aware  of  a  growing  gas  and coal glut in Western Australia.  Gas  demand  for 
1984  had  been  well  below  the  figures  set out in 1977  and there was  no 
significant  export market for Collie  coal  to  ease  the pressure  on domestic 
demand.  In view of this situation and the fact that only  a  limited amount 
of  coal  was  allocated for power  generation,  the  SECWA  attempted to  reduce 
the  take  or  pay quota agreed with Griffin in 1979.  This  led to  a  period 
of  litigation with the Griffin Coal  Co.  filing for breach of contract.  An 
out  of court resolution was  reached in March  1985  whereby Griffin received 
compensation  for  reducing  the  SECWA  take  or pay  commitment  from  3  MTPA  to 
2.2  MTPA  (Western Mail,  August  31  1985)  (see  8.1 for update). 
The  SECWA  currently contracts  a  total of 2.9  MTPA  from  WA's  two 
major  coal  producers.  However,  this  figure still exceeds  current and 
anticipated  market  demand  forcing  the  State  government  to  sanction the 
stockpiling  up  to  3  million tonnes  of Collie coal by 1988.  The  cost of 
the  gas  for  coal trade off as  a  power  station fuel has been estimated to 
cost  the  State  government  $5  million  (1985  dollars)  after 5  years  of 
stockpiling.  The  decision was  justified on  the  grounds  that jobs would be 
preserved  in the  town of Collie and the  extended use of NWS  gas  as  a  power 
station  fuel  would  save  $40  (1985  dollars)  in inventory costs  over  the 
life of the  contract  (Western Mail,  August  31  1985). 7.3. 
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The  Anatomy of the  SECWA  Debt  Problem 
The  revised agreements 
In  March  1985  an  agreement  established between the JVPs,  the 
SECWA  and  Alcoa  laid out a  set of revised terms  and conditions which  the 
WA  government  claimed  would  considerably reduce  the debt which had been 
accrued  by  the  energy  commission,  under  the original 1980  take or pay 
arrangements  (Parker,  1985).  This  seems  to  be  the  case  when  the 
minister's  statement  is  examined,  with  SECWA  appearing  as  the  main 
beneficiary  from  the  new  arrangements.  However,  further consideration 
needs  to  be  given  to  the  concessions  which  the  State  and  Federal 
government  had to make  in order to  reach agreement with the JVPs  and Alcoa 
on  gas  pricing and supplies. 
According  to  the Parker  document  the  new  deal  in purely capital 
terms  required the State and Federal governments  to  forego  a  total of $315 
million  in royalties  over the  20  year life of the new contract.  The  State 
government  made  royalty  concessions worth  $145  million in dollars of the 
day  (1985)  which  would  amount  to  an estimated $638  million at the end of 
the  contract  in  2005.  In addition to the State contributed $100 million 
(1985  dollar terms)  equivalent to an estimated $460 million in 2005  from  a 
3%  levy  on  gas  operations.  The  Commonwealth  government contributed the 
balance  of $70 million  (1985  dollar terms)  estimated to total $302  million 
in  2005  (Parker,  August  1985).*[3]  These  concessions  formed  a  large 
proportion  of  the  overall  cost  to  the  State  and Federal authorities 
stabilising the financial  future of the  SECWA. 
Throughout  the  negotiations  of  January-March  1985,  the  WA 
government  had  sought  swift action to resolve  the  SECWA  debt problem and 
other  areas  of  dispute  with  the  JVPs.  An  important concern was  to 245 
safeguard  investment  in the  LNG  phase of the  NWS  project.  The  WA  (Burke) 
government's  action  was  also  an  attempt  to  preserve future  levels of 
foreign  investment  in  the  State  which  may  have  been  threatened  by 
uncertainty over the long term financial stability of the  SECWA. 
7.3.2.  Alcoa's  involvement  in the  1985  negotiations 
In  view  of Alcoa's position as  the major third party client for 
NWS  gas,  the  company was  represented in the negotiations which led to the 
revision  of  the  domestic  gas  sales contracts in March  1985.  Throughout 
the  negotiations,  which  commenced at the end of 1984,  the Alcoa management 
were  in  a  strong bargaining position for  two  major  reasons.  Firstly,  the 
company  was  the  principal customer for  SECWA  gas  sales to  the  South West 
of  the  State,  accounting for  over half the total West Australian markets 
for  natural  gas  in  1984  (Parker,  August 1985).  Secondly.  the  launch of 
the  domestic  phase  of  the  NWS  project had hinged on  the assumption that 
Alcoa  would  be using over 140  MMCFD  of NWS  gas by 1985  (see Table  3).  As 
a  result  of  these crucial factors  any decision on Alcoa's part to reduce 
gas  use  in their three major  alumina refineries in the  State could further 
increase  the  SECWA's  debt  problems.  They  also  had  the  additional 
advantage  of not having signed any final purchase agreement  for additoinal 
gas with the  SECWA  prior to March  1985. 
The  strong  bargaining  hand  which  Alcoa  held  in  early 1985 
suggests  that  they  may  have  been  able  to gain considerable financial 
concessions  from  the  State  government under  the  terms  of the  1985  sales 
and  purchase  agreements.  This  point  is  not  discussed  in  Parker's 
statement  which  concentrates  on  revised  terms  which were presented as 
concessions  made  by Alcoa  to  the  SECWA.  These were  (i)  the  establishment 246 
of  a  price  moratorium for the first five years of gas  sales until July 1 
1990;  (ii)  an  adjustment  of  coal  competitive  gas  prices;  (iii) the 
introduction of a  fixed oil coal competitive gas  price ratio. 
Comment 
It  is  not  possible  to  make  any  accurate  assessment of the 
financial  benefit  derived  by  the  SECWA  in the absence of key points of 
information  covered  by  the  confidentiality  clauses of the domestic  gas 
contracts.  The  relevant  areas  on  which  information  is not publicly 
available  are  (i)  the  exact  details of the  gas pricing formula  and the 
final  charge  rates  to  the  SECWA  and third party customers;  (ii)  general 
details  on  the final agreement  signed between Alcoa  and  the  SECWA. 
When  asked  to  comment  on  the  position  of Alcoa in the  1985 
negotiations  a  number  of  Stage II interview respondents  suggested that: 
(i)  the  aluminum  giant  would  push the  SECWA  to  improve  the  gas  pricing 
deal  which  they  had  been offered prior to that time  (ii) Alcoa may  have 
gained  price  concessions  from  the  SECWA  on their bulk gas  purchases  for 
use  in  their  three  South  Western  refineries  as  a  result of the  1985 
revision  of  the original domestic  sales contract.  However,  no  conclusive 
evidence  to  this  effect  has  been  made  publicly available to date  (Oct 
88).**[4]  What  has  been  documented  is  that  Alcoa  did gain a  major 
financial  concession  from  the  SECWA  in 1986  when  the pricing formula  for 
oil  competitive gas  was  changed from  a  system using a  $28  benchmark to  one 
which  more  closely reflects changes  in international oil prices.  Although 
the  change  was  not  introduced  solely for Alcoa's benefit,  the  company, 
which  reported an  86%  drop  in profit against half yearly earnings  in 1985, 
had  continued  to  negotiate  with  the  SECWA  after  March  1985  (The 
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It  is  possible  that  during  ongoing  negotiations  Alcoa 
pressurised  the  SECWA  into  making  a  major financial  concession to  them 
which  had not been agreed in March  1985.  The  drop  in aluminum prices over 
the  period  between March  1985  and the  end of that year,  combined with the 
slump  in  oil prices,  would have  added considerable weight to Alcoa's  case 
for  the  removal  of a  $28  benchmark for  indexation of gas prices.  As  the 
end  user  of over  95%  of oil indexed gas  sold to  the  South Western market, 
Alcoa  stood  to  gain  substantially  under  the  new pricing arrangement. 
Estimates  of  total  savings  for  the  company  from  the  introduction of the 
revised  pricing formula were  set at approximately  $71 million per annum  in 
August  1986  (Western Mail,  30/31 August 1986).  (Since  1986  there has been 
a  considerable upturn in the price and worldwide  demand  for  aluminium with 
important  flow  on effects for  the  WA  bauxite/alumina processing industries 
(see Appendix  IV). 
In  his  statement,  Parker  (1985)  makes  little mention of the 
financial  trade  bff  which  took  place  with the JVPs  and Alcoa prior to 
agreement  being  reached  on  revised  terms  for  the  domestic  gas  sales 
contracts.  The  exact  cost  cannot  be  measured  due  to limitations on 
publicly  available  information.  However,  to  assume  that the debit to  the 
State  stopped  at  $245  million in royalties and tax foregone,  would be  to 
underestimate  the  negotiating  power  of  two  powerful  multinational 
concerns. 
7.3.3.  Stated benefits  to  WA  from  the revised agreement 
The  Parker  document  itemises several major benefits which will 
accrue  to  the  WA  economy under  the  revised contractual arrangements  for 
NWS  domestic  gas  sales.  The  changes  and associated benefits are stated 
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(i)  a  reduction  in  the  coal  competitive  gas price applied by the 
JVPs. 
Stated  Benefit  Increased  marketability  of  the  gas  and the 
reduced  (relative  to  1980  agreement)  cost of Southern gas  sold 
to  the  SECWA  by the JVPs. 
(ii)  "Incremental  Gas",  introduced as  a  new  category of Southern gas 
to  reduce  the cost of greenfield projects in WA. 
(iii) 
Stated  Benefit  - Up  to  37  MMCFD  of gas will be available to new 
industries  which  would  not  have  been purchased under  the old 
pricing arrangements. 
The  threshold  for  minimum  drawdown  from  the gas  inventory for 
the  sixth to  the  twentieth year of the contract was  reduced from 
100%  to  95%. 
Stated  Benefit  Reduces  the  cost of the  gas  inventory which 
contributes  a  large  proportion of the  SECWA  debt over  the life 
of the contract. 
All  of  the  above  should  produce  some  direct benefits for  the 
SECWA  and  the  state  of Western Australia.  However,  the major  questions 
which  remain  unanswered  in Parker's  statement are  (i)  can these benefits 
be  quantified  in  terms  of economic  rates of return;  (ii) if this is the 
case,  do  they  offset  the costs of the concessions made  by the State and 
Federal  government  to  the  JVPs?  There  is little data available  from 
government  or  independent  sources  which  can  be  used  to answer  these 
questions.  However,  it is possible that the  issue of the capital cost to 
the  Federal  and State governments of establishing the deal with the JVPs, 
was  overridden by the political necessity of ensuring that Phase II of the 
project went  ahead. 7.3.4. 
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The  potential  impact of new  industrial development  on  the  SECWA 
debt profile 
The  future  commercial viability of the  domestic  phase  gas  contracts 
for  both  the  SECWA  and the JVPs  is predicated on the  introduction of new 
industrial  developments  in  WA  to  soak  up  the  gas  surplus.  Figures 
7.1-7.5,  which  are  drawn  from  the  Energy Minister's published statement, 
illustrate  how  the  WA  government  viewed  the  impact of new  industrial 
developments  on the gas  surplus  in the State  (March  85). 
Starting  from  the basic assumption of no  new  developments  under  the 
revised  contract  arrangements  (Figure  6.1),  the estimated SECWA  debt at 
the  end  of  the contract is placed at $2  billion.  Figure  7.2  illustrates 
the  difference  that would result from  the  introduction of an Ammonia/Urea 
plant.  This  type of development was  designated in the  1974 Pilbara plan 
as  a  commercially viable operation using significant quantities of NWS  gas 
as  a  basic feedstock.  The  economic  advantages  of the plant were based on 
the  fact that it would use  resources readily available in WA,  and would be 
less  reliant  on  international  markets  than other proposed developments 
such as  an aluminum smelter  (Spooner  1974). 
Assuming  that  an  Ammonia/Urea  development  on a  sizeable scale was 
established  in  WA  over  two  to  three  years  (1985-1988),  the  State 
government  estimated  that the  SECWA  debt could be  reduced to  $500 million 
by  2005  (see Figure 7.2).  Figure 7.3 illustrates the potential impact of 
establishing  both  a  medium  sized LPG  plant  (100-150  thousand tonnes per 
annum)  and  a  large  Ammonia/Urea  (1,500  tonnes  ammonia 1,300 urea on  the 
SECWA  debt  which  is  estimated  to  be  zero by  2005.  The  biggest single 
impact  on  the  debt  profile  would  arise  if  an  aluminum  smelter was FIGURE  7.1 
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established  and in operation by the early 1990s.  In this instance  (Figure 
7.4)  it  is  indicated  that  in a  single development  scenario the  smelter 
would  reduce  the  SECWA  debt in 2005  from  the base  figure of $2 billion to 
$250 million (Parker,  1985)  (see 8.1). 
Figure  7.5  illustrates  the  potential  combined  impact  of  a 
smelter,  LPG  plant  and  Ammonia/Urea  plant  on the debt profile.  These 
three  developments  are  assumed  to wipe  out the unsold gas  component of the 
SECWA  debt  by  2002  leaving  only  capital  repayments  on  the  Dampier  to 
Wagerup  pipeline  which  end  in 2005  (Parker,  1985).  At present  (Oct  88) 
only  the  LPG  development is underway.  An  agreement was  finalised between 
Wesfarmers-Kleenheat  Gas  Pty  Ltd and  the  WA  State government in December 
1986  and  construction  work  is now  well underway at Kwinana  in the South 
West  of  the State.  Following start up  scheduled for  the end of 1988,  the 
medium  sized plant will produce  150,000  tonnes  of LPG  and 25,000  tonnes  of 
condensate  per  annum.  It was  reported at the  time  when  the WesfarmersjWA 
government  deal was  announced that the plant will draw off 25  MMCFD  of NWS 
gas  when  full  production  is  reached  in late 1988  (Wesfarmers  News  17, 
December  1986).  (This project is now  operational,  Oct 88.) 
The  status  of  the  Ammonia/Urea  development  proposed for  the 
south-west  of  WA  is  as  yet unclear.  In October  1986  the  WA  government 
issued  a  report  describing  proposed  new  developments  in  the  State 
(Prospect  WA  3/86).  An  ammonia/urea  plant  backed  by  C.S.B.P.  (a 
Wesfarmers  subsidiary)  and  Norsk  Hydro  of  Norway,  designed to produce 
1,300  tonnes  of urea per annum was  reported to be  in the final feasibility 
stages.  However,  to  date  (Oct  88)  despite E.P.A.  clearance the project 
has not been given the final  go  ahead  (see 8.1). 254 
On  reaching  the  proposed  production  levels  in  the  early 
nineties,  it  is reported that the project could become  the  second largest 
consumer  of  NWS  gas  behind  Alcoa.  Total  drawdown for  the plant was 
estimated  at  50  MMCFD  or  just  under  one-seventh  of the total volume 
contracted by  SECWA  (Wesfarmers  News  14th January 1987). 
Another  major  development which could have  a  significant impact 
on  the  NWS  gas  surplus  is  the  proposed  petrochemical  complex to be 
developed  at  Kwinana  by Petrochemical Industries Ltd,  a  company  in which 
the  WA  government  recently purchased a  43.5%  stake  (West Australian 10th 
October  1988).  The projects E.R.M.P.,  Environmental  Review and Management 
Programme,  was  released  early in the year  although no  fixed decision has 
been  made  by the  investors.  This  is in part due  to  the current political 
controversy  surrounding  the  financing of the deal and  the WA  government's 
endorsement of the  scheme  (see 8.1). 
At  the  present  time,  the  WA  government  have  announced  no 
definite  plans  for  the  development of an Aluminium  smelter in the  South 
West  of  WA.  However,  the  French  company Aluminium Pechiney is currently 
undertaking  a  feasibility  study  on  behalf  of  a  consortium headed by 
Kemerton  Aluminium.  The  consortium  is  investigating  the  commercial 
feasibility  of  constructing  a  smelter at Kemerton based on  two  aluminium 
potlines  each  with  a  capacity of 185,000  tonnes  a  year  (West Australian 
August 1st 1988). 
Proposals  of  this  type have been raised and shelved on several 
occasions  throughout  the  seventies and as recently as  1985,  the  economic 
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As  early  as  1974  the Pilbara report listed a  proposed aluminium 
smelter  as  a  poor  economic prospect for  that region with little indication 
of  better  prospects  elsewhere  in the State  (Spooner  1974).  Although  the 
world  market for  aluminium has  picked up  since  a  price slump  in 1985  which 
witnessed  plant  closures  in Europe,  the  immediate viability of a  smelter 
development  in  WA  is still open to question  (see The Australian 19/12/86 
and Alcoa Annual Report 1987). 
When  assessing  the  potential  impact  of  these  and other new 
developments  on  the  SECWA  debt profile,  it is necessary to proceed with 
caution.  The  estimates  made  by  the  State  government in 1985  for  the 
impact  of the  LPG  Ammonia  Urea and Smelter projects listed above  contained 
certain  assumptions  about  the  timing and scale of these  developments  i.e. 
assuming  that the  LPG  plant and Ammonia/Urea plant progressed as predicted 
and  reached  the  designated production levels,  the  SECWA  gas  glut wwas  to 
be  cut  by  approximately  75  MMCFD  by  the mid-1990s.  However,  since 1985 
the  position  of  the  WA  energy  ministry has  changed in relation to  the 
publicly acknowledged gas  surplus  and ongoing debt payments. 
The  official  WA  government  line  promoted  in  recent  press 
releases  and  the  document  "Energy  Policy  Options  for WA",  is that the 
State  is  now  approaching  an energy balance situation with both coal and 
gas  inventories  paid  off  and  due  to  be  cleared  by  1994  (The  West 
Australian  12/11/88).  This policy statement is clearly predicated on the 
assumption  that  one  of  the  major  gas  and  user projects proposed for 
development  in  the  SW  of the State will get the  green light in 1989.  At 
present  the  Petrochemical  Industries  Ltd  P.I.C.L.  petrochemical plant 
appears  to  be  poised  to join Alcoa  and Wesfarmers  recently commissioned 256 
(Oct  88)  LPG  plant  as  one of the big three NWS  gas users  in the State. 
The  future of the Wesfarmers/Norsk Hydro  Ammonia/urea plant projects  seems 
less certain in the light of recent press releases  (see 8.1). 7.4. 
7.4.1. 
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Why  Did the Debt  Problem Arise? 
Three key decisions  in context 
The  issue  of  who  or  what  was  responsible  for  the massive 
financial  problems  facing  the  SECWA  in the 1980s has been the subject of 
extensive  parliamentary  debate  and  media  focus.  The  current Energy 
Minister  Mr.  Parker,  pinpoints  the  actions  of Mr.  Mensaros  in November 
1978  and  December  1979,  and  Mr.  Jones  in September  1980,  as  the main 
causes of the problem. 
With  hindsight,  it  is  easy to point to  the decisions  taken by 
the  relevant  ministers  at these  times  and singling these out as  the sole 
causes  of  the  ongoing gas  glut problem in WA.  However,  this does  little 
justice  to  the  complexity  of  the  issue  and ignores  the political and 
economic  context within which  these decisions were  taken. 
In  1978  when Mr.  Mensaros  committed the  SECWA  to  increase their 
gas  take  from  250  MMCFD  to  300  MMCFD,  the WA  government's projections  for 
natural  gas  demand  in  the  state  pointed  to  steady  growth  into  the 
eighties.  Prior to the signing of the  1977  MOU,  the  SECWA  had prepared a 
market  assessment  based  on demand  in the  South West  of the State and  the 
Pilbara.  The  South  Western  market  comprised  five  major  industrial 
customers,  power  stations  and  large  scale  reticulation  systems  as 
principal  end  users.  The  figure  set for this market was  230.3  MMCFD  by 
1985.  Projections for  gas  consumption in the Pilbara in 1985  stood at 70 
MMCFD,  bringing  total  projected  demand  for  NWS  gas  to  300  MMCFD  (see 
Table  3). 
These  figures  had  not  been  altered by November  1979  when  the 
decision  was  taken  by  the  minister  that  the  SECWA  should  assume 
responsibility  for  marketing  an  additional  70  MMCFD,  which  the joint 258 
venturers  had  originally  sought  to  sell  independently  in the Pilbara 
market. 
Despite  indications  of  contraction in the Pilbara's  industrial 
base  the  SECWA  continued to work  from  the  1977  projections laid out in the 
MOU.  The  second  oil  shock  of  early  1979  had sent crude  oil prices 
spiralling  from  approximately US$15bbl  in November  1978  to  a  level between 
US$28-US$32  bbl  throughout  1979  (Mcaslin,  1984).  This  rapid rise in oil 
prices  had  given  a  major  boost  to  alternative  energy programmes  and 
increased  gas  prices,  which  in  WA.  were projected to rise to  60%  of the 
cost  of  imported  oil  (WA  Hansard Assembly,  August  28  1985).  Set against 
this  background of rising prices  and  demand  for natural  gas  on  a  worldwide 
scale  it  is easy  to  see why  the  WA  government at the  time were willing to 
continue  working  on  the  optimistic scenarios being presented to  them by 
the  SECWA  energy  forecasters.  The  fact that this was,  with hindsight,  a 
serious  mistake  on  the part of the  coali.tion government's  Energy M.inistry, 
will  be  raised  when  discussing  Parker's  attack  on  the  actions  of Mr. 
Mensaros  and Mr.  Jones  (see  7.5.2  and 7.5.4). 
By  the  time  Mr.  Jones  came  to  sign  the  domestic  gas  sales 
contracts  in  September  1980  there  were  clear indications  that the  1977 
projections  were  over-optimistic.  Oil  prices  remained high at around 
US$30  bbl  maintaining  the  worldwide  trend  towards  increased  gas 
consumption.  However,  in WA  the  closure of the Hamersley Iron Pelletising 
plant  at  Dampier  and  the  imminent closure of the Cliffs Robe  Pelletising 
plan  at  Cape  Lambert  would  severely  undermine  future  gas  sales  to  the 
Pilbara  market.  The  DRD  estimated that the total loss of potential gas 
sales  to  this  market  incurred  by  these  closures  amounted  to  45  MMCFD 
(Parker,  August  1985).  In his  statement  (Parker  1985)  claims  that both 259 
Mr.  Mensaros  and  Mr.  Jones  were  aware  of the  likely effect of a  major 
industrial  closure  in  the  Pilbara  when their respective decisions were 
taken,  and uses  this as  the basis  for his attack on the  two  ministers. 
7.4.2.  Parker's attack on Jones  and Mensaros 
In  the  published document  outlining the State Energy Minister's 
statement  of  August  25,  1985,  he  sets  out his major  criticisms of the 
actions  of his Liberal predecessors  in relation to  the  SECWA  gas  glut. 
The  decision  of  November  1978  to  commit  the  SECWA  to  an 
additional  50  MMCFD  is viewed by Parker as  erroneous but understandable  in 
the  light  of  the  optimistic  gas  demand projections which were  used to 
guide  State  energy  policy  at the  time.  His  only major criticism of Mr. 
Mensaros's  1978  decision is that it was  taken in the knowledge  that Alcoa 
had  not  exercised  an  option to  take  an extra 40  MMCFD  of NWS  gas  within 
the  one-year  time  frame  set out in the  1977  MOU. 
Mr.  Mel1saros's  actions  of  November  1979  are criticised on  the 
basis  that  the  decision  was  taken  in  full knowledge  of the Hamersley 
closure  and  the  fact  that the  JVPs  had been unable  to  obtain the prices 
they  had  sought  for  gas  in  the  Pilbara  market.  The  main  target of 
Parker's  attack  was  the  action  taken by Mr.  Jones  in September  1980  to 
convert  the 
commitment. 
decisions  of  his  predecessor  into  a  firm  contractual 
The  contracts  were  signed  by  the State  government  in the 
knowledge  that the  Cape  Lambert pelletising plant was  to  close only  a  year 
after  the  announcement  of the  closure of the Hamersley Pelletising plant 
at  Dampier.  Parker  claimed that by  September  1980  existing market  demand 
indicators  for  natural  gas  in WA  had  shown  that previous projections  for 
the  1980s  were  over-optimistic.  .However,  despite  the loss  of over half 260 
the  original Pilbara gas  market  and other contra-indications for projected 
gas  sales  to  the  South West,  the  WA  government ratified the  1978  and  1979 
measures  by  signing a  contract with  the  JVPs.  The  main motive  for  such an 
action  according  to  Parker,  was  political points  scoring for  the  imminent 
Federal  election.  It  is  certainly  true  that  at the  time  the  Fraser 
Liberal/NCP  coalition  had strong reasons  to  ensure  the project which  they 
had  backed  with  major  fiscal  incentives  would not run into difficulty 
prior  to  the election.  It is therefore possible that by August  1980,  Mr. 
Jones  was  under  pressure  from  the Liberals  in Canberra to put in place 
contractual  arrangements  which would signal  the  launch of the  domestic  gas 
phase  of  the  NWS  project.  The  timing of such  an action could be  crucial 
to  the  outcome  of a  Federal election for  a  government  seeking  investment 
led recovery  and  the promotion of a  resources  boom. 
7.4.3.  Mensaros'  defence  in parliament 
In  the  parliamentary  debate  which  followed  the  issue of Mr. 
Parker's  statement  of  August  23,  1985,  both Mr.  Mensaros  and Mr.  Jones 
sought  to  defend their actions relating to  the  SECWA  gas  issue.  The  basis 
for  Mr.  Mensaros's  defence  of the  1978  decision was  as  follows. 
(i)  Working  from  the  1977/78  SECWA  market  forecast for  gas  sales  to 
the  WA  market  in 1985  (see  Table  3),  Mr.  Mensaros  claimed that 
in 1978  an additional  50  MMCFD  was  considered necessary to: 
(a)  allow  for  a  planned  expansion  in the State's  industrial 
base; 
(b)  keep  delivery costs  to  the metropolitan area low. 261 
(ii)  At  the  time  when  the additional commitment was  made  (November 
1978)  it  was  assumed  that  Alcoa  were  to exercise an option 
contained  in  the  1977  MOU  to  increase their gas  take  from  150 
MMCFD  to 190  MMCFD. 
(iii)  The  measure  was  in part a  reflection of the State government's 
concern  that the Federal government withhold export licences  for 
the  LNG  phase if the uptake  of gas  for  the  domestic market fell 
below a  certain threshold  (WA  Hansard Assembly,  August  28  1985). 
Turning  to  the  1979  decision  to  commit  the  SECWA  to  an 
additional  70  MMCFD,  which  had been originally targeted by the JVPs  for 
sales  to  the  Pilbara  market,  Mr.  Mensaros  pointed to  a  number  of broad 
economic  indicators  which  favoured  expanded  use  of  natural  gas  as  a 
premium  fuel.  In  1979  the  price  of  natural  gas,  according  to  WA 
government  sources  was  projected  to  remain at approximately  60%  of the 
indexed  price  of  imported  oil,  in  the  short  term.  This  price 
differential,  and  the  large  volumes  of  gas  available  from  the  NWS 
reservoirs,  were  viewed as  a  major  incentive  to new  industries  to use  gas 
as  a  fuel or feedstock. 
On  the  more  specific  issue of the Hamersley Pelletising plant 
and  the  effect  of  its  imminent  closure on the Pilbara gas  market,  Mr. 
Mensaros  claims  that a  senior executive  from  the  company advised him that 
the  plant  could  be  reopened pending the establishment of discounted gas 
price with the  SECWA  (WA  Hansard Assembly,  August  28  1985). 
Comment 
In  order to  throw  some  light on the validity of former ministers 
defence  against  the  criticisms  of  his  actions  lodged  by the current 
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The  first point reflects  the developmentalist  ideology which  the 
Court  government  was  promoting in WA  throughout  the seventies.  The  broad 
policy  line  of  the State government  on industrial expansion based on NWS 
gas  and  the  upward  trend  in  the  cost  of  imported oil,  provided Mr. 
Mensaros  with  a  strong incentive to commit  the  SECWA  to an additional gas 
take  in 1978.  However,  the  second point related to the ongoing assumption 
that  Alcoa would increase its uptake  from  the  SECWA  is harder to defend in 
the  light  of Parker's evidence.  The  company  had been set a  one year time 
limit  on the extra 40  MMCFD  option when  the  MOU  was  formulated in November 
1977.  Alcoa  had  made  no  attempt to exercise this option or finalise a 
sales contract with the  SECWA  by November  1978. 
The  final  point  raised  by  Mr.  Mensaros  relative to the  1978 
decision  is  inconsistent  with  historical evidence raised in this study. 
Whilst  the  Federal  government  may  have  previously  used the threat of 
withholding  export  permits  to  ensure  the  inclusion of a  sizeable domestic 
component  in  the  NWS  project by November  1978,  the Fraser government had 
introduced  a  series  of measures  to hasten the  launch of the  NWS  project. 
The  budgetary  concessions  for  the  NWS  and  a  series  of other fiscal 
incentives  were  provided  by the Federal government,  which,  by the end of 
1978,  had  clearly  accepted  the  JVPs'  position  that a  sizeable export 
component  was  essential  to  the  commercial viability of the  NWS  project 
(see 4.2). 
Despite  broad  macroeconomic  indicators pointing to a  worldwide 
growth  in  the use of natural gas,  as  an alternative to oil based fuel  and 
chemical  feedstock,  the  indications  from  the  WA  market at the end of 1979 
were  not so positive.  The  main problem lay in the Pilbara where  prospects 
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Mr.  Mensaros  had raised the  idea that the availability of cheap  gas  could 
lead  to  the  reopening  of  the  Hamersley  Iron  Pelletiser  at Dampier. 
However,  as  far back as July 1977,  Sir Charles  Court had conceded that NWS 
gas  would not be available at low prices  (Harman,  1984:p.2l0).  Throughout 
1978  and  1979,  it  had  become  evident  that the JVPs  were  not going to 
supply  low  cost  gas  to  the  SECWA  on  the  basis  of an argument  that 
operating  costs  for  the distribution network would be  low,  offsetting the 
high cost of extraction at the wellhead  (Harman,  1984:p.2l0). 
In  November  1979  Mr.  Mensaros  was  aware  that NWS  gas  prices were 
not  low  enough  to  support Court's original ideas for  the  development of 
the  Pilbara.  No  new  large  scale  industry had been introduced to  the 
region since the  early seventies and the Pilbara concept was  shelved. 
In  view  of  the  above  it  is unlikely that Mr.  Mensaros  could 
support  his  argument  relating  to  the  Hamersley  closure  in practical 
terms.  The  confidentiality  clauses  relating to  the pricing of NWS  gas 
preclude  any  objective  assessment of Mr.  Mensaros's  claim.  However,  the 
current  financial  problems  facing  the  SECWA  relating to  the sales and 
purchase  agreement for  NWS  gas  suggest that this body is in no position to 
supply  low  cost  gas  to  third  party consumers.  At present the  SECWA's 
charge  rate  for  NW  gas  is dictated by a  formula set out in the  terms  of 
the  1985  revised  sales  contracts.  However,  given  a  shift in the WA 
economy  and  political climate the possibility of future  renegotiations of 
the  1985  agreement  (price  schedules  and  gas  volumes)  could  not  be 
precluded. **[5] 264 
7.4.4.  Jones'  defence  in parliament 
In  his  response  to  Mr.  Parker's  statement  on  the  SECWA 
contracts,  Jones  chose  to  directly  challenge  only  one  of  the major 
criticisms  lodged against him.  He  refuted the  idea that he  ignored advice 
contained  in the  SECWA  brief of September 1981,  pointing to the need for  a 
delay  in  the  project  until  the  SECWA's  financial security was  assured. 
Jones  claimed  that  in  a  series  of letters written to  the State Energy 
Commissioner,  Mr.  Kirkwood,  he had outlined the necessity of approaching 
the  JVPs  to challenge the original terms  of the sales agreements.  He  also 
stated  that the letters advised that no borrowing should be authorised for 
construction  of the Dampier-Wagerup pipeline until it was  established that 
the  project  was  financially viable.  Finally,  Mr.  Jones  stressed that the 
JVPs  had  been advised of his position in April  1982  and that he  continued 
to  advocate  delaying  the  project  until the  issue of the first pipeline 
construction  contract  to  Saipem  Pty.  three  months  later  (WA  Hansard 
Assembly Aug  1985). 
Rather  than  countering  Mr.  Parker's  criticisms  relating  to 
electioneering  for  the  Federal government  and the State of the  WA  market 
for  natural  gas  in September 1980,  Mr.  Jones  chose  to avoid discussion of 
the  signing  of  the  SECWA  contracts and the rationale which underlay this 
action.  His  position  on  the revision of the contracts and the need to 
delay  the  domestic phase of the  NWS  project is difficult to determine with 
clarity.  However,  his  failure  to  directly justify the decision which 
committed  the  SECWA  to  what  proved  to be  an untenable contract,  lends 
weight  to Mr.  Parker's  indictment of the  former minister's actions. 
In  keeping  with  Mr.  Mensaros's  argument Mr.  Jones  could claim 
that  he  was  acting  on  the basis of the  SECWA's  sales forecasts  for  the 265 
eighties.  This  argument has  some justification in the  economic  context of 
1978  and  1979  when it was  assumed domestic  demand  and pricing of natural 
gas  would  reflect  worldwide  trends.  However,  by September  1980 with the 
impending  loss  of  more  than  half  of  the  projected  gas  sales to the 
Pilbara,  the  sales  projections  of  1976/77  must  have  appeared  to be 
extremely optimistic. 
Brotherton  (1982).  claims  that the  forecasts  issued by the  SECWA 
had  been  unrealistic even in the context of the mid seventies.  He  states 
that  due  to  weaknesses  in  the  SECWA's  forecasting techniques  and  the 
values  implicit in their methodology,  the  figures  which  they issued for  WA 
gas  demand  between  1977  and  1982 were distorted.  A major  institutional 
problem  is  assumed  by  Brotherton to lie in the fact that until 1987  the 
SECWA,  through  the  Energy Advisory Committee  (EAC).  was  the  government's 
sole  official  advisor  on energy demand  forecasting.  This he  claims,  has 
resulted  in  a  series  of  optimistic  demand  forecasts  from  the  late 
seventies,  which  were  in  part  a  reflection  of  the  developmentalist 
aspirations of the Court  government. 
7.4.5.  Concluding comments  on  the  SECWA  contracts debate 
The  debate  over the  renegotiation of the  SECWA  contracts serves 
to  illustrate  the  political complexities which can arise when  government 
and  multinationals  engage  in negotiations  over  the development of a  large 
scale  resource project.  With hindsight it is easy to be judgemental about 
the  actions  of  politicians  charged with responsibility for  the national 
interest.  Thus,  decisions  which now  appear  to have been misguided,  are 
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Policy  decisions  reflect  a  wide  range  of  pressures  on the 
decision  maker  emanating  from  a  number  of sources.  The  decisions made  by 
Mr.  Mensaros  in  1978  and 1979,  Mr.  Jones  in 1980,  would reflect pressure 
from  within  their  own  party,  the opposition and external bodies  such as 
the  SECWA  and the joint venture organisation. 
The  three  key  points to be  considered when  placing the actions 
of  Mr.  Jones  and Mr.  Mensaros within their historical context are  (i)  the 
Court  government's  zeal  for  the  introduction  of  new  industrial 
infrastructure  and development  of WA's  resource base;  (ii)  the negotiating 
power  of  the joint venturers;  (iii)  the absence  of any coherent action on 
the  part  of  SECWA  officials and MPs  who  supported the  recommendations  of 
the  SECWA  ministerial brief of September 1981. 
Point  (i):  The  developmentalist  ethos  adopted by the Court government 
since  its  election  in 1974 had ensured broad support for  the  NWS  project 
from  the  initial  planning  stages  in the mid-seventies.  The  enthusiasm 
which  the  WA  Premier held for  the project led him to lend support to  the 
joint  venturers  on  a  number  of occasions when  they lobbied the Federal 
government  for  key  concessions  for both the  domestic  and LNG  phases  (see 
4.3).  As  early  as  1977  Court  had acceded to pressure  from  the joint 
venturers  who  had  insisted  that  the project could only be  commercially 
viable if a  significant export component was  included  (Harman,  1984). 
In  view  of  Court's  position on new  industrial development  and 
the  strong  support  he  enjoyed  from  within  his  own  party in the late 
seventies,  it is likely that many  decisions made  regarding the  NWS  project 
were  carried  by  a  strong political momentum  which was  established during 
this  period.  The  decisions  of Mr.  Mensaros  and Mr.  Jones must  in part 
reflect  the  strong  desire  within  the coalition State government  of the 
time  to exploit the massive  resource wealth of the  NWS. 267 
Point  (ii)  The  WA  government's  policies  relating to the  NWS  project 
have  often  been  the  product  of a  bargaining process  in which  the joint 
venturers  held  the  upper  hand.  A  clear  example  of  the  superior 
negotiating  strength  of  the joint venturers  following  the signing of the 
1979  Development  Agreement  Act  occurred  in the six months  prior to the 
issue of the  Dampier-Wagerup pipeline contract in June  1982. 
Following  the  issue of the  SECWA  ministerial brief in September 
1981,  a  number  of  SECWA  officials  and  coalition  MPs  had raised the 
possibility  of delaying the  issue of the pipeline contract until the  SECWA 
financial  position  could be  reassessed.  Prior to the signing of the  1979 
NWS  development  agreement,  the JVPs  had ensured that the  SECWA  had assumed 
responsibility  for  financing  the  $946  million project  (1983  dollars  DRD, 
October  1983). 
By  the  beginning of 1982  the JVPs  were  anxious  to eliminate the 
risk  of protracted delays  in construction work  for  the  domestic phase at a 
time  when  questions were being raised about its commercial viability.  Any 
open  political  debate  over  the  SECWA's  financial stability could have 
resulted  in  a  postponement or major  setback for work on the  domestic  gas 
phase.  Shell and BRP,  the experienced negotiators  for  the JVPs,  were well 
aware  of  this when  they acted to safeguard the  interests of the venturers 
by  convening meetings with the  SECWA  and senior State government ministers 
behind closed doors. 
By  June  1982,  the JVPs  had persuaded the  Energy Minister Jones 
to  issue  the  initial  pipeline construction contract to  Saipem Pty.  with 
the  subsequent  amendment  in  September  which  gave  the  Saipem-ICC joint 
venture  responsibility  for constructing the entire trunk1ine  from  Dampier 
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Point (iii)  Despite  his  claims  that  he had fundamentally  opposed the 
issue  of  the  SECWA  pipeline contract in June  1982.  Jones bears ultimate 
responsibility  for  allowing  the  Commissioner  Kirkwood,  to  ratify the 
action.  During  the  NWS  parliamentary debate of August  1985  Mr.  Kirkwood 
was  accused  of steamrolling the deal by entering into secret negotiations 
with  the  JVPs  without  direct  referral  to the minister or senior  SECWA 
officials. 
In  conclusion  it  can  be stated that no  clear evidence  emerges 
from  the  NWS  debate  to  contradict  the  position  that,  if  Mr.  Jones 
suspected  a  political conspiracy against those who  wished to  see  the  SECWA 
contracts  revised  in 1982,  he did little to  expose it.  No  further action 
in  this  direction  was  taken  until  the end of 1984  when  the ruling ALP 
government  acting  on  the advice of the  Gas  Strategy Committee  approached 
the  JVPs  to negotiate an amendment  to the  1980  sales agreements. 269 
ENDNOTES 
[1]  According  to  press  reports  the  Commonwealth  Grants  Commission 
may  assess  the  $315  m in forfeited State and Federal royalties 
as  part  of  WA's  concession for 1988/89.  This  in itself could 
force  a  further renegotiation of the  SECWA  contracts established 
in March  1985  (West Australian April  6  1988) 
**[2]  Sourced  from  discussion  with  Alcoa  contracts  department, 
Booragoon WA,  9/2/89. 
[3]  Figures based on an 11%  discount rate. 
[4]  [5]  Selected  material  from  Stage  II interviews  conducted March  to 
Oct  88. 270 
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CHAPTER  EIGHT 
THE  STRATEGIC  OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  NWS  PROJECT 
NWS  Outlook:  The  Domestic  Gas  Market  1988-1995 
The  WA  Energy  Economy  1985-1988 
In  Chapter  7  an  attempt  was  made  to  place  the  1985 
renegotiations  of the  SECWA,  North West  Shelf natural  gas  contracts  into  a 
broad  political  and  historical  perspective.  The  parliamentary debate 
which  continued  for  several  months  after the  new  deal was  finalised in 
March  1985  and  the  WA  government's  proposals  to  deal with the  ongoing  gas 
surplus  were  examined in some  detail. 
The  major  source  employed  in  Chapter  7  was  a  policy document 
released  in  August  1985  by the  ViA  energy minister,  David Parker,  entitled 
'The  Impli~  1.tions  of the  North West  Shelf Gas  Sales  Agreement '.  The  P::'r-~::: 
considered  the  effects  of the  SECWA  gas  glut by  examining  the  actions  of 
previous  ministers  and senior energy officials  from  the perspective of  the 
Burke  government.  It also set out  a  series  of policy directives  aimed at 
reducing  the  gas  inventories  and associated debts  accumulated by  the  SECWA 
since  1980.  Part of this strategy was  to maximise  the use  of NWS  gas  in 
industry  and  power  generation,  extend  the  reticulation  network  and 
aggressively market natural  gas  as  a  clean burning fuel  for  domestic  use. 
In  the  period  between  August  1985  and October  1988  there has 
been  a  considerable  increase in demand  for  NWS  gas,  partially as  a  result 
of  policies  put  in  place  by  the  Parker  energy ministry in 1985.  WA 
government  initiatives  to  increase  gas  usage  implemented  since  1985 
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(a)  Continued  stockpiling  of coal and increased use  of NWS  gas  as  a 
fuel  for power  stations. 
(b)  An  extension  of  the  SECWA  gas  pipeline network facilitating 
increased  domestic  and  light  industrial  use  in  the  Perth 
metropolitan area and larger country centres. 
(c)  The  introduction  of  new  industrial  developments  in the  South 
West.  To  date the most notable new  gas user is the Wesfarmers 
LPG  extraction  plant which uses  up  to  25  terajou1es  (TJ)  of NWS 
gas  per  day,  and  ranks  as  the State's second largest gas  user 
behind Alcoa  (DRD  Aug.  1988:  Major Potential Projects pre-2005). 
Since  the Parker policy document was  issued in August  1985  there 
has  been a  considerable shift in the  WA  government's position on the  SECWA 
gas  glut.  In  a  recent  statement  issued by energy minister Parker he 
emphasised  that  "The  SECWA  is now  in a  state of energy balance.  It has 
stopped  stockpiling  coal  and  is looking for additional energy supplies, 
especially from  the Perth basin."  (West Australian 30/12/88). 
The  State  energy  minister's confident assertion has  some basis 
in  the  light of the  increased uptake of gas  since 1985  from both domestic 
and  industrial  users.  In September  1988 it was  reported that consumption 
of  NWS  gas  had  risen  from  275  to  375  (TJ)  per day  over the preceding 
year.  This  increase  undoubtedly made  a  major  impact on the  gas  surplus 
bringing  total  daily consumption of NWS  gas within 40  TJ  of the total 414 
(TJ)  per  day  contracted  by  the  SECWA  (West Australian 5/9/88).  (DRD, 
Prospect WA  4/87). 
However,  closing the final  gap  on the  inventory and achieving an 
energy  balance  in  WA  is clearly predicated on  two  main assumptions.  (i) 
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will  be  given  the  go  ahead  in  1989,  (ii) A  successful formula  can be 
implemented  to  reduce  coal  stockpiles  and  the  gas  inventory  to 
economically desirable levels. 
The  first  issue  merits  some  separate  discussion  in view of 
recent  changes  in  the  arena of industrial development  in WA  and will be 
discussed  in  8.1.3.  The  second  concern  can  be  highlighted through 
reference  to  recent  policy statements  issued by Mr.  Parker which clearly 
aim  to  change  public  and  industry  perceptions  of  the State's energy 
surplus.  In  a  recent  statement Mr.  Parker claimed that the  government 
expected  to  clear  its coal and gas  inventories,  which have  now  been paid 
for,  by  1994,  two  years earlier than the  1987  forecast.  The  government 
planned  to  achieve  this  goal by reconverting gas  fuelled power stations 
back  to coal,  which over  the five years  from  1989  to  1994 would reduce  the 
2.7  million  tonne  stockpile  at Collie back to  a  buffer level of 600,000 
tonnes.  It  was  reported  that  this  policy  was  being  implemented as 
industrial  demand for  NWS  gas  pushed the  SECWA  close to its daily purchase 
commitment  set  out  in  the  revised  (1985)  contracts  (West Australian 
12/11/88). 
A  month  after  the  November  policy  statement  the  government 
reinforced  industry  confidence  in  the  new  gas  supply  equilibrium by 
announcing  that  it was  deregulating the State's energy market by allowing 
independent  explorers  to  sell  commercial  gas  finds  to  the  SECWA  or 
directly  to private sector concerns.  Whilst this measure  appeared to be  a 
clear  endorsement  of  the  idea that the State's expanding industrial base 
would  require  additional  gas  suppliers  into the  1990s,  it may  have been 
primarily  introduced  as  a  bargaining  instrument  for  the  SECWA.  This 
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context  of  negotiations  with  the  NWS  joint  venturers  over the years 
(see 8.1.2). 
8.1.2.  Domestic Market Deregulation and  the  NWS  Gas  Price 
Since  September  1980 when  the original contracts were  finalised 
between  the  JVP  and  the  SECWA  the  price  of the  gas has been a  major 
political  issue.  The  shroud  of  secrecy  surrounding  the  price  of 
industrial  gas  supplied  by  the  SECWA  has been subject to considerable 
criticism  by  academics,  parliamentarians  and other commentators  over  the 
years  (see  Brotherton  1982,  Harman,  1984)  (Australian financial Review 
Editorials  Sept/Nov 1980). 
WA  Domestic  gas  tariffs  continue  to be  amongst  the highest in 
Australia  and  unofficial  sources  suggested  that  the  price  paid  by 
industrial  users  has  always  been considered too high.  As  early as  1983 
Alcoa  had  indicated  that they were not entirely satisfied with the price 
they  were  paying  for  NWS  gas  in  view  of the scale of the  contracted 
drawdown  over  a  20  year  contractual  period  (approximately  150 
MMCFD).**l  The  1985  renegotiations  centred on the fact that the  SECWA 
could  not  on-sell  the  original contracted quantity of 370  MMCFD  but the 
price  would  also be  an important issue.  This  is clear in the concessions 
made  relative to  the original take or pay conditions  (see 7.3). 
Part  of  the  1985  agreement  was  that  a  five year moratorium 
should  be  placed  on  price  adjustments  for  NWS  gas.  The  fact that this 
moratorium  expires  in  March  1990  holds  particular relevance to the  WA 
government's  energy  market deregulation policy.  Over  the past four years 
the  gas  price  levels  set  by  the  JVP  may have  served to handicap  the 
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fixed  price  of the  gas  would have  become  more  of a  problem as  oil  indexed 
prices  for  gas  sold  in  other  markets  slumped in 1986 with only  a  slow 
recovery over  the  subsequent  two  years. 
On  one  level the  deregulation of the  HA  gas  market would appear 
to  have  provided  the  SECWA  with  a  strong  negotiating  hand  for  the 
contractual  changes  which  would  seem  to be  inevitable in 1990.  They  can 
justly  claim that the WAPET  pipeline which  connects  the  Perth basin to  the 
metropolitan  area  could  be  extended  to  tap  into  onshore  commercial 
gas fields  in  the  region.  This  could supply a  relatively cheap  source  of 
gas  to  the  domestic  and  light  industrial  consumers  in  Perth  and 
surrounding  suburbs.  However,  the  NWS  JVP  are  fully  aware  that they can 
offer  long  term security of supply using pre-existing infrastructure.  The 
threat  of losing a  small portion of the  WA  market  is unlikely to  force  any 
major  price  concessions  from  the  traditionally marginal  Domestic  phase  of 
the  project.  The  major  current  concern  of  the.  joint venturers  is  to 
ensure  a  smooth  start-up  for  the  LNG  phase  and  concentrate  on  expanding 
export  markets  for  LNG  and  condensate  into  the  late 1990s.  The  JVP 
strategy  for  the  WA  domestic  market  in  the  1990s  is  likely  to be 
maintenance  of  a  holding position to  ensure  steady financial  returns  from 
Phase  I  whilst concentrating on  the  expansion of Phase  II. 
Whilst  the  NWS  joint venturers  cannot  ignore  the  threat of new 
competitors  coming  onto  the  WA  market  in the mid-1990s,  there are  a  number 
of  signs  that the  WA  government  is fully  committed to  tn~s  gas  as  the major 
energy  source  to  power  new  industrial developments until the  end of the 
century.  Apart  from  existing contractual  commitments  a  clear indicator of 
the  government's  position came  in recent reportage  of plans  to  upgrade  the 
1600  km  Dampier  to  Bunbury pipeline*2.  Whilst  the pipeline is  owned  and 276 
operated  by  the  SECWA  the  NWS  venturers  are  likely to  remain the major 
suppliers  until  the  end  of  the  century  for  contractual and technical 
reasons.  The  pervasive  influence  of  the  joint  venture  participant 
companies  in  the  arena of Federal  and  WA  State politics is another major 
factor  which  will  serve  to consolidate  the  JVP  position in the  event of 
any  serious  challenge  to key sectors  of the  domestic market. 
When  last  reported  (Sept.  88)  plans  for upgrading  the  SECWA 
pipeline  were  at  a  very  early  stage  and  were  based  firmly  on  the 
assumption  that  at  least  one  major  new  gas  end user project will be 
operational  by  the  mid-1990s.  At  the present time  this  looks  possible 
with  the  favoured  development being  the  P.I.C.L.  Petrochemical plant to be 
sited  at  Kwinana  in  WA's  south-western  industrial  belt  (The  West 
Australian 5/9/88). 
8.1. 3.  Future  development  in WA  1988-1995 
In  May  1987  the  WA  government's  Department  of  Resources 
Development  issued a  listing of major potential industrial developments  in 
the  State  pre-2005.*3  Of  the  twenty-six potential mineral  and petroleum 
related  projects  listed  nine were  identified as  requiring natural  gas  as 
fuel  or  feedstock.  Other  proposed projects like the  aluminium  smelter 
indicated  a  high power  requirement which may be  supplied by private power 
stations fuelled by natural  gas. 
According  to  the  status listing for  each  development  there are 
only  two  new major  gas  end user projects which have  a  realistic chance  of 
being  operational  by  the  mid-1990s,  although  two  minor  developments  are 
also  in  the  pipeline.  The  former  are  the Wesfarmers/Norsk Hydro  Nlli~onia 
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indicated  at  60  TJ  and  30  TJ  respectively.  In terms  of current  gas  usage 
this  compares  to  Alcoa  as  the  SECWA's  biggest  NWS  gas  customer who  are 
contracted  to  draw  down  167.7  TJ  per  day  (150  MMCFD)  and  the Wesfarmer's 
LPG  plant which uses  some  25  TJ  per day.*4 
At  the  time  of  writing  (Jan.  1989)  the petrochemical project 
seems  close  to  gaining  final  government  approval  despite  the  ongoing 
political  controversy  relating to  funding  and  the  location of the project 
(West  Australian  10/1/89).  Environmental  concerns  have been highlighted 
by  opposition  members  and  independent parties  on several occasions  since 
the  project  emerged  as  a  major  political  issue  in  1988  (see  West 
Australian  2/8/88,  22/12/88,  2/1/89).  However,  E.P.A.  clearance  is likely 
to be  given by mid-1989. 
A  number  of  factions within  the  WA  government will be  eager  to 
see  the  1.2  billion  project go  ahead  to  support  the planning initiative 
set  out  for  new  industrial  developments  in the  State for  the next  five 
years.  Another  key  factor  is the$175m,  43.75%  stake which  the  Dowding 
government  holds  in  the  project  with  the  balance  held  by  the  Bond 
Corporation.  Both  these  parties  will wish  to  ensure  a  return on their 
considerable  investments.*5  (See West  Australian 10/10/88). 
According  to  recent  media  reportage  and  industry sources,  the 
proposed  $450  million  ammonia/urea  development  is not likely to  go  ahead 
in  1989.  The  main reason for  the postponement cited by Wesfarmers  is  the 
gas  price set by  the  SECWA  (West Australian 10/11/88).  Given  the  scale of 
gas  use  required  by  the plant when  operational  (60  TJ  per  day),  the unit 
cost  of  the  gas  supplied is undoubtedly  a  key  influence  on  the viability 
of the project. 278 
As  on  previous  occasions,  negotiations  over the price of gas 
offered  to  a  major  industrial end user have been strongly influenced by 
political  factors.  This  is  illustrated  by  recent events whereby  the 
development  of  the  WesfarmersjNorsk  Hydro  project  has  been partially 
traded off against the  development of the  PICL  petrochemical plant. 
In  1985  when  the AmmoniafUrea project was  first tabled,  the  WA 
government  was  eager to support any proposed development which could help 
soak  up  the  gas  surplus.  As  a  result,  Wesfarmers  may  have been in a  good 
position  to  negotiate  some  form  of  concession  on  the  industrial gas 
price.  However,  throughout  1986  and 1987  any  advanced planning on the 
project  was  delayed by Wesfarmers  on the  grounds  that the export price for 
fertilisers  was  not  high  enough  to  merit  an  immediate start on plant 
construction.  In  the  process  of  these  delays  they lost a  significant 
Asian  market window  which was  filled by the construction of new  fertiliser 
plants  in India and China. 
As  things  stood in July 1988  when  the project underwent its last 
review,  the  WA  government were  no  longer willing to  support the Wesfarmers 
project  with  gas  price  concessions.  The  PICL  project had become  a  top 
political  and  economic  priority.  The  massive  gas  inventories which had 
existed  in  1985  had been considerably reduced by the  SECWA  initiatives of 
1986-1988  and  the  petrochemical plant when  operational would account  for 
the  annual  uncontracted  quantity  of  NWS  gas  which would remain by 1992 
(West Australian 5/9/88 and 10/11/88). 
Wesfarmers  had  effectively lost part of their export market  and 
the  strong  bargaining  platform  which  they had held in 1985.  Political 
priorities  are likely to continue to  dominate  the  future  of the Wesfarmers 
project  in  the  near  future.  However,  if the  aluminium smelter proposal 279 
remains  stagnant  for  another  year,  the  WA  government may  re-adjust its 
energy  mix  cutting  back  further  on  the  use  of  NWS  gas  for  power 
generation.  This may  release significant quantities of gas  for industrial 
purposes  with  the  possibility  of  minor price concessions  for major  end 
users  like  the  Wesfarmers/Norsk  Hydro  project.  Although there remains 
little  doubt  about the availability of large quantities of additional  gas 
if  required,  the price offered by the JVP  will remain as  a  limiting factor 
unless  alternative  sources  are supplied from  the Perth basin.  Switching 
power  stations back to coal and fuel oil also remains  a  major policy issue 
in  view  of the  increased output of sulphur and other dangerous  Greenhouse 
gases  into the  atmosphere. 8.2. 
8.2.1. 
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NWS  Outlook:  LNG  Exports  1989-2005 
Introduction 
In  an  LNG  status report released by  the  WA  government  (Nov.  87), 
three  major target markets were  identified as  the most prospective for  LNG 
sales  from  Australian  projects in the period 1995  to  2005.*6  These  were 
Japan,  Korea  and  Taiwan.  The  report  acknowledged existing contracts 
including  NWS  LNG  sales  to  Japan  (due  to  commence  Oct.  1989),  but took 
future  market openings  as  its major  focus  (DRD:  Nov.  1987).  The  following 
sections will draw  on material sourced from this document  in order to: 
(i)  Update  the  arguments  presented  in 3.3  and 6.1 which deal with 
export  markets  for  NWS  gas,  LNG  market  structure and price 
indices. 
(ii)  Place  the  NWS  LNG  export programme within a  broader strategic 
framework. 
In  order to provide  a  basic assessment of the strategic position 
of  the  NWS  project as  a  major  LNG  exporter post 1989,  it is important to 
consider five basic areas.  In broad terms  they can be set out as: 
(i)  Existing markets  (LNG  importing nations). 
(ii)  Existing contracts  (LNG  suppliers  - Importer nations. 
(iii) 
(iv) 
Projected future market expansion. 
Planned  expansion  of  supply  capacity  (new  and  upgraded  LNG 
projects). 
(v)  Changes  in LNG  market structure and price indices. 
These  areas are explored briefly in the following section. 281 
8.2.2.  The  Asia-Pacific market for  LNG 
The  West  Australian  government  have  identified  three  major 
target  nations  which  may  facilitate an expansion in the Asia-Pacific  LNG 
market  over  the next  decade  - Japan,  Korea  and Taiwan. 
A.  Japan 
According  to  current  estimates  supplied  by  the  Japanese 
Institute  of  Energy  Economics  (lEE)  by  the  end of 1989  Japan will be 
importing  a  total of 35.37  MTPA  of LNG  from  seven different projects based 
in five  countries  (see  Table 4).  (US  contract terminates  1989.) 
This  appears  to  be  an indication of the Japanese  government's 
continued  commitment  to  large scale  importation of LNG  as  a  premium  fuel 
source  and an ongoing strategy of supply diversification. 
A  number  of estimates  of future  LNG  demand  have been produced by 
internal  agencies  within  Japan since  1986.  A measure  of disagreement is 
evident  between different bodies  on  final figures,  i.e.  Year  2000  LNG  use, 
Japanese  Ministry for  International Trade  and  Industry,  (MITI)  figure  - 38 
million  tonnes,  Petroleum Association of Japan  (PA3)  figure  - 35.1 million 
tonnes  (DRD:  Nov.  1987).  However,  at time  of writing  (Nov.  88)  the most 
current  and  comprehensive  figures  available  were  those  supplied by  the 
Japan  Institute  of  Energy  Economics  (lEE).  These  are based on  a  real 
crude  oil  price of US$25  or US$30fbarrel with the  linkage between the  LNG 
and  crude  set at 80%,  90%  and 100%.  The  lower  demand  for  LNG  is predicted 
to  occur  when  oil  is  priced  at US$30fbarrel with 100%  link to  the  LNG 
price.  Highest  demand  is assumed to result when  oil is US$25fbarrel with 
an  80%  indexation factor. 
Table  5  below  shows  the  range  of  possible  outcomes  at five 
yearly intervals  from  1995  to  2010. 282 
TABLE  4 
LNG  SUPPLY  CONTRACTS  TO  JAPAN 
First  Actual  Contracted 
Delivery  Termination  Quantity 
Date  (million tonnes/ 
year) 
In Operation 
USA  (Alaska 1  Nov.  1969  1989  0.96 
Brunei  Dec.  1972  1993  5.14 
Abu  Dhabi  May  1977  1996  2.06 
Indonesia  (I)  Aug.  1977  1999  7.50 
Malaysia  Feb.  1983  2003  6.00 
Indonesia  (II)  Aug.  1983  2003  3.20 
Indonesia  (III)  Jan.  1984  2003  3.30 
Sub  Total 
Indonesia 
(Incremental)  1987  1997  0.67 
Indonesia 
(New  Chubu  Contract)  Oct.  1987  Dec.  1990  0.70(1) 
TOTAL 
Committed 
Australia  1989  2008  5.84(2) 
GRAND  TOTAL  35.37(3) 
(1)  1989  and 1990  import volume. 
(2)  Full production volume not attained until 1994. 
(3)  Total assumes  contracts expiring before 1994 are extended. 283 
Taking  the  extremities,  i.e.  36.2  million  tonnes  (HI)  (100% 
indexation  to  a  $30  bbl  oil  price)  and 38.1 million tonnes  (MT)  (80% 
indexation  at  $25  bbl)  possible  supply  deficiencies or maximum market 
windows  can  be  indicated  for  the  Japanese energy economy at five year 
intervals. 
Figure  8.1  was  produced  using this method  to  show minimum  and 
maximum  contracted  amounts  and  potential  market  windows.  The  largest 
market  windows  available  from  lEE projections were:  1.9 HI  in the year 
1995,  5.3  MT  in 2000,  6.7  MT  in 2005  and 8.2  MT  in 2010. 
Drawing  on  an  average  of  MITI  and  lEE  figures  the range of 
potential  supply  deficiencies read as  follows:  1995  - 0.6  to 2.7 million 
tonnes,  2000  2.6  to  9.8  million  tonnes,  2005  - 6.0  to 12.7 million 
tonnes,  2010  - 7.7  to 15.9 million tonnes. 
The  minimum  market windows  shown in Figure  8.1 are likely to be 
the  most  reliable  indicator  of supply shortfalls up  to  the year  2000  in 
view  of  uncertainty  affecting  future  oil  prices  and industrial power 
demand  within  Japan.  During the period between 1988  and  2000  the scope 
for  new  projects  to  supply Japan will depend critically on the extent to 
which  existing  projects  have  surplus capacity or can be extended by the 
addition  of  further  trains.  Estimates  cited  by  the West Australian 
government  suggest  that  the  Malaysian  and  Indonesian  LNG  plants have 
surplus  capacity  in  excess of 2  MTPA  and the North West  Shelf  (Woodside) 
project  could have  a  surplus capacity of up  to 0.5 million tonnes  per year 
(Prospect WA  4/87). 
Whilst  this  LNG  production capacity could easily account for  the 
supply  shortfall  indicated  for 1995,  the situation from  the year 2000  to 
2010  is quite different.  The  lEE  figures  illustrated in Figure  7  show  the 284 
TABLE  5 
LNG  DEMAND/OIL  PRICE  INDEX-2010 
Crude  Oil Price  $30  $25 
LNG  Price Link to  Crude  %  100  90  80  100  90  80 
LNG  Demand  (million tonnes) 
1995  36.2  36.3  36.4  36.7  37.2  38.1 
2000  39.9  40.9  41.9  4l.8  44.1  45.2 
2005  41.4  42.6  43.5  43.5  47.0  48.1 
2010  43.1  44.6  46.7  45.3  50.2  51.3 
Figure  8.1 
ESTIMATED  LNG  USAGE  JAPAN  1995-2010 
Million  Tonnes  Per/Annum  (MTPA) 
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emergence  of  large  market  windows  for  the  years  2000,  2005  and  2010. 
These  levels  may  also be  increased by approximately 1.4 MTPA  if the  Chubu 
and  Indonesian  incremental  contracts  are  not  renewed  in 1990  and  1997 
respectively  (see Table  4)  (Source  DRD  LNG  Status Report,  Nov.  87). 
B.  South Korea 
Under  an  existing  contract  established with Indonesia in 1986 
South  Korea  imports  2  MTPA  of LNG.  The  importing agency,  the  Korean  Gas 
Corporation  (KGC) ,  built  the  Pyongtaek  terminal  100  kID  south west of 
Seoul,  a  gas  pipeline  to  Inchon  power plant plus  two  loop  networks  to 
Seoul  between April  1983  and  December  1986.  KGC  has  cited expansion plans 
to widen  the  country's  gas  distribution network.  These  include: 
Extension  of  the  Pyongtaek  terminal  with the  construction of 
additional  regasification  facilities  to  allow an additional  LNG 
supply  of 1  MTPA  for  the northern region. 
Construction  of  a  second  LNG  receiving  terminal  in  Pusan 
(capacity  2  MTPA)  to  supply  the  southern part of Korea. 
Construction  of  a  24"  north-south gas  trunkline to  interconnect 
the north-south gas  networks. 
At  present  KGC  may  select  the  extension  of the  Pyongtaek terminal  in 
association  with  a  north-south pipeline in preference  to  the  construction 
of  a  second  terminal  at  Pusan.  These  options  continue to be  revievled 
pending  further  detail  from  the  Daelin feasibility study for  LNG  use  in 
Korea. 
Table  6  shows  the breakdown  of existing and projected LNG  use  in 
Korea  to  2001.  Estimates  supplied  by  the Korean Institute of Energy 
Resources  (K.I.E.R.)  suggest that no  additional  LNG  demand  over  and above 
the  2  MTPA  supplied from  the Arun plant in Indonesia will exist.  However Residential & 
Commercial 
Industrial 
Power  generation 
TOTAL 
Source:  K. I.E.R.  Nov. 
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TABLE  6 
LNG  Demand  in South Korea 
(million tonnes/year) 
1987  1991 
0.13  0.51 
0.10  0.13 
1.56  1.36 
2.00  5.00 
87. 
Figure  8.2 
1996  2001 
1.42  2.16 
0.27  0.41 
3.31  2.43 
5.00  5.00 
ESTIMATED  GAS  SUPPLY  &  DEMAND 
South  Korean  LNG  Market  1987-2001 
LNG  Contract Volume (MTPA) 
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by  1996  the  situation  has  changed dramatically with a  potential market 
window  of  3  MTPA  opening up  (Figure 8.2).  These  figures will be  subject 
to  review.  However,  it is possible that the lack of change  in projected 
demand  indicated  for  the  period  represents  a  conservative estimate for 
that period. 
South  Korea has been identified by the  WA  government as  the best 
opportunity  for  Australian LNG  projects up  to  the year  2000.  It is known 
that  the  Koreans  are  seeking  to  diversify their sources of supply and 
therefore  Malaysia  and  Australia are seen as  likely suppliers  (DRO:  Nov. 
1988). 
C.  Taiwan 
Current  natural  gas  production  in  Taiwan  by  the  Chinese 
Petroleum  Corporation  (CPC)  is  approximately  1  billion  m3  per annum. 
Proven  indigenous  reserves  of gas  are limited and domestic production is 
expected to decline over  the next decade. 
In  order  to  compensate  for this Taiwan has negotiated a  20  year 
contract  with  Indonesia  to  supply  1.5 MTPA  of LNG  (1.95 bcm  of natural 
gas)  from  1990. 
An  LNG  receiving terminal  (capacity 1.5 MTPA)  is currently under 
construction  on  the  west coast of Kaohsiung Hsun in the southern part of 
Taiwan  and  will  be  operational  by  1990.  Plans have been made  for  a 
smaller  second stage development with a  capacity of 0.5 million tonnes  per 
annum but no  construction date has been finalised. 
Demand  and  contracted supply is thus currently in balance until 
1995  from  which  time  demand  will  gradually increase  to give  a  0.5 bcm 
deficiency by the year  2000  (see Figure 8.3). 288 
Figure  8.3 
ESTIMATED  GAS  SUPPLY  &  DEMAND 
Taiwan  LNG  Market  1986-2004 
LNG  Contract Volume  (SCM) 
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It  is  anticipated  that  after  the year  2000  the potential for 
steadily  increasing natural gas  demand  in Taiwan  is considerable  given the 
country's  rapid  development.  In  addition  unless  further  domestic  gas 
supplies  are  discovered  a  further  0.5  bern  (0.38 million tonnes  of LNG) 
will  be  required  by  2003,  giving  a  total uncontracted quantity of 1  bern 
(0.77  million  tonnes  of  LNG).  With  the  increasing  (but  as  yet 
unquantified)  demand  for  gas  in  Taiwan post  2000  plus  the uncontracted 
deficiency  of  1  bern  by  2003  a  much  larger contract could be put in place 
by  the  epe  with  a  graduated build up  met by existing suppliers  leaving 
considerable  scope  for  new  entrants  into  the Taiwanese  LNG  market prior to 
2005. 
D.  Other Potential LNG  Markets 
The  NWS  LNG  development  plans  are  unlikely  to  exclude  the 
possibility  of  new markets  arising in the Asia-Pacific region in the post 
2000  period.  At  the  present  time  the joint venturers  are  aware  of a 
possible  shortfall in gas  supplies  in India,  Singapore  and the Philippines 
during  the  1990's.  To  date  the  governments  of these respective nations 
have  not  issued any  formal policies outlining projected demand  and  supply 
for natural  gas  in the post 1990  period. 
8.2.3.  NWS  LNG  strategic possibilities 
At  the  start of this  section,  five basic areas were  set out for 
examination  as  a  means  to  assess  the  strategic posi.tion of the  NWS  project 
as  a  major  exporter to  the Asia-Pacific  LNG  market  1989-2005.  Subsection 
8.1.1  covered  the  initial  three  areas  identi.fied but did not deal with 
potential  new  supplies  (post 1995)  and relevant  changes  in the structure 
of the Asia-Pacific  LNG  market  (post 1985) . 290 
In  this  subsection there will be  a  brief discussion of the  above 
and  the  significance  which  they hold relative  to  the  future planning of 
LNG  exports  from  the  NWS  project. 
A.  Potential New  Supplies  1995-2005 
According  to  available  estimates  of  LNG  demand  by major  end 
users  in  the  Asia-Pacific  region  there  will  be  limited scope  for new 
supply  outlets prior to  1995  (see  8.2.2).  By  the  end of 1989  there  should 
be  five  major  suppliers  to  the  region,  all  of  whom  will  have  the 
capability for  increased production into  the  1990s. 
This  LNG  production  capacity  is located in the USA,  Malaysia, 
Brunei,  Abu  Dhabi,  Indonesia  and Australia  (see  DRD,  LNG  Status Report, 
No.  1987:  p.24). 
Projected  market  windows  in Japan,  Korea  and Taiwan  (pre-1995) 
could  conceivably be met by  incremental  supplies  from  the  NWS  or  any  other 
major  project  operating  in  the  region.  Current  excess  capacity in 
existing  production  plants  is  sufficient  to  meet  any  further  demand 
anticipated  by  available  estimates  (see  WA  Government  LNG  StattlS  Report, 
No.  1987). 
The  post  1995  period  is  predicted  by major  governmental  and 
independent  sources  to  show  a  steady  increase  in  LNG  demand  in the 
Asia-Pacific  region.  Petroleum Intelligence weekly recently released an 
estimate  indicating  that  Pacific  basin demand  for  LNG  would  increase by 
more  than  20  MTPA  over  the next  decade,  with  the more  rapid increase  in 
the  post  1995  period.  Total  LNG  demand  for  the region is estimated to 
reach  51-55  MTPA  by  the year  2000  (PIW  Jan.  1989). 291 
The  PIW  estimates  for  LNG  demand  in the pre-2000 period are 
slightly  more  optimistic than those  tabled in the  WA  government's  1987  LNG 
Status  Report.  The  figures  presented in the  WA  government  report suggest 
that  LNG  demand  in the Asia-Pacific region can be met by existing projects 
up  until  the year  2000.  Thereafter there may  be  scope  for  developing one 
and possibly two  more major projects  (WA  DRD,  Nov.  1987). 
Amongst  those  identified on  a  shortlist of possible new projects 
were  the  Sakhalin project  (USSR),  the  Gorgon project and  the Bonapart Gulf 
project  (both  in  Australia).  Sakhalin  was  identified  as  a  good 
possibility  in  view  of  the  fact  that  preliminary  planning  was  well 
underway  on the giant Soviet-Japanese initiative,  prior to its deferral in 
1986. 
Of  the  two  Australian  projects  mentioned,  the Bonaparte Gulf 
development  proposed  by  the French group  Elf-Aquitaine appears  to be  the 
most  favoured  with  potential  importer  governments.  A  number  of 
development  plans  for  the  Petrel  and Tern fields have been tabled with 
proposals  for  a  natural  gas  pipeline network running south from  Darwin 
and/or  a  small scale  LNG  export project to be  operational post  2000. 
The  Australian  Financial  Review  reports  that  during  recent 
negotiations  between  the  Australian  Federal  energy  minister  and  the 
Japanese  government,  considerable  support was  raised for  the  development 
of  smaller  scale  LNG  projects  outside of Indonesia,  the major producer 
from  Asia-Pacific region  (AFR  Jan.  31/1989).  This position was  supportive 
to  both  the  Gorgon  and Bonaparte Gulf proposals which  include provision 
for  scaling  up  production  incrementally  to 2.5  MTPA  in the case of the 
Bonaparte  Gulf development  and  4  MTPA  for  the Gorgon proposal.  Both these 
projects  will  be  considerably smaller than the  NWS  development which will 292 
have  a  production capacity in excess  of 6.0  MTPA  when  the  third LNG  train 
is  completed  in  1993  (see  DRD  LNG  Status Report Nov.  87),  (NWS  Report, 
Jan.  1989). 
B.  Changes  in Market  Structure  and Pricing 
Since  1985  a  number  of  changes  have  emerged  in the world LNG 
trade  which  will  be  significant  in  terms  of  the future  trade between 
Australian based LNG  projects,  the Japanese  and other prospective buyers. 
The  first  important  change  carne  in  1986  when plummeting oil 
prices  made  a  nonsense  of the  LNG  pricing provisions which had been built 
into  a  number  of recently signed contracts.  The  scale of the  discrepancy 
between  1986  LNG  prices  can be  appreciated by  the  following  comparison: 
March  1985  average  C.I.F.  price for oil landed in Japan  =  US$28.30  bb1, 
average  LNG  C.I.F.  price  US$4.89/MMBTU;  March  1986  C.I.F.  oil price 
US$16.46  bbl,  C.I.F.  LNG  price  =  $5.l7/MMBTU. 
By  early  1987  new price provisions had heen negotiated between 
the  Japanese  and  their major  suppliers,  most  notably Indonesia.  Oil/LNG 
indices  were  adjusted  to  ensure  that LNG  prices reflected the  new  lower 
equilibrium  for oil prices.  Indonesia initiated the  new  system by selling 
LNG  to Japan at a  C.I.F.  price of US$3.10  MMBTU  indexed against  Indonesian 
Minas  crude  at  US$17.46  bb1  (Feb.  1987).  A  few  months  later the Korean 
contract  was  finalised at a  C.I.F.  price of US$3.40  (DRD,  LNG  Report,  Nov. 
1987). 
The  Indonesian  pricing  initiative  has  been  complemented  in 
recent  years  by  two  other precedents  in the  establishment of a  more  open 
international  trade  in  LNG.  The  first  of  these  measures  was  the 
introduction  of  spot  market  sales  of  LNG  in 1986  and  the  second,  the 
removal  of  take  or  pay  provisions  from  a  contract established with the 
Chubu power  company  in 1987  (DRD:  LNG  Report,  Nov.  1987). 293 
Indonesia,  and  more  recently Algeria.  has  enjoyed  some  success 
in  trading  excess  LNG  capacity on the spot market.  To  date volumes  have 
been  low  and  prices  below the market average but there may  be  scope  for 
expansion. 
The  removal  of  take  or  pay  provisions from  some  existing or 
future  LNG  contracts could have  an  important  influence on the structure of 
the  LNG  trade.  The  Indonesian  precedent  could  be reinforced by the 
Japanese,  initially  in  future  contracts  and other importers  may  follow 
suit.  In  general  terms  such  measures  will allow more  flexibility in 
annual  LNG  consumption  by  importer nations but will mean  less financial 
security  for  exporters.  This  additional risk factor may handicap project 
developers 
projects. 
c. 
seeking  large  amounts  of  capital  to  underwrite  new  LNG 
NWS  LNG:  Future Planning 1989-2005 
From  the  discussion presented in A  and B  above it is clear that 
the  future  of  liquified  natural  gas  sales  from  the North West  Shelf 
project  will  depend  largely  on  the  demand  profiles  emerging  in the 
Japanese,  South Korean  and Taiwanese markets  over the next 15 years. 
From  a  strategic  point  of  view  the  NWS  joint venturers will 
retain  the  Japanese  market as  the main priority for  incremental sales of 
LNG  up  to late 1990s,  with the possibility of larger scale contracts being 
assigned thereafter. 
Output  from  the  first  platform,  North Rankin  'A'  is currently 
estimated  by  the  JVP  to  be  adequate  to  meet  existing  contractual 
commitments  and  incremental  sales  to the Japanese market until the late 
1990s.  The  third LNG  train for the  NWS  project is due  for  completion in 
1993  to  meet  peak  demand  levels  of  5.8  MTPA  outlined in the existing 
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The  development  of  the  Goodwyn  field originally scheduled to 
come  onstream  in 1993  is currently under  review  (Dec.  88)  in the light of 
low  oil  prices  and  higher  than  anticipated  recoverable  natural  gas 
resources  from  North Rankin  (see 3.4.1).  In the last Offshore Development 
Plan  tabled by the JVP  in the mid 1980s,  Goodwyn  was  scheduled to commence 
production  in  October  1993  with  platform fabrication underway by march 
1989  (Woodside,  May  1985:pp.8-9). 
Natural  gas  production  from  Goodwyn  was  to  supplement output 
from  North  Rankin with the high condensate yield from  the newly developed 
field sold directly to refineries for production of petroleum spirit. 
It  is  now  likely that the JVP  will postpone  the development  of 
Goodwyn  for  up  to  two  years  in  order to assess  a  series of strategic 
possibilities.  These  relate  to  oil  pricing  scenarios,  future  output 
levels  from  North  Rankin  'A'  the  scale  of any new  LNG  contracts with 
buyers  in  the  Asia-Pacific  market  and  the possibility of exploiting the 
new  condensate rich discovery at Echol  (see  NWS  Report Dec.  1988). 
All  of  the  above  require detailed consideration which is beyond 
the  scope  of this thesis.  However  at this point  (Dec.  1988)  it is likely 
that  Goodwyn  will  be  in production by  1998  unless oil indexed LNG  prices 
do  not  rise  in  real  terms  against current average  contract prices  (see 
8.2.2(B)  above). 
Given  the  size  of  potential  market  windows  in the Japanese, 
Taiwanese  and  South Korean LNG  markets  post 2000,  the  NWS  JVP  may  be able 
to  secure  additional  contracts  to  supply one or more  of these  importer 
nations.  In  the  event of additional  LNG  supplies being contracted from 
the  NWS,  production  from  a  second and possibly a  third platform would be 
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The  NWS  joint  venturers  should  be  in  a  good  position  to 
negotiate  small  scale  incremental contracts with the Japanese  and Koreans 
in  the  mid  to  late 1990s.  However,  as outlined in 8.2.1 they will face 
competition  from  a  number  of suppliers  including Malaysian and Indonesian 
projects  which  could  have  a  combined surplus capacity of 2  MTPA,  during 
this period  (Prospect WA,  DRD,  Dec.  87). 
Current  commentators  suggest that the  increase in LNG  demand  in 
the  Japanese  market  post  2000,  will  be  sufficient  to  warrant  the 
development  of  at  least  one  and  possibly two  new  LNG  supply projects. 
Changes  in  the  Korean  and Taiwanese markets  are likely to determine  the 
possibility  of  a  second  or  third  project  being  developed  (AFR  Jan. 
31/1989)  (Prospect WA,  DRD,  Dec.  1987). 
In  the  event  of  two  new  LNG  supply projects coming  onstream 
prior  to  2005,  contract  quantities  would  have  to  be  arranged  with 
prospective  buyers  prior  to  initial construction work being undertaken. 
Given  this  scenario  the  NWS  JVP  would be  forced to  compete directly with 
new  potential  suppliers for  any additional supply contracts to be  awarded 
post-1996.  It is therefore likely that the JVP will initiate negotiations 
in  the  mid  1990s  with both  LNG  importers  and potential future  suppliers 
over  the  contractual breakdown for  LNG  exports  to the Asia-Pacific market 
commencing  in the  2000-2010 period. 
The  NWS  project has clear strategic importance  for  the planners 
of  all  new potential LNG  projects to  supply the Asia-Pacific region,  with 
Japan,  Korea  and Taiwan as  the major target markets.  It is of particular 
significance  to  the  proposed  Australian  projects due  to  the network of 
overlapping  political  and  economic  interests  which  exist  between 
participating  parties  in  each project.  This  extends  to both Federal  and 296 
State  government  interests and in the case of both the  NWS  and Gorgon  LNG 
projects,  direct  participation  by major multinational subsidiaries Shell 
Development  (Australia)  Pty  and Cal-Asiatic  (see DRD,  LNG  Status Report, 
Nov.  1987,  also 3.1 and 3.2  "The  International Petroleum Network"). 297 
8.3  An  Overview of the Model 
8.3.1  Recapitulation 
Prior  to presenting the model  and major  conclusions  in the final 
section  of  the  thesis,  it will be  useful  to reiterate the principal study 
goals  set  out  in Gh.apter  1.  '5.'he?JC  'i,ere  as  folloKs:  (i)  To  faci.litate  an 
increased  understanding  of  a  number  of key policy decisions  taken by  the 
JVP  between  September  1980  and July 1985.  (ii)  Production of an original 
and  comprehensive  commentary  on  the  history  of  the  North West  Shelf 
project  1973  to  1986.  (iii)  To  develop  a  conceptual  schema  representing 
the  decision making  environment of the  rnvs  joint venturers  and extend this 
into  a  model  with  applications  for  the  study of corporate policy and 
strategy within ~ultinational resource based j oint venture proj ects. 
The  first  objective listed above has,  in effect,  been fulfilled 
through  the  application of key theoretical concepts  and  1:he  critical event 
methodology  to  the policy issues  examined  in Chapters  6  and  7  (see  Chapter 
1  for  definitions).  An historical commentary  on  the planning of the  NWS 
project,  viewed  in  a  broad political and economic  context has  also been 
produced.  This  was  developed from  a  combination of background material 
(Introduction  and  Appendices)  and  through  exploration  of  a  series of 
interrelated themes  embodied  in Chapters  3,  4,  6,  7  and  8. 
The  third  major  objective  highlighted above has  been met with 
regard  to  the  conceptual  schema  developed  throughout  the  preceding 
chapters;  the  model  of  "Policy  Making  Enviromnent"  for  resource based 
j oint  venture  proj ects  draw'!1  from  this  schema is is presented in this 
section as  a  preamble  to  describing the model  in 8.3.2. 298 
(i)  The  model  represents  a  visual extension of the broad conceptual 
schema  described  in  Chapter  1.  This  schema  and the  conceptual map  have 
been  employed  throughout  the  study for  the analysis of corporate policies 
introduced  by  the  NWS  joint  venturers  during  critical periods  in the 
planning  and  development  of the project. 
(ii)  The  model  is  in  part  a  response  to the call  amon~st policy 
writers  for  a  more  multidisciplinary approach  to policy analysis.  This 
follows  (Hogwood  and  Gunn,  1984)  who  advocate  the  development of a  more 
integrative  framework  for  the  study  of  corporate  and  public  policy 
(Hogwood  and  Gunn,  1984:p63).  Allison  (1971)  presents  an argument which 
lends  broad  support  to this  idea,  with the contention that policy makers 
will  inevitably  view  a  specific event or series of events  from  a  variety 
of perspectives. 
In  his  seminal  study of US  and Soviet  governments'  reaction to 
the  Cuban  Missile  Crisis,  Allison  illustrated  how  a  critical  event 
unfolding  over  an  identifiable time period  (13  days  in October  1962)  can 
elicit  a  variety of strategic options.  Allison's  schema required each of 
these  options  to  be  identified  as  a  prerequisite to understanding  the 
policy  decisions  taken  by  each party.  In summary he  stated that policy 
analysts  must  carefully  view  key  events using  a  variety of "conceptual 
lenses"  (Allison,  1971:pS). 
(iii)  Althou~h  the  model  has  applications  for  the  analysis  of 
corporate  policy  and  strate~y  relatin~ to  'Multinational Resource  Based 
Joint  Venturers'.  it  is essentially descriptive  in nature  (see  8.3.2 for 
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The  major  components  of  the  model  are  consistent  with the 
Hogwood  and  Gunn  (1984)  typology for  a  descriptive model.  These  authors 
cite  the  need  for  this  type  of construct in the  field of policy studies 
and  comment  that  "The  more  complex  the  phenomena  to be  represented the 
greater  will  be  the  tendency  towards  selectivity  simplification  and 
generalisation  in the  making of models.  Provided that simplification does 
not  involve  gross  distortion  such  models  can  assist  description, 
explanation and understanding"  (Hogwood  and  Gunn,  1984:p43). 
(iv)  The  model highlights  the  relationship between three key concepts 
defined in Chapter 1.  i.e.  strategy.  policy and  environment. 
An  understanding  of the  relationship between the  three  concepts 
listed  above  is  of  considerable  importance  for  the student of corporate 
policy.  This point is raised by several business policy writers  including 
Summer  (1980),  Palia  and Hitt  (1982)  and Johnson  and Scholes  (1984),  all 
of  whom  set out detailed definitions of policy,  strategy and environmental 
typologies  prior  to  embarking  on  the  main  part  of their theoretical 
arguments.  However,  the  major  contribution  made  to  this  study by  the 
business  policy  and  strategy  writers  relates  to  their  broad  based 
examination  of  the  relationship  between  large  organisations  and their 
external  environments  (see Palia and Hitt p:1-59  for  a  review of relevant 
literature). 
Other  studies  in  the field of Organisational ecology conducted 
by  Benson  (1975),  Trist  (1977)  and Stringer  (1980,  1982)  have  contributed 
to  the  conceptual  framework  of the thesis  through  their examination of the 
important  interface  between  the organisation and its environment  and  the 
structure  of interorganisational networks  (see 1.4.2).  All  these  elements 
are  encompassed within the model  presented below. 300 
8.3.2  The  model 
The  model  illustrated in Figure  9  is a  hierarchical arrangement 
of  general  features  found  within  the  policy  making  environment  of 
'Multinational  Resource  Based  Joint Ventures'.  This  term is defined for 
the  purposes  of  the  study  as  "Any  large  scale petroleum or minerals 
exploration  and  development  project.  with significant levels of foreign 
equity and control within its joint venture corporate structure". 
In  this  case  the  term  'resource'  has been delimited,  referring 
only  to  minerals  and  petroleum  projects.  This has been necessary to 
ensure  that  the  model  is not  so  general as  to be of little practical use 
for  the analysis of multinational corporate policy. 
In  effect  the  model  is applicable for  the  study of policy and 
strategy  relating  to  large  scale  multinational  joint  venture 
organisations,  operating within the vertically integrated structure of the 
international  petroleum  and  minerals  industries.  The  high  level of 
vertical  integration  within  these  industries  is  paralleled  by  the 
oligopolistic  control  exercised  by  the  major multinationals  over large 
sectors  of the worldwide market for principal mineral,  metal  and petroleum 
products.  (In  the  Australian  case  these would  include coal,  processed 
iron  ore,  alumina,  processed mineral  sands,  gold,  diamonds,  LNG,  LPG  and 
crude oil.) 
The  model  accommodates  the  major  features  listed  above  and 
highlights  the  existence  of  inter-organisational  networks  within  the 
international  petroleum  and  minerals  industries.  Direct and indirect 
linkages  between  various  governmental  and  independent bodies  operating at 
the  World,  National,  State/local,  Project  and  Systems  levels  are 
indicated. FIGURE  9 
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In  keeping with the  schema  employed in the  conceptual map,  solid 
lines  connecting  box borders  represent direct links between organisations 
whilst  broken  lines  represent  'indirect'  or  less  clearly  defined 
connections  (see  Chapter  5  and Appendix  3). 
The  most  important  direct  connection  indicated  between 
organisations  operating  at  World  level  and  subsidiaries  operating at 
Project  level  is  shown  down  the left hand side of Figure  9.  This  link 
between  the  multinational  joint venture headquarters  and the participant 
organisations  shown within the  joint venture  corporate structure is  common 
to  most  large  scale  petroleum  and  minerals  developments.  The  terms 
'X  corp',  'Y/Z  corp'  and  'Govmt corp'  have been used to  denote  a  possible 
combination of participants  (see 1.1.3 and 3.1.2). 
In  many  countries  the  'host government'  may  take  out  a  direct 
stake  in the project in an effort to maximise  control over  the  development 
and  exploitation  of  a  national  resource.  In  certain  nations where 
sovereignty  over  minerals  and  petroleum  resources  is  a  primary policy 
objective,  the  government  may  demand high levels of direct participation 
in  new  resource  developments.  This  is  often facilitated through  the 
vehicle  of  a  State  petroleum  or  mining  company  entering into  a  joint 
venture  agreement  with  incoming  multinationals.  In general,  levels of 
direct  government  participation  in  major  multinational  resource based 
joint  ventures  are  kept  below  50%.  This  serves  to  ensure that the 
multinational  developers  retain  an acceptable  equity balance  and overall 
control of the project organisation  (see  3.2,  3.5  and 4.2.2). 
Host  governments  have  a  number  of instruments at their disposal 
to  ensure  that  they  do  not  lose control over  the  development of major 
petroleum  and  minerals  discoveries.  In  many  cases  these  include an 303 
extensive  legal  and  policy  framework  pertaining  to  exploitation  of 
national  resources  and  the  siting and construction of new projects  (see 
Figure  9).  Rules  governing  levels  of foreign equity in new projects, 
royalties  or  the  structure  of participation agreements  often form  a  key 
part  of the resource policy framework set out by host governments  (see  3.2 
and 4.1). 
International  legislation and agreements  governing petroleum and 
minerals  developments  have become  increasingly important over the past 20 
years.  This  is  reflected  in  the  powers  held by host governments  to 
negotiate  detailed  development plans with the multinationals which ensure 
minimum  thresholds  of  economic  return  to  the  nation,  local industry 
participation,  technology  transfer  and adequate  environmental protection 
(see  Zorn,  1983)  (also 4.1.3 and 4.1.6). 
A  key  component  of  the  development plans for  any large scale 
resource  project  is  the  source  and  structure  of  project  finance 
agreements.  In  the  case  of  the  North West  Shelf development project 
capital  was  provided  through  two  part  rollover  loan  sourced from an 
international  banking  consortium.  The  project  loan  was  based  upon 
anticipated  returns  from  the  NWS  development,  as  opposed to  a  traditional 
balance  sheet assessment of company  assets  and cash flows  (see 6.2.4).  In 
general  terms  the  scale  and  structure  of capital funding required for 
large  scale  multinational  resource projects necessitates the  involvement 
of  international  financiers  with  the  strong asset backing necessary to 
cover  any  acceptable  risk.  Figure  9  shows  this group of institutions 
operating  at  world  level,  with direct connections  to national banks  and 
financial  institutions.  There  is  also  a  less  direct  linkage  with 
multinational  competitors  of  the  joint  venture  participants,  foreign 304 
governments  and  international  suppliers.  These  links  may  be direct 
through  commercial  contracts  or  more  tenuous  in  nature;  however  any 
detailed  description  of  the  form  they take is beyond  the  scope  of this 
study. 
As  is  the  case  with the  conceptual map  (Sections VI  and VII), 
the  second  rank  of  organisations  in the network  included key  government 
departments,  banks  and  financial  institutions  and  relevant unions.  A 
direct  connection  is  indicated  between  the  government  agencies  and  the 
national  banks  who  in the  case of the  larger clearing institutions will be 
a  major  source  of capital,  guilds  and bonds  for  government projects. 
A  series  of  more  indirect  links  is  indicated  between  the 
national  banks  and  financial  institutions,  national competitors  for  the 
joint  venture  participant,  the unions  and national suppliers of materials 
and  capital  equipment.  Multinational  competitors  are  assumed  in  a 
majority  of  cases  to have  a  direct link with national competitors  in view 
of  the  oligopolistic  and  vertically  integrated  structure  of  the 
international  petroleum and minerals  industries.  Independent  lobby groups 
are  shown  to have  a  possible connection to  the other organisations listed 
above  as  they  may  draw  funding  or political support  from  any of these 
bodies. 
The  independent  lobby has  grown in importance  in many  democratic 
countries  over  the last decade with the  influence of various  lobby  groups 
evident  in  the  outcome  of  important policy issues.  Key  areas  affected 
include  environmental  protection,  local  industry  participation and the 
siting  of  new  developments.  Stringer  (1980:p5)  covers  the  role of 
political  lobbies  and  interest  groups  within his broad conception of a 
/Project  Multi-organisation/(P.M.O.).  This  represents  a  set or network of 305 
organisations,  notably the client,  contractors,  industry bodies,  political 
lobbies  interest  groups  and  other  external agencies which  can directly 
influence the  development  of a  major construction project  (see 1.4.2). 
The  State  and  local  level  of  the  model  broadly  reflects 
Stringer's  schema  in  terms  of the network of connections  indicated with 
Project  and  Systems  level operations and a  number  of key bodies operating 
at  national level.  No  detail has been provided in the boxes  in respect of 
the  wide variation in State/local infrastructure in different areas.  (The 
conceptual  map  provides  a  case illustration of Western Australian State 
level infrastructure pertaining to the  NWS  project.) 
The  area  below the line marked  'External environment'  comprises 
the  project and systems  levels of the joint venture organisation.  Drawing 
on  Mintzberg  (1979),  the  corporate model  shows  a  'Strategic Apex'  where 
the  major  project planning functions  are  located.  Immediately below this 
is  the  central  project organisation which coordinates  the  development of 
the  project in accordance with the broad planning  framework  established at 
the Strategic Apex. 
In  many  cases  there  will  be  no  clear hierarchical division 
between  the  functions  located  at  these  levels which are controlled by 
senior  executives.  The  strategic  planning  function  will normally be 
located  in  the  upper  echelons  of the joint venture project organisation. 
However,  high level strategy will also be directly influenced by the world 
level,  central  operations,  of  the  various  multinational joint venture 
participants  and  the  operational  strategies  implemented by the project 
managers.  World  level influences  on corporate planning and strategy are 
discussed  in  5.2,  5.3  and  6.2.3  with  regard  to  the North West  Shelf 
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The  concept  of  'operational  strategies'  is  drawn  from  Quinn 
(1980),  who  argues  that high level strategy is built in increments  from  a 
series  of  lower level operational strategies which are used to coordinate 
internal organisational functions  and programmes. 
Drawing  on  Quinn  (1980)  and  Palia  and Hitt  (1982)  it can be 
argued  that  in  the  case  of  multinational  joint  venture  project 
organisations  strategic  planning  is influenced and adjusted according to 
i)  Directives  from  the  World  level,  central  operations  of  the 
multinational  joint venture participants,  ii) Direct feedback  from project 
managers  and  systems  planners  responsible  for  coordinating  project 
development  on  a  day  to  day  basis,  iii)  A variety of pressures  from 
governmental  and  independent  organisations  operating  in  the  external 
environment of the project organisation. 
In  order  to plan effectively and ensure efficient operation and 
coordination  of  systems  level  or  technical functions  the joint venture 
project  organisation  requires  a  number  of  support  units.  These are 
indicated  in  the  model  as  Policy/Legal negotiators,  public relations  and 
research  and development  and seen as  'boundary spanning'  units.  According 
to  Thompson  (1967:p70)  'boundary  spanning'  functions  are those parts of 
the.  organisation  which  form  an  interface with the external environment 
either by monitoring or trying to  implement  change .. 
In  the  model  the  research  and  development  function draws  in 
information  from  the  external  environment  and  uses  it to  improve  the 
quality of  'Project systems'  and advance planning objectives  (see 2.3.3). 
The  public  relations function is normally designed to project a 
specific  image  of  the  project  and  the  participant-companies  into  a 
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manipulate  the  environment  by  negotiating  with government  departments, 
competitors,  suppliers,  unions  and other  independent bodies  on  a  variety 
of  legal,  fiscal  and planning issues.  In essence  the  schema presented in 
the  model  follows  the  ideas  of business policy writers,  notably Johnston 
and  Scholes  (1984:p58)  who  state that  "The  organisation is not passive in 
its  interaction  with  the  environment,  it influences  and is  influenced by 
the  environment"  and  organisational theorists like Mintzberg  (1979)  who, 
in  consideration  of the work of Thompson  (1967)  cites that  "Organisations 
also  seek  to  dominate  their  environments  by  fixing  prices,  creating 
cartels  and  integrating  themselves  vertically  (becoming  their  own 
suppliers  and  customers)  (Mintzberg  (1979:p22».  Mintzberg's  comment  is 
given  particular  poignancy  when  considered  in  the  context  of  the 
international petroleum and minerals  sector. 
The  final  section  of the model  which  requires brief comment  is 
the  chronology  or  time  scale  shown  at  the  bottom  of  the page.  It 
indicates  two  important features  which relate to  the strategic planning of 
large  scale  petroleum  and  minerals  development  projects.  Firstly it 
mentions  a  construction  period  of two  to  five years  (the latter extreme 
being  the  most  representative  for  large scale multinational projects). 
The  operational  period  cannot be stated in view of the vast variation in 
reserves,  extraction  and processing rates  and market  demand  found between 
different  resource projects.  Following Quinn  (1980)  it can be  argued that 
operational  or functional  strategies will influence  and be  influenced by  a 
number  of  technical  contingencies  relating  to  materials,  construction 
schedules,  operations  and  ongoing  maintenance.  The  relative success  or 
failure  of  these  lower  level incremental plans  can then be used to  inform 
higher level longer  term strategic planning. 308 
However,  in  accordance  with  the  mainstream  business  policy 
writers,  notably  Hofer  and  Schendel  (1978)  and Palia and Hitt  (1982)  the 
influence  of  external  organisations  on joint venture policy and strategy 
remains  the major  feature highlighted in the  model. 309 
8.4.  Conclusions  and Recommendations  for  Further Research 
The  recapitulation  and model  presented in the previous  sections 
have,  in  effect,  covered the final  stages  in the  theoretical development 
of  this  thesis.  A  series of themes  have been explored in the  preceding 
chapters  and  encompassed  within  a  broad conceptual  framework.  However, 
the  remit for  these final pages must  include both theoretical and thematic 
concerns  in consideration of three main points: 
(i)  "How  important  was  the  thesis  as  an historical commentary  and 
case  study  of  major  planning and policy decisions  relating to 
the North West  Shelf Natural  Gas  project?" 
(ii)  "In  what  ways  could  the methodology,  conceptual  framework  and 
(iii) 
model  employed  in  the  thesis  contribute  to  future  studies  of 
corporate policy with major multinational  resource projects?" 
"What  lessons  and  topics  for  future  research have  emerged  from 
the thesis?" 
These  points  are  covered in four  subsections starting with 8.4.1 
which  considers  the  significance  of  the  thesis  as  a  major  case  study 
examining  corporate  policy  associated  government  policy  and  the 
development  of a  large scale multinational petroleum project. 
8.4.1.  The  significance of the  thesis  as  a  NWS  case  study 
In  broad  terms  this  study  is  of  some  importance  for  three 
principal reasons  outlined below: 
(i)  The  North  West  Shelf project presented a  unique  opportunity to 
study  the relationship between  two  host  governments  (Federal  and 
State)  and  a  multinational  joint venture  consortium seeking  to 
develop  a  fully  integrated  petroleum  exploration production, 
pro~essing and marketing/distribution project 310 
Similar  types  of  study  have  been  conducted in the past by  a 
number  of  writers in the  fields  of Business  Policy,  notably by  Doz  (1982) 
and  Summer  (1980),  Economics  Gray  (1976)  and Political Science  Doern and 
Toner  (1985)  and  Patton  (1973).  However,  only  Patton's  thesis  on 
government- business  relations in the  Canadian petroleum industry touched 
on  several  of  the  key  issues  raised in the North West  Shelf study.  His 
work  also  employed  a  similar methodology which was  able  to  account  for  the 
highly  political  nature  of  studies  examining  multinational  corporate 
policy in the  resources  sector  (see 1.4). 
Patton's  study  touched  upon  an  area  which  has  to  a  certain 
extent  been ignored by economists  and political scientists  - the  interface 
between  public  and  corporate  (private sector)  policy.  This  area,  which 
was  a  focal  point  in  the current study,  is of particular importance in 
relation  to  large  scale  resource  developments.  The  North West  Shelf 
project  was  a  case  in  point  where  the  Australian  government  in the 
pre-1980  period  and  more  notably  the West Australian government  in the 
period  1977  to  1985,  employed  a  number  of  statutory instruments  and 
agencies  to  regulate,  co-ordinate  and  oversee  the  development  of the 
project  (see  Chapter 4). 
The  second  point  supporting  a  'raison d'etre'  for  the  study, 
related to  the political considerations  outlined above. 
(ii)  The  sheer  scale  of capital investment required and high levels 
of  multinational  representation  within the corporate structure 
of  the  North West  Shelf project organisation.  ensured that from 
the  outset  the  development  of the project would have widespread 
political  and  economic  repercussions  within  Australia  and 
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The  political  and  economic  impact  of  the  North  West  Shelf 
project  within Western Australia and Australia presented itself as  a  prime 
topic  for  study.  However,  in view of the  two  conventional costfbenefit 
type  economic  analyses  already  conducted  in  this area  (Bambrick 1977; 
Brown  and Copeland 1985)  the major  focal point of the current study turned 
to  the  political  sphere.  Economic  factors  were  however  widely 
incorporated  into  an  analytical  framework which placed joint venture  and 
governmental  policy  decisions  within  a  wider  political  and  economic 
context. 
(iii)  The  study provides  the first comprehensive historical account of 
the  planning  and  development  of  the North West  Shelf project 
1973  to  1986  and also  employed  a  unique  conceptual  framework  to 
examine  key  influences  on  JVP  policy over specific  'critical' 
periods between September  1980  and July 1985 
The  historical  account  presented  in  the  thesis  ran from  the 
Introduction  through  Chapters  one,  four,  six,  seven  and eight.  This 
descriptive  component  of  the  thesis  was  structured within an holistic 
analytical  framework  which  was  in  turn used to  examine relevant public 
policy  and  JVP  corporate  policy  within  a  broad political and  economic 
context  over  a  set period of time  (see  Chapter  1  +  8.3  (Allison 1971)  an 
analysis  of unfolding events). 
8.4.2.  The  thesis:  theoretical and methodological contributions 
Although  the  three  points  outlined above  support  the  idea that 
the  study  has  both  topical  and original content in general  terms,  it is 
important  to reiterate the contribution to  theory and methodology outlined 
in  Chapter  1.  In view of the multidisciplinary nature of the work it is 
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discipline  (i.e.  economics,  political science etc.).  In this  case it is 
more  straightforward  to  state  that  (i)  "The  methodology,  t,heoretica1 
framework  and  conceptual  schema  developed  in this  study have helped to 
bridge  the  conceptual  gap  between several  groups  of writers whose  work is 
concerned  with complex organisations  and  the  study of corporate policy and 
strategy  (see 1.3  and 1.4). 
The  conceptual  schema which  supported the model presented in 8.2 
was  based  on  development  of  a  number  of ideas previously employed by  a 
range  of writers  from  several disciplines.  These  include Mintzberg  (1979) 
and  Thompson  (1967)  organisation theory,  Johnston and Scholes  (1984)  and 
Palia  and  Hitt  et  al  (1982)  business  policy/strategy  studies  and 
economists  with  a  political economy  slant notably Odell  (1981)  and Patton 
(1973). 
(It  should  be noted that only the construct presented in 8.2  is 
referred  to  as  'The Model'.  The  series of preceding diagrams  (I-VII)  are 
viewed  as  a  sectioned plan supported by  a  broad conceptual  schema.  When 
applied  for  analytical  purposes  this was  referred to  as  the  'Conceptual 
Map') . 
The  Methodology  employed in the  thesis  showed originality in the 
sense  that  it  was  predicated On  a  rejection of some  of the more  popular 
approaches  for  the  study of organisational structure  and process  commonly 
taught  to  management  students  in  Australia  and  the  U.S.A.  A prime 
contention  of  the  thesis  stems  from purely pragmatic considerations,  i.e. 
that  'Any  large scale multinational  joint venture project operating within 
the  petroleum  or  minerals  industry  will be  controlled by  an inherently 
political  organisation  operating  in  a  highly  politicised environment. 
This  factor  should  be  acknowledged  by  any  independent researcher 
wishing  to  study key  corporate policies or organisational processes. 313 
Many  conventional  organisational  analyses  examining  corporate 
processes  and  policy,  start  with  the  assumption that questionnaires  or 
codifiable  interview  questions  can be  used to  generate  a  certain quantity 
and  quality  of  information.  This  information  is  then  collated and 
analysed  to  present  profiles  of organisational structure and processes, 
some  of  which  may  be  directly  associated  with  company  policy  and 
strategy.  In  keeping  with the point highlighted above it can be  argued 
that:  "Whilst  empirical  approaches  based  on  statistical measures  of 
validity  have  clear  application  in  certain  areas  of  organisational 
studies.  they  cannot  normally be  applied when  examining corporate policy 
and  processes  within  complex.  highly  political  multinational 
organisations."  This  thesis  seeks  to  advance  the  case for  the use  of  a 
less  rigid exploratory approach based on gradual  refinement of information 
when  studying  complex organisations  operating within a  highly politicised 
environment. 
8.4.3.  Applications  for  the model  and conceptual  schema 
In  support  of  the  argument  that  both  the multidisciplinary 
theoretical  framework  and  methodology  employed in this study have wider 
application  in  the  areas  outlined above,  it is necessary to  consider the 
potential  contribution  of  the  model  and supporting conceptual  schema  to 
future  'policy'  and to  a  lesser degree  'organisational'  studies. 
In  summary  the  main  applications  for  the major  concepts  and 
model  developed in the  thesis were  as  follows: 
(i)  The  basic visual and  conceptual  framework  presented in the  model 
provides  a  starting  point for  future mUltidisciplinary studies 
of business  or public policy 
The  unique  contribution  of  this  model  to  the  disciplines 
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of  organisational  theory,  public policy and business policy/strategy into 
one  conceptual  framework.  This  is supported by the visual detail which 
outlines  the  network of connections  which link the principal organisation 
to  a  series  of  other  governmental  and  independent organisations  in its 
external  environment.  Structural detail from  the  'Project Organisations' 
internal  environment  is  also  shown.  As  such the model  serves  to bridge 
the  gap  between  conventional  organisational  theorists  and the business 
policy writers  (see  Chapter 1). 
(ii)  The  model  provides  an  holistic,  hierarchically  arranged 
reference map  for policy makers  and corporate strategists 
The  original conceptual map  provided a  useful means  to  study the 
major  external organisational  influences  on JVP  policy over  a  given period 
of  time.  The  model  represented an extension of the  generalisable features 
of  the  conceptual  map  which  had  application  for  the  study of other 
multinational resource based joint venture projects. 
Through  application  of  the basic visual  framework  of the model 
and  key  concepts  developed  in  this  study,  corporate  and  government 
planners  should  be  able  to  build  a  picture  of  key  organisational 
influences  on  the  policies  of a  given joint venture project organisation 
over  specific  periods  of time.  It should also be possible to  employ  the 
basic  steps  used  to  build the  NWS  study Conceptual Map,  to  construct an 
inter-organisational  network for  other multinational minerals  or petroleum 
projects. 
The  model  and  supporting  schema  can  therefore  be  used as  a 
planning  aid  and  a  starting  point  for  the  construction of strategic 
scenarios.  The  planner  could  use  the  model  and conceptual  schema  to 
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specified  'joint  venture  project  organisation'.  These  independent  and 
governmental  organisations  could  then  be  designated as  'known  variables~ 
J 
whose  influence  on the strategies of the joint venture project operatives 
could  be  gauged within a  given scenario.  This  combination of economic  and 
political  influences  could  then be  incorporated into  a  series of broader 
scenarios  examining  macroeconomic  outcomes  in  key  international  and 
domestic  market  sectors.  These  applications  are necessarily general in 
nature  and  would  require  adaption  to  suit  specific  case  studies  and 
further  development  to  go  beyond  basic first generation scenarios  into 
more  detailed  second  generation  scenarios.  First generation scenarios 
normally  take  the  form  of  a  simple  framework  encompassing  a  series of 
variables  and  possible outcomes.  This  type  of scenario is normally broad 
and  unspecific  in  nature  and  designed  as  a  stimulus  for management 
thought.  Over  time  as  certain possibilities become  'highly probable'  or 
'highly  unlikely'  these  can  be  developed  by  planners  into  more 
sophisticated  second  generation scenarios.  Th0  latter have been employed 
throughout  the  seventies  and  eighties by  'Shell U.K.'  and  'S.I.P.M.'  as 
key  tools  for  planning projects  and operations at every level within the 
massive  'Shell International'  corporate network  (see Wack  1985). 
8.4.4.  Thesis  lessons  and  recommendations  for  future  research 
In  this  brief  concluding section it is useful  to  draw upon  the 
'critical  events'  highlighted  in Chapters  6  and  7  to  illustrate some  key 
points  or lessons which have  emerged  from  the  study. 
The  first  'event'  or  string of events  examined were  the  three 
delays  of  the proposed start up  date  for  LNG  exports  from  the  NWS  project 
to  Japan.  In many  respects  these  delays  were  simply  a  reflection of the 
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commonly  afflict  large  scale engineering projects.  However,  when viewed 
in  the  context of high level corporate strategy and the  bargain~ng process 
which  was  being  undertaken  with  the  Japanese  government  and  power 
utilities,  these  delays  were  illustrative  of  the  key  role  of  the 
international  network  in  shaping  project  planning  and  development at 
ground level. 
In  the  case  of  the  1982  and 1983  postponement,  macroeconomic 
factors  relating  to  the  World  and Asia-Pacific markets  for oil and LNG, 
were  crucial  in  influencing the decision on  the part of the Japanese  and 
ultimately  the  JVPs  to push back the  scheduled start up  date for  the  LNG 
programme. 
International  market  forces  affecting  oil  and  LNG  prices  and 
demand  were  also  significant  in  initiating  the  final postponement in 
1984.  However  intramural  politics  based on the corporate relationship 
between  Shell  BHP  and  Woodside  Petroleum proved to be  the major factor 
influencing  this decision to  delay  the  commencement  for  exports  from April 
1988  to  October  1989.  Internal politics within the  NWS  joint venture  and 
ongoing  negotiations  with  the  Japanese  and  WA  governments  over  the 
Domestic  gas  and  LNG  export contracts  continued to  shape  JVP  policy until 
April  1985.  At  the  end  of  this month  Shell  and  BHP  had successfully 
bought  out  Woodside  Petroleum's  stake in the  NWS  joint venture by gaining 
a  controlling interest in the  company  and its subsidiary Woodside  Offshore 
Petroleum,  the  operator for  the  NWS  project.  One  month prior to  this  the 
original  SECWA/JVP  Sales  and Purchase Agreement had undergone  considerable 
revision  following  three  months  of negotiations between the JVPs,  the  WA 
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The  events  listed above  are all illustrative of a  central lesson 
derived  from  this  study  notably:  "Corporate  policy  relating  to  a 
multinational  joint  venture  project organisation should be viewed  from  a 
broad political and economic perspective." 
Following this it can be  stated that: 
"Corporate  policy and strategy at project level will normally be 
subject  to  political  and  economic  pressures  emanating  from 
within  an  interorganisational  network  of  which multinational 
petroleum  proj ects  will  form  an integral part"  (see 8.3.1.  the 
Model). 
This  point  is  often  ignored  in  traditional economic  models  of project 
planning  which  appear  to  work  on  the  implicit assumption that policy is 
devised and  implemented in a  political vacuum. 
Another  key point which has  emerged  from this study is that  "Any 
host  government  drawing  upon  offshore  capital  and  multinational 
participation  to  develop  a  national resource,  must  take  every  reasonable 
measure  to  ensure  maximum  returns  to  the nation offset against profit 
incentives  for  joint  venture participants."  This  responsibility extends 
to  ensuring  that  the  political  power  of  the  incoming  joint venture 
participants  does  not  supercede  that of the host  government  and  domestic 
participants. 
There  have  been a  number  of instances  throughout  the history of 
the  North  West  Shelf  project  where  the joint venture participants have 
used  various  means  ranging  from  superior  negotiation skills to  covert 
political  action  in  order to  defeat the  Federal  or WA  governments  on key 
policy  issues.  Notable  examples  include:  (i)  The  climb  down  by the 
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projects;  (ii)  The  associated tax concessions  for  the  NWS  venturers;  (iii) 
Closed  door negotiations  on  the  Dampier-Wagerup  pipeline contracts  and  the 
Domestic  gas  Sales  and Purchase  agreements;  (iv)  The  invisibility of the 
F.I.R.B.  and  WA  government  during the period when  the Woodside  board were 
attempting  to  fight off the  Shell/BHP  takeover  (ref.  Chapters  4,  6,  7). 
The  Shell/BHP  takeover  of  Woodside  Petroleum  serves  as  an 
example  of  the  dominant  role which  an  incoming multinational  can assume 
within  the  management  structure  of  a  major project if measures  are not 
taken  to  protect domestic participants.  In effect "Contractual and legal 
measures  should be  established at the outset of a  joint venture project to 
ensure  that  dominant  foreign  based  multinationals  cannot undermine  the 
position of domestic participants." 
In  conclusion  it  is  worthy  of note  that if the  two  Australian 
Federal  governments  in  office  during  the period 1975  to  1985  had learnt 
any  valuable  lessons  from  the  development  of the  Bass  Straight petroleum 
reserves  (50%  participation  by  u.S.  oil  giant  Exxon)  there was  only 
limited  evidence  of this in their dealings with the North West  Shelf joint 
venturers.  At State level the  WA  government are  now  postured to  reap  the 
benefits  of  both stages of what has  ultimately been a  successful project, 
in  spite  of  past political failings  and  the  SECWA  debt,  which  remains  as 
the  economic  Albatross  in the  State budget  to  this  day. 
Recommendations  for  Future Research 
Three  basic  themes  have  emerged  from  this  thesis which  could be 
usefully  explored  through  future  research  encompassing  the  fields  of 
'Business policy',  'Public policy'  and  'Organisational theory' . 
(i)  The  thesis  demonstrated  the need  to  advance  the  development  of 
multidisciplinary  approaches  to  the  study of corporate policy 319 
relating  to  multinational  resource  projects.  Future  research 
should  place  particular  emphasis  on  the key  interface between 
public and corporate policy. 
(ii)  Further  research is required in the field of Business policy and 
(iii) 
Strategy  examining  host government/multinational relationships. 
Particular  emphasis  should  be  placed  on  the  nature  of the 
multinational  joint  venture,  an  organisational form which has 
become  increasingly  widespread  in  major  resource  projects 
throughout  the world. 
Significant  amounts  of  research are required in the broad area 
of  public  policy  and  legal  frameworks  governing joint-venture 
resource  project  development  and  the  powers  of  incoming 
multinationals. *1 
*2 
*3 
*4 
*5 
*7 
*8 
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ENDNOTES 
Source Alcoa contracts dept.,  Booragoon,  WA  9/2/89. 
Previously  the Dampier  to Wagerup  pipeline.  Extended to  Bunbury 
in 1986. 
Available  for  issue  to  government  and  industry sources  only. 
Copy held Murdoch University. 
One  Terajoule  equals  a  million,  million  joules  (source West 
Australian 8/9/88). 
Peter Dowding  replaced Brian Burke  as  WA  State Premier in 1987. 
At  present  there  are  two  further  LNG  projects  under 
consideration  in  Australia.  The  Bonaparte Gulf project and the 
Gorgon  development. 
Indonesia's  annual  contracted exports  to  the Asia-Pacific market 
was  raised from 18.3  MTPA  (1986)  to  18.9  MTPA  in 1987  by  the  new 
Chubu  contract. 
The  subsea  completion  well, 
the  third  production  facility 
Schedule:  see Woodside  May  1985. 
North Rankin  'B'  was  scheduled as 
in  the  1985  Project Planning 321 
APPENDIX  I 
THE  PHYSICAL  AND  FINANCIAL  PROFILE  OF  THE  PROJECT 
A.  PHYSICAL  COMPONENTS  OF  THE  PROJECT 
The  major  physical  components  for both phases  of the  NWS  project 
Phase  I  (Domestic)  supplying natural gas  to  the W.A.  market  and  Phase  II 
(LNG)  exporting  1iquified  natural  gas  to  Japan,  can  be  described as 
follows: 
(i)  The  North Rank  'A'  drilling and production platform. 
(ii)  Two  proposed  additional  platforms,  Goodwyn  and North Rankin  'B' 
currently scheduled for  commissioning  in 1991  and  the year  2000. 
(iii)  A  1016  mm  (40")  submarine pipeline connecting North Rankin  'A'  and 
eventually  Goodwyn  and North Rankin  'B'  to  the  gas  processing plant 
at Withne11  Bay  on the  Burrup  Peninsula. 
(iv)  A  gas  treatment plant comprising  two  domestic  gas  trains currently 
in  operation,  three condensate stabilisation trains currently under 
construction  and  three  LNG  trains,  the first of which is scheduled 
for  completion in 1989,  a  second in 1991,  with  a  third due  to start 
up  in 1993  (Woodside,  May  1985,  updated February 1987). 
(v)  The  1500  km  Dampier-Wagerup  natural  gas  pipeline constructed by  the 
State Energy  Commission of Western Australia. 
With  all  the major work  on  the Domestic  phase  completed  (May  1987) 
the  outstanding  work  on  the  LNG  export phase  to be  finished prior to peak 
deliveries  of  LNG  to  Japan scheduled for  1995  amounts  to: 
(i)  Ongoing  construction of the  LNG  plant. 
(ii)  Creation  of port facilities for  the  seven  LNG  tankers  servicing the 
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(iii)  Additional work  camps  and housing. 
(iv)  Construction  of the  Goodwyn  platform with detailed design, for  North 
Rankin  'B'  initiated. 
(v)  Building  seven  LNG  tankers.  The  Woodside  Shipping Group  has  now 
selected  the  contractors  to  build  5  out  of  a  total  of  7 
125,000  m3  capacity ships  (see  Section B). 
The  North  Rankin  'A'  drilling and production platform will supply 
all  the  gas  for both phases  of the project until Goodwyn  is commissioned 
in  1993.  Tests  on  the  Goodwyn  field have  revealed a  higher condensate 
yield  from  the  gas  produced at North Rankin  'A',  a  factor which  encouraged 
the  joint  venturers  to  develop  Goodwyn  some  30  km  to  the  South West  of 
North  Rankin  'A'  prior  to  a  second platform in the North Rankin field. 
Condensate  currently  being  produced  from  North Rankin  'A'  gas  is readily 
saleable  for  production  of  motor  spirit  in  the  domestic  market  and 
provides  an  important  boost  to  the  joint  venturers  cash  flow  in the 
pre-production stages  of the  LNG  export phase. 
Gas  produced  from  the North Rankin  'A'  field was  first supplied to 
the  South  West  of  Western  Australia  in  August  1984 when  the  1500  km 
Dampier-Wagerup  pipeline was  commissioned.  Since  that time  the  SECWA  have 
constructed  a  series  of laterals supplying domestic  and commercial users 
in  Perth and  the  South West  (see  SECWA  1986).  Although provision was  made 
in  the  original  pipeline budget for  the  extension of additional laterals 
to  industrial users  in the Pilbara region,  current  indicators  suggest  that 
the  Pilbara  market  will continue  to represent only  a  small proportion of 
total demand  for  NWS  gas  in the  late eighties  (see  3.3.3). 
The  LNG  processing plant is  scheduled to be  brought into operation 
in  mid  1989  prior  to  the first deliveries  of LNG  to Japan in October  of 323 
that  year.  Deliveries  at that stage  should amount  to  some  4  mpta  rising 
to  a  peak level of  6  mpta  in 1993  (Woodside,  May  1985). 
Estimated  recoverable  reserves  for  the  larger Woodside  fields  on 
the  North West  Shelf can be  summarised as  follows: 
TABLE  7 
ESTIMATED  RECOVERABLE  HYDROCARBON  RESERVES: 
NWS  (WOODSIDE  PERMITS) 
90%  probability of discovery  Gas  (109m3)  Condensate 
(106KL) 
North Rankin  188.5  20.7 
(currently in production) 
Goodwyn  Main  1.00  70.60  14.30 
Goodwyn  North  36.50  18.60 
Goodwyn  South  1. 60 
(Currently undeveloped. 
Goodwyn  platform scheduled to 
commence  production 1993.) 
(Woodside  May  1985) 
Angel  14.90  4.40 
(May  be  developed post  2000.) 
*  Source:  Dept.  of  Mines,  Petroleum in Western Australia,  January 
1988. 
B.  CAPITAL  INVESTMENT  AND  LABOUR  INPUT 
In  may  1985  the  "DRD"  issued  an estimate of total construction 
costs  for  the  NWS  project including  LNG  shipping.  The  figure was  set at 
$11  billion  (in  May  1985  dollars)  split $2,100  for  the  Domestic phase  to 
$8,900  million  for  the  LNG  export phase  (DRD  May  1985).  These  figures 
represented  a  considerable  escalation  on  figures  issued by Woodside  in 
1980  which  stood  at $5,000 million  (1980  dollars)  rising to  a  final  cost 324 
of  $8,000  million  (in  1992  dollars).  (1988  figure  $12  billion in 1988 
dollars.)  (Petroleum in WA  January 1988). 
In  view  of the  sharp  decline  in the value  of the Australian dollar 
in  1986,  which  was  not  anticipated  by  the  1985  estimates  and  the 
possibility  of other cost overruns it is likely that the total cost of the 
project  will rise above  the  1985  figure.  This  possibility is  increased by 
the  fact  that  no  firm  estimates  are currently available regarding  the 
final  cost  of  constructing  the  seven  LNG  carriers.  An  August  1985 
estimate  issued  to  the  West  Australian  media  placed the  figure at $2 
current  estimates  range  from  $1.6-2 billion  (WA  Dept.  of Mines,  Petroleum 
WA  January 1988.)  Five  shipbuilding contracts have  currently been awarded 
to  a  Mitsui/Mitsubishi/Kawasaki  consortium  by  the  Woodside  shipping 
group.  Another  two  contracts  are  likely  to  follow  taking Japanese 
commitment  to  shipping,  port  handling  and  LNG  storage facilities  to  $5 
billion  (see  DRP  Prospect,  December  1987),  (Dept.  of Mines,  Petroleum in 
WA  January 1988.) 
The  financing  of  the  other  major  component  of the project,  the 
Dampier-Wagerup  pipeline  is  being  undertaken  by  the  State  Energy 
Commission  of Western Australia.  In 1983  total construction costs  for  the 
main  pipeline  and planned laterals was  set at $926  million in 1983  dollars 
(WA  Govt.  October  1983).  This has  since blown out to  $1.1 billion  (West 
Australian Sept.  5th 1988). 
Figures  produced by  the  DRD  in May  1985  provided a  broad profile of 
estimated  employment  levels  for  the  NWS  project over  the  construction 
period  for  the  Domestic  gas  phase.  In January  1981  the  number  of people 
directly  employed  on  the  project  stood  at 1,500  climbing  to  a  peak of 
5,100  in  mid  1982.  This  fell  to  approximately  2,600  employees  as 325 
construction  work  on  the  domestic  gas  plant  neared completion in mid 
1984.  Proj ections  for  total direct labour  input for  Phase  II, plant and 
infrastructure  construction  suggest  that  a  new peak workforce  level of 
4,500  will  be  reached at the  end of 1988.  The  level of direct employment 
on  the  project  is  anticipated  to  remain  in  excess  of 3,000 workers 
throughout  the  seven  year  construction phase  from  1986  to 1993.  (These 
figures  do  not  include  spin off work  in fabrication shops  and  lower  level 
subcontract  and  service  jobs.)  (DRD  May  1985).  (DRD  Prospect December 
1987) . 327 
private  company,  Associated  Pipelines  Ltd.,  owns  the  pipeline  which 
transports  gas  drawn  from  a  number  of  small  fields  in the  Roma  area. 
Supplies  from  this area may  be  augmented  in the  future  by  South Australian 
fields  in  the  Cooper  Basin  or  gas  fields  in the  Denison trough which 
adjoins  the Roma/Surat  Basin producing area  (Erskine 1985:p.8l). 
The  Perth  metropolitan  market  and  a  number  of major  end users  in 
the  South  West  of  Western  Australia  are  supplied  from  the  Dampier 
processing  plant  owned  by  the  NWS  joint venturers,  through  the  1.500 km 
SECWA  pipeline.  Spur  lines have been completed to  Bunbury,  Kwinana  and 
Pinjarra  (SECWA,  1984,  Annual  Report). 
The  simplified  picture  presented  above  does  not account  for  the 
processing  and  distribution  of  natural  gas  products  like LPG  and  LNG. 
Although  the processing of these products  in Australia takes place as part 
of  the  same  integrated operation,  which produces  treated gas  for piping to 
end  users,  the  distribution  and  marketing  of  LPG  and  LNG  follows 
distinctly different patterns  from piped natural gas. 
(i)  The  integrated  operation  referred  to  usually  involves  the 
processing  of  raw  gas  to  remove  heavier fractions  like ethane  and 
propane  for  the  production  of  LPG  or alcohol  fuels.  Gas  direct 
from  the  wellhead  may  also  yield  significant  quantities  of 
condensate  which  is extracted and  sold as  a  light crude  oil.  Once 
sizeable  proportions  of  propane,  ethane  and other gases have been 
removed  from  the  gas  mix,  the  gas  can be  treated and piped to  the 
distributor.  If  an  LNG  system is incorporated into  the plant the 
Methane  levels  are  adjusted  to between  90  and  95%  and  the  gas  is 
liquified  through  cooling  to  -162oC  (Woodside,  May  1985)  (Drake 
and Reid,  1977). 328 
(ii)  Distribution  and  marketing  of  LPG  takes  place  through similar 
channels  to  those  for  oil products.  LPG  is produced  i,n  both gas 
processing  plants  and oil refineries  (as  a  by-product of oil);  thus 
several  major  multinationals,  notably  Mobil,  Shell  and  Esso  are 
involved  with  the  distribution and sales  of LPG  to  the Australian 
domestic  market.  Other  major  distributors  who  supply  retail 
outlets  throughout  the  country include  CIG,  Boral  and Wesfarmers. 
Exports  of  LPG  are  currently underway  from  the  Bass  Straight and 
the  Cooper  Basin to  the Japanese market  (Erskine,  1985:p62-66). 
The  high  capital commitment  involved by both buyer  and seller,  and 
the  unique  nature of LNG  markets  and associated technology,  distinguishes 
the  distribution  pattern  for  the product  from  LPG  and oil products.  At 
the  present  moment  no  LNG  is  exported  from  Australia or  consumed  in 
commercial  quantities  in  the  domestic  gas  market.  However,  when  exports 
begin  (scheduled October  1989)  from  the  NWS,  the distribution network will 
run  from  Dampier  to  receiving  terminals  servicing utilities in Tokyo, 
Nagoya,  Osaka,  Hiroshima  and Kyushu  (Woodside,  May  1985:p20). 329 
APPENDIX  III 
SECTION  A  THE  CODING  SYSTEM  FOR  THE  INSTITUTIONAL  MAP 
The  coding  system set out below was  designed to present information 
on  the  corporate  structure and external  environment of the joint venture 
organisation  which  could  not  be  shown  in the  schematic  diagrams  which 
comprise  the  conceptual  schema.  The  system provides  information on  two 
separate  areas:  (i)  Linkages:  Brown,  Red  and Blue  lines  are used to 
distinguish  between  the  various  corporate  and  commercial  linkages which 
connect  the  key organisations within the  JVP  decision making  environment; 
(ii)  Nodes  (organisations  or  institutions):  Black and Purple  lines are 
used  to distinguish between different organisations or institutions in the 
network.  The  border  of  each box depicting an organisation is  coded to 
indicate  how  strong  its influence was  on JVP  planning during  the  1977/85 
(Domestic  Phase)  and  1985/87  (LNG  phase). 
1.  LINKAGES 
Integral Linkage 
(Brown):  Private  sector  or  independent  organisations  which  are 
connected  through  a  parent  company  subsidiary 
relationship  or are directly linked through joint venture 
participation in the  NWS  project. 
Primary Linkage 
(Red):  Government  agencies  and  independent  organisations which 
have  a  large  number  of  overlapping  primary 
responsibilities  relating  to  the planning,  coordination 
and/or  regulation  of  various  key  areas  of  the  NWS 
project. 330 
Secondary Linkage 
(Blue) :  i)  State  and  Federal  agencies  and  independ~nt bodies 
which  must  liaise  and  cooperate  on  a  number  of 
legislative  and  commercial  issues  relating to  the 
NWS  proj ect. 
ii)  Independent  bodies  and State instrumentalities who 
Tertiary Linkage 
share  overlapping  interests  by virtue of a  direct 
contractual relationship with the  JVPs. 
(Broken Blue):  Organisations  which  individually may  have  exerted a 
significant  influence  on  the policies of the joint 
2.  NODES 
venturers  but  are  connected  by  corporate  or 
commercial  relationships  which  have  only  minor 
relevant  to  the  planning  and  development of the 
North West  Shelf project. 
The  colour  of  each  border  indicates  the relative status of each 
organisation  within  the  JVP  decision  making  environment  over  a 
specified  period  of  time.  Changes  in colour reflect a  change  in 
this  status.  A  broken  line  denotes  a  reduction  in  an 
organisation's  status  or  influence  over  JVP  policy.  The  status 
ascribed  to  each  organisation  is based on  the perceptions  of the 
State  I  and II interview respondents. 
Primary  Importance 
(Black):  An  organisation of central  importance  to  the planning  and 
development  of  the  NWS  project over  the  specified period 
of time. 331 
Secondary  Importance 
(Purple):  An  organisation  which  can exert  a  direct  inf~uence over 
the  JVP  planning process: 
i)  Government  agencies  which  must  be  consulted 
throughout  the  planning and ongoing  development  of 
the  project.  These  have  the  power  to veto  or 
ratify  proposals  relating  to  finance,  exports, 
environmental  issues,  planning  and  other  major 
commercial  or legal concerns. 
ii)  Private  sector  or  independent  bodies  which  can 
exert  a  significant influence  over  the planning of 
the  project  and  whose  cooperation must be  sought 
when  operationalising these plans. 
Tertiary Importance 
(Broken Purple Line) 
i)  Government  agencies  or  independent bodies  which are 
perceived  by  the  respondents  to  exert  a  weak or 
indirect  influence  over  JVP  planning  of the  NWS 
project. 
ii)  In  the  transparency  for  Section  VII,  the broken 
line  may  also  denote  agencies  or  independent bodies 
which  exerted  a  significant  influence  over  JVP 
planning  for  Phase  I  but have little influence  on 
plans  for  Phase  II. 
*  Note:  Acetates  enclosed separately. 332 
SECTION  B  COLOUR  CODING  FOR  VI  AND  VII 
In  Section  A  the  design  and  general  application of the  colour 
coding  system was  explained in some  detail.  The  aim of this subsection is 
to  offer  some  examples  of how  the  colour  coded transparencies  can be used 
to  supplement  the  existing information on key  organisations  and linkages 
shown  in  VI  and  VII.  The  principal examples  cited will be  at project 
level  as  an  exhaustive  description  of  colour  coding applied at other 
levels would retrace material presented in Section A. 
Domestic  phase project  - world levels 
Taking  the  example  of  Woodside  and  its  relationship  to  other 
organisations  within the  internal structure of the project,  we  have  Shell, 
BHP,  Caltex  and  BP  outlined  in  black.  This  denotes  each of these 
organisations  as  being  of  central  importance  within  the  JVP  decision 
making  environment  during  the  planning detailed design and construction 
stages  of  the  Domestic  phase.  KJR,  the major  contractor for  this phase, 
is  also  outlined  in  black.  Fluor/Maunsell  and  the  Saipem  ICC  joint 
venture  are  outlined  in  purple  to  show  that  whilst  they  are  of 
considerable  importance  to  the  project as  a  whole,  their activities are 
more  the  concern  of the  State  government  than the joint venturers.  They 
are,  however,  perceived  to  be  of secondary  importance  in terms  of their 
influence  on JVP  decision making. 
Woodside  has  an integral link to all the  other participants  in the 
project  through  the  corporate  structure  of  the  joint  venture 
organisation.  This  type  of  connection  is  shown  as  a  brown  connecting 
line.  BHP  and Shell have  the closest links  due  to  the  43%  shareholding in 
the  company  which  they held prior to April  1985. 333 
KJR  are  not  shown  to  have  an  integral connection to  the joint 
venture  structure but have  a  primary linkage  shown by  a  red  lin~.  The  red 
line  is  assigned  to  show  that KJR  has  overlapping responsibilities with 
Woodside  relating  to  the planning and development  of the North West  Shelf 
project.  Fluor/Maunsell  and  Saipem  ICC  have  a  secondary linkage blue line 
to  Woodside  and  KJR,  and  are  designated  as  organisations which must 
cooperate  when  carrying  out  development work  on specific modules  of the 
North  West  Shelf  project.  They have  a  primary,  red line linkage  to  DRD 
and  SECWA  who  are  the bodies which  appointed Fluor/Maunsell  as  government 
consultant and main contractor on  the  Dampier  to Wagerup  pipeline project. 
LNG  phase project-world level 
The  major  change between the corporate  relationship  shown  to exist 
at  project  level  for  Phase  I  and  Phase  II is  the  entry of MIMI  as  a 
participant  in  the joint venture.  KJR  remains  as  the major  subcontractor 
with  Japanese  Gasoline  shifting from its role of sleeping partner for  the 
Domestic  phase  to  the  chief contractor working  on  the  design of the  LNG 
plant and associated infrastructure  (see 5.3). 
In  transparency  No.2  an  integral  connection,  brown  line,  runs 
between  Japan  Gas  at project level  and  the design operations at Yokohama, 
world  level.  A  broken  blue  line,  indicating a  tertiary connection is 
indicated  between  Japan  Gas,  MITI  and  the Japanese  power utilities  (see 
5.3.3).  This  indicates that whilst they are all organisations which have 
individually  influenced  JVP  policies  at  specified  points  in time,  the 
commercial  and corporate links between  them  do  not hold great significance 
for  the planning of the North West  Shelf. 334 
State,  national  and world level 
Using  the  colour  coding  system  described  in  Section  'A'  the 
transparencies  show  a  visual  representation  of  the  institutional 
relationship  described in 5.2.  The  changes  in the status  or organisations 
and  inter- organisational  linkages  shown when  comparing  Sections VI  and 
VII,  and  the  corresponding  transparencies  (Domestic  phase  1976/85)  (LNG 
phase  1985/86)  are  described in 5,2.2. 335 
FIGURE  10 
KEY  ORGANISATIONS  IN  THE  JVP  DECISION  MAKING  ENVIRONMENT 
10.1  - PHASE  1:  1976/85 
10.2  - PHASE  2:  1985/87 N.W.S.  PHRSEI. 
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APPENDIX  IV 
WESTERN  WORLD  ALUMINIUM  PRICES  1978-1987 
Extract  from  Alcoa Australia,  Annual  Report  1987 
The  aluminium  industry  experienced a  solid recovery in 1987,  with 
world  demand  for  primary  metal  setting  a  new  record.  Prices  for both 
aluminium  and  alumina  were  higher  than  in 1986  - significantly so  for 
metal. 
Alcoa  of  Australia  Limited  responded  to  the  improved  market 
conditions  by  increasing  production  and  shipments  to  the highest levels 
since  the  company's  formation.  Sales  revenue  increased by  38%  to  $1,378 
million,  and net profit after tax was  a  record $150  million. 
The  welcome  improvement  in  the  company's  financial results  came 
after  five  years  of  poor  profitability.  The  main  reasons  for  the 
improvement were better prices  and higher production. 
Western  World  demand  for  primary aluminium in 1987  reached  a  record 
level  of  over  13  million  tonnes.  The  strength  of  demand  exceeded 
expectations,  forcing  inventories  down  and driving prices  (in US  dollars) 
to  the  highest levels for  several years.  The  average metal price in 1987 
measured in Australian dollars was  the highest in the  company's history. 
The  smelting  industry  responded  to  higher  prices by  increasing 
output  and  by  the  end  of  the  year  Western  World  smelters'  average 
operating  rate  had risen to  95%.  Total metal production for  the year  was 
12.6 million tonnes,  up  5%  on  1986. 
The  increase  in  smelter  production  caused  demand  for  alumina  to 
strengthen,  and  refinery  operating  rates rose  to  86%,  the highest level 
for  six  years.  Prices  rose,  although  the rate of increase was  much  less 
than that of metal prices. 339 
The  alumina  market,  which  has  suffered from  a  severe  overhang of 
excess  capacity  since  1982,  has  gradually  regained  a  more  stable 
equilibrium,  as  inefficient  plants  have  been  shut  down  and  demand has 
improved.  In  1988,  demand  should increase strongly in line with metal 
production,  and  should  be  able  to  absorb  the  output from  the  only new 
major  refinery coming  on stream  (in India)  relatively comfortably. Figure II 
ALUMINIUM  PRICE  vs  INVENTORIES 
Quarterly  1978  - 1987 
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APPENDIX  V 
Organogram  for  the Ministry of Economic  Development 
and  Trade  (October  1988). 
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